Files
helm-charts/minecraft-server/templates/minecraft-server.networkpolicy.yaml
T
jklein f88e443a2e refactor(minecraft-server): ambientMesh becomes an object carrying Istio's two constants
Gitea #143, maintainer's instruction. The HBONE port and the redirected probe
source are ISTIO CONSTANTS, not standards, so they move from template literals
into values with documented defaults - an operator can then correct them when
Istio changes a number, without waiting for a chart release.

One object under one "enabled", so the two halves still cannot be set
separately; two values could drift apart, which is what this design exists to
prevent. Every read is null-safe (#99), so a deleted object or one carrying
only "enabled: true" falls back to the defaults declared here rather than
dereferencing nil - the defect #136 shipped one value away.

Provenance now written on each constant: 15008 is Istio's HBONE port, not
IANA-registered for this and unknown to Kubernetes; 169.254.7.127 is link-local
(RFC 3927, never routed), its IPv6 counterpart carries the same digits plus
1337, and neither the NetworkPolicy API nor the kubelet knows the address -
only Istio's data plane rewrites the probe source onto it. Both read for
ztunnel 1.30.6, and a change in either fails silently.

The exception in ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh stays pinned to the numbers that
test names, and additionally asserts this chart declares the same defaults -
never "whatever the value says", which would let a mistyped port in through a
configurable field.

No version change: nothing is published yet, the default is still off, and the
render at defaults is byte-identical - re-diffed against origin/main.

No redirectedProbeSources here, in neither values.yaml nor the schema: this
chart offers no networkPolicy.probeSources, so its probe rule is never
source-restricted and no ipBlock is ever rendered. The key would reach no rule
and read as a control that does nothing, which is worse than one that is
absent. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts that absence rather than
tolerating it.
2026-10-19 17:57:01 +00:00

310 lines
15 KiB
YAML

{{- /*
NetworkPolicy for minecraft-server (Gitea #5).
THIS IS THE CHART WHERE THE POLICY GETS GENUINELY TIGHT, and the reason is its
probes: all three are exec probes. An exec probe runs inside the container
through the kubelet's runtime and puts NO packet on the network, so there is no
kubelet traffic to accommodate on any port - which means every port here can be
restricted by source, with no probeSources needed at all. valkey is tight for
the same reason.
The one rule that cannot be fixed is the game port, and it depends on a value:
server.service.type == NodePort players arrive from the internet, already
masqueraded, so the rule must be OPEN.
anything else (the default) the only reachable path is in-cluster, i.e.
minecraft-router, so the rule is RESTRICTED
to this namespace plus allowedNamespaces -
and the router's namespace has to be in that
list.
Both branches are rendered from the same value the Service reads, so they cannot
disagree. The RCON and metrics ports are restricted in either case.
WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
notice it exists.
WHAT IT IS NOT:
- EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
PORT to any destination.
- NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
configured while nothing is filtered.
- THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
selects.
*/ -}}
{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
{{- /* networkPolicy.ingress - the policy's INBOUND side, and not the same
thing as the top-level .Values.ingress (the Ingress object) - both match
a search for "ingress". */}}
{{- $npIngress := $np.ingress | default dict }}
{{- /* NULL-SAFE ON PURPOSE (#99): ambientMesh is an OBJECT, so every read goes
through a fallback reproducing THIS chart's declared defaults. An
operator who deletes the object, or writes only "enabled: true", must
land on the defaults and not in a nil dereference - #136 shipped exactly
that defect one value away, where the NOTES.txt branch dereferenced
.networkPolicy.egress directly. */}}
{{- $ambient := $npIngress.ambientMesh | default dict }}
{{- $ambientEnabled := $ambient.enabled }}
{{- $ambientPort := $ambient.port | default 15008 }}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
labels:
app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
spec:
{{- /*
Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
*/}}
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
policyTypes:
- Ingress
{{- /*
Egress is listed because there is something real to restrict: a Minecraft
server needs DNS and HTTPS and nothing else in the normal case. Mod packs that
call out on other ports are the exception, and extraPorts is for them.
*/}}
- Egress
ingress:
{{- if eq .Values.server.service.type "NodePort" }}
{{- /*
THE GAME PORT, NODEPORT BRANCH (server.service.type is NodePort). Open with no
"from": the senders are Minecraft clients on the internet and, after NodePort
masquerading, the source address is a cluster node anyway.
THE NUMBER IS THE POD PORT (server.port), not server.service.outwardPort. A
NetworkPolicy is evaluated after kube-proxy has translated the NodePort, so the
NodePort number would match nothing here while looking strict - and being the
only rule for the port, it would block every player instead.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ .Values.server.port | int64 }}
{{- if $ambientEnabled }}
{{- /* networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh (Gitea #143). 15008/TCP is ztunnel's
HBONE tunnel, the port every inbound connection arrives on once the
namespace carries istio.io/dataplane-mode - ambient "does not and will
never bypass Kubernetes NetworkPolicy enforcement", so without it a pod
in the mesh is unreachable.
It is the one port here that is NOT a containerPort of the selected pod
spec: ztunnel terminates it, not the application. ci/run-networkpolicy-
test.sh holds a NAMED exception for exactly this number, gated on exactly
this value, and proves on a second render that it stays the only such
port and that it is absent while the value is false.
THE PORT HALF ONLY, and that is not an omission. Elsewhere this switch
also adds 169.254.7.127/32 as a probe source, because inside the mesh the
kubelet's probes are redirected away from the worker node's address.
This chart offers no networkPolicy.probeSources at all, so the rule
carrying the probe port is never restricted by source - and an
unrestricted rule needs no probe address. Measured in the render: three
exec probes, which put no packet on the network at all.
WHICH RULE IT JOINS:
the game-port rule, in BOTH of its branches. That rule is open when the
Service is a NodePort (players arrive from outside, already masqueraded)
and restricted to the namespace otherwise, and the two branches are
separate rules in this template - so the port is added twice, or it
would be missing from whichever branch a release happens to render.
AN ISTIO CONSTANT, NOT A STANDARD: 15008 is not registered with
IANA for this, no protocol prescribes it, and Kubernetes knows
nothing about it - Istio picked it for HBONE and Istio can change
it. Hence a VALUE with a documented default rather than a literal
here, so an operator can correct it without a chart release. Read
for ztunnel 1.30.6. The exception ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh
grants is pinned to the number THAT TEST names, plus a check that
this chart declares the same default - never to whatever the value
says, because that would let a mistyped port ride in through a
configurable field (design A of #143).
NOT MEASURED: that 15008 alone suffices comes from Istio's
documentation. Measured on this cluster is only which listeners ztunnel
opens. Provable at the first namespace to join the mesh; none has. */}}
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ int $ambientPort }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if not (eq .Values.server.service.type "NodePort") }}
{{- /*
THE GAME PORT, CLUSTER-INTERNAL BRANCH (the default): the Service is not a
NodePort, so nothing outside the cluster can reach this port through this
chart, and the rule is restricted to this namespace plus allowedNamespaces.
PUT THE ROUTER'S NAMESPACE IN allowedNamespaces. In this cluster players reach
the server through minecraft-router, which runs in its own namespace - so
without that entry the server is unreachable and the symptom is a connection
timeout in a game client, with a healthy pod behind it.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ .Values.server.port | int64 }}
{{- if $ambientEnabled }}
{{- /* networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh (Gitea #143). 15008/TCP is ztunnel's
HBONE tunnel, the port every inbound connection arrives on once the
namespace carries istio.io/dataplane-mode - ambient "does not and will
never bypass Kubernetes NetworkPolicy enforcement", so without it a pod
in the mesh is unreachable.
It is the one port here that is NOT a containerPort of the selected pod
spec: ztunnel terminates it, not the application. ci/run-networkpolicy-
test.sh holds a NAMED exception for exactly this number, gated on exactly
this value, and proves on a second render that it stays the only such
port and that it is absent while the value is false.
THE PORT HALF ONLY, and that is not an omission. Elsewhere this switch
also adds 169.254.7.127/32 as a probe source, because inside the mesh the
kubelet's probes are redirected away from the worker node's address.
This chart offers no networkPolicy.probeSources at all, so the rule
carrying the probe port is never restricted by source - and an
unrestricted rule needs no probe address. Measured in the render: three
exec probes, which put no packet on the network at all.
WHICH RULE IT JOINS:
the game-port rule, in BOTH of its branches. That rule is open when the
Service is a NodePort (players arrive from outside, already masqueraded)
and restricted to the namespace otherwise, and the two branches are
separate rules in this template - so the port is added twice, or it
would be missing from whichever branch a release happens to render.
AN ISTIO CONSTANT, NOT A STANDARD: 15008 is not registered with
IANA for this, no protocol prescribes it, and Kubernetes knows
nothing about it - Istio picked it for HBONE and Istio can change
it. Hence a VALUE with a documented default rather than a literal
here, so an operator can correct it without a chart release. Read
for ztunnel 1.30.6. The exception ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh
grants is pinned to the number THAT TEST names, plus a check that
this chart declares the same default - never to whatever the value
says, because that would let a mistyped port ride in through a
configurable field (design A of #143).
NOT MEASURED: that 15008 alone suffices comes from Istio's
documentation. Measured on this cluster is only which listeners ztunnel
opens. Provable at the first namespace to join the mesh; none has. */}}
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ int $ambientPort }}
{{- end }}
from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
{{- /*
Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
*/}}
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
{{- range $allowedNs }}
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- if .Values.server.rcon.enabled }}
{{- /*
RCON - remote console, i.e. full administrative control of the server. No
Service and no probe, so it is restricted to this namespace plus
allowedNamespaces: the rule with the most security value in this chart, and it
costs nothing.
GATED ON server.rcon.enabled, AND THAT GATE IS NOT COSMETIC. The containerPort
itself is rendered only when RCON is on (see the StatefulSet), so without the
same condition here the policy would name a port the pod does not declare -
which is not merely untidy: ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh rejects it, and it
rejected exactly this while the chart was being written. A rule for a port
nothing listens on is a rule nobody can verify.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ .Values.server.rcon.port | int64 }}
from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
{{- /*
Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
*/}}
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
{{- range $allowedNs }}
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- /*
The metrics port. No Service, no probe, so restricted like RCON. A Prometheus
that scrapes this release from another namespace needs that namespace in
allowedNamespaces - and the failure is a target that silently stops reporting,
which is worth knowing before it happens.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 19565
from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
{{- /*
Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
*/}}
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
{{- range $allowedNs }}
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
egress:
{{- /*
DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
the pod is a trap and not a feature.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
{{- /*
Outbound HTTPS. Needed for Mojang's session server when online-mode is on - a
server that cannot reach it rejects every login - and for resource-pack and mod
downloads. To any destination, because those are hostnames.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 443
{{- with $np.egress }}
{{- with .extraPorts }}
{{- /*
Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
the whole policy off.
*/}}
- ports:
{{- range . }}
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ int . }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}