Files
helm-charts/freesailarr/values.yaml
T
jklein 9cdbe097f6 Qualify the Docker Hub image names, drop the gluetun branding
main qualified five charts' image references in 6c73ef8 on the same day this
chart would otherwise arrive carrying the pattern that was just cleared out.
The seven Docker Hub names now say where they come from: qmcgaw/gluetun, the
five linuxserver.io images and the busybox init image, the last as
docker.io/library/busybox since it is an official image. The three ghcr.io
names were already qualified - checked rather than assumed.

Verified with Renovate 44.41.0 in the official container (RENOVATE_PLATFORM=
local, RENOVATE_DRY_RUN=lookup) that the prefixed form still resolves under the
built-in helm-values manager, since that manager is the only thing keeping
these images updated: it extracts all ten, datasource docker, no skipReason and
no warnings, and returns concrete candidates for eight of them. A control run
against the unqualified form produced byte-identical results, so the prefix
changes nothing about what Renovate offers.

Trivy's trusted-registry check (KSV-0125) drops from ten findings to none, which
is what the registry list in ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml documents as the point
of writing images this way.

Chart metadata: the icon was gluetun's logo and the description opened with a
list of four of the nine projects, both suggesting a "main app" the stack does
not have. The description now names none of them, and the icon field is omitted
rather than filled with another project's logo - every other chart's icon is its
one upstream's, and this chart has no such upstream. helm lint --strict notes
"icon is recommended" as INFO and still exits 0.

Rendered output differs in exactly the seven image prefixes and nothing else.
2026-08-24 15:23:35 +02:00

713 lines
22 KiB
YAML

# freesailarr runs gluetun plus the whole media automation stack in a single
# StatefulSet pod: every app container shares gluetun's network namespace, the
# containers talk to each other over localhost and all traffic leaves through
# the Wireguard tunnel.
#
# Image pinning (documented deviation from the Chart.AppVersion standard):
# NO image tag comes from appVersion. All nine images, gluetun included, are
# pinned here via <app>.image.repository / <app>.image.tag, because the stack
# combines nine independently versioned upstream projects and none of them is
# "the" one app version.
#
# That is also what puts every image under Renovate: the built-in helm-values
# manager reads image.repository/image.tag pairs out of this file and proposes
# one update per image, and ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh bumps the chart version
# along with it. A chart whose main image came from appVersion would instead
# need a hard-coded block in renovate.json5 - freesailarr deliberately has none.
#
# Chart.yaml's appVersion is therefore the chart's own version marker, freely
# chosen and tied to no upstream - not the source of any tag here. Nothing
# rewrites it automatically; raise it by hand when you want to mark a new
# edition of the chart as a whole.
# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false
# Replica count for the whole stack (one pod contains all containers); 0 is
# allowed and scales it down. The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
# More than 1 replica is not meaningful: every replica would run its own
# isolated stack on its own config volumes.
replicas: 1
secrets:
# op:// item path for the gluetun VPN credentials. The 1Password item must
# contain the fields "wireguard-private-key" (the Wireguard private key) and
# "wireguard-addresses" (the Wireguard interface address, e.g. 10.x.y.z/32).
gluetunSecretRef: null
# User/group the linuxserver.io containers drop to after init (their PUID/PGID
# mechanism) and the runAsUser/runAsGroup for the seerr and recyclarr
# containers. Media and config volumes must be writable for this user.
puid: 1000
pgid: 1000
# Timezone for all containers.
timezone: Europe/Zurich
securityContext:
# Pod-level security context. No pod-level runAsNonRoot/runAsUser: the pod
# mixes root containers (gluetun, linuxserver.io images) with non-root ones
# (seerr, recyclarr, flaresolverr); users are set per container instead.
# fsGroup (keep in sync with pgid) makes freshly provisioned config volumes
# group-writable for the non-root containers; fsGroupChangePolicy
# OnRootMismatch avoids recursively re-chowning the (large, shared) media
# claims on every pod start.
pod:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
storage:
# StorageClass for all config volumeClaimTemplates (null = cluster default).
storageClass: null
# Media libraries as pre-existing PVCs (shared with the separately deployed
# Jellyfin) - the chart mounts but never creates them. Each claim is required
# as soon as an app that mounts it is enabled:
# downloads: qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr
# movies: radarr, bazarr
# tv: sonarr, bazarr
#
# subPath mounts a sub-directory of the claim instead of its root (null = the
# claim root, i.e. one claim per category). The same existingClaim may back all
# three categories with different subPaths - one library volume, one
# sub-directory per category, e.g. downloads / movies / tv-shows.
#
# What this buys and what it does NOT buy - measured in a k3d cluster against
# this chart, because the usual argument for a shared volume is hardlinking:
# - It buys the layout: one claim to provision, back up and share with
# Jellyfin, with the categories as sibling directories instead of three
# separate volumes.
# - It does NOT buy hardlinked imports. Radarr and Sonarr import by moving,
# and a move within one filesystem can be a hardlink or a rename instead of
# a copy - but Kubernetes turns every volumeMount into its own bind mount,
# and link()/rename() across two mount points fails with EXDEV even when
# both sides are the same claim on the same device. Measured: /downloads and
# /movies in the radarr container both report device 65025 and resolve to
# the same PV directory, yet `ln /downloads/f /movies/f` fails with
# "Cross-device link", while the identical link succeeds when the claim root
# is mounted once and both categories are sub-directories under it.
# This is not a property of subPath: two plain mounts of the same claim
# without any subPath fail exactly the same way, so the chart has never
# supported cross-category hardlinks.
# - Consequence today: an import still copies, so download and library each
# hold a full copy until the torrent is removed.
# Getting hardlinks would mean giving the apps a single mount that contains all
# categories (the "one /data mount" layout the *arr guides recommend) instead of
# one mount per category - a separate change to the chart's mount layout, not a
# values setting.
media:
downloads:
existingClaim: null
subPath: null
movies:
existingClaim: null
subPath: null
tv:
existingClaim: null
subPath: null
# Ingress defaults. There is deliberately no global domain: every app carries
# its own <app>.ingress.host, so the hosts are independent of each other and
# may live in completely different domains. clusterIssuer, className and
# annotations are the defaults for all apps and can be overridden per app in
# the <app>.ingress block (an explicitly set per-app value always wins).
ingress:
# Master switch: false suppresses every app ingress regardless of the
# per-app toggles.
enabled: true
clusterIssuer: null
className: nginx
# Extra annotations for the Ingress objects; merged with the cert-manager
# cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
annotations: {}
gluetun:
# Pinned here like every other image in this chart, so Renovate's helm-values
# manager proposes gluetun updates too. Docker Hub tags carry a v prefix.
image:
repository: docker.io/qmcgaw/gluetun
tag: v3.41.1
vpn:
serviceProvider: mullvad
type: wireguard
serverCities: Zurich
serverCountries: Switzerland
dnsUpstreamResolvers: quad9
# Comma-separated CIDRs the gluetun firewall allows outbound traffic to
# outside the VPN tunnel. Set this to the cluster pod and service CIDRs
# (e.g. "10.42.0.0/16,10.43.0.0/16" on k3s) - without it the firewall
# blocks cluster-internal egress such as DNS lookups against cluster DNS
# and seerr talking to the in-cluster Jellyfin.
firewallOutboundSubnets: null
storage:
# Size of the gluetun config volume (server list cache under /gluetun).
size: 1Gi
# Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets.
# Values are rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef
# forms are supported. (Same for every <app>.env block below.)
env: []
# gluetun's built-in HTTP health server; the chart binds it to :9999 (env
# HEALTH_SERVER_ADDRESS) so the kubelet probes, which connect to the pod IP,
# can reach it. It returns 200 only while the VPN tunnel is up and working.
# Liveness is more tolerant (60s) than readiness (30s): during a short
# tunnel re-negotiation gluetun recovers on its own and a kubelet restart
# would only prolong the outage; the kill switch keeps all egress blocked
# the whole time, so nothing runs unprotected.
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 9999
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 6
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 9999
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Budget for image start plus
# Wireguard handshake: 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 9999
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
# Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
# limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
# CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
# (Same for every <app>.resources block below.)
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.1
memory: 128Mi
ephemeralStorage: 50Mi
# Deviations from the hardening baseline, forced by gluetun's role as VPN
# gateway:
# - runs as root (no runAsNonRoot): required to create the tun device and
# program the firewall.
# - NET_ADMIN capability: creates the Wireguard tunnel and the iptables
# rules (firewall, kill switch).
# - readOnlyRootFilesystem: false: gluetun rewrites /etc/resolv.conf and
# other files on its root filesystem at runtime.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- NET_ADMIN
qbittorrent:
enabled: true
image:
repository: docker.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent
tag: 5.2.1
# Every app gets its own Ingress object (named <release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress)
# with its own TLS secret tls-<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress, so the apps can
# be exposed independently and under unrelated hosts.
# host is required while enabled is true and has no default - an app whose
# ingress is switched off never demands one. clusterIssuer, className and
# annotations may be set here to override the global ingress block.
# (Same block for prowlarr, radarr, sonarr, seerr and bazarr below.)
ingress:
enabled: true
host: null
# clusterIssuer: null
# className: null
# annotations: {}
storage:
size: 1Gi
# Network interface qBittorrent binds its BitTorrent session to - gluetun's
# Wireguard device. Without this binding libtorrent listens and announces on
# every interface in the shared pod network namespace, including eth0 (the
# pod IP) and loopback. Those announces bypass the tunnel, so gluetun's kill
# switch (OUTPUT DROP except tun0 and the allowed cluster subnets) drops
# them: trackers report "skipping tracker announce (unreachable)", no peers
# are found and torrents stall at 0 bytes in stalledDL. Binding to tun0 is
# therefore both the functional fix and a leak fix - it stops qBittorrent
# from listening on the pod IP past the tunnel. The value is written into
# /config/qBittorrent/qBittorrent.conf by the config-interface init
# container below; setting it to null or "" removes that init container and
# leaves the binding to the user (not recommended).
networkInterface: tun0
# The init container that seeds qbittorrent.networkInterface into the
# persisted qBittorrent config before the app starts. Runs as puid/pgid so
# the config file keeps the ownership the app expects.
configInit:
# Auxiliary busybox image for the init container, pinned here like every
# other image in this chart and proposed by Renovate the same way.
image:
repository: docker.io/library/busybox
tag: "1.38.0"
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 16Mi
ephemeralStorage: 1Mi
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
env: []
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 8080
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.2
memory: 512Mi
ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
# Deviations from the hardening baseline, forced by the linuxserver.io
# images (s6-overlay init that starts as root and drops to PUID/PGID):
# - no runAsNonRoot: s6-overlay must start as root to apply PUID/PGID and
# chown /config.
# - readOnlyRootFilesystem: false: the s6 init applies PUID/PGID by
# rewriting /etc/passwd and /etc/group and stages runtime state on the
# root filesystem. With a read-only root filesystem the containers still
# start, but silently keep the image's built-in uid/gid (911) instead of
# PUID/PGID (verified at runtime) - unacceptable for the shared media
# volumes.
# - capabilities: ALL dropped except what the s6-overlay init needs:
# CHOWN/FOWNER/DAC_OVERRIDE (taking ownership of /config and /run) and
# SETUID/SETGID (dropping from root to the PUID/PGID user).
# (Same block for all linuxserver.io containers: qbittorrent, prowlarr,
# radarr, sonarr, bazarr.)
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- CHOWN
- DAC_OVERRIDE
- FOWNER
- SETGID
- SETUID
prowlarr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: docker.io/linuxserver/prowlarr
tag: 2.3.5
# See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
ingress:
enabled: true
host: null
# clusterIssuer: null
# className: null
# annotations: {}
storage:
size: 1Gi
env: []
# The *arr apps expose /ping as an unauthenticated health endpoint.
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 9696
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 9696
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 9696
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.1
memory: 256Mi
ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
# linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- CHOWN
- DAC_OVERRIDE
- FOWNER
- SETGID
- SETUID
flaresolverr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: ghcr.io/flaresolverr/flaresolverr
tag: v3.5.0
# No ingress and no config volume: flaresolverr is stateless and only
# consumed by prowlarr over localhost.
env: []
# /health is flaresolverr's dedicated lightweight health endpoint.
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8191
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8191
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8191
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.2
memory: 512Mi
ephemeralStorage: 200Mi
# Deviations from the hardening baseline, forced by the flaresolverr image:
# - readOnlyRootFilesystem: false: on startup flaresolverr copies and
# patches the chromedriver binary to the hardcoded path /app/chromedriver
# and writes chromedriver caches under /app (its home directory).
# - runAsUser/runAsGroup pin the image's "flaresolverr" user numerically
# (uid/gid 1000; the image declares it by name only, which the kubelet's
# runAsNonRoot check cannot verify).
# Chromium's scratch paths (/tmp, /dev/shm) are emptyDirs.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
radarr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: docker.io/linuxserver/radarr
tag: 6.1.1
# See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
ingress:
enabled: true
host: null
# clusterIssuer: null
# className: null
# annotations: {}
storage:
size: 1Gi
env: []
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 7878
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 7878
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 7878
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.1
memory: 256Mi
ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
# linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- CHOWN
- DAC_OVERRIDE
- FOWNER
- SETGID
- SETUID
recyclarr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: ghcr.io/recyclarr/recyclarr
tag: 8.6.0
# No ingress: recyclarr has no web UI, it syncs TRaSH guides to radarr and
# sonarr on a schedule (daemon mode).
storage:
size: 1Gi
env: []
# recyclarr serves no HTTP port in daemon mode, so all probes exec the CLI.
livenessProbe:
exec:
command:
- recyclarr
- --version
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
exec:
command:
- recyclarr
- --version
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
exec:
command:
- recyclarr
- --version
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 10
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.05
memory: 128Mi
ephemeralStorage: 50Mi
# The image supports running as an arbitrary non-root user; runAsUser and
# runAsGroup are set from the global puid/pgid values in the template - do
# not set them here.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
runAsNonRoot: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
sonarr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: docker.io/linuxserver/sonarr
tag: 4.0.17
# See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
ingress:
enabled: true
host: null
# clusterIssuer: null
# className: null
# annotations: {}
storage:
size: 1Gi
env: []
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 8989
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 8989
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ping
port: 8989
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.1
memory: 256Mi
ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
# linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- CHOWN
- DAC_OVERRIDE
- FOWNER
- SETGID
- SETUID
seerr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr
tag: v3.3.0
# See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
ingress:
enabled: true
host: null
# clusterIssuer: null
# className: null
# annotations: {}
storage:
size: 1Gi
env: []
# /api/v1/settings/public answers unauthenticated once the app is up.
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/settings/public
port: 5055
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/settings/public
port: 5055
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. First boot runs database
# migrations: budget 10s * 30 = 300s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /api/v1/settings/public
port: 5055
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.1
memory: 256Mi
ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
# The image runs fine as an arbitrary non-root user; runAsUser and
# runAsGroup are set from the global puid/pgid values in the template - do
# not set them here.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
runAsNonRoot: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
bazarr:
enabled: true
image:
repository: docker.io/linuxserver/bazarr
tag: 1.5.6
# See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
ingress:
enabled: true
host: null
# clusterIssuer: null
# className: null
# annotations: {}
storage:
size: 1Gi
env: []
# bazarr has no unauthenticated health endpoint; / serves the UI with 200.
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 6767
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 6767
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: 6767
periodSeconds: 5
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
limitFactor: 3
requests:
cpu: 0.1
memory: 256Mi
ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
# linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
add:
- CHOWN
- DAC_OVERRIDE
- FOWNER
- SETGID
- SETUID