Update Helm release valkey to v2

Pre-existing, and corrected here rather than left because the third item is the
mail rule this PR rewrites. values.yaml already said THREE.

Part of #136

.github/workflows/validate-charts.yml

@@ -237,6 +237,128 @@ jobs:
       - name: "Check every rendered HTTPRoute against the rendered Services"
         run: ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh
 
+  bump-level:
+    name: "Bump level"
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # The fourth job that ignores the changed-chart matrix, and the only one
+    # that touches no chart at all: it tests ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh, the
+    # postUpgradeTasks hook that computes a chart's `version:` after Renovate
+    # moved an app version (Gitea #128).
+    #
+    # Why it is a job rather than a review: since #128 the hook takes the bump
+    # level from Renovate's update type, so an app minor becomes a chart minor.
+    # That makes it deciding logic, and its failure mode is silence - a wrong
+    # level is a VALID version string, so the PR goes green, the chart
+    # publishes, and the only symptom is a number that understates what it
+    # ships. Nothing else in this pipeline reads that number.
+    #
+    # It needs no Helm, no cluster and no Python: each case is a throwaway
+    # `git init` under mktemp with one commit plus a dirty Chart.yaml - the
+    # state the hook really runs in, since it reads the base commit - and the
+    # assertion is one `version:` line read back with sed. About a second for
+    # all 49 cases, and it depends on no other job.
+    steps:
+      - name: "Checkout Repository"
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
+      - name: "Check every bump level of the version-bump hook"
+        run: ci/run-bump-level-test.sh
+
+  yaml-scalar:
+    name: "YAML scalars"
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # The fifth job that ignores the changed-chart matrix, and the fourth that
+    # runs over *every* chart (Gitea #11), for the same reason as the three
+    # render tests above: the unquoted
+    # form arrives by copy into a chart whose own diff nobody reads for it, and
+    # it is in seven charts right now.
+    #
+    # What it asserts: every CronJob schedule, every env[].value and every label
+    # and annotation value a chart renders is a STRING, which is what Kubernetes
+    # types all three as. A value rendered without | quote fails in one of two
+    # ways and the quiet one is the dangerous one: the render aborts with a YAML
+    # error naming the TEMPLATE while the operator's value appears nowhere in
+    # it, or - when the content is a legal plain scalar that simply is not a
+    # string - the render succeeds and the API server rejects the object at
+    # apply time with "cannot unmarshal bool into Go struct field
+    # EnvVar.value of type string".
+    #
+    # WHY THIS JOB EXISTS AT ALL, rather than the install-test covering it: the
+    # object that carried the defect is rendered by no fixture. paperless-ngx'
+    # consume CronJob sits behind smbConnection.enabled, false in the defaults
+    # and in every committed fixture, so nothing in this repository ever
+    # produced it - which is how an unquoted schedule shipped for months. The
+    # overlays under ci/yaml-scalar/ switch such objects on and feed them
+    # hostile values, and the script fails when an overlay stops reaching its
+    # object.
+    #
+    # No cluster and no Trivy; the whole repository in well under a minute,
+    # depends on no other job. The YAML is parsed by Helm through ci/yaml2json,
+    # because the runners have neither pyyaml nor yq and a hand-written parser
+    # could read nothing and report nothing - see the script's header.
+    steps:
+      - name: "Checkout Repository"
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
+      - name: "Install Helm"
+        uses: azure/setup-helm@9bc31f4ebc9c6b171d7bfbaa5d006ae7abdb4310 # v5
+      - name: "Check every rendered scalar that must be a string"
+        run: ci/run-yaml-scalar-render-test.sh
+
+  networkpolicy:
+    name: "NetworkPolicy"
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # The sixth job that ignores the changed-chart matrix and the fifth that runs
+    # over *every* chart (Gitea #5), for the same reason as the render tests
+    # above: the mistake arrives by copy into a chart whose own diff nobody reads
+    # for it - and since #5 this convention is in all 29 installable charts, so
+    # there is a lot of copy.
+    #
+    # What it asserts, on every NetworkPolicy a chart renders, against the pod
+    # specs, probes and Services of the SAME render: the podSelector really
+    # matches a pod; every ingress port is a containerPort of those pods; no
+    # ingress rule allows every source by accident; and every port a NETWORK
+    # probe addresses is either left unrestricted or comes with
+    # networkPolicy.probeSources and the consequence written into NOTES.txt.
+    # Plus two guards of its own: a chart that renders NO policy fails, and a
+    # rendered "#" comment fails.
+    #
+    # And one assertion that spans TWO charts (Gitea #136), the only one here
+    # that does: where a chart dials the Service of another chart of this
+    # repository, its EGRESS rule must contain that chart's POD ports. kube-proxy
+    # does the ClusterIP's destination NAT before the policy is evaluated, so a
+    # rule naming the SERVICE port matches nothing wherever port and targetPort
+    # differ - paperless-ngx shipped exactly that and lost Tika and Gotenberg in
+    # production on 2026-10-15. The pairs are an explicit table in the script,
+    # because no render can discover which Service another chart dials, and the
+    # row is checked with the feature gate on AND off.
+    #
+    # Every one of those failures is SILENT. The API server accepts a policy
+    # whose selector matches nothing - it then sits in the namespace, is listed
+    # by kubectl, reads as a boundary and filters exactly nothing - just as
+    # readily as it accepts one naming a NodePort number, which matches no
+    # traffic at all because the policy is evaluated at the pod's interface
+    # after kube-proxy has already translated the port. Neither is a render
+    # error and neither denies anything, so neither the build nor a rollout can
+    # see it.
+    #
+    # It does NOT replace the install-test, which is the real net under this
+    # convention: that one proves ENFORCEMENT on a live k3s with its policy
+    # controller running, and it is what makes "all charts at once, default on"
+    # defensible. This job is the cheap half, and it covers the two charts the
+    # install-test cannot reach at all - satisfactory and template-chart, both
+    # in ci/excluded-charts.txt.
+    #
+    # No cluster and no Trivy; a few seconds for the whole repository, depends
+    # on no other job. The YAML is parsed by Helm through ci/yaml2json, because
+    # the runners have neither pyyaml nor yq and a hand-written parser could read
+    # nothing and report nothing - see the script's header.
+    steps:
+      - name: "Checkout Repository"
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
+      - name: "Install Helm"
+        uses: azure/setup-helm@9bc31f4ebc9c6b171d7bfbaa5d006ae7abdb4310 # v5
+      - name: "Check every rendered NetworkPolicy against the render it belongs to"
+        run: ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh
+
   trivy-config:
     name: "Trivy config ${{ matrix.chart }}"
     needs: detect-changed-charts

CLAUDE.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Flat layout, one Markdown file per page, page name = file name, links are relati
 | a Renovate rule added or changed | `Renovate` |
 | something broke in a way a rule now prevents | `Lessons-Learned` |
 
-**What does not oblige an edit:** a plain app-version bump. Renovate automerges those continuously and never touches the wiki, which is why chart pages carry no version numbers at all and name `Chart.yaml` as the source of truth. An app update that *does* change values or behaviour is not a plain bump, and the table applies.
+**What does not oblige an edit:** an app-version bump, at any level. Renovate automerges those continuously and never touches the wiki, which is why chart pages carry no version numbers at all and name `Chart.yaml` as the source of truth. Since Gitea #128 **"plain" is mechanically defined instead of being a judgement**: the chart version now states the size of the jump, because `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` takes that size from Renovate's update type (app minor → chart minor). An app update that *does* change values or behaviour is not a plain bump and the table applies — but **nothing obliges anyone to go and find out**. That is the deliberate limit of #128, not an oversight: the reading duty was rejected, so the `sonarr` incident in `Lessons-Learned` stays repeatable and a bigger number is the only warning that is given.
 
 Wiki commits follow the same rules as repo commits: no `Co-Authored-By`, no "Generated with Claude Code" footer.
 
@@ -94,11 +94,13 @@ Copy `template-chart/` and replace every `xxx` placeholder — in file names (`t
 
 `Chart.yaml` versions follow `version: <chart-semver>+up<appVersion>` (e.g. `1.4.0+up1.9.2`), with `appVersion` matching the suffix (dashes in the app version are normalized to dots in the suffix). Any push to `main` touching a chart directory publishes that chart, so the version must be bumped in the same change.
 
-Semver conventions for the chart part:
+Semver conventions for the chart part. **The chart jump is the greater of the chart's own classification and the jump of what it ships** (Gitea #128) — a maximum, never a replacement, so a value that becomes required stays a major even under an app patch:
 
-- **Patch**: bug fixes without behavior or values-schema change; plain app-version updates.
-- **Minor**: additive, backward-compatible changes (new optional values with unchanged defaults).
-- **Major**: runtime behavior changes or breaking values changes (e.g. probes, security hardening, computed limits, values that become required).
+- **Patch**: bug fixes without behavior or values-schema change; an app **patch** or digest update.
+- **Minor**: additive, backward-compatible changes (new optional values with unchanged defaults); an app **minor** update.
+- **Major**: runtime behavior changes or breaking values changes (e.g. probes, security hardening, computed limits, values that become required); an app **major** update.
+
+The app half of that is mechanical: `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` takes the level from **Renovate's update type**, passed in as `{{{updateType}}}`, and not from comparing `appVersion` — `freesailarr` pins every tag in `values.yaml` and its `appVersion` never moves, so a comparison is blind to exactly the case the rule exists for. Non-semver app versions (CalVer, date tags, four-part and suffixed tags — seven charts) stay at **patch** for a minor, because their second position is a month or a flavour and says nothing about the jump; an app **major** still produces a chart major. **It obliges nobody to read the release notes** — that variant was rejected in #128 — so an app minor that changes a default can still reach `main` unremarked; the number stops understating, that is all it does. See the wiki, `Lessons-Learned`.
 
 App-version updates go through PRs (so the validate and install-test pipelines run), not through the `change-app-version.yml` dispatch workflow (which commits directly to main and bypasses both). For app **major** jumps, update stepwise: first to the last release of the old major line (own PR, merge, publish), then to the newest major.
 
@@ -114,7 +116,8 @@ The binding style guide for all current and future charts lives in **README.md (
 - Every container offers an additive `env` block rendered through `tpl` with `value`, `secretKeyRef`, and `configMapKeyRef` forms.
 - Hardening: `automountServiceAccountToken: false`, non-root, `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`, caps dropped, `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`; contexts values-configurable (`securityContext.pod` / `securityContext.container`); writable paths as emptyDirs; image-forced deviations MUST be documented with a comment in the chart's `values.yaml`.
 - Probes: liveness/readiness/startup on every workload (exception: paperless consume CronJob), values-configurable with calibrated defaults.
+- **Every chart renders a `NetworkPolicy`, `networkPolicy.enabled` defaults to `true`** (#5); adding one to an existing chart is a **major**. Values: `enabled`, `allowedNamespaces`, `probeSources`, `ingressController`, `egress.extraPorts` — and only the ones that actually reach a rule, because a value that does nothing reads as a control. Each port falls in one of four classes and the class decides the rule: a port a **network** probe addresses stays open (`no from`) until `probeSources` is set, because the kubelet probes from the worker node's IP and no chart can know it; a NodePort-published port stays open (the source is already masqueraded); anything else is restricted to the namespace, `allowedNamespaces` and — for HTTP — `ingressController`; a replica-to-replica bus gets a bare `podSelector`. **`exec` probes are not network probes** (no packet, so the port can be restricted — `valkey`, `minecraft-server`). **`allowedNamespaces` is never shipped pre-filled** — a chart must not bake in an assumption about this cluster's namespace layout, so restrictive is the default and filling it is the deployment adaptation (which is why a sweep produces release-side one-liners: that is the procedure, not a defect list). **A policy applies to traffic that came through a Service** — a Service is only destination NAT and the policy acts at the pod interface; what changes is the *source address*, preserved for pod→ClusterIP→pod (this is why the `ingressController` rule works) and masqueraded to a node for NodePort traffic. **And the whole convention depends on one setting it cannot check: Traefik must not run with `hostNetwork`** — measured, its pods have real pod IPs in `10.42.0.0/16`; on host networking they stop being selectable as pods and every web chart goes dark at once while every pod stays `Ready`. **Pod ports, never NodePorts.** Never `from: []`. Reasoning in Go template comments, never `#` (those ship to the cluster), and such a comment must not spell out its own closing delimiter. Egress is by **port, never destination** — Canal has no FQDN rule and Calico-specific objects are out of scope — so most dependency ports are the *standard* ones and a dependency elsewhere is blocked; `policyTypes` names only what there is something to restrict (`valkey`, `homeassistant`, `satisfactory` are Ingress-only, each argued in its own file). `ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh` is the gate. Full rules: README, "NetworkPolicies".
 - Resources: requests as values defaults; limits auto-computed by the `_helpers.tpl` helper (`limitFactor` default 3; no CPU limits unless set explicitly).
 - Replicas per workload (explicit `0` allowed) plus a chart-global `scaleDown` flag that overrides them.
 - `icon:` mandatory in every `Chart.yaml`; `helm lint --strict` without findings; CI fixtures under `ci/<chart>/` or a justified exclusion.
-- **Chart dependencies are admissible but expensive** (the former "no dependencies" rule fell with #214; `ytdlp-web-player` was the first to use one, `stalwart` the second, `paperless-ngx` the third). A dependency has to be optional and off by default via `condition:`, and upstream's chart is consumed as it comes — where its defaults fall short of these conventions, that is **documented in our `values.yaml`, never patched**. The price to know before adding the next one: a subchart is invisible to everything downstream that watches Helm release versions, so a new upstream version — a security fix included — reaches a cluster only when the outer chart is republished (Renovate's built-in `helmv3` manager plus `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` is the whole safety net, and it belongs in a comment at the pinned version); and every helm command exits 1 while `charts/` is unfilled, which is why `ci/helm-dependencies.sh` runs before lint, package, render and install — including the render test that covers **all** charts on **every** PR. Full rules and the rest of the cost: README, "Chart dependencies".
+- **Chart dependencies are admissible but expensive** (the former "no dependencies" rule fell with #214; `ytdlp-web-player` was the first to use one, `stalwart` the second, `paperless-ngx` the third). A dependency has to be optional and off by default via `condition:`, and upstream's chart is consumed as it comes — where its defaults fall short of these conventions, that is **documented in our `values.yaml`, never patched**. The price to know before adding the next one: a subchart is invisible to everything downstream that watches Helm release versions, so a new upstream version — a security fix included — reaches a cluster only when the outer chart is republished (Renovate's built-in `helmv3` manager plus `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` is the whole safety net, and since #128 that republish carries the **subchart's own level** — an upstream minor is a chart minor, which is the only place that jump becomes visible at all; it belongs in a comment at the pinned version); and every helm command exits 1 while `charts/` is unfilled, which is why `ci/helm-dependencies.sh` runs before lint, package, render and install — including the render test that covers **all** charts on **every** PR. Full rules and the rest of the cost: README, "Chart dependencies".

README.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Every chart has a wiki page of its own — `https://git.jk-dev.de/jlab-cluster/h
 | `garage` | Garage (S3-compatible object store) | **One** node, `replication_factor = 1` — a deliberate trade with its price named (Gitea #81): the volume layer underneath already replicates and encrypts, so Garage replication on top would be nine times the raw data across two layers that know nothing about each other. What that costs is that the factor applies to the **metadata** too, where a corrupted database is upstream-documented as "generally not recoverable" and a replicated volume replicates the corruption. Hence three settings that are mandatory rather than optional: `metadata_fsync = true` (**off** in Garage's defaults), the automatic metadata snapshots, and those snapshots on a **second PVC** — a file-system snapshot of a live metadata database is not a restore point, so the volume backup covers the blocks and not the index. The first PVC carries `metadata_dir` **and** `data_dir` as two subdirectories, because volume snapshots are atomic per volume: that is what keeps index and blocks consistent with each other. Two further properties shape the whole chart: the image is **`FROM scratch`** and contains exactly one file, `/garage` — no shell, so **exec probes are impossible here** and an init container would need a second image — and the RPC secret has to arrive as an **environment variable**, because `rpc_secret_file` rejects any file with a group bit set while the kubelet sets one (the reasoning sits at the value). Started with `garage server --single-node`, which creates the cluster layout in-process before any listener opens and is idempotent on the layout version, and with `--default-access-key`/`--default-bucket`, which **import** key and bucket from the 1Password item — so the vault is the source of truth instead of a copy of what the server generated. Readiness is the admin API's `/health`, liveness and startup deliberately are **not**: `/health` answers 503 until a layout exists, so a node waiting for one would be restarted forever |
 | `gotenberg` | Gotenberg | Deployment + Service only (no ingress) |
 | `homeassistant` | Home Assistant | StatefulSet; the only chart carrying Helm tests (`templates/tests/`) |
-| `keycloak` | Keycloak (OpenID Connect / SAML identity provider) | **Two** replicas with `cache=ispn`, clustered through Keycloak's default `jdbc-ping` stack — discovery runs over the PostgreSQL that is there anyway, so no headless Service and no JGroups wiring. Deployment, **no PVC** (Keycloak 26 keeps everything in the database, user sessions included). **The chart has two init containers and needs both** (Gitea #83): `db`, `health-enabled` and `metrics-enabled` are Keycloak *build* options, the published image is built with their defaults, and a runtime change makes Keycloak rewrite `/opt/keycloak/lib/quarkus` at start — which `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` forbids and which upstream describes as a start that "creates an image that is mutable". An empty `emptyDir` over that path does not work either, because `QuarkusEntryPoint` loads `quarkus/quarkus-application.dat` before it dispatches any command, `build` included. So one init container **seeds** the directory into a volume, the next runs `kc.sh build` into it, and the serving container runs `start --optimized` — every container keeping the full hardening baseline. Build options therefore exist in exactly **one** place and a build option in `keycloak.env` fails the render. First chart with a `PodDisruptionBudget` (§11) and first `quay.io` image (hence the entry in `ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml`). Two Services (8080, and the management port 9000 **never** published — it serves `/health/*` and optionally `/metrics` unauthenticated) and two Ingresses. **The admin hostname is not an access control**: `hostname-admin` only decides which URLs the server generates, and upstream states that it "does not prevent accessing the Administration REST API endpoints via the frontend URL" — restricting that API is reverse-proxy work, and the chart renders no `/admin` deny rule. `ingress.domain` is read as `KC_HOSTNAME` (as a full URL, which upstream requires alongside `hostname-admin`), so it stays required with the Ingress off. Liveness is `/health/live` and deliberately not `/health` or `/health/ready` — those include the database, and a liveness probe on them restarts the whole cluster for as long as the database is away. **`keycloak.metrics.enabled` defaults to `true` for the readiness probe, not for the metrics**: upstream's table of health checks carries a "Requires Metrics" column and the *database* check is the row that says yes, so with it off `/health/ready` answers 200 while the database is gone — the `urlaubsverwaltung` shape (#218) with the dependency hidden behind an option whose name says observability. Two traps at the values: upstream's `db-pool-max-size` default of 100 would ask a default PostgreSQL for 200 connections across two replicas (the chart ships 20), and two releases sharing one database **merge into one Infinispan cluster** unless the cluster names differ |
+| `keycloak` | Keycloak (OpenID Connect / SAML identity provider) | **Two** replicas with `cache=ispn`, clustered through Keycloak's default `jdbc-ping` stack — discovery runs over the PostgreSQL that is there anyway, so no headless Service and no JGroups wiring. Deployment, **no PVC** (Keycloak 26 keeps everything in the database, user sessions included). **The chart has two init containers and needs both** (Gitea #83): `db`, `health-enabled` and `metrics-enabled` are Keycloak *build* options, the published image is built with their defaults, and a runtime change makes Keycloak rewrite `/opt/keycloak/lib/quarkus` at start — which `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` forbids and which upstream describes as a start that "creates an image that is mutable". An empty `emptyDir` over that path does not work either, because `QuarkusEntryPoint` loads `quarkus/quarkus-application.dat` before it dispatches any command, `build` included. So one init container **seeds** the directory into a volume, the next runs `kc.sh build` into it, and the serving container runs `start --optimized` — every container keeping the full hardening baseline. Build options therefore exist in exactly **one** place and a build option in `keycloak.env` fails the render. First chart with a `PodDisruptionBudget` (§11) and first `quay.io` image (hence the entry in `ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml`). Two Services (8080, and the management port 9000 **never** published — it serves `/health/*` and optionally `/metrics` unauthenticated) and two Ingresses — plus one routing object per `keycloak.realmHosts` entry (Gitea #122), empty by default, which gives a realm a hostname of its own by sending that hostname's bare `/` to `/realms/<realm>/account/`: `app-root` in Ingress mode, an `Exact` match with a `RequestRedirect` filter in Gateway mode. Those entries carry a **required** per-entry TLS secret name and an **optional** per-entry issuer, the documented deviation in §4, because the hostnames they publish already have certificates and often share one. **The admin hostname is not an access control**: `hostname-admin` only decides which URLs the server generates, and upstream states that it "does not prevent accessing the Administration REST API endpoints via the frontend URL" — restricting that API is reverse-proxy work, and the chart renders no `/admin` deny rule. `ingress.domain` is read as `KC_HOSTNAME` (as a full URL, which upstream requires alongside `hostname-admin`), so it stays required with the Ingress off. Liveness is `/health/live` and deliberately not `/health` or `/health/ready` — those include the database, and a liveness probe on them restarts the whole cluster for as long as the database is away. **`keycloak.metrics.enabled` defaults to `true` for the readiness probe, not for the metrics**: upstream's table of health checks carries a "Requires Metrics" column and the *database* check is the row that says yes, so with it off `/health/ready` answers 200 while the database is gone — the `urlaubsverwaltung` shape (#218) with the dependency hidden behind an option whose name says observability. Two traps at the values: upstream's `db-pool-max-size` default of 100 would ask a default PostgreSQL for 200 connections across two replicas (the chart ships 20), and two releases sharing one database **merge into one Infinispan cluster** unless the cluster names differ |
 | `matrix-synapse` | Matrix Synapse | StatefulSet plus an nginx delegation Deployment/Service |
 | `minecraft-router` | itzg/mc-router | Deployment + routing ConfigMap + NodePort Service (TCP only, no ingress); `mappings` is a required value |
 | `minecraft-server` | itzg/minecraft-server | StatefulSet + PVC + Service + init-script ConfigMap (no ingress); service type is a value (`ClusterIP` by default, routed via `minecraft-router`). **Only the newest Java line is maintained** (chart 5.0.0, #158): the directory carries one line, older ones stay published as frozen artifacts (java8/java17 at `4.0.0`, java21 at `4.1.0`) and receive no further chart changes — publishing once per line out of one directory is what made the lines drift. To run an older JVM with the current chart, set `image.tagOverride`; the chart then checks that `minecraft.version` fits the Java line of the **effective** tag and fails the render with both values named. Two cases pass unchecked on purpose: a tag without a `java<N>` part and a `minecraft.version` that is not a plain numeric `x[.y[.z]]`. `image.tagOverride` is deliberately outside Renovate's reach — `renovate.json5` tracks `appVersion` only. Since chart 2.0.0 the tag is an **immutable dated upstream release** (`appVersion: <release>-java8` / `-java17` / `-java21` / `-java25`, e.g. `2026.8.2-java8`) instead of the continuously rebuilt rolling line tag. Pilot for the strict `values.schema.json` (#68), which is now binding for every chart |
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Every chart has a wiki page of its own — `https://git.jk-dev.de/jlab-cluster/h
 | `paperless-ngx` | Paperless-ngx | Largest chart: consume CronJob, SMB-connector PV/PVC, pre/post-consumption scripts ConfigMap. Optional `valkey` subchart — **this repo's own chart, from the published index**, off by default and gated on `valkeySubchart.enabled` (not `valkey.enabled`, which the subchart's strict schema rejects). Configured as a **queue** (PVC + `noeviction`), unlike `stalwart`'s cache: `PAPERLESS_REDIS` is the Celery broker, and `allkeys-lru` evicts across the whole keyspace, where a backlog of waiting consume tasks is exactly what LRU reads as cold. The password comes from the **same 1Password item** as the Redis connection, in a third field `auth-conf` holding the complete line `requirepass <password>` — so the password sits in that item **twice** and a rotation has to touch both fields. Two more traps: with the subchart on, `redis-connection-url` in the vault **must** be repointed at `<release>-valkey-service:6379` or the bundled Valkey runs unused, and `valkeySubchart:` must not be erased — a null override deletes the key, Helm reads an unresolvable `condition:` as *enabled*, so erasing the switch turns the subchart **on** (rejected by `values.schema.json`). Never change `valkey/` and this chart in the same PR, see "Chart dependencies" |
 | `patchmon` | PatchMon | One Deployment (the 2.x server serves frontend and `/api/*` from one process) plus an optional guacd sidecar; OIDC-only sign-in |
 | `rallly` | Rallly | Deployment, DB/OIDC/SMTP secrets |
-| `rss-bridge` | RSS-Bridge | Deployment + whitelist ConfigMap; `ingress.hosts` is a required list of host + optional `tlsSecretName`, so several hosts can keep their own existing certificates (documented deviation from the one-TLS-secret rule, see its `values.yaml`) |
+| `rss-bridge` | RSS-Bridge | Deployment + whitelist ConfigMap; `ingress.hosts` is a required list of host + optional `tlsSecretName`, so several hosts can keep their own existing certificates (documented deviation from the one-TLS-secret rule, see its `values.yaml`) — required only while `ingress.enabled`, since in Gateway mode the names come from `httpRoute.hostnames` and the secret grouping has nothing to group. **The last chart of the Gateway-API sweep (#114)**. Its install-test had failed on the Gitea runner since the move (#51) and the chart was deliberately **not** excluded so that a pass would be noticed — it passed in the conversion PR, on a render byte-identical to `main`, which rules the chart out and leaves the runner |
 | `samba` | Samba | StatefulSet, users secret + config ConfigMap |
 | `satisfactory` | Satisfactory game server | StatefulSet, no ingress |
 | `searxng` | SearXNG | Stateless Deployment + settings ConfigMap (`use_default_settings: true` plus a free-form `settings.extra` passthrough); the signing key is a required `OnePasswordItem`, an external Valkey an optional second one. `ingress.domain` is read twice — Ingress host and `SEARXNG_BASE_URL` — so it stays required with the Ingress switched off |
@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ Every chart has a wiki page of its own — `https://git.jk-dev.de/jlab-cluster/h
 
   Note: the registry **accepts a re-upload of an already published version** (HTTP 201) and replaces the stored artifact, so a republish of an existing version is still silent — see #160. That is also what makes a manual `workflow_dispatch` of any `publish-<chart>.yml` a harmless way to prove the shared block works.
 - `change-app-version.yml` — manually dispatched app-version bump; the chart must be listed in its `chart-name` choice list.
-- `ci/helm-dependencies.sh <chart-dir>` — not a workflow but the step they all share: fetches a chart's declared dependencies into `charts/`, and returns silently for the charts that declare none (all but three: `ytdlp-web-player`, `stalwart`, `paperless-ngx`). It runs in **seven** places, because every helm command this repo builds on exits 1 while a declared dependency is missing: before lint and package in `validate-charts.yml`, before package in the shared publish block (which is why that block names this script as a prerequisite of its callers — see above), and inside `ci/run-install-test.sh`, `ci/run-quantity-render-test.sh`, `ci/run-selector-match-test.sh`, `ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh` and `ci/run-trivy-config.sh`. See "Chart dependencies" in the style guidelines for what that costs.
-- `validate-charts.yml` — PR pipeline: detects which charts a PR touches and, for exactly those, runs `helm lint --strict`, `helm package`, and a chart-version bump check (`template-chart` is exempt from the version check). PRs without chart changes skip the build matrix. After the build stage, an **install-test** job (the same changed-charts matrix, minus the charts listed in `ci/excluded-charts.txt`) installs each changed chart into an ephemeral [k3d](https://k3d.io) cluster on the runner and requires every workload to become Ready — see below. Both matrices follow the changed chart directories, so a PR that only changes the harness under `ci/` exercises nothing by itself; the Trivy scan has a fixed-sample fallback for that case, the install-test has none — bump the affected chart's patch version to pull it into the matrix, or run the all-charts install-test after the merge. The **resource-quantity render test**, the **selector-match render test** and the **HTTPRoute render test** are the three exceptions to that rule: all of them run over every chart on every PR — see below.
+- `ci/helm-dependencies.sh <chart-dir>` — not a workflow but the step they all share: fetches a chart's declared dependencies into `charts/`, and returns silently for the charts that declare none (all but three: `ytdlp-web-player`, `stalwart`, `paperless-ngx`). It runs in **eight** places, because every helm command this repo builds on exits 1 while a declared dependency is missing: before lint and package in `validate-charts.yml`, before package in the shared publish block (which is why that block names this script as a prerequisite of its callers — see above), and inside `ci/run-install-test.sh`, `ci/run-quantity-render-test.sh`, `ci/run-selector-match-test.sh`, `ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh`, `ci/run-yaml-scalar-render-test.sh` and `ci/run-trivy-config.sh`. See "Chart dependencies" in the style guidelines for what that costs.
+- `validate-charts.yml` — PR pipeline: detects which charts a PR touches and, for exactly those, runs `helm lint --strict`, `helm package`, and a chart-version bump check (`template-chart` is exempt from the version check). PRs without chart changes skip the build matrix. After the build stage, an **install-test** job (the same changed-charts matrix, minus the charts listed in `ci/excluded-charts.txt`) installs each changed chart into an ephemeral [k3d](https://k3d.io) cluster on the runner and requires every workload to become Ready — see below. Both matrices follow the changed chart directories, so a PR that only changes the harness under `ci/` exercises nothing by itself; the Trivy scan has a fixed-sample fallback for that case, the install-test has none — bump the affected chart's patch version to pull it into the matrix, or run the all-charts install-test after the merge. The **resource-quantity render test**, the **selector-match render test**, the **HTTPRoute render test** and the **YAML-scalar render test** are the four exceptions to that rule: all of them run over every chart on every PR — see below. A fourth job, the **bump-level test**, ignores the matrix for a different reason: it tests no chart at all, but the `postUpgradeTasks` hook that computes their versions.
 - `install-test.yml` — reusable workflow (`workflow_call`) holding the install-test **job** itself: the runner-label expression, the pinned `kubectl` with its skew check, `envsubst`, the containerised-job detection, the per-leg k3d cluster and the `freesailarr` VPN credentials. Its one input is a JSON array of chart names; its callers decide *which* charts are tested and whether the job runs at all, never *how*. Two callers: `validate-charts.yml` and `install-test-all-charts.yml`. **It is not copied for the second caller** — a second copy is a second chance to test differently, unnoticed, the same argument that gives `ci/excluded-charts.txt` exactly one parser.
 
   **It stays in this repository, and that is a decision, not an oversight** (Gitea #66, decision 4). It is reusable in form but not in substance: it is welded to the `ci/` fixtures, to the `ci/excluded-charts.txt` parser and to this repository's chart matrix. A building block that only one repository can use is not shared, it is merely moved somewhere else — and moving it would buy nothing while putting a tag between us and a file we change often. `publish-helm-chart.yml` was the opposite case: it takes a chart name and a registry owner and knows nothing about this repository, which is exactly why it could go. This note exists so the question is not asked again in half a year.
@@ -156,29 +156,98 @@ Neither is a render error, neither fails the install-test, and neither shows up
 Three things to know before touching it:
 
 - **Helm is the YAML parser, through the one-template chart `ci/yaml2json`.** The runners have neither `pyyaml` nor `yq` (measured; the same constraint `ci/run-trivy-config.sh` and `ci/run-quantity-render-test.sh` work under), and a YAML reader written in `awk` was the obvious alternative and the wrong one: its failure mode is a parser that quietly reads nothing, finds no selector, reports no mismatch and leaves the test green for a chart it never looked at. So the rendered manifest stream is handed to that chart as a **values file** and comes back as JSON, which `python3` reads from the standard library. The one textual step is the document split on a line that is exactly `---` in column one, and getting *that* wrong does not produce a false pass — the fragment stops being valid YAML and `helm` exits 1.
-- **What is deliberately not checked, named so the gap is not mistaken for coverage.** `podAffinity`/`podAntiAffinity` are out of scope: their semantics are relative to pods that exist, so a term matching nothing is a legitimate configuration rather than a mistake. And a selector expressed **only** through `matchExpressions` is **reported as "not checked", never counted as passing** — evaluating set-based requirements means reimplementing label-selector semantics, which is a second parser by another name.
-- **Two anti-vacuum guards, because this test can be green over nothing.** Both objects are rendered only above a replica threshold, and most charts' CI fixtures sit below it. `ci/selector-match/<chart>.yaml` is a render-only overlay applied **last**, whose only job is to push a chart over that threshold — and a chart that *has* one and still renders no selector **fails**, since that overlay existing is the whole claim that something was checked. On top of that the run fails if **no selector at all** was checked anywhere. Today `stalwart` is exercised through its overlay (two replicas in both node groups plus an `externalServices.valkey.host`, without which the chart's own "cluster with no in-memory store" abort fires) and `keycloak` through its ordinary install-test fixture, which already runs two replicas.
+- **What is deliberately not checked, named so the gap is not mistaken for coverage.** *Preferred* `podAffinity` and `podAntiAffinity` of either strength are out of scope: their semantics are relative to pods that exist, so a term matching nothing is a legitimate configuration rather than a mistake — a preference that cannot be met is dropped, and an anti-affinity over zero pods is satisfied. And a selector expressed **only** through `matchExpressions` is **reported as "not checked", never counted as passing** — evaluating set-based requirements means reimplementing label-selector semantics, which is a second parser by another name.
+- **`requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution` `podAffinity` *is* checked** (Gitea #101), and it is the one affinity case that is not a preference: a required term whose selector matches no pod in the release can never be satisfied, so the pod stays `Pending` for good. It is held against **all** pod templates of the render rather than its own, because selecting a *different* workload's pod is the entire purpose of such a term. First and so far only user: `paperless-ngx`' consume CronJob, pinned onto the node of its StatefulSet pod so Longhorn will mount the shared RWX consume volume — where the silent failure would be a mover that stops moving, one `Pending` pod per schedule, with both templates still rendering perfectly.
+- **Two anti-vacuum guards, because this test can be green over nothing.** Both objects are rendered only above a replica threshold, and most charts' CI fixtures sit below it. `ci/selector-match/<chart>.yaml` is a render-only overlay applied **last**, whose only job is to push a chart over that threshold — and a chart that *has* one and still renders no selector **fails**, since that overlay existing is the whole claim that something was checked. On top of that the run fails if **no selector at all** was checked anywhere. Today `stalwart` is exercised through its overlay (two replicas in both node groups plus an `externalServices.valkey.host`, without which the chart's own "cluster with no in-memory store" abort fires), `keycloak` through its ordinary install-test fixture, which already runs two replicas, and `paperless-ngx` through `ci/selector-match/paperless-ngx.yaml`, whose only job is to switch `smbConnection` on so the consume CronJob — and with it the required `podAffinity` — renders at all.
 
-Measured: 30 charts, **5 selectors verified in ~14 s**, no cluster. The fail path was exercised rather than assumed — renaming `node-group` to `nodegroup` in a hand-written copy of the PDB selector produced two `FAIL` lines naming both the selector and the labels actually present, and a non-zero exit; the same was done for the spread constraint's selector.
+Measured: 30 charts, **6 selectors verified**, no cluster. The fail path was exercised rather than assumed — renaming `node-group` to `nodegroup` in a hand-written copy of the PDB selector produced two `FAIL` lines naming both the selector and the labels actually present, and a non-zero exit; the same was done for the spread constraint's selector. For the `podAffinity` check the same was done by renaming the StatefulSet's `app` label in a throwaway copy of `paperless-ngx` while leaving the CronJob's term alone: one `FAIL` naming the selector, the three pod templates it missed and the labels actually present, and a non-zero exit.
 
 ### HTTPRoute render test (all charts, every PR)
 
-`ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh [chart …]` (no argument = all charts) renders every chart with the same fixtures the install-test uses and checks every `HTTPRoute` in the result against the `Service` objects of that **same** render. Introduced with the Gateway-API pilot (Gitea #114); two failure modes, both silent:
+`ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh [chart …]` (no argument = all charts) renders every chart with the same fixtures the install-test uses and checks every `HTTPRoute` in the result against the `Service` objects of that **same** render. Introduced with the Gateway-API pilot (Gitea #114); three failure modes, all silent:
 
 | Finding | What it does | Who notices today |
 |---|---|---|
 | `parentRefs` empty | the route attaches to **no** Gateway: created, schema-valid, rejected by nobody, and it routes nothing | nobody — no event, no condition, the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer |
 | `backendRefs` naming a Service or a port that does not exist | the reference is resolved **by name** at runtime and validated by nothing | nobody in CI — `ResolvedRefs: False` lands in a route status that only a Gateway controller writes, and none runs here |
+| a prefix stripped with `ReplacePrefixMatch` while the same route carries no `Exact` match on that prefix with a `RequestRedirect` filter (Gitea #118) | the **slashless** form of the path is rewritten to `/` and answered **200** by the app, under a document URL that keeps the prefix off — so every relative link in that page resolves against the host root, which on a shared host is a *different* application | nobody — the app's own assets and XHRs are served by its neighbour, and the symptom is a half-working UI, not an error |
 
-**The real CRDs in the install-test do not close either gap**, which is the whole reason this job exists next to them: the Gateway-API schema happily accepts an empty `parentRefs` list and a `backendRefs` entry pointing at a Service that was never created. The CRDs prove the object is *well-formed*; this test proves it *points somewhere*. The port half is a genuine new exposure rather than a hypothetical: an Ingress backend references its Service port **by name**, while `backendRefs` takes a `PortNumber` and cannot, so the number in the route and the port in the Service are kept in step by hand from now on.
+**The real CRDs in the install-test close none of these gaps**, which is the whole reason this job exists next to them: the Gateway-API schema happily accepts an empty `parentRefs` list, a `backendRefs` entry pointing at a Service that was never created, and a prefix-stripping rewrite with no redirect beside it. The CRDs prove the object is *well-formed*; this test proves it *points somewhere*, and *somewhere right*. The port half is a genuine new exposure rather than a hypothetical: an Ingress backend references its Service port **by name**, while `backendRefs` takes a `PortNumber` and cannot, so the number in the route and the port in the Service are kept in step by hand from now on.
+
+The third check is a **pairing within one HTTPRoute object**, and the scope is deliberate: Gateway-API matching precedence is a property of a single route, so a redirect in a *different* route (a different hostname) says nothing about this one. Precedence also makes the pairing a question of existence rather than order — an `Exact` path match outranks every prefix match, so the redirect rule wins wherever it is emitted, and the rules' length-descending order stays a rendering convention. `freesailarr` is the first chart it applies to — **and, after group 3, still the only one.** The line that used to stand here said `bulwark` was the second `rewrite-target` chart and would meet the same check when group 3 landed. Group 3 landed and it does not: **`bulwark` has one Ingress object, no `rewrite-target`, and cannot have one** — `NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH` is compiled into its bundle, so it cannot be served under a sub-path at all and its route is one rule at `/` with no `URLRewrite` filter. Every occurrence of the string `rewrite-target` in that chart is an explanation of *why it does not help*, and #114's measured table arrived at "`bulwark`, `freesailarr`" by grepping for the string rather than for the annotation. The check still runs over all charts for the reason below — the mistake arrives by copy into a chart whose own diff nobody reads for it — not because a second chart is known to need it.
 
 Three things to know before touching it:
 
 - **Helm is the YAML parser**, through `ci/yaml2json`, for the same reason as the selector-match test above — the runners have neither `pyyaml` nor `yq`, and a parser written in `awk` fails by reading nothing and reporting nothing.
-- **What is deliberately not checked**, named so the gaps are not mistaken for coverage. *That traffic flows* — no Gateway controller runs in CI and none will, so `Accepted: True` is not obtainable; that claim is simply not made anywhere in this pipeline. *Mutual exclusion with the Ingress* — each chart aborts its own render when `ingress.enabled` and `httpRoute.enabled` are both true, which is where it belongs: this test renders one configuration per chart, and a rule here would have to assume the switch is chart-global, which may not survive the multi-app charts of the sweep. *Cross-namespace and non-Service backends*, and a rule with no `backendRefs` at all (legal for a filter-only rule) — all three are **reported as "not checked", never counted as passing**.
-- **Two anti-vacuum guards**, because the convention ships `httpRoute.enabled: false` and this test would otherwise be green over nothing. `ci/httproute/<chart>.yaml` is a render-only overlay applied **last** whose one job is to put a chart into Gateway mode — and a chart that *has* one and still renders no route **fails**. On top of that the run fails if **no assertion at all** held anywhere. Today `cyberchef` is exercised through its ordinary install-test fixture (which installs in Gateway mode, see below) and `template-chart` through its overlay.
+- **What is deliberately not checked**, named so the gaps are not mistaken for coverage. *That traffic flows* — no Gateway controller runs in CI and none will, so `Accepted: True` is not obtainable; that claim is simply not made anywhere in this pipeline. *That any redirect is ever served* — the pairing check proves the rendered **object** carries a `RequestRedirect` rule on the bare prefix and nothing more: whether an implementation honours the `statusCode` or declines it and fails the whole route is outside what a render can see. *Mutual exclusion with the Ingress* — each chart aborts its own render when `ingress.enabled` and `httpRoute.enabled` are both true, which is where it belongs: this test renders one configuration per chart, and a rule here would have to assume the switch is chart-global, which may not survive the multi-app charts of the sweep. *Cross-namespace and non-Service backends*, and a rule with no `backendRefs` at all (legal for a filter-only rule) — all three are **reported as "not checked", never counted as passing**. The redirect rule the pairing check demands is itself backend-less, so a chart that satisfies that check also earns one "not checked" line; both verdicts are correct at once.
+- **Two anti-vacuum guards**, because the convention ships `httpRoute.enabled: false` and this test would otherwise be green over nothing. `ci/httproute/<chart>.yaml` is a render-only overlay applied **last** whose one job is to put a chart into Gateway mode — and a chart that *has* one and still renders no route **fails**. On top of that the run fails if **no assertion at all** held anywhere. `cyberchef` is exercised through its ordinary install-test fixture (which installs in Gateway mode, see below), every other converted chart through its overlay. For a multi-app chart the overlay also has to enter every shape the template has: `ci/httproute/freesailarr.yaml` moves one app onto a host of its own so that the shared-host route *and* the per-app route are both rendered.
 
-Measured in CI (run 719): **30 charts, 4 assertions held**, whole job 13 s including checkout and the Helm setup, no cluster. The fail path was exercised rather than assumed: a Service renamed in the route, a port the Service does not expose, a port left out entirely, an emptied `parentRefs` with the chart's own guard disabled, an overlay that renders no route, and a run with zero assertions — each produced a `FAIL` naming both sides and a non-zero exit.
+Measured in CI (run 719, the pilot): **30 charts, 4 assertions held**, whole job 13 s including checkout and the Helm setup, no cluster. Group 1 took that to 20 assertions over 10 charts and group 2 to 36 over 15; the prefix/redirect pairing of Gitea #118 adds the first check since the pilot rather than a chart, which brought it to 37 over 15 — one assertion for `freesailarr`'s `/qbittorrent`, plus one more "not checked" line for the backend-less redirect rule it demands. Group 3 took it to `56` assertions over `21` charts, from six charts of which three contribute more than one route: `keycloak` 4 (public and admin routes), `matrix-synapse` 4 (homeserver and delegation routes), `homeassistant` 5 (two routes, three rules — its overlay was the first in the repo that has to *supply* hostnames, since the chart has no `ingress.domain`), `bulwark` 2, `stalwart` 2, `ytdlp-web-player` 2. **`rss-bridge` finishes the sweep at `58` assertions over `22` charts** — read on this branch, which does **not** contain the realm-hostname round of Gitea #122 (measured separately at `60` over `21`, on a branch that did not contain `rss-bridge`). **Neither total includes the other, so the figure to trust from either is the delta**; the running total was therefore read off the first branch that contained both — the realm-hostname branch rebased onto this one — and it is **`62` assertions over `22` charts**, `0` failed. `keycloak` contributes `8` of them: one `parentRefs` and one `backendRefs` assertion for each of its four routes, the two realm routes adding one "not checked" line each for their backend-less redirect rule (`keycloak: ok (8 assertion(s) held, 2 not checked)`). The #118 prefix/redirect pairing deliberately does **not** fire on those two: it is scoped to rules that strip a prefix with a `ReplacePrefixMatch` rewrite, and a realm route strips nothing — it redirects the bare root of a hostname that serves one realm. The delta here is one route, so two assertions, and its overlay is the **second** that has to supply hostnames — for a different reason than `homeassistant`'s, which is worth keeping apart. `homeassistant` has no `httpRoute.hostnames` key at all and its overlay supplies the names through `ingress.hosts`; `rss-bridge` *has* the key and its overlay fills it, because this chart has no `ingress.domain` to fall back to either but its hostnames are unambiguous (one Service, one path). **The MTA-STS routes of Gitea #123 add `2`**, and they are the entry that shows what this figure means once the sweep is over: `stalwart` goes from `2` assertions to `4` — one `parentRefs` and one `backendRefs` assertion for its new MTA-STS route — and **the chart count does not move at all**. Every earlier entry in this history grew because a chart *joined* the list; this is the first that grew because a chart already in it gained an **object**, which is the ordinary shape of the next one too. Following the same delta rule, and read off the first run that contains all three rounds — this branch, rebased onto a `main` that already held `rss-bridge` and the realm hostnames — the figure is **`64` assertions over `22` charts**, `0` failed. The delta counts only because the overlay was extended to enter the new shape: `ci/httproute/stalwart.yaml` carries an entry with a `clusterIssuer`, one without, and one host on a **subdomain**. An overlay left alone would have added a second route this test never rendered — the anti-vacuum rule biting on a *second* object inside a chart that already passes, which no per-chart "has an overlay" check can see. **The Ingress half of that feature is not covered here at all**, because an overlay's one job is to switch Gateway mode on; it sits in `ci/stalwart/test-values.yaml`, where the install-test has a real API server accept it.
+
+**And in the same PR that chart's install-test went green, which is the event Gitea #51 was waiting for.** It had failed on the Gitea runner for months (uid 33 unable to read `/app/index.php`, startup probe 403 through its whole budget), and the chart was deliberately kept *out* of `ci/excluded-charts.txt` precisely so that the day it passed would be noticed rather than silenced. It passed: k3d cluster up, `helm install` in Ingress mode, pod `1/1 Ready` in 22 s with 0 restarts, and no `Permission denied` anywhere in the job. **The chart cannot be the reason, and that is measured rather than argued** — the rendered output for the fixture values is byte-identical to `origin/main`, so the pod spec that installed is exactly the one `main` produces. The implicated layer is the runner, which is where #51 had already put the burden of proof. Two cautions belong with the result: **nobody has identified what changed on the runner**, and a green test does not explain itself — it has reproduced on every run of that branch since, across several commits, so it is not a fluke - but that is still a colour and not a cause; and the install covers **Ingress** mode, since that is what the fixture installs — so this chart's Gateway mode stays render-only, exactly like its 21 siblings rather than worse than them.
+
+The fail path was exercised rather than assumed: a Service renamed in the route, a port the Service does not expose, a port left out entirely, an emptied `parentRefs` with the chart's own guard disabled, an overlay that renders no route, a run with zero assertions, and — for the pairing — both the redirect rule deleted outright and the redirect pointed at a path other than the one stripped; each produced a `FAIL` naming both sides and a non-zero exit.
+
+### Bump-level test (the version-bump hook, every PR)
+
+`ci/run-bump-level-test.sh` (no arguments) holds every case of `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` against the version string it writes. Added with Gitea #128, which is what made it necessary: until then the hook was a calculator with one branch, and with the update type coming from Renovate it became the thing that *says how big a change a cluster is being offered* — while the chart version is the only signal anything downstream sees (see "Chart dependencies": Fleet reads our chart version and nothing inside the package).
+
+Its failure mode is the silent kind this section's two rules are about: **a wrong level is a valid version string.** The PR goes green, the chart publishes, and the only symptom is a number that understates what it ships. Nothing in the pipeline reads that number, so nothing but a test can.
+
+A case is not a function call, because the script reads the **base commit** (`git show HEAD:<chart>/Chart.yaml`) *and* the working tree: each of the 49 cases gets a throwaway `git init` under `mktemp -d`, one commit carrying the base `Chart.yaml`, and the new one written over it uncommitted — the state Renovate's `postUpgradeTasks` hook actually runs in. Signing is switched off per command, since this workspace signs through an SSH signer and a throwaway repo has no business invoking it. No Helm, no cluster, no `pyyaml`, no `yq`, no Docker: the fixtures are six-line `Chart.yaml` files written with `printf`, and the assertion is one `version:` line read back with `sed`. The job therefore carries no Helm step and takes about a second.
+
+What the cases cover: each update type, the `freesailarr` shape (an app minor while `appVersion` stands still), all seven non-semver app versions plus the majors that must *not* fall back, the maximum rule in both directions including a stale branch version that must **not** be kept, a missing and an empty and an unknown second argument, and the inputs the script must leave alone — a chart new on the branch, `template-chart`, a `.github/` or `ci/` argument, no argument at all. The full `version:` line is asserted in every case, so the `+up` suffix and its dash-to-dot normalization are covered throughout.
+
+**What it cannot assert, and does not pretend to:** that Renovate passes the update type at all. The hook runs only when the command is allow-listed on the shared instance, which is outside this repository — which is why a *missing* second argument is itself a case here, and why the change that introduced it carries a dry run instead of a claim (see "The version-bump hook").
+
+### YAML-scalar render test (all charts, every PR)
+
+`ci/run-yaml-scalar-render-test.sh [chart …]` (no argument = all charts) renders every chart with the same fixtures the install-test uses and checks that **every scalar Kubernetes types as a string really arrived as one**. Introduced with Gitea #11, where a value rendered without `| quote` had been shipping in a chart for months; #112 turned out to be the same defect in the same chart's `env` block. Three assertions, and all three are properties the API itself requires — there is no chart for which the opposite is a legitimate configuration, which is why this test needs no per-chart expectations:
+
+| Assertion | What a bare render does | Who notices today |
+|---|---|---|
+| `CronJob.spec.schedule` is a non-empty string | a schedule beginning with `*` (the commonest cron notation there is) or with `@` **aborts the render** — YAML reads the leading character as an alias or a reserved indicator | the operator, eventually: the error names the **template** and their own value appears nowhere in it, and **quoting it in the values file does not help**, because Helm passes the string's content through |
+| every `env[].value` of every container and initContainer is a string | `"true"` and `"0755"` are legal plain scalars that are **not strings**: the chart renders perfectly and the API server rejects the object with `cannot unmarshal bool into Go struct field EnvVar.value of type string` | nobody until apply time — which in this repo means the install-test or a cluster, never the render |
+| every `metadata.labels` and `metadata.annotations` value is a string | both are typed `map[string]string`, so a unit-less `100` in an upload-size annotation is rejected whole | nobody in the render |
+
+**Why this job exists next to the render tests that already run:** the object that carried the original defect is rendered by **no fixture at all**. `paperless-ngx`' consume CronJob sits behind `smbConnection.enabled`, which is `false` in the chart defaults and `false` in its install-test fixture — deliberately, since the CI cluster has no SMB CSI driver. So nothing in this repository ever produced that object: not lint, not the other render tests, not the install-test. A test that renders only what the fixtures already render would have been just as blind, which is the whole argument for the overlays below.
+
+Three things to know before touching it:
+
+- **Helm is the YAML parser**, through `ci/yaml2json`, for the same reason as the two tests above — the runners have neither `pyyaml` nor `yq`, and a parser written in `awk` fails by reading nothing and reporting nothing.
+- **Two anti-vacuum guards.** `ci/yaml-scalar/<chart>.yaml` is a render-only overlay applied **last**, whose job is to switch such objects on *and to feed them the hostile values* — a schedule beginning with a star, an `env` value that is a bare `true`. A chart that *has* one and still renders none of the three kinds **fails**, and the run fails if **nothing at all** was asserted anywhere.
+- **What is deliberately not checked**, named so the gaps are not mistaken for coverage. A value rendered into a scalar that is **hand-quoted in the template** (`"{{ .Values.x }}"`) is a string in the output by construction, so this test is blind to it — what it can still do is break the YAML when the value itself contains a quote or a backslash, and only `| quote` fixes that. Everything that is **not** a label, an annotation, an `env` value or a schedule: a bare `storage:` or `className:` is just as unquoted, but its value space is DNS labels and quantities, where no legal value is YAML-ambiguous. And **whether a cron schedule is a *valid* schedule** — that is the controller's judgement, and narrowing the schema to a regex was considered and rejected, because the defect was never a wrong schedule but a correct one rendered bare.
+
+Measured locally: **30 charts, 408 scalars verified, 0 failed**, no cluster. The fail path was exercised rather than assumed, in all three of its shapes, against a throwaway copy of the chart as it stands on `main`: the unquoted schedule aborted the render with `yaml: line 6: did not find expected alphabetic or numeric character` and the test reported it; with only the schedule quoted, the star-valued `env` entry aborted the render on the StatefulSet instead; and with only the bool-looking value left — a render that **succeeds** — the type assertion produced a `FAIL` naming the variable, the container and the exact API-server message. **Seven charts still render their `env` block bare** (`matrix-synapse`, `minecraft-router`, `minecraft-server`, `rallly`, `satisfactory`, `teamspeak-server`, and `paperless-ngx` until #11); the test is green for them only because their fixtures set no hostile `env` value, and the overlay is what makes the difference between covered and merely green.
+
+### NetworkPolicy render test (all charts, every PR)
+
+`ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh [chart …]` (no argument = all charts) renders every chart with the same fixtures the install-test uses and holds **every `NetworkPolicy` it renders against the pod specs, probes and Services of the same render**. Introduced with Gitea #5, which put a policy into all 29 installable charts at once with `networkPolicy.enabled: true` as the default — 29 objects whose every failure mode is silent, because the API server accepts a policy that filters **nothing** exactly as readily as one that filters **everything**.
+
+| Assertion | What goes wrong without it | Who notices today |
+|---|---|---|
+| the `podSelector` matches a pod spec of the same render | the object sits in the namespace, is listed by `kubectl`, reads as a boundary and filters nothing at all — usually because a label was renamed in the workload template, a different file and a different diff | nobody, ever: nothing is denied, so there is no symptom to trace |
+| every **ingress** port is a `containerPort` of the selected pods | a NodePort number where a pod port belongs. The policy is evaluated at the pod's interface, *after* kube-proxy translated the port, so `30025` matches nothing while looking strict — and being the only rule for that port, it blocks every inbound connection instead | nobody in CI (see below), and in production as a service that went mute |
+| no ingress rule allows every source by accident | `from: []` allows everything, identically to having no `from` at all, while reading in a diff and in `kubectl` output as a restriction — the one mistake in this class that makes a policy *weaker* while looking *stricter* | nobody |
+| every port a **network** probe addresses is either unrestricted, or the chart offers `networkPolicy.probeSources` **and** says in `NOTES.txt` what a wrong CIDR costs | the kubelet probes from the IP of the worker node running the pod, which no chart can know. A restricted probe port without that address drops every probe: the pod never becomes `Ready`, the rollout times out, and the symptom reads as a broken application | the install-test, in production's CNI — **but not in CI**, see below |
+| **cross-chart egress**: where a chart dials another chart *of this repository*, its egress rule must contain the **pod** ports behind that chart's Services (#136) | an egress rule naming the **Service** port. kube-proxy does the ClusterIP's destination NAT *before* the policy is evaluated at the pod's interface, so the policy sees `podIP:targetPort` and the rule matches nothing wherever `port` and `targetPort` differ | nobody: the symptom is a **timeout**, not `connection refused`, and no error mentions a NetworkPolicy — `paperless-ngx` 14.0.0 shipped it and cost an outage on 2026-10-15 |
+
+Egress ports are otherwise **deliberately not** held against the pod's `containerPort`s: an egress port is a port on the *destination*, and that comparison would fail every chart that reaches a database.
+
+**The one exception is the fifth row, and it is the only assertion here that needs two charts.** For a database, a cache or the web the destination is in no render this repository has — but it *is* in a render when one chart dials the Service of another, and `paperless-ngx` → `apache-tika`, `gotenberg` is the single place in the repository where that happens (checked for #136: the three other charts naming `port: 80` in a policy are aiming at the **internet**, where there is no DNAT and 80 is the real port). So the pairs live in an explicit table (`EGRESS_PEER_ROWS`) rather than being discovered — a chart cannot know which Service another chart dials, because the address is a value or a 1Password field — and a row naming a chart that no longer exists **fails** instead of being skipped. Each row is checked on **two** renders: with the feature gate **on** the containment must hold, and with it **off** the requirement must not apply *and* those ports must be gone, so a gated rule cannot quietly become one that permits what the release cannot use.
+
+Two guards beyond the four, both earned rather than designed. **A chart that renders no policy at all fails** — that is how this issue decayed in the first place: `garage` (#81) and `keycloak` (#83) were both created *after* #5 was filed and both arrived without a policy, `keycloak` with its unauthenticated management surface on 9000. And **a `#` comment inside a rendered policy fails**, because a `#` comment is part of the *object*: it travels into the cluster, shows up in `helm get manifest` and `kubectl get -o yaml`, and lands in every release diff. Reasoning belongs in Go template comments, which render nothing. Both precedent charts failed that check when it was first run, which is what it is for.
+
+Four things to know before touching it:
+
+- **Assertion 3 is stricter than it first reads, deliberately.** A *missing* `from` is the documented open form and both precedent charts use it on purpose, so banning it outright was not an option. It is accepted only where the render itself justifies being open: every port of the rule is addressed by a network probe, or is published by a `NodePort` Service in the same render. Anything else is an allow-all nobody chose.
+- **`exec` probes are not network probes**, and that distinction carries real weight rather than being a technicality. An `exec` probe runs inside the container through the kubelet's runtime and puts no packet on the network, so a chart whose probes are all `exec` can restrict its port by source with **no `probeSources` at all** — which is why `valkey` and `minecraft-server` have the tightest policies in the repository and every web app has a looser one.
+- **Subchart documents are skipped by the comment assertion**, for a structural reason and not a lenient one: a dependency is fetched from the Helm registry rather than from the copy in this repo, so the policy `paperless-ngx` and `stalwart` bundle is whatever `valkey` version is *published*, and nothing in the parent chart can change its rendered comments. The subchart's own PR is where it is caught, because this test runs over `valkey` too.
+- **Anti-vacuum guard**, as in the tests above: `ci/networkpolicy/<chart>.yaml` is a render-only overlay applied **last**, whose job is to render the **source-restricted probe rule** — a branch no chart's own defaults ever reach, and the one containing the expensive mistake (a `namespaceSelector` and a `podSelector` written as two list entries instead of one would be an OR, opening the port to every pod in `kube-system`). A chart that *has* an overlay and still renders no restricted **probe** rule fails. That counter is specifically the probe rule and not "any restricted rule", because `keycloak` restricts two rules in its own defaults and would have satisfied a looser guard while the branch went unrendered.
+
+Measured locally: **30 charts, 210 assertions held, 0 failed**, no cluster, ~15 seconds. All twelve fail paths were exercised rather than assumed — and one earned its keep immediately: the `probeSources` check was a substring test, so a chart whose key had been **deleted** while the long comment above it still discussed the value passed it. It now looks for the key. The cross-chart assertion added two of those 210, and its own six fail paths were executed the same way: a required port removed from the rule, a wrong number in its place, a peer chart renamed away, the policy's name no longer following the `<release>-<chart>-<kind>` convention, the peers rendering no Service at all (which would make the requirement empty, and is treated as a failure because an empty requirement reads exactly like a satisfied one), and the gated rule made unconditional — which is the failure path of the *gate-off* half, since with the gate off and the rule properly gated the assertion must stay silent.
+
+**What this test does not and cannot cover, named so the gap is not mistaken for coverage:** that traffic still flows. No ingress controller runs in the install-test cluster, so the path from Traefik to a pod is proven nowhere in this pipeline — and, measured on the PR for #5, **k3s exempts the kubelet's probe traffic from policy**, so a blocked probe path does *not* turn the install-test red either (`cyberchef` became `Ready` in 69s with its probe port restricted to an address no probe can come from). What the install-test *does* prove is enforcement of everything the application itself needs: with `outline`'s DNS egress rule removed, its pod never became `Ready` and the job failed after 5m59s. So the net under this convention is real, but it is an **egress** net — which raises the stakes for assertion 2, since a wrong ingress port is caught mechanically here or not at all.
 
 ### Install-test (PR pipeline stage 2)
 
@@ -252,7 +321,7 @@ What Renovate keeps current:
 | --- | --- |
 | Chart app versions (`appVersion:` in `Chart.yaml`) | One `customManagers` entry per chart, hard-coding the image repository |
 | Sidecar/init images in `values.yaml` (nginx, guacd, busybox, alpine) | Built-in `helm-values` manager |
-| **All** images of `freesailarr`, including its main one | Built-in `helm-values` manager — the chart pins every tag in `values.yaml` and has no app-version block. One exception: `mediathekarr` is pinned by **digest** (its tags carry no version) and has its own `customManagers` block |
+| **All** images of `freesailarr`, including its main one | Built-in `helm-values` manager — the chart pins every tag in `values.yaml` and has no app-version block. One exception: `mediathekarr` is pinned by **digest** (its tags carry no version) and has its own `customManagers` block. All ten arrive **grouped into one PR**, see "The one grouped chart" below |
 | GitHub Actions | Built-in `github-actions` manager |
 | Tool versions pinned as workflow env vars (`TRIVY_VERSION`) | `# renovate: datasource=… depName=…` comment above the line |
 
@@ -260,23 +329,51 @@ Each chart renders its main image as `<repo>:{{ .Chart.AppVersion }}` — reposi
 
 One rule those overrides share, learned from `searxng` and worth knowing before writing the next one: **a capture group is a claim about how the value is compared.** Renovate's regex versioning parses `major`, `minor`, `patch`, `build` and `revision` with `Number.parseInt` (`modules/versioning/regex/index.js`, `_parse`), so a non-numeric commit hash captured as `build` becomes whatever digits lead it — `9fea41204` is `9`, `777ba8fa4` is `777`, and a hash starting with a letter is `NaN`. Measured on renovate 41.173.1 and 44.48.0, that makes Renovate offer an image pushed *earlier the same day* as an update to a newer one — a downgrade wearing the clothes of a routine date bump, which is exactly what a review waves through and automerge then carries to `main`. Parts of a tag that carry no ordering belong **outside** every group: the anchored pattern still requires them to be there, they simply take no part in the comparison. `prerelease` is not the way out either — it sorts correctly but marks every tag `isStable === false`, which hands the whole chart to `ignoreUnstable`. `freesailarr` has no **app-version** block on purpose — see the images exception above; a block would either duplicate the `helm-values` updates or rewrite an `appVersion` that selects no image. It does carry one `customManagers` block, for `mediathekarr`: that image is pinned by digest because its tags carry no version (`latest` is a 2024 build, `beta` moves), and the built-in `helm-values` manager reads only `repository`/`tag` and skips it (`skipReason: invalid-value`), so the two cannot collide. Digest rules need the same guard as versioning rules and for a sharper reason: while the pin is current, a matching rule and a broken one produce the identical empty result. Verified with two dry-run fixtures — the real digest yields no update, a deliberately stale one yields exactly one `digest` update back to the pinned digest.
 
-A consequence of pinning every tag in `values.yaml`: `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` sees an unchanged `appVersion` and bumps the chart **patch**. That holds for all ten images alike, the digest-pinned one included — none of them is special — and it is the intended outcome, since `appVersion` here is the chart's own marker rather than a tracked upstream version.
+A consequence of pinning every tag in `values.yaml`, and the measurement that forced the change in Gitea #128: `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` used to see an unchanged `appVersion` and bump the chart **patch** — for all ten images alike, the digest-pinned one included. `appVersion` here is the chart's own marker rather than a tracked upstream version, so a comparison had nothing to read: prowlarr's `2.5.2 → 2.6.5` was an upstream **minor** that arrived as a chart patch. Since #128 the level comes from Renovate's classification instead (`{{{updateType}}}`, the hook's second argument), so a minor among the ten makes a chart minor and a mixed group takes the highest level in it. The `+up` suffix still follows `appVersion` and therefore still stands still.
+
+**That open point is now decided (Gitea #128), and the decision is deliberately smaller than the problem.** The gap was real: the automatic patch was also a *classification*, and the convention exempts a "plain app-version bump" from the wiki obligation — so an image update that quietly changed a **default** was the one case where nothing reviewed it and nothing documented it. It had already happened: the `sonarr` 4.0.19 bump carried upstream's removal of the hard-coded trusted proxy networks and reached `main` unremarked (see [Lessons learned](https://git.jk-dev.de/jlab-cluster/helm-charts/wiki/Lessons-Learned)). What was decided is **the classification and not a reading duty**: the chart jump follows the app jump, so the number stops understating what it ships. The variant that would have caught that incident at its origin — *a chart minor or major obliges reading the upstream release notes, with the result stated in the PR even when it is "nothing found"* — was **rejected**, and its price is the part that stays: nobody is obliged to look behind the number, so an app minor that changes a default can still reach `main` unremarked. What the bigger number does buy is visibility where a patch has none — Fleet's `fleet.yaml` in `cluster-config` sees only our chart version (see "Chart dependencies"), so a minor is a number other gates can act on. Whether `cluster-config` actually distinguishes update types is **not** visible from this repository; that is the mechanism which makes the number effective, not a claim that it is in use.
 
 Two dependencies are constrained beyond their versioning. **nginx** (the Synapse delegation sidecar) is limited to **even minors** via `allowedVersions`. nginx numbers its release branches by minor — even is stable, odd is mainline — and the chart belongs on stable. Patch updates inside the stable branch still flow through normally. The constraint tolerates a variant suffix (`1.30.4-alpine`) on purpose: docker versioning only ever offers candidates carrying the current tag's suffix, so a suffix-blind constraint would silently freeze nginx the day the sidecar moves to a slimmer base image — a switch to `1.30.4-alpine` that #84 has commissioned a check on — with no error and no warning.
 
 **linuxserver/qbittorrent** (freesailarr) excludes two tags by name, `14.3.9` and `20.04.1`. They are leftovers from earlier linuxserver tagging schemes, and docker versioning sorts both above every real release, so Renovate offers them as major updates — PRs #152 and #153 were exactly that. They are named rather than cut off with an upper bound like `<10`, because a bound would eventually reject a genuine major, while two finished artifacts cannot grow and therefore cannot hide a future release. The same guard as for nginx applies and was run: a lookup from `currentValue 4.6.4` still offers `5.2.3` as a **major**, so the filter does not silently empty the update list. That fixture also shows the cost of leaving it alone — without the rule the very same lookup offers `20.04.1` and never mentions the real `5.2.3`, since Renovate fills the major bucket only once.
 
+### The one grouped chart
+
+`freesailarr` is the only chart whose updates are **grouped**: all ten of its images arrive as one PR per cycle (`groupName: "freesailarr stack"`), where every other chart in this repo gets one PR per image. For the others that is already the same thing — one chart, one image — so this is a rule about a ten-image chart rather than a change of policy. It is also the only `groupName` in `renovate.json5`, and it reverses what the comment above the app-version managers describes: the `helm-values` manager finding those ten images and proposing "one update per image". That sentence described what Renovate does, not what the chart wants.
+
+**What it fixes, measured on 2026-10-12.** Eight of the ten images had an open Renovate PR simultaneously (#102 bazarr, #103 qbittorrent, #104 sonarr, #105 flaresolverr, #106 recyclarr, #107 prowlarr, #108 radarr, #111 seerr). Each edits `freesailarr/values.yaml` and — through the `postUpgradeTasks` hook — `freesailarr/Chart.yaml`, so the API reported `mergeable: false` for all eight: they rewrite the same `version:` line. One could merge; the other seven then needed a rebase each, and every rebase restarts the most expensive install-test here (a real Wireguard tunnel, ten containers). A sharper second symptom came with it: all eight carried `version: 3.1.1+up1.0.0 → 3.1.2+up1.0.0` while `main` already stood at `3.3.0+up1.0.0`, because the hook derives everything from the **base commit** and those branches predated the Gateway-API rounds. A rebase repairs that, which is precisely the problem — nothing *fails* if the rebase does not happen first, so the repair depends on the bot reaching the branch before a human reaches the merge button. Grouped, there is one branch, one `version:` computed from one base, one publish and one install-test run.
+
+**Four decisions worth keeping** (the reasoning sits next to the rules in `renovate.json5`):
+
+- **Matched by file name, not by a list of images.** What causes the collision is "touches `freesailarr/Chart.yaml`", true of every dependency Renovate finds in that `values.yaml` regardless of manager or datasource. A `matchPackageNames` list would be a second place to keep the chart's image set current, and its failure mode is silence — an image added later never joins the group, with no error (#158: a valid rule is not a matching rule).
+- **`mediathekarr` is in the group** although it comes from its own `customManagers` block: its digest PR edits the same two files and blocks the others identically. `digest` is in `matchUpdateTypes` for exactly that, and its own block is untouched — a group decides which *branch* an update lands on, not how it is found.
+- **`gluetun` and the `busybox` init image are in too.** Neither "gluetun is the tunnel" nor "busybox is only an init container" has anything to do with the blocking, and a grouped PR hides nothing: the review still sees every changed line, just not eight times over.
+- **Majors stay out**, via `matchUpdateTypes: ["patch", "minor", "digest"]`. An app major must be taken stepwise in its own PR, and `separateMultipleMajor` splits a multi-major jump to produce that sequence; a group throwing a major in with seven patches would undo both.
+
+**It takes two `packageRules`, and that is not cosmetic.** Renovate refuses `matchUpdateTypes` and `separateMinorPatch` in one rule — `packageRules cannot combine both matchUpdateTypes and separateMinorPatch`, a config-validation error — which is consistent, since `separateMinorPatch` is what *decides* the split a rule would then be selecting on. So one rule groups the non-major update types and a second sets `separateMinorPatch: false` for the same file. Without that second rule the group still arrives as **two** PRs: verified by dry-run (`--platform=local --dry-run=full`, real registries) against a checkout holding those eight updates, they landed on `renovate/freesailarr-stack` (the three minors) and `renovate/patch-freesailarr-stack` (the five patches) — note that `separateMinorPatch` **prefixes** the branch rather than suffixing it, which makes the second name easy to miss in a branch list. With both rules, one branch carries all eight. The global `separateMinorPatch: true` keeps its reason for every other chart; "one red install-test must not block unrelated updates" simply does not apply within a single chart, where the updates share a pod, a chart version and a publish.
+
+What this cannot show from inside the repo: Renovate runs as the shared instance outside it, so a valid config and a correct local lookup are the evidence available — not the behaviour of the next real run.
+
 Not managed: `ci/**` (install-test fixtures pin throwaway infrastructure to major lines on purpose) and `template-chart/**` (placeholder image). A consequence worth knowing: `ci/matrix-synapse/fixtures.yaml` pins a Synapse image that Renovate will not follow — bump it by hand when the chart moves a major.
 
 ### The version-bump hook
 
-Renovate only rewrites `appVersion:` or an image tag; it knows nothing about `version: <chart-semver>+up<app-version>`. Left alone, every chart PR would fail the `build-chart` version check. `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh <chart-dir>` closes that gap and is wired up as a `postUpgradeTasks` command:
+Renovate only rewrites `appVersion:` or an image tag; it knows nothing about `version: <chart-semver>+up<app-version>`. Left alone, every chart PR would fail the `build-chart` version check. `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh <chart-dir> [update-type]` closes that gap and is wired up as a `postUpgradeTasks` command. **Since Gitea #128 the chart jump follows the app jump**, which turned the script from a calculator into deciding logic:
 
-- **app major changed** → chart major (`6.0.0` → `7.0.0`), matching "runtime behavior changes" in the semver conventions
-- **anything else** (plain app update, sidecar image) → chart patch
+- **update type `major`** → chart major (`6.0.0` → `7.0.0`), matching "runtime behavior changes" in the semver conventions
+- **update type `minor`** → chart **minor** (`6.0.0` → `6.1.0`) — the part that was missing, and where the incident sat
+- **`patch`, `digest`, `pin`, `pinDigest`** → chart patch
+- **no or unknown update type** → the pre-#128 behaviour: app major changed → chart major, anything else → chart patch
+- **never below what the branch already carries** — the maximum rule below
 - the `+up` suffix is recomputed from the new `appVersion`, dashes normalized to dots
 
-Everything is derived from the base commit, so the script is idempotent across the multiple updates a single Renovate branch can carry.
+**The level comes from Renovate, not from `appVersion`,** and that is the whole point: `freesailarr` keeps a hand-maintained `appVersion` for ten upstreams, so the update that prompted the rule moved an image tag in `values.yaml` while `appVersion` stood still (see "The one grouped chart" above). Verified rather than assumed — Renovate 44.155.7, keycloak pinned one minor back: `--platform=local --dry-run=full` classifies the update (`"updateType": "minor"`) but **never reaches the branch worker**, so it cannot show the hook at all; driving Renovate's own post-upgrade executor against a throwaway checkout does, and logs `cmd: "ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh keycloak minor"` with the script answering `1.3.0+up26.7.0 -> 1.4.0+up26.8.1 (update type minor)`.
+
+**Non-semver app versions stay at patch for a minor**, with the reason in the convention rather than in a footnote: in CalVer and date tags the second position is a *month*, so following it would mint a chart minor every month that says nothing about the risk, and in a four-part or suffixed version the positions are not semver positions at all. Seven charts on `main` are in that class — `rss-bridge` (`2026-09-30`), `homeassistant` (`2026.8.3`), `searxng` (`2026.9.13-3b8009065`), `minecraft-server` (`2026.8.2-java25`), `apache-tika` (`3.3.1.0-full`), `teamspeak-server` (`6.0.0-beta13.1`), `valkey` (`9.1.2-alpine`) — and an app **major** is not subject to it, so a year rolling over in a date tag is a chart major exactly as it was before. The honest edge: for `6.0.0-beta13.1` and `9.1.2-alpine` the numeric part *is* a semver line, so the fallback understates a real minor there. That is the accepted trade — conservative by default; a chart that wants the minor earns a documented exception rather than a widened pattern.
+
+**Maximum, not replacement.** The chart jump is the *greater* of the chart's own classification and the app jump, so a value that becomes required stays a chart major under an app patch. Mechanically it is also what makes a grouped branch deterministic: the hook runs once per update and every call recomputes from the same base commit, so without the maximum the last call would win and `freesailarr`'s minor-among-patches group would take whatever level it happened to end on. The script only ever keeps a *higher* version than it computes, which is why repeated runs stay idempotent, and everything else is derived from the base commit for the same reason.
+
+`ci/run-bump-level-test.sh` holds every one of those cases (49 of them) against the version string the script writes — a wrong level is a valid version string, so the PR would go green and the only symptom would be a number that understates what it publishes.
 
 > **One-time setup outside this repo:** `postUpgradeTasks` only runs on self-hosted Renovate **and** only when the command is allow-listed in the *instance* config:
 >
@@ -285,6 +382,8 @@ Everything is derived from the base commit, so the script is idempotent across t
 > ```
 >
 > Without that entry Renovate skips the task without an error and every chart PR stays red on the version check.
+>
+> **The second argument depends on that pattern's shape, and the shape is not visible from here.** Renovate matches the allow-list against the **compiled** command (`allowedCommands.some((p) => regEx(p).test(compiledCmd))`), so the front-anchored form above still matches with an argument appended — measured, see the dry run noted in `renovate.json5`. A pattern anchored at the end on the instance (`…\.sh$`) would stop matching and produce the same silent skip a missing entry does. Only the maintainer can check that at the instance. It is why the script treats a **missing** update type as the pre-#128 behaviour instead of an error: the worst case of a narrower allow-list, an older Renovate or an unpopulated template field is the old classification, not red chart PRs.
 
 If the dependency dashboard reports `Failed to look up github-releases package …: no-result` for third-party repos, that is the instance's github.com credentials, not this config. The instance needs a read-only PAT as `GITHUB_COM_TOKEN` for github.com datasource lookups; its own platform token is a Gitea token and is worth nothing there.
 
@@ -305,7 +404,7 @@ The config is aligned with the one in `cluster-config`, because the same `jlab-r
 
 - **Automerge is global** (`automerge: true`, `automergeType: "pr"`, `platformAutomerge: true`) — every update type, **majors included**. The safeguard is not the absence of automerge, it is the branch protection: `main` requires a **review** and requires `validate-charts` to pass. `platformAutomerge` arms the PR on the forge, and Gitea merges it when *both* conditions are met, so an armed PR without a review simply sits there. This is the setting the older `platformAutomerge: false` comment in `renovate.json5` named as the better one "once required checks exist on `main`" — they now do. Same reasoning as `cluster-config`, which retired its dashboard-approval step for it.
 - **`minimumReleaseAge: "3 days"`** for `patch`, `minor` and `digest` updates. Renovate does not even open the PR before then. A merge here is never just a merge — a chart publish follows it straight away — so a release that gets yanked hours after it appeared must not reach the registry. Majors carry no age gate: they are held at the review, not by a delay.
-- **Majors** arrive one line at a time (`separateMultipleMajor`): a v1 → v3 jump produces a PR for the latest v2 first and then one for v3 — the stepwise procedure the versioning section requires. `separateMinorPatch: true` likewise splits minor and patch into separate PRs, so one red install-test does not block unrelated updates.
+- **Majors** arrive one line at a time (`separateMultipleMajor`): a v1 → v3 jump produces a PR for the latest v2 first and then one for v3 — the stepwise procedure the versioning section requires. `separateMinorPatch: true` likewise splits minor and patch into separate PRs, so one red install-test does not block unrelated updates. **It has one exception**, `freesailarr`, where it is overridden to `false` — see "The one grouped chart" below for why that separation is wrong inside a single chart.
 - **No PR caps** (`prConcurrentLimit: 100`, `prHourlyLimit: 0`), as in `cluster-config`. The known cost, written down rather than discovered: the first run after a quiet week can open many PRs at once, and every chart PR starts a k3d install-test — which on a Gitea runner queues inside one job rather than fanning out (see "Where this repo lives"). That queue is the accepted trade for not having updates trickle in four per hour.
 - **`config:best-practices`** is in `extends`. Two of its members matter here: `helpers:pinGitHubActionDigests` moves the workflow files from `actions/checkout@v7` to SHA pins (wanted), and `docker:pinDigests` is switched off again for `custom.regex` and `helm-values` — an `appVersion:` is a tag by construction (`<repo>:{{ .Chart.AppVersion }}`, and the `+up` suffix is built from the same string), so a digest has nowhere to go. Sidecar digests in `values.yaml` *could* be pinned; that is a separate decision, since each digest change would be a chart patch plus a publish.
 - The manually dispatched `change-app-version.yml` still exists for one-off bumps, but the normal path for app updates is now a Renovate PR.
@@ -345,10 +444,11 @@ These guidelines are **binding for every current and future chart** in this repo
 ### 2. Versioning
 
 - `Chart.yaml` uses `version: <chart-semver>+up<appVersion>`; the `+up` suffix matches `appVersion`, with dashes normalized to dots (e.g. `0.0.36-beta` → `+up0.0.36.beta`). `appVersion` is the **exact image tag** of the main app image.
-- Semver rules for the chart part:
-  - **Patch**: bug fixes without behavior or values-schema change; plain app-version updates.
-  - **Minor**: additive, backward-compatible changes (new optional values with unchanged defaults).
-  - **Major**: runtime behavior changes or breaking values changes (e.g. resource renames, probes, security hardening, values that become required).
+- Semver rules for the chart part. **The chart jump is the greater of the chart's own classification and the jump of what it ships** (Gitea #128) — a maximum, never a replacement, so a value that becomes required is a chart major even under an app patch:
+  - **Patch**: bug fixes without behavior or values-schema change; an app **patch** or digest update.
+  - **Minor**: additive, backward-compatible changes (new optional values with unchanged defaults); an app **minor** update.
+  - **Major**: runtime behavior changes or breaking values changes (e.g. resource renames, probes, security hardening, values that become required); an app **major** update.
+- The app half of that is mechanical and belongs to the hook rather than to a reviewer's judgement: `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` takes the level from Renovate's update type, with non-semver app versions staying at patch for a minor and a missing update type falling back to the old behaviour. The full rule, the seven affected charts and what it deliberately does **not** oblige anybody to read are in "The version-bump hook" above.
 - Any push to `main` touching a chart directory publishes that chart, so the version must be bumped in the same change.
 
 ### 3. Images
@@ -364,7 +464,8 @@ These guidelines are **binding for every current and future chart** in this repo
 - `ingress.className` selects the ingress class and defaults to `nginx`.
 - `ingress.annotations` takes optional extra annotations that are merged with the cert-manager `cluster-issuer` annotation the chart always sets.
 - The TLS secret is named `tls-<release>-<chart>-ingress`.
-- **Documented exception — homeassistant**: keeps its upstream-style flexible ingress values (host/tls lists, no required values); only its `ingress.className` default follows the standard (`nginx`, clearable to omit the field).
+- **A set of objects publishing ONE backend under hostnames the chart does not own is the third admissible shape, and it buys its secret name and its issuer per entry (Gitea #122).** Where a chart's app serves several tenants from one deployment and each wants a hostname of its own — `keycloak`'s realms are the case this was written for — the hostnames come as a values list and the chart renders one object per entry. Two convention rules do not survive that, and both deviations are **required**, not merely tolerated: the TLS secret name is a per-entry value with **no** default, because these hostnames already have certificates and several entries typically share one (a wildcard for a zone), so a derived `tls-<release>-<chart>-...` name per entry would ask cert-manager for a second certificate for a name that is already covered — one ACME order per hostname, for nothing; and the cert-manager annotation becomes **optional per entry**, because cert-manager keys a Certificate by the secret it writes, so of several objects naming one secret exactly one may carry it. That is the same deliberate omission the qBittorrent object in `freesailarr` makes, for the same reason, and it is why the secret name is required rather than defaulted: a chart that invents the name cannot also leave the issuing to somebody else. Annotations are per entry too, since the set is not uniform across the hostnames. Object names carry the **list index**, for the reason spelled out in the homeassistant bullet below — a hostname is not a dependable object-name fragment, so reordering the list renames and recreates the objects — and the entries render in **both** routing modes: a routing value in this repository is mode-independent by design, so a feature rendering in one mode only would silently disappear when an installation switched. That is also why the per-entry `parentRefs` exists, as the counterpart of the per-entry class.
+- **Documented exception — homeassistant, and it extends to the Gateway mode**: keeps its upstream-style flexible ingress values (host/tls lists, no required values); only its `ingress.className` default follows the standard (`nginx`, clearable to omit the field). Because it has **no `ingress.domain`**, it has **no `httpRoute.hostnames`** either — the second chart without that key after `freesailarr`, and the schema rejects it outright so the absence is enforced rather than merely intended. The hostnames and the paths come from `ingress.hosts`, which is therefore read in **both** modes and is not an Ingress-only value, and the chart renders **one `HTTPRoute` per entry** of that list with one rule per path of the entry. One object carrying several hostnames would be wrong rather than merely different: an `HTTPRoute`'s rules apply to *every* hostname of the object, and per-host paths are this chart's whole point. `ingress.className`, `ingress.tls` and `ingress.annotations` are not read in Gateway mode. Route names carry the entry's **index**, not its hostname (a hostname is not a dependable object-name fragment), so reordering `ingress.hosts` renames routes and therefore recreates rather than edits them — harmless, since a route holds no state and no certificate, but worth knowing before it looks like a bug. Its `pathType` default is the awkward one; see the `ImplementationSpecific` rule in the Gateway-API bullets below.
 - **A shared domain with sub-paths is the second admissible ingress shape.** Where a chart exposes several apps, they may either each take a host of their own or share one host and be told apart by path (`domain.tld/sonarr`, `domain.tld/radarr`, …) — one DNS name and one certificate for the whole bundle. The rules for the shared shape: the domain is a single value (`ingress.host`), each app's path is its own value defaulting to `/<app>`, the paths render in one Ingress object `<release>-<chart>-ingress` with the standard TLS secret `tls-<release>-<chart>-ingress`, and an app that carries a host of its own always wins and keeps its own object — so both shapes mix without extra values. An app that needs a per-path proxy annotation (`rewrite-target` is per **object**, not per path) gets its own object on the same host, repeating the same TLS secret name and **omitting** the cert-manager annotation, so that exactly one certificate is requested. Apps that cannot serve a base path must be rendered at `/` or refused with a `fail` — never rendered somewhere they provably cannot work.
 - **The Gateway API is the second routing mode, and it is implementation-neutral by construction (Gitea #114).** A chart offers it through one values block, off by default:
 
@@ -381,14 +482,40 @@ These guidelines are **binding for every current and future chart** in this repo
   - **A value, not auto-detection.** `.Capabilities.APIVersions` is unreliable at template time, and an `HTTPRoute` without the Gateway-API CRDs fails at install time — so a chart that guessed would sometimes render an object the cluster rejects and sometimes silently render nothing.
   - **Mutually exclusive with `ingress.enabled`**, enforced by a `fail` that names **both** value paths. Two paths onto the same Service under one hostname is a conflict at DNS level already; a migration runs over a **second hostname** (`httpRoute.hostnames` set explicitly while the Ingress keeps `ingress.domain`), never over parallel operation.
   - **`parentRefs` is mandatory in Gateway mode**, enforced by a `fail` on the empty list. A route without a parent attaches to nothing and is simply inert — created, schema-valid, rejected by nobody, reported by nothing.
-  - **One source of truth for the hostname.** Empty `hostnames` means `[ingress.domain]`; two values that have to agree drift apart. `ingress.domain` is therefore read in Gateway mode too — it names the release's public hostname and is not an Ingress switch.
+  - **One source of truth for the hostname.** Empty `hostnames` means `[ingress.domain]`; two values that have to agree drift apart. `ingress.domain` is therefore read in Gateway mode too — it names the release's public hostname and is not an Ingress switch. After the sweep there are **three** shapes here, and which one a chart gets follows from its values rather than from taste: a chart with an `ingress.domain` falls back to it (the default, most charts); a chart with no `ingress.domain` whose names could not be attributed — `freesailarr` to one of ten apps, `homeassistant` to one host entry and therefore one set of paths — has **no `hostnames` key at all** and reads the names where they already live; and `rss-bridge` has the key as a **mandatory** value with no fallback, because it has no `ingress.domain` either but its names *are* unambiguous (one Service at `/`), while the `ingress.hosts` list it would otherwise reuse carries per-host `tlsSecretName` values that address nothing once TLS sits on the listener. The rule behind all three: a hostname list is admissible exactly where it can say what it belongs to, and reusing an Ingress structure whose other half is meaningless in this mode is not a saving.
   - **`NOTES.txt` says which mode is active**, as `keycloak` already does for its cases, and names what the mode costs.
-  - **What has no counterpart, and must be said rather than rebuilt.** The Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour. `rewrite-target` has a real equivalent (the `URLRewrite` filter in a rule); **`proxy-body-size` has none** — an upload limit is implementation-specific policy, so a chart that depends on one must print in its Gateway-mode `NOTES.txt` that the limit is **not enforced** and has to be set at the Gateway. Five charts *set* one by default (`bulwark`, `calibre-web-automated`, `outline`, `paperless-ngx`, `zipline`), and `garage` is a sixth that *depends* on one without setting it: its `ingress.annotations` comment tells the operator to set `proxy-body-size: "0"` because ingress-nginx's 1 MB default truncates S3 uploads. Measured while sweeping group 1 — "sets no behaviour-bearing annotation" is not the same question as "needs none", and the sweep screens on the second one. The same applies to auth annotations in front of an app with no login of its own: in Gateway mode that escape hatch does not exist in the chart at all (`cyberchef`, `searxng`), and so does any annotation a chart documents as its only lever for a response header (`bentopdf`: `X-Robots-Tag`).
-  - **A value derived from `ingress.enabled` is a second thing the sweep has to look for, and it is not visible in the Ingress template.** Gateway mode sets `ingress.enabled: false` *by construction*, so any value computed from it flips — and where it stood for "is there a TLS-terminating proxy in front", the flipped value is wrong while nothing fails. Found in `sure`, whose `RAILS_ASSUME_SSL`/`RAILS_FORCE_SSL` would have gone `false` with TLS terminated at the Gateway: insecure cookies, no HSTS, `http://` links, green pod. The fix is one helper reading `ingress.enabled OR httpRoute.enabled`, not a new value. Still open on this count: `freesailarr` and `ytdlp-web-player` both read `.Values.ingress.enabled` outside their Ingress templates.
-  - **CI**: either the chart's install-test fixture installs in Gateway mode, or it gets a render-only overlay at `ci/httproute/<chart>.yaml` — otherwise `ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh` is green over nothing for it, which that test fails on.
+  - **What has no counterpart, and must be said rather than rebuilt.** The Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour. `rewrite-target` has a real equivalent (the `URLRewrite` filter in a rule); **`proxy-body-size` has none** — an upload limit is implementation-specific policy, so a chart that depends on one must print in its Gateway-mode `NOTES.txt` that the limit is **not enforced** and has to be set at the Gateway. Charts that *set or recommend* one carry that disclosure: `calibre-web-automated`, `outline`, `paperless-ngx`, `zipline` since group 2, `bulwark` and `matrix-synapse` since group 3. `garage` *depends* on one without setting it: its `ingress.annotations` comment tells the operator to set `proxy-body-size: "0"` because ingress-nginx's 1 MB default truncates S3 uploads. Measured while sweeping group 1 — "sets no behaviour-bearing annotation" is not the same question as "needs none", and the sweep screens on the second one. `freesailarr` is the mirror image of `garage` and was measured in group 2: it sets no body-size annotation and needs none itself, but `ingress.annotations` is the only lever an operator has for one (qBittorrent takes torrent-file uploads), so its Gateway-mode `NOTES.txt` says that an annotation set there is gone. The same applies to auth annotations in front of an app with no login of its own: in Gateway mode that escape hatch does not exist in the chart at all (`cyberchef`, `searxng`), and so does any annotation a chart documents as its only lever for a response header (`bentopdf`: `X-Robots-Tag`).
+  - **Screen the LIVE object, not only the chart — group 3's lesson, and the generalisation of Gitea #118.** A chart can read as correct while the running system fills a gap of the chart with an annotation the **operator** set, and the Gateway mode drops `ingress.annotations`, so it drops the compensation with it. At #118 that was found *after* shipping, on `freesailarr`, where the annotation was a redirect nobody would have looked for in the chart. Group 3 measured it beforehand with read-only `kubectl` against the live cluster, and **four of its six charts carried such an annotation that the chart never sets**: `keycloak` (`proxy-buffer-size: 16k` and `proxy-buffers-number: 4`, on *both* of its Ingress objects), `matrix-synapse` (`proxy-body-size: 50m`, plus the `nginx.org/client-max-body-size` twin for the other nginx controller, plus a `configuration-snippet`), `stalwart` (the whole `enable-cors` block), `bulwark` (`proxy-body-size: 25m`). None of them appears in a `git grep` of this repository, because no template sets any of them — the only hits are the *documentation* that recommends two of them. **The measurement at the live object is part of the procedure, not a flourish**, and reading the chart alone is not a substitute for it.
+  - **And read the annotation's directive before calling it load-bearing.** `matrix-synapse`'s live `configuration-snippet` looks like exactly what Synapse's `x_forwarded` setting depends on — client IP for rate limiting, and federation. It is not: `more_set_headers` is the headers-more module's **output**-header directive ("Replaces (if any) or adds (if not any) the specified output headers"), the request-side one being `more_set_input_headers`. Those headers therefore go on the **response to the client**; Synapse never sees them, and what it reads with `x_forwarded: true` is the *request's* `X-Forwarded-For`, which ingress-nginx supplies itself. So the scariest-looking loss in group 3 is not a loss at all, and its `NOTES.txt` says in as many words **not** to re-create it at the Gateway and not to read its absence as the cause of a rate-limiting problem. The real loss on that chart is the body size. A reading of documented semantics, stated as such — nothing A/B-tested a running Synapse.
+  - **"No counterpart" is a claim to check against the pinned CRDs, and for CORS it is false.** `stalwart`'s live Ingress carries `enable-cors` with an allow-origin pointing at `bulwark`, the webmail chart in the *same group* — so losing it breaks a second chart, with a browser console error and nothing at all in the server's log. Measured by grepping the CRD set this repo pins (`ci/gateway-api-crds.sh`, gateway-api v1.6.3 standard channel): HTTPRoute's filters **do** carry a full `cors` field (GEP-1767) with `allowOrigins`/`allowMethods`/`allowHeaders`/`allowCredentials`/`maxAge`, and its documented level, verbatim from that CRD, is `Support: Extended`. `responseHeaderModifier` is in the same CRD and is **also Extended, not Core**. The chart still renders neither, for three reasons in order: it has **no CORS values** to render one from (the origin and the method list are the operator's, and the chart sets no CORS annotation in Ingress mode either, so a filter would exist in Gateway mode only — an asymmetry that is its own defect and its own piece of work); **Extended support is not support**, since a rejected route is rejected *whole* (the reasoning #119 reached for `statusCode`) and the observed failure is quieter still — Cilium accepts `filters.type: CORS` and forwards the preflight upstream anyway, i.e. `Accepted: True` with the behaviour absent; and **half a CORS is worse than none, with the translatable half being the useless one here** — the browser's preflight must be answered *by the gateway* (the CORS filter's own contract forbids passing it upstream) and a bare header filter cannot do that, while this installation's allowed headers include `Authorization`, which makes **every** request preflighted. Hence: configure CORS at the Gateway with that implementation's own support *before* moving the host, and test from the browser — `curl` sends no preflight, so it passes while the webmail fails.
+  - **`rewrite-target` is the one place where the Gateway API is less machinery than what it replaces, not a translation of it.** `rewrite-target` applies per **Ingress object**; a `URLRewrite` filter applies per **rule**. A chart serving several apps under one host, one of which needs its prefix stripped, therefore needs a *second* Ingress object for that app — which then has to repeat the other object's TLS secret name, omit the cert-manager annotation so only one certificate is requested (conditionally, for the case where no other object renders), and match on an `ImplementationSpecific` regex path whose capture group the rewrite refers to. In Gateway mode all four disappear: one route, one rule per app, the filter on one rule, a plain `PathPrefix`. Measured on `freesailarr` in group 2, and after group 3 it is still the **only** chart here with a `rewrite-target`: `bulwark` was listed as the second one by #114 and by this file, and it has none — see the HTTPRoute-test section for why the string occurs in that chart four times without the annotation ever being set.
+  - **`pathType: ImplementationSpecific` has no counterpart either, and it is a chart *default* in one place.** Ingress offers `Exact`, `Prefix` and `ImplementationSpecific`; the Gateway API offers `Exact`, `PathPrefix` and `RegularExpression`. The first two map cleanly. `ImplementationSpecific` means "ask the controller", so nothing preserves it — and it is the default in `homeassistant`'s `ingress.hosts`, the one chart keeping upstream's flexible host list. The rule group 3 settled on, and the split is not tidiness: on the path `/` it is rendered as `PathPrefix`, because every controller treats a root `ImplementationSpecific` path as a prefix match and the chart's own default therefore works in Gateway mode unchanged; on **any other path the render aborts**, because in ingress-nginx an `ImplementationSpecific` sub-path is a **regex** and `PathPrefix` is not one, so mapping it silently would change how the path matches while the render stayed green — the #118 class of defect exactly. `RegularExpression` is deliberately not offered as an escape hatch: its support level is Implementation-specific, which is what the first rule above forbids.
+  - **A value derived from `ingress.enabled` is a second thing the sweep has to look for, and it is not visible in the Ingress template.** Gateway mode sets `ingress.enabled: false` *by construction*, so any value computed from it flips — and where it stood for "is there a TLS-terminating proxy in front" or "is this app published at all", the flipped value is wrong while nothing fails. Two finds so far, both fixed by one helper reading `ingress.enabled OR httpRoute.enabled` rather than by a new value:
+    - `sure` (group 1), whose `RAILS_ASSUME_SSL`/`RAILS_FORCE_SSL` would have gone `false` with TLS terminated at the Gateway: insecure cookies, no HSTS, `http://` links, green pod. Helper `sure.publishedOverTls`.
+    - `freesailarr` (group 2), whose `freesailarr.sharedIngressApps` was gated on `ingress.enabled` and is read by the `<APP>__SERVER__URLBASE` environment variables as well as by the routing objects. In Gateway mode that list would have come out **empty**, so Radarr, Sonarr and Prowlarr would have been told no base path while their routes served them under `/radarr`, `/sonarr`, `/prowlarr` — a UI whose assets and API calls are linked at the host root, behind a Ready pod. The two guards living in that helper (seerr/mediathekarr only at `/`, no duplicate paths on the shared host) would have gone unenforced in that mode for the same reason. Helper `freesailarr.published`.
+    - `ytdlp-web-player` (group 3), the one this file had listed as still open, and the find with the sharpest consequence. Its `ytdlp-web-player.validate` guard — which refuses to publish the application and the bundled oauth2-proxy on the **same host** — was gated on `ingress.enabled`, so in Gateway mode it went silent. **And that guard is needed more in Gateway mode, not less.** In Ingress mode ignoring it fails loudly: ingress-nginx's admission webhook rejects the second Ingress and the Fleet bundle lands in `ErrApplied`. In Gateway mode **the webhook never fires** — it compares Ingress objects with Ingress objects, and an `HTTPRoute` is a different kind — so nothing rejects anything, both objects stay valid, and one hostname is served over two data paths that are *not* equivalent: the proxy's Ingress goes through **authentication**, the chart's `HTTPRoute` goes straight to the application. Which one a client reaches depends on what DNS resolves to, so it is an authentication bypass that comes and goes with a record, reported by nothing. Helper `ytdlp-web-player.published`, and the Gateway-mode abort carries its own message saying exactly that.
 
-  Reference implementation: `template-chart/templates/xxx.httproute.yaml`. Pilot: `cyberchef`. Group 1 — the charts rendering one Ingress with no behaviour-bearing annotation — followed: `bentopdf`, `garage`, `patchmon`, `rallly`, `searxng`, `sure`, `urlaubsverwaltung`, `voucher-vault`. That leaves **twelve** charts plus `rss-bridge`, which is frozen for changes (#51) and is why #114 cannot be closed while #51 is open: group 2 is the annotation cases (`calibre-web-automated`, `outline`, `paperless-ngx`, `zipline`, `freesailarr`) and group 3 the special shapes (`homeassistant` is the documented ingress exception, `keycloak` and `bulwark` have two Ingresses each, `matrix-synapse` renders in a loop, `stalwart` renders per node group, `ytdlp-web-player` hangs off the oauth2-proxy subchart). `garage` was one of the named special cases and is done: it ships `ingress.enabled: false`, so both of its modes are off by default and its route is exercised by a render overlay rather than by the install-test, which keeps its Ingress.
-- **Documented exception — freesailarr**: the chart bundles several independently exposed apps in one pod, so it has **no** `ingress.domain`. It offers both shapes. By default each app carries its own `<app>.ingress.enabled` plus a required `<app>.ingress.host` (required only while that app's ingress is enabled and it is not on the shared domain) and renders its own Ingress object `<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress` with its own TLS secret `tls-<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress`. Setting the global `ingress.host` switches every app without a host of its own to the shared-domain shape under `<app>.ingress.path`; qBittorrent (no base path, needs a prefix-stripping rewrite) gets the extra object described above, and seerr as well as mediathekarr are pinned to `/` — mediathekarr because its UI links assets with root-absolute paths, which a rewrite cannot fix; with both of them on one shared host the duplicate-path guard fires and one of them needs a host of its own (its ingress is therefore off by default). `clusterIssuer`, `className` and `annotations` stay global defaults under `ingress.` and are overridable per app.
+    All three are now closed, and the screen was run over all six charts of group 3 rather than only the suspected one — and over `rss-bridge` as the last chart, where it came back **clean**: outside its Ingress template the only readers of an ingress value are `NOTES.txt`, which knows its own mode, and the `rss-bridge.tlsGroups` helper, which is called only from behind `ingress.enabled`. The application takes no base URL and no hostname in its environment, so there is nothing to compute from the switch and no `published` helper is needed. **A clean result is worth recording too**: the screen's value is that it is run, not that it always finds something, and "this chart needed no helper" is a measurement rather than an omission.
+  - **A subchart does not come along, and that has to be said where somebody will look for it.** `ytdlp-web-player`'s oauth2-proxy dependency has **no Gateway-API support** and this repo does not patch upstream charts (see "Chart dependencies"), so it renders an Ingress or nothing. In the *recommended* configuration — the proxy in the data path, owning the host, the chart's own routing object off — the object that publishes the release is therefore **the subchart's Ingress in both of the chart's modes**, and setting `httpRoute.enabled` there changes nothing about how the host is served. The chart's own route is for the proxy-disabled case or for the application on a host of its own, which is the documented unauthenticated bypass. Stated in the template header, in `values.yaml`, in the schema and in the proxy branch of `NOTES.txt`, because an operator migrating hosts would otherwise set the value and wonder why nothing moved.
+  - **CI**: either the chart's install-test fixture installs in Gateway mode, or it gets a render-only overlay at `ci/httproute/<chart>.yaml` — otherwise `ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh` is green over nothing for it, which that test fails on. An overlay for a multi-app chart has a second job: it must enter **every** shape the template has, or the branch nobody exercised is the one that breaks. `ci/httproute/freesailarr.yaml` gives one app a host of its own so both the shared-host route and the per-app route render.
+
+  Reference implementation: `template-chart/templates/xxx.httproute.yaml`. Pilot: `cyberchef`. Group 1 — the charts rendering one Ingress with no behaviour-bearing annotation — followed: `bentopdf`, `garage`, `patchmon`, `rallly`, `searxng`, `sure`, `urlaubsverwaltung`, `voucher-vault`. Group 2 — the charts whose behaviour hangs off an nginx annotation — followed: `calibre-web-automated`, `outline`, `paperless-ngx`, `zipline` (all four `proxy-body-size`) and `freesailarr` (`rewrite-target`). Group 3 — the special shapes: `homeassistant`, `keycloak`, `bulwark`, `matrix-synapse`, `stalwart`, `ytdlp-web-player`. **`rss-bridge` finishes the sweep**, as the twenty-second and last chart: 22 charts carried an Ingress template and 21 an HTTPRoute template, and the difference was exactly this one. It had been held back as frozen for changes by #51 — a runner defect, not a property of the chart — and the earlier claim that **#114 could not be closed while #51 was open no longer holds**: the maintainer lifted that freeze, so #114 closes with the chart converted while **#51 stays open**, since the runner defect is worked around for this purpose rather than fixed. Its shape: one `HTTPRoute` carrying **all three** of its hostnames, because nothing differs per host (every name serves the same Service at `/`, measured on the live Ingress), so `spec.hostnames` as a list is the whole answer and a second object would repeat one rule. It is also the only chart of the sweep whose Gateway branch has **no loss to document** — its live Ingress carries no `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io` annotation at all, so the group-3 screen came back empty. Its install-test, red since the move (#51), **went green in the conversion PR** with a pod `Ready` in 22 s and no `Permission denied`; since that PR's rendered defaults are byte-identical to `origin/main`, the chart is ruled out as the cause and the runner is the implicated layer. That green covers Ingress mode, which is what the fixture installs, so the Gateway mode of this chart is render-only like every other chart's.
+
+  **Three of #114's descriptions of the group-3 shapes did not survive contact with the charts**, and the corrected list is worth having here because it is the one somebody will copy from:
+
+  | #114 said | Measured |
+  |---|---|
+  | `keycloak` and `bulwark` have **two** Ingresses each | `keycloak` has two (public and admin hostname) and gets two routes. **`bulwark` has one.** |
+  | `bulwark` is the second `rewrite-target` chart | It has none and cannot have one — `NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH` is compiled into its bundle, so it cannot be served under a sub-path and its route is one rule at `/`. The grep that produced the claim hit the chart's *refutations* of the idea. |
+  | `matrix-synapse` renders its Ingresses **in a loop over several apps** | That is `freesailarr`. `matrix-synapse` renders **one** Ingress object with **two host rules** — the homeserver at `/` and the delegation nginx at `/.well-known/matrix` — which has to become **two** `HTTPRoute` objects, because `spec.hostnames` applies to the whole object and these two want different paths and different backends. |
+  | `stalwart` renders **per node group** | Its Services and StatefulSets do; the routing object does not and must not. One Ingress targets exactly `ingress.nodeGroup`'s own http Service, and the route keeps both of that template's guards — the management surface is not safe to spread over a group that may not run the management tasks. |
+
+  Three further group-3 specifics: **`keycloak`'s admin Ingress did not hang off `ingress.enabled`** before the sweep (`ingress.admin.enabled` gates it, and that value is not an Ingress switch — it also sets `KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN`), so `ingress.enabled: false` did not mean "no Ingress" and the object would have gone on claiming the admin host next to the admin route; it is gated on both now, which leaves the default render unchanged and only alters a combination that could not be coherent. `httpRoute.admin.parentRefs` falls back to `httpRoute.parentRefs` exactly as `ingress.admin.className` falls back to `ingress.className`, because **"which data path" is a property of the Gateway in this API, not of the route** — an internal Gateway there is what an internal ingress class is in the other mode. And **`stalwart` is the only chart in the sweep that still renders a `Certificate` in Gateway mode**: its mail certificate covers STARTTLS on 25 and implicit TLS on 465/993, which pass through neither an ingress controller nor a Gateway, so `ingress.domain` stays required there and the object must not be removed as part of a migration — deleting it drops SMTP and IMAP back to a self-signed certificate while every Kubernetes object stays green.
+
+  `garage` was one of #114's named special cases and was done in group 1: it ships `ingress.enabled: false`, so both of its modes are off by default and its route is exercised by a render overlay rather than by the install-test, which keeps its Ingress. `homeassistant` is the same case and the same treatment — its `ingress.enabled` default is `false` too, so group 3's overlay for it **adds** coverage the install-test never had rather than trading one object for another. `paperless-ngx` was the one chart in the repository that still rendered its Ingress **unconditionally**; group 2 gave it an `ingress.enabled` switch defaulting to `true`, because without a second value path there is nothing for the mutual-exclusion abort to name and the `required()` on `clusterIssuer` would have kept demanding a value the Gateway mode does not use.
+
+  **One place where the Gateway API is the better fit, found in group 3**: Matrix delegation. The server name is normally an apex domain that already serves a website, and under ingress-nginx two Ingress objects cannot both claim one hostname — the admission webhook rejects the second — which is why `matrix-synapse` has to carry the `/.well-known/matrix` rule *inside* its own single Ingress object. HTTPRoutes attached to the same listener for the same hostname are **merged** by the implementation, longest match winning, so in Gateway mode that route can sit beside whatever owns the apex without either side knowing about the other.
+- **Documented exception — freesailarr, and it extends to the Gateway mode**: the chart bundles several independently exposed apps in one pod, so it has **no** `ingress.domain` — and therefore **no `httpRoute.hostnames`** either, the only chart without that key. A chart-global list of hostnames could not say which of the ten apps it belonged to, so the hostnames stay where they already are, in `ingress.host` and `<app>.ingress.host`; both are read by both modes and neither is an Ingress switch. In Gateway mode the per-app shape renders one `HTTPRoute` per app (`<release>-<chart>-<app>-httproute`) and the shared shape exactly one (`<release>-<chart>-httproute`) with one rule per app — qBittorrent included, since its prefix-stripping rewrite is a per-rule filter there, and it is the one app contributing **two** rules: the rewrite plus a 301 from the bare, slashless prefix to the slashed form (Gitea #118). Without that redirect the slashless path is stripped to `/`, answered 200, and the page's relative links resolve to the root of the shared host — a different app. **The Ingress mode does not render it and cannot**: nginx offers only a `configuration-snippet` annotation, which is ignored unless the controller runs with `allow-snippet-annotations=true` (off by default since ingress-nginx 1.9, and it means accepting annotation risk level `Critical`), so the chart documents the snippet in `values.yaml` instead of shipping a no-op. It is the one place where the Gateway mode closes a gap rather than merely replacing machinery. It offers both shapes. By default each app carries its own `<app>.ingress.enabled` plus a required `<app>.ingress.host` (required only while that app's ingress is enabled and it is not on the shared domain) and renders its own Ingress object `<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress` with its own TLS secret `tls-<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress`. Setting the global `ingress.host` switches every app without a host of its own to the shared-domain shape under `<app>.ingress.path`; qBittorrent (no base path, needs a prefix-stripping rewrite) gets the extra object described above, and seerr as well as mediathekarr are pinned to `/` — mediathekarr because its UI links assets with root-absolute paths, which a rewrite cannot fix; with both of them on one shared host the duplicate-path guard fires and one of them needs a host of its own (its ingress is therefore off by default). `clusterIssuer`, `className` and `annotations` stay global defaults under `ingress.` and are overridable per app.
 
 ### 5. Security hardening
 
@@ -441,6 +568,7 @@ These guidelines are **binding for every current and future chart** in this repo
 
 - Every workload container offers an additive `env` value block, appended to the env entries the chart always sets.
 - Entries are rendered through `tpl` (so values may contain Helm templating) and support the `value`, `secretKeyRef` and `configMapKeyRef` forms (pattern: `template-chart/templates/xxx.deployment.yaml`).
+- **`| quote` on the rendered `value`, and on the `name`/`key` of the ref forms, is part of the pattern and not cosmetic.** An env value is typed `string` by Kubernetes, so a value of `"true"` or `"0755"` rendered bare becomes a YAML bool or integer and the API server rejects the whole manifest with `cannot unmarshal bool into Go struct field EnvVar.value of type string` — after a perfectly green render. A value beginning with `*` is worse in the other direction: it aborts the render with a YAML error naming the template, while the operator's own value appears nowhere in the message, and quoting it in the values file does not help. **The rule is held by `ci/run-yaml-scalar-render-test.sh` on every PR** (Gitea #11/#112), which is also how the count below is known rather than assumed: `template-chart` carries the rule in a comment claiming "every chart in this repo quotes here", and **six still do not** — `matrix-synapse`, `minecraft-router`, `minecraft-server`, `rallly`, `satisfactory`, `teamspeak-server`. They are green only because no fixture of theirs sets a hostile value; bringing a chart to the quoted form is a **major** bump for it, since it changes rendered output for values that currently work.
 - **Additive means additive: an entry repeating a name the chart already sets does not replace it, and what the pair does depends on when it arrives.** At install both entries reach the pod and the later one — the user's — wins. On an *existing* release the same entry is lost: Kubernetes merges `env` by name, the pair collapses to the chart's own value, and `helm upgrade` still reports success. Measured on `urlaubsverwaltung` (helm 3.19.0, Kubernetes 1.35): `helm get manifest` shows the variable twice while the live Deployment shows it once, carrying the chart's value. The failure mode is silence, so a chart whose `NOTES.txt` tells operators to override one of its own variables has to say that the override only takes at install time — and that a green upgrade proves nothing, the value belongs read back off the Deployment.
 
 ### 11. Scaling
@@ -531,7 +659,7 @@ One more trap, and it is the reason `stalwart` gates its subchart on `valkeySubc
 
 **What it costs, all of it visible before the next one is added:**
 
-- **The subchart is invisible to everything downstream.** Its version is inside our packaged `.tgz`, so anything that watches Helm release versions — Fleet's `fleet.yaml` in `cluster-config` included — sees only *our* chart version. A new upstream release, security fix included, reaches a cluster **only** when we publish a new version of the outer chart. Nothing reports the gap. Renovate's built-in `helmv3` manager opens the PR (no `customManagers` entry needed — the repository URL and version sit together in one file) and `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` bumps the chart patch that ships it; that chain is the entire safety net. State this in a comment at the pinned version, not only in a review.
+- **The subchart is invisible to everything downstream.** Its version is inside our packaged `.tgz`, so anything that watches Helm release versions — Fleet's `fleet.yaml` in `cluster-config` included — sees only *our* chart version. A new upstream release, security fix included, reaches a cluster **only** when we publish a new version of the outer chart. Nothing reports the gap. Renovate's built-in `helmv3` manager opens the PR (no `customManagers` entry needed — the repository URL and version sit together in one file) and `ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh` bumps the chart version that ships it — since Gitea #128 at the **subchart's own level**, so an upstream minor is a chart minor even though our `appVersion` did not move. That chain is the entire safety net, and the number it writes is the only place the subchart's jump is visible at all. State this in a comment at the pinned version, not only in a review.
 - **Every pipeline that touches the chart needs a network fetch first.** `helm lint`, `helm package`, `helm template` and `helm install` all exit 1 while a declared dependency is missing from `charts/`, so `ci/helm-dependencies.sh` runs before each of them (see CI/CD above). One of those call sites is the resource-quantity render test, which runs over **every** chart on **every** PR — a dependency-carrying chart can therefore turn a third-party Helm repository's bad day into a red pipeline on a PR that touched nothing related.
 - **`charts/*.tgz` and `Chart.lock` are not committed** (`.gitignore` says why): the archive is a third-party binary nobody reviews in a diff, and a committed lock would arrive stale because Renovate rewrites `Chart.yaml` and cannot regenerate it — which is also why the pipelines run `helm dependency update` and not `helm dependency build`.
 - **The repo's own mechanisms stop at the subchart boundary.** `checksum/config`, the 1Password auto-restart annotation and the `scaleDown` flag reach our templates only. A chart that renders a `OnePasswordItem` for its subchart documents the manual `kubectl rollout restart` that replaces the missing restart-on-change.
@@ -539,3 +667,71 @@ One more trap, and it is the reason `stalwart` gates its subchart on `valkeySubc
 Two implementation notes that cost time otherwise: a values key containing a dash is unreachable as `.Values.oauth2-proxy` (that parses as a subtraction) and needs `index .Values "oauth2-proxy"`, while `condition:` in `Chart.yaml` splits on dots only and needs no escaping. And inside a subchart `.Chart.Name` is the **subchart's** name — a value templated into it (`config.configFile` in this case) must spell the parent chart out literally; only `.Release.Name` is shared.
 
 Charts that need no dependency still have none, and `charts/` stays empty for all of them. `template-chart` remains dependency-free: the scaffold should not carry a `dependencies:` block a new chart has to remember to delete.
+
+### 15. NetworkPolicies (#5)
+
+**Every chart renders a `NetworkPolicy`, and `networkPolicy.enabled` defaults to `true`.** Reference implementation: `template-chart/templates/xxx.networkpolicy.yaml`. The default is the decision the whole convention rests on — a policy that ships switched off is reached only when somebody remembers to switch it on, and then the issue is closed while nothing is filtered. Adding one to an existing chart is therefore a **major** bump.
+
+**What the object is: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.** Three limits are real and worth having, and for most charts here the first two are where all of the value sits:
+
+1. **Only the declared ports are reachable at all.** Whatever else the process binds — a debug listener, a management interface the image opens by default, a port that appears in the next app version — is blocked without anyone having to notice it exists.
+2. **Egress is capped by port**, so a compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+3. **Ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches.**
+
+#### The four port classes, and why the class decides the rule
+
+Every port of a workload falls into one of four, and this is the part to get right before writing anything:
+
+| Class | Rule | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| **probe path** — a port a *network* probe addresses | **no `from`** by default; restricted once `networkPolicy.probeSources` is set | the kubelet probes from the IP of the **worker node running the pod**, an address no chart can know. A guessed CIDR that misses it drops every probe: the pod never becomes `Ready`, the rollout times out, and the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy |
+| **public** — published by a `NodePort` Service | **no `from`** | the senders are on the internet and, after NodePort masquerading, the source address is a cluster node anyway. A source selector could only ever be a list of node IPs — a restriction in appearance and a maintenance trap in fact |
+| **closed** — no probe, not published outside | own namespace + `allowedNamespaces` (+ the ingress controller where the chart routes HTTP there) | this is the only class that yields a *real* inbound restriction, and the charts that have one are the ones whose probes use a *different* port: `keycloak`'s 8080, `garage`'s s3 and web, `minecraft-server`'s RCON, `teamspeak-server`'s query interface |
+| **self** — a cluster bus between a release's own replicas | `podSelector` only, no `namespaceSelector` | the narrowest rule the object can express: "these labels, in this namespace". `keycloak`'s jgroups, `garage`'s rpc. Note that `policyTypes: Egress` means the **outbound** side needs its own rule, or the bus is open one way and the cluster never forms while every node looks healthy |
+
+**`exec` probes are not in the probe class**, and the distinction is load-bearing rather than pedantic: an `exec` probe runs inside the container through the kubelet's runtime and puts no packet on the network, so there is no kubelet traffic to accommodate. That is the entire reason `valkey` and `minecraft-server` have the tightest policies in the repository — every port restricted by source, no `probeSources` value at all — and every HTTP-probed web app has a looser one.
+
+#### Values
+
+`networkPolicy.enabled`, `.allowedNamespaces`, `.probeSources`, `.ingressController`, `.egress.extraPorts` — and a chart ships **only the ones that reach a rule**. A chart may add a **named** egress switch where a port depends on something the values cannot see: `paperless-ngx`' `.egress.mailImport` opens IMAPS `993`, off by default, because its mail accounts are rows in its own database and no value says whether a release fetches mail. The bar for one of those: it names what it opens, and it is **not** a second switch for a port some *other* value already decides — that is why the Tika/Gotenberg rule stayed gated on `paperless.files.tikaGotenberg.enabled` and got no policy switch of its own. Two values that can drift apart re-arm the outage the rule was fixed for. A value that silently does nothing is worse than one that is absent, because it reads as a control: `samba` and `satisfactory` carry `enabled` alone (every inbound rule is open to any source), and `teamspeak-server` has `allowedNamespaces` but no `probeSources`.
+
+**No chart ships `allowedNamespaces` pre-filled, ever.** A chart that named `mc-router`, or `paperless-jk`, or `stalwart` in its defaults would be baking in an assumption about *this* cluster's namespace layout — which is exactly the kind of claim a chart cannot keep true. So the default is the empty list and the chart is **restrictive**; filling it is the **deployment adaptation**, made where the namespace layout is actually visible. That is why a sweep like this produces a list of release-side one-liners: those are the expected procedure, not a defect list, and the breaking-change major on each chart is what announces them.
+
+`ingressController` is the one exception to that, and only because it names a **cluster component** rather than a tenant: its default is measured below, and it is still overridable.
+
+`ingressController` is a separate value with two keys rather than a line in `allowedNamespaces` for one reason: **its two selectors render as one `from` entry, which is an AND** — those pods in that namespace. Written as two list entries they would be an OR, and putting `kube-system` into `allowedNamespaces` instead would open the port to every pod in the cluster's own namespace. Its default is **measured, not assumed**: `ingress-nginx` is gone from this cluster, the only `IngressClass` is `traefik`, and the controller is the DaemonSet `rke2-traefik` in `kube-system` — which also serves the Gateway API here, so one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute path alike. `ingress.className` says nothing about it: a class names an implementation, not the pods the traffic comes from.
+
+#### What these policies do not do — and it belongs in every chart, not just here
+
+- **Egress is coarse: by port, never by destination.** A `NetworkPolicy` matches `ipBlock` CIDRs and pod/namespace selectors and **never hostnames**, so "only to the database host" is not expressible at all. This cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN rule; Calico's `GlobalNetworkSet` could express one but would bind every chart to Calico — the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out of the Gateway-API sweep (#114) — so it is **not used**. This is a limit of the object, and each chart names what it costs *that* chart.
+- **Most dependency ports are the standard ones, not the configured ones.** Databases, caches and OIDC issuers arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items the charts never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is **blocked**, and `networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts` is the escape hatch. The exceptions are the two charts that hold their ports as values and therefore derive them: `keycloak` (`keycloak.db.port`) and `stalwart` (`dataStore.postgres.port`, `externalServices.*.port`); `minecraft-router` derives its backend ports from its own routing table the same way.
+- **The probed port stays open inside the cluster by default.** For a single-port web app that means the policy is a port and egress ceiling, not pod-level isolation — say so in the chart rather than letting the object imply otherwise.
+- **A subchart's pods are not covered.** The policy selects this chart's workload by label; a subchart renders its own pods with its own labels. `ytdlp-web-player`'s oauth2-proxy is the sharpest case — with the proxy on, the pod that actually faces the Ingress is unrestricted in both directions, and an upstream chart is consumed as it comes (section 14). `paperless-ngx`' `valkey` is the opposite: it brings its own, tighter policy. Name which case a chart is in.
+- **And a policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.** Unenforced, the API server still accepts it and nothing is filtered, so everything reads as configured. Verify by connecting from an unrelated namespace, not by reading the value.
+
+#### Where the convention says "Ingress only"
+
+`policyTypes` names only what there is something to restrict. `valkey` established it for a workload that opens **no** outbound connection: an egress rule would constrain nothing while making the object look stricter than it is. Three charts now invoke the same rule in the other direction, for outbound traffic nobody can enumerate — and each argues it in its own file rather than inheriting a blanket excuse:
+
+- **`homeassistant`**: outbound traffic is the union of every integration an operator enables (mDNS and SSDP discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP). A cap would protect little — the devices sit on the node's own LAN — and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a flaky device.
+- **`satisfactory`**: Steam's content delivery is not a pinnable port set, *and* this is the one chart with no install-test at all (`ci/excluded-charts.txt`), so an egress cap here would be the only one in the sweep with no empirical check behind it, on the chart whose correct port set is least knowable.
+- **`gotenberg`** goes the other way and is worth contrasting: it *keeps* a DNS-only cap deliberately, because it drives a headless Chromium and 3000 is its probe port — so an egress rule for 80/443 would turn a service the whole cluster can POST to into an SSRF pivot. The price is that HTML conversion silently loses remote assets, which is written into the chart because nothing will alert on it.
+
+#### Mechanics
+
+- **Pod ports, never NodePorts.** A `NetworkPolicy` is evaluated at the pod's network interface, *after* kube-proxy has translated a NodePort to the `targetPort`. `30025` where the pod listens on `25` matches nothing: accepted, strict-looking, and blocking every inbound connection instead. The render test asserts this mechanically against the selected pod spec's `containerPort`s.
+- **And pod ports, never Service ports — in `egress` too (#136).** The same destination NAT runs on the way *out*: kube-proxy rewrites a ClusterIP's address and port **before** the egress policy is evaluated, so the policy sees `podIP:targetPort` and never `clusterIP:port`. An egress rule therefore names the **pod** port of its destination, and a Service port only ever matches by coincidence — wherever `port` and `targetPort` are the same number, which is the case for `5432`, `6379`, `993` and `443` and is why this mistake stayed invisible until a chart dialled a Service that forwards `80` to `9998`. It was argued the other way in `paperless-ngx` (*"an egress rule names the port on the destination as the client dials it, and the client dials the Service"*), shipped, and cost an outage. **The tell is the symptom:** a dropped packet runs into a **timeout**, a missing listener answers `connection refused` — so a timeout where the service demonstrably exists is a policy question, and no Kubernetes error will say so. For a destination *outside* the cluster there is no NAT in the path and the port dialled is the port to name; the deciding question is the DNAT, not the direction.
+- **Protocol as well as number.** `teamspeak-server`'s voice port is UDP and `satisfactory`'s game port is both — a TCP-only rule on either is accepted, looks complete, and drops the traffic that actually arrives.
+- **`kubernetes.io/metadata.name`** is set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (≥ 1.21), so namespace selectors need no labelling work on namespaces the chart does not own — and get no typo protection either.
+- **Never `from: []`.** It allows everything, identically to having no key, while reading as a restriction. Write no `from` where open is meant and say so in a template comment.
+- **Reasoning goes in Go template comments, not `#` comments.** A `#` comment is part of the rendered object: it travels into the cluster, appears in `helm get manifest` and `kubectl get -o yaml`, and lands in every release diff. The render test fails on a rendered `#`. One second-order trap, found while writing the reference implementation: prose inside a template comment must not spell out the comment's own closing delimiter, or the parser ends the comment early and the rest is emitted as manifest content — the render then fails with `did not find expected node content`, pointing at the template and not at the sentence.
+- **A conditional `containerPort` needs a conditional rule.** `minecraft-server`'s RCON port is rendered only when `server.rcon.enabled` is true; a rule without the same gate names a port the pod does not declare, and the render test rejects it.
+- **A policy applies to traffic that arrived through a Service, and that is why the `ingressController` rule works at all.** A `NetworkPolicy` is evaluated at the pod's network interface and a Service is only destination NAT, so going through a ClusterIP does not exempt anything. What the Service *does* change is the **source address**: pod → ClusterIP → pod **preserves** it, which is what lets a `podSelector` match the Traefik pod or a `namespaceSelector` match a consumer's namespace. **And what it also changes is the destination port, which is the half #136 was paid for:** "a Service is only destination NAT" is exactly why an *egress* rule has to name the pod port — the same sentence, finished in the other direction. It was written here before the wrong rule was written there; the information was present and the conclusion was missing, which is the sort of gap no check catches. Traffic from outside through a `NodePort` with the default `externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster` is **masqueraded to a node**, which is why those rules cannot be restricted by source at all and are left open instead (`stalwart`'s template carries that second half; the first half is the load-bearing one).
+
+#### The one cluster setting this convention depends on and does not control
+
+**Traefik must not run with `hostNetwork`.** Measured on 2026-10-14: the `rke2-traefik` DaemonSet has no `hostNetwork`, and its pods carry real pod IPs (`10.42.3.120`, `10.42.4.94`, `10.42.0.187` — the pod CIDR is `10.42.0.0/16`, nodes are on entirely different addresses). **Only because of that does a `podSelector` match it**, and the `ingressController` value is built on exactly that.
+
+If Traefik were ever switched to host networking, its pods would share the node's network namespace, they would no longer be selectable as pods, the `ingressController` entry would match nothing — and **every web chart in this repository would go dark at once**, in the restricted configuration. The policies would still be accepted, still read as correct, and deny all web traffic.
+
+This is a dependency on a cluster setting this repository does not own, in the same class as the `--enable-certificate-owner-ref` case from #126: nothing here can detect it, and nothing here can fail usefully on it. It is written down in both places someone would look — here, and in the header of `template-chart/templates/xxx.networkpolicy.yaml` — so that whoever changes the ingress controller's networking finds the consequence attached to the thing they are changing. The symptom to recognise: every chart's web traffic stops at once while every pod stays `Ready`, because the probe path does not go through the controller.

apache-tika/Chart.yaml

@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@ icon: https://www.apache.org/logos/res/tika/default.png
 
 type: application
 
-version: 10.0.2+up3.3.1.0.full
+version: 11.0.0+up3.3.1.0.full
 appVersion: "3.3.1.0-full"

apache-tika/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -58,3 +58,57 @@ THE JVM ONLY GETS A QUARTER OF THE MEMORY LIMIT
   cheap regardless; the heap is what matters for parsers that have to build a
   whole document in memory, and for OCR.
 {{- end }}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 9998 only. Outbound: DNS{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }} plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }} — Tika is handed documents and
+  fetches nothing.
+
+  THIS CHART HAS NO INGRESS AND ITS CONSUMERS ARE OTHER PODS. While
+  networkPolicy.probeSources is empty the 9998 rule has no source selector, so
+  any pod in the cluster — including a paperless-ngx release in another
+  namespace — reaches it. Narrowing probeSources restricts that rule, and the
+  consumers' namespaces must then be listed in networkPolicy.allowedNamespaces
+  in the same change, or document extraction stops with a connection error on
+  the paperless side and nothing at all on this one.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

apache-tika/templates/apache-tika.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for apache-tika (Gitea #5).
+
+Apache Tika here is a cluster-internal service: the chart creates no Ingress at
+all, and its only consumers are other pods - paperless-ngx points at
+http://<service>.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local for text extraction.
+
+THAT MAKES THE SOURCE QUESTION THE INTERESTING ONE, AND IT HAS AN AWKWARD
+ANSWER. 9998 is the port all three probes address, so it cannot be restricted
+by source without the worker node's IP - and this chart's consumers live in
+OTHER namespaces (paperless-cmk, paperless-jk, paperless-tb in this cluster).
+So an operator who narrows probeSources has to list those namespaces in
+allowedNamespaces in the same breath, or every document extraction stops. That
+is written into values.yaml and NOTES.txt rather than left to be discovered.
+
+Egress is DNS only. Tika extracts text from documents it is handed; it fetches
+nothing, and a text extractor that can reach the internet is a worse thing to
+hand an untrusted document to.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the Deployment's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because there is something real to restrict: Tika extracts
+    text from documents it is handed and fetches nothing of its own, so DNS is the
+    only rule. A text extractor that can reach the internet is a worse thing to
+    hand an untrusted document to.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    9998 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service forwards 80 to, and
+    the one all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 9998
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      NO ingress controller is added here, because this chart renders no Ingress: its
+      consumers are other pods, and they have to be named in allowedNamespaces.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

apache-tika/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,43 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },

apache-tika/values.yaml

@@ -70,3 +70,63 @@ tika:
       cpu: 0.1
       memory: 512Mi
       ephemeralStorage: 10Mi
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 9998 only - the single port this pod
+  # declares - and outbound nothing but DNS. Tika is handed documents and
+  # fetches nothing, which is a property worth keeping: a text extractor that
+  # can reach the internet is a worse thing to hand an untrusted document to.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO, and read this before narrowing anything: 9998 is the
+  # probe port, so it is NOT restricted by source in the default. This chart
+  # has no Ingress and its consumers are other pods - paperless-ngx releases,
+  # which in this cluster live in their own namespaces. The moment probeSources
+  # is set, the 9998 rule is restricted and those namespaces must be in
+  # allowedNamespaces, or every document extraction stops.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 9998, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # Nothing is needed here for Tika itself. Add a port only if a parser is
+    # configured that fetches remote resources - and consider whether that is
+    # wanted at all.
+    extraPorts: []

bentopdf/Chart.yaml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/alam00000/bentopdf/main/public/images/fa
 
 type: application
 
-version: 1.1.0+up2.8.8
+version: 2.0.0+up2.8.8
 appVersion: "2.8.8"
 
 maintainers:

bentopdf/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -153,3 +153,49 @@ bentopdf.env HAS NO EFFECT ON THE APP — AND THREE VALUES BREAK THE POD
   starts. Using them means also setting
   securityContext.container.readOnlyRootFilesystem: false.
 {{- end }}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 8080 only. Outbound: DNS{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }} plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }} — the documents are
+  processed in the browser, so the pod needs nothing more.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

bentopdf/templates/bentopdf.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for bentopdf (Gitea #5).
+
+BentoPDF is a browser-side PDF tool: nginx serves the bundle, the documents are
+processed in the visitor's browser, and the chart has no secrets and no
+volumes. So the pod holds nothing and calls nothing, and the policy is as tight
+as this object gets - inbound 8080, outbound DNS.
+
+The ingress direction is not restricted by source in the default, because 8080
+is the port all three probes address. See the rule below.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the Deployment's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because the restriction is close to total and therefore worth
+    having: a static file server needs name resolution and nothing else, so DNS is
+    the only rule.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    8080 - the image's EXPOSE and the port its nginx.conf listens on, the one the
+    Service targets, and the one all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8080
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress and the
+      HTTPRoute both go dark the moment this list is filled.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

bentopdf/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },

bentopdf/values.yaml

@@ -299,3 +299,79 @@ httpRoute:
 # chart has no OnePasswordItem, and why the checksum limitation for
 # operator-filled secrets does not apply here: the only thing mounted is the
 # ConfigMap, and that one is covered by checksum/config.
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8080 only, outbound nothing but DNS.
+  # BentoPDF processes documents in the visitor's browser and the chart has no
+  # secrets and no volumes, so the pod has no reason to open an outbound
+  # connection at all.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: the 8080 rule is not restricted by source in the
+  # default, because 8080 is the probe port - see probeSources. So this is a
+  # port and egress ceiling, not pod-level isolation. And it is only a boundary
+  # where the CNI enforces policies.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8080, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # Nothing is needed here for BentoPDF itself.
+    extraPorts: []

bulwark/Chart.yaml

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type: application
 # duplicated here. The short version: eight tag shapes, six of them things
 # nobody should pin, and plain `docker` versioning excludes all six - so that
 # block deliberately carries NO versioningTemplate.
-version: 1.0.0+up1.12.0
+version: 2.0.0+up1.12.0
 appVersion: "1.12.0"
 
 maintainers:

bulwark/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
+{{- /*
+NOTHING IN CI READS THIS FILE. `helm template` does not emit notes and no
+workflow or script under ci/ reads it, so every claim below carries
+review-only assurance - it is checked by being read, not by a stage. A
+rendering ERROR here does fail `helm template`, which is all the pipeline can
+see of it.
+*/ -}}
 {{- $settings := fromYaml (include "bulwark.settings" .) -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list .Values.ingress.domain -}}
+{{- end -}}
 {{- $replicas := int (include "bulwark.replicas" (dict "scaleDown" .Values.scaleDown "replicas" $settings.replicas)) -}}
 {{- $sfs := printf "%s-%s-sfs" .Release.Name .Chart.Name -}}
 {{- $svc := printf "%s-%s-service" .Release.Name .Chart.Name -}}
@@ -11,17 +23,75 @@ The messages and the accounts belong to the Stalwart server at
 If that server is away, this release is still Ready and still green - see
 "WHAT THE PROBES DO NOT TELL YOU" below.
 
-ENDPOINTS
-{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}  Web:        {{ $url }}
-{{ else }}  Web:        no Ingress (ingress.enabled: false) - in-cluster only
+ENDPOINTS - {{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false){{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }}GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false){{ else }}NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE{{ end }}
+{{ if or .Values.ingress.enabled $httpRoute.enabled }}  Web:        {{ $url }}
+{{ else }}  Web:        no Ingress and no HTTPRoute (ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are
+              both false) - in-cluster only
 {{ end }}  In-cluster: http://{{ $svc }}.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:{{ $settings.port | int64 }}
-{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}  Admin:      {{ $url }}/admin/login
-{{ else }}  Admin:      /admin/login on the in-cluster address above. With no Ingress, reach it with
+{{ if or .Values.ingress.enabled $httpRoute.enabled }}  Admin:      {{ $url }}/admin/login
+{{ else }}  Admin:      /admin/login on the in-cluster address above. With nothing published, reach it with
                 kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward statefulset/{{ $sfs }} 3000:{{ $settings.port | int64 }}
               and open http://localhost:3000/admin/login
-{{ end }}{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+{{ end }}{{ if or .Values.ingress.enabled $httpRoute.enabled }}
   Bulwark is served at the ROOT of that host and cannot be moved under a path:
-  NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the image.
+  NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the image.{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }} That is also why the
+  HTTPRoute carries no URLRewrite filter - there is no prefix to strip.{{ end }}
+{{ end }}{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}
+GATEWAY MODE - WHAT THIS CHART DOES NOT RENDER, AND WHAT YOU MUST SET YOURSELF
+
+  This release renders ONE HTTPRoute and NOTHING else of the routing path - no
+  Gateway, no class, no Certificate, no policy object.
+
+    {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute   {{ join ", " $hostnames }}
+
+  Three things therefore belong to the cluster, and if any is missing the
+  hostname above simply does not answer:
+
+    1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed, so
+       they are present - nothing to check.
+    2. The Gateway named in httpRoute.parentRefs
+{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}
+{{- end }}
+       must exist AND its listener must allow routes from this namespace
+       ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment is visible only
+       in the route's status:
+
+         kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
+
+       Read status.parents[].conditions - "Accepted: True" and
+       "ResolvedRefs: True" is what a working attachment looks like. An empty
+       status means no controller has looked at the route at all.
+    3. The TLS certificate for the hostname, on the Gateway's listener.
+       ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required: the
+       chart renders no Certificate here, so there is no
+       tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress secret and nothing for cert-manager to do
+       for this release.
+
+  THE UPLOAD LIMIT IS NOT ENFORCED BY ANYTHING THIS CHART RENDERS.
+
+  In Ingress mode an operator sets nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size
+  through ingress.annotations - this installation runs with 25m - because
+  nginx's default of 1m rejects almost every attachment. IN THIS MODE THAT IS
+  GONE: the Gateway API has no body-size field, it is implementation policy
+  rather than routing, and this chart renders no policy object on purpose (it
+  would bind the chart to one Gateway implementation).
+
+  So the limit in force is THE GATEWAY'S, whatever it happens to be, and no
+  value of this chart has any say in it. The failure mode on a webmail client
+  is worth picturing before it happens: a user has written the mail, attached
+  the file and pressed send, and the 413 comes back FROM THE PROXY. It reads
+  like Bulwark being broken, nothing mentions a limit, and the draft is the
+  thing at risk.
+
+  Set the equivalent next to the Gateway, in your implementation's own object,
+  BEFORE you point DNS at it - and size it to what the MAIL SERVER accepts
+  (the Stalwart release above), not to what looks generous here. A webmail
+  client that accepts a 40 MB attachment the mail server will refuse has only
+  moved the failure later.
+
+  ingress.annotations is inert in this mode in general: the Gateway API has no
+  annotation channel for controller behaviour.
 {{ end }}
 THE 1PASSWORD ITEMS, AND WHICH FIELDS THEY MUST CARRY
 The operator materializes one Secret key per item FIELD. A missing or misnamed
@@ -244,9 +314,69 @@ WHAT THIS CHART DOES NOT RENDER
   - No PodDisruptionBudget: with one replica a minAvailable of 1 would forbid
     every voluntary eviction and make `kubectl drain` hang forever on a pod
     nothing may move (README, guideline 11).
-  - No sub-path Ingress, and no value that could add one - the base path is
-    compiled into the image.
+  - No sub-path Ingress and no sub-path route, and no value that could add
+    one - the base path is compiled into the image. Hence also no URLRewrite
+    filter in Gateway mode.
   - No proxy-body-size annotation. Attachment uploads go through the Ingress and
     nginx's default of 1m rejects larger ones with a 413 that reads like an
     application fault; the right number is the mail server's limit, which this
-    chart does not know. Set it in ingress.annotations.
+    chart does not know. Set it in ingress.annotations{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }} - except that in GATEWAY
+    MODE there is no annotation to set and no counterpart at all, which is the
+    section above{{ end }}.
+  - No Gateway, no GatewayClass and no listener, in either mode. Those are
+    platform objects and live in cluster-config; this chart renders an
+    HTTPRoute at most, which is the part that looks the same on every Gateway
+    implementation.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 3000 only. Outbound: DNS and TCP 443 — the JMAP server and the
+  OIDC provider{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }}, plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+
+  CHECK THE JMAP PORT. 443 is where a published JMAP endpoint lives. A
+  bulwark.jmapServerUrl pointing at Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP port (8080), or
+  at anything else, is BLOCKED by this policy — and because Bulwark's probes
+  only test its own port, the pod becomes Ready and then serves an empty,
+  broken webmail with nothing in the events to explain it. Add the real port to
+  networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

bulwark/templates/_helpers.tpl

@@ -447,17 +447,34 @@ for the first time during a real `helm install`. A guard that only runs in
 production is worse than no guard.
 
 The honest position for THIS chart, checked in both directions as guideline 12.1
-asks: nothing outside the Ingress template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain.
-Bulwark derives its own public URL from the request origin and takes no base-URL
-variable, so with ingress.enabled: false the release is complete without a
-domain - the calibre-web-automated case, where the gate frees both values. The
-enforcement therefore sits entirely in bulwark.ingress.yaml, where it is reached
-by every render that has the Ingress on (the default), and this helper renders a
-visible placeholder instead of failing.
+asks, AND CORRECTED WITH THE GATEWAY-API SUPPORT (Gitea #114): it used to say
+that nothing outside the Ingress template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain.
+That was true and is no longer - bulwark.httproute.yaml reads it as the route's
+hostname, with a required() of its own. What still holds is the half that made
+the claim worth making: Bulwark derives its own public URL from the request
+origin and takes no base-URL variable, so with BOTH modes off the release is
+complete without a domain - the calibre-web-automated case, where the gate
+frees both values. The enforcement sits in whichever routing template is
+active; this helper still renders a visible placeholder instead of failing,
+because `helm template` does not render NOTES.txt.
+
+IN GATEWAY MODE THE PUBLIC URL IS THE ROUTE'S HOSTNAME, not ingress.domain, and
+the two differ exactly when httpRoute.hostnames is set explicitly - which is
+how a migration off the Ingress runs. Printing ingress.domain there would hand
+the operator an OIDC redirect URI for the host being migrated AWAY from, and
+that failure surfaces as a rejected login at the identity provider rather than
+as anything about this chart. So the helper follows the active mode.
 */}}
 {{- define "bulwark.publicUrl" -}}
-{{- if .Values.ingress.domain -}}
-https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $host := .Values.ingress.domain -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $host = (first ($httpRoute.hostnames | default list)) | default .Values.ingress.domain -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $host -}}
+https://{{ $host }}
+{{- else if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+https://<neither httpRoute.hostnames nor ingress.domain SET>
 {{- else -}}
 https://<ingress.domain NOT SET>
 {{- end -}}

bulwark/templates/bulwark.httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+{{/*
+HTTPRoute - the Gateway-API alternative to bulwark.ingress.yaml (Gitea #114).
+
+ONE ROUTE, ONE RULE, AT THE ROOT - and the reason is the same one that makes
+the Ingress rule permanently "/": NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into
+Bulwark's bundle, so the application cannot be served under a sub-path at all.
+Which is also why THIS CHART RENDERS NO URLRewrite FILTER and needs none. That
+differs from what #114's measured table and the header of
+ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh both expected of this chart, so it is worth
+writing down where it will be read:
+
+  - This chart has ONE Ingress object, not two (keycloak has two).
+  - This chart has NO rewrite-target annotation and CANNOT have one. Every
+    occurrence of the string "rewrite-target" in this chart - values.yaml, the
+    schema, the Ingress template - is an explanation of why it does not help:
+    the bundle's own asset and API URLs are built for the root, so stripping a
+    prefix at the proxy yields a page that loads and then fetches everything
+    from the wrong place. A `git grep rewrite-target bulwark/` finds those
+    refutations and counts them as occurrences, which is how the expectation
+    arose.
+  - Consequently the #118 prefix/redirect assurance in
+    ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh does not apply here: with no URLRewrite on a
+    prefix other than "/", its precondition is never met. The bare-prefix
+    redirect that freesailarr needs has nothing to redirect here.
+
+WHAT THIS RENDERS, AND WHAT IT MUST NOT
+
+Only an HTTPRoute with parentRefs. No Gateway, no gatewayClassName, no
+Certificate, no implementation-specific policy object - the subset that looks
+identical on nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway and Istio (decision 1
+of #114). Class and certificate belong to the PLATFORM, on the Gateway and its
+listeners, in cluster-config.
+
+WHAT THIS MODE DROPS FOR THIS CHART, MEASURED ON THE LIVE OBJECT
+
+On 2026-10-12 the live Ingress (jk-cluster, namespace bulwark,
+webmail.bekemeyer-klein.de) carried
+
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: 25m
+
+The CHART does not set it - values.yaml recommends exactly that value and
+explains why the chart cannot pick it (the right number is the mail server's,
+which this chart does not know), so the 25m is the operator's, supplied through
+ingress.annotations. It is therefore invisible to anyone reading this
+repository alone, and it is the single annotation this installation depends on.
+
+In this mode it is gone. The Gateway API has no body-size counterpart: it is
+implementation policy, not routing, and decision 2 of #114 says such a limit is
+DOCUMENTED rather than rebuilt. So the Gateway branch of NOTES.txt names it in
+this chart's own terms - an attachment above the Gateway's default is rejected
+before Bulwark sees a byte, with a 413 from the proxy that reads like an
+application fault, on the one application whose whole purpose is sending files
+to other people.
+*/}}
+{{- /*
+Null-safe like every other block a template here dereferences (#99): an
+override written without children - "httpRoute:" with its keys deleted - is
+YAML null, and .Values.httpRoute.enabled would abort with a nil pointer.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $settings := fromYaml (include "bulwark.settings" .) -}}
+{{- if and $httpRoute.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
+{{- fail "ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true - set exactly one of them. The Ingress and the HTTPRoute would publish the same Service under the same hostname over two different data paths, which is already a conflict at DNS level: one name, two addresses, and which one a client reaches is luck. For Bulwark it also breaks the login: the OIDC redirect URI registered with the identity provider names ONE origin, and a session that starts on one data path and returns on the other fails on the state cookie. A migration runs over a SECOND hostname (set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain) with that second origin registered as a redirect URI too, never over parallel operation of both." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $parentRefs := $httpRoute.parentRefs | default list -}}
+{{- if not $parentRefs -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but httpRoute.parentRefs is empty - an HTTPRoute without a parent attaches to no Gateway. It is created, it is schema-valid, and it routes NOTHING, with no event and no condition that says so; the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer. Name the cluster's Gateway, e.g. httpRoute.parentRefs: [{name: public, namespace: gateway}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- /*
+One source of truth for the hostname: an empty httpRoute.hostnames means
+[ingress.domain]. Two values that have to agree drift apart.
+
+AND THIS READ CHANGES THE CHART'S OWN ACCOUNT OF ITSELF. Before this mode
+existed, bulwark.ingress.yaml and the bulwark.publicUrl helper both stated that
+nothing outside the Ingress template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain - true
+then, false now, because this template reads it. Both have been corrected
+rather than left standing (the same correction garage and calibre-web-automated
+needed in groups 1 and 2). The required() below is what makes it true again:
+ingress.domain is mandatory in Gateway mode too, unless hostnames are given
+explicitly.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list (required "A Domain/Host must be provided: set ingress.domain (used as the HTTPRoute's single hostname when httpRoute.hostnames is empty) or set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly" .Values.ingress.domain) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    {{- toYaml $hostnames | nindent 4 }}
+  rules:
+      {{- /*
+      The Ingress counterpart is `path: / , pathType: Prefix`, and "/" here is
+      as permanent as it is there - see the header. The port is the Service's
+      port NUMBER and not its name "http": backendRefs takes a PortNumber, so
+      unlike the Ingress this reference cannot be made by name. It comes from
+      the same settings helper the Service renders its port from, so
+      bulwark.port and this file still cannot drift apart;
+      ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh holds the pair for the case where they do.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service
+          port: {{ $settings.port | int64 }}
+{{- end }}

bulwark/templates/bulwark.ingress.yaml

@@ -14,12 +14,22 @@ Prefix, deliberately and permanently.
 
 GUIDELINE 1, CHECKED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS (README, "Values that must not lie"),
 AND FOR THIS CHART THE GATE FREES BOTH VALUES. Checked rather than assumed:
-nothing outside this template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain. Bulwark derives
-its own public URL from the request origin and takes no base-URL environment
-variable - there is no KC_HOSTNAME equivalent here - so a release with
-ingress.enabled: false is complete without a domain. That is the
+Bulwark derives its own public URL from the request origin and takes no
+base-URL environment variable - there is no KC_HOSTNAME equivalent here - so a
+release with no routing object at all is complete without a domain. That is the
 calibre-web-automated case rather than the matrix-synapse one.
 
+CORRECTED WITH THE GATEWAY-API SUPPORT (Gitea #114): this paragraph used to say
+that nothing outside this template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain.
+bulwark.httproute.yaml now does - as the route's hostname, with a required() of
+its own - so the value is mandatory in Gateway mode too unless
+httpRoute.hostnames is given explicitly. "The gate frees both values" means
+BOTH gates off, not this one alone.
+
+THE TWO MODES ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE and the HTTPRoute template aborts the
+render when ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true, naming both
+value paths.
+
 The one other READER is NOTES.txt, which prints the access URL and the OIDC
 redirect URI. That read is deliberately NOT guarded with a required(): `helm
 template` does not render NOTES.txt, so a guard there would fire for the first

bulwark/templates/bulwark.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for bulwark (Gitea #5).
+
+Bulwark is a JMAP webmail CLIENT: it holds no mail, has no database, no cache
+and no broker. Everything it shows lives on a Stalwart server reached over
+bulwark.jmapServerUrl, and that single outbound dependency is what shapes the
+egress rules.
+
+AND IT IS THE ONE CHART WHERE THE EGRESS CAP CAN FAIL QUIETLY. Bulwark's probes
+address its own HTTP port and say nothing about whether the JMAP server is
+reachable - so a release whose JMAP URL sits on a port this policy does not
+allow comes up Ready and then shows an empty, broken webmail. 443 is allowed
+because that is where a published JMAP endpoint lives; a URL pointing straight
+at Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP port (8080) is blocked and needs
+networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts. That asymmetry is in values.yaml and NOTES.txt
+because nothing else will report it.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict: this workload
+    needs DNS and the ports named below, and nothing else. A chart whose
+    workload opens no outbound connection of its own must NOT list Egress -
+    valkey is the example - because a rule that constrains nothing makes the
+    object look stricter than it is.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    3000 - the only port this pod declares, targeted by both the regular and the
+    headless Service, and the port all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 3000
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress goes dark the
+      moment this list is filled.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound HTTPS. This covers both of Bulwark's outbound dependencies: the JMAP
+    server named by bulwark.jmapServerUrl, and the OAuth/OIDC provider. Ports only
+    - the URLs are hostnames, which this object cannot match. A JMAP server reached
+    on its in-cluster HTTP port instead (Stalwart's 8080) is NOT covered and needs
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

bulwark/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "description": "true renders the StatefulSet with replicas: 0 and takes precedence over bulwark.replicas. The PVC, Secrets, Service and Ingress stay in place.",
       "type": "boolean"
@@ -166,27 +217,50 @@
       "additionalProperties": false,
       "properties": {
         "enabled": {
-          "description": "Gates the whole Ingress template (issue #93). Checked in both directions for this chart: nothing outside that template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain - Bulwark derives its own public URL from the request origin and takes no base-URL variable - so switching the Ingress off frees domain as well as clusterIssuer. The only other reader is NOTES.txt, which renders a visible placeholder rather than carrying a required() that helm template could never reach.",
+          "description": "Gates the whole Ingress template (issue #93). Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. Checked in both directions for this chart, and CORRECTED with Gitea #114: it used to say that nothing outside that template functionally reads ingress.domain, which the HTTPRoute now does. Switching the INGRESS off frees clusterIssuer; it frees domain only if httpRoute is off as well. What still holds is the reason - Bulwark derives its own public URL from the request origin and takes no base-URL variable - so a release with no routing object at all is complete without a domain. NOTES.txt renders a visible placeholder rather than carrying a required() that helm template could never reach.",
           "type": "boolean"
         },
         "clusterIssuer": {
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "domain": {
-          "description": "The public hostname. Bulwark is served at the ROOT of it and cannot be served under a path: NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the bundle, and a rewrite-target annotation does not help because the bundle's own asset URLs are built for the root.",
+          "description": "The public hostname. Bulwark is served at the ROOT of it and cannot be served under a path: NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the bundle, and a rewrite-target annotation does not help because the bundle's own asset URLs are built for the root - which is also why the HTTPRoute renders no URLRewrite filter. Read by the Ingress, by the HTTPRoute (when httpRoute.hostnames is empty) and by NOTES.txt for the OIDC redirect URI.",
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "className": {
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "annotations": {
-          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open. The one worth adding for this application is nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: attachment uploads go through this Ingress and nginx's default of 1m rejects anything larger with a 413 that reads like an application fault.",
+          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open. The one worth adding for this application is nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: attachment uploads go through this Ingress and nginx's default of 1m rejects anything larger with a 413 that reads like an application fault - and that is what this installation's live Ingress actually carries (25m, measured 2026-10-12). INERT IN GATEWAY MODE: the Gateway API has no annotation channel and no body-size counterpart at all.",
           "type": "object"
         }
       }
+    },
+    "httpRoute": {
+      "description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true, naming both value paths. The chart renders only an HTTPRoute with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. ONE rule, at the root, with no URLRewrite filter - Bulwark cannot be served under a sub-path, so there is nothing to strip and the #118 prefix/redirect assurance has no precondition to meet here. NOT COVERED IN THIS MODE: proxy-body-size, which this installation's live Ingress carries at 25m and which has no counterpart in the specification - an oversized attachment is then rejected by the Gateway with a 413 that reads like a webmail fault. See values.yaml, httpRoute block. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them.",
+      "type": ["object", "null"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "parentRefs": {
+          "description": "The Gateway(s) the route attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced by required()-equivalent in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+        },
+        "hostnames": {
+          "description": "Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has a single source of truth. Setting it means a second origin, which has to be registered as an OIDC redirect URI with the identity provider before a login can succeed on it.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "type": "string" }
+        }
+      }
     }
   },
   "definitions": {
+    "parentRef": {
+      "description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["name"]
+    },
     "port": {
       "type": ["integer", "null"],
       "minimum": 1,

bulwark/values.yaml

@@ -711,6 +711,11 @@ ingress:
   # away would produce a release that renders cleanly and whose operator is told
   # to register `https:///auth/callback`.
   #
+  # AND A THIRD TIME SINCE Gitea #114: the HTTPRoute reads it as its hostname
+  # when httpRoute.hostnames is empty, with a required() of its own. So this
+  # value is mandatory in GATEWAY mode as well, and only a release with both
+  # modes off can do without it.
+  #
   # BULWARK IS SERVED AT THE ROOT OF THIS HOST AND CANNOT BE SERVED UNDER A
   # PATH. NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the bundle (point 4 at the top
   # of this file), so a sub-path deployment would need a rebuilt image. The
@@ -734,4 +739,162 @@ ingress:
   # (or whatever the mail server accepts) to match stalwart's own limit. The
   # chart does not set it, because the right number is the mail server's and
   # this chart does not know it.
+  #
+  # AND THAT RECOMMENDATION IS NOT HYPOTHETICAL - IT IS WHAT THIS INSTALLATION
+  # RUNS ON. Measured on 2026-10-12: the live Ingress on
+  # webmail.bekemeyer-klein.de carries exactly
+  # nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: 25m, supplied here by the
+  # operator. In GATEWAY MODE this whole block is INERT - the Gateway API has
+  # no annotation channel for controller behaviour, and body size has no
+  # counterpart in the specification at all. Read the httpRoute block below
+  # before switching modes.
   annotations: {}
+
+# THE GATEWAY-API ALTERNATIVE TO THE INGRESS (Gitea #114).
+#
+# Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are
+# true, and the message names both value paths. The chart renders ONLY an
+# HTTPRoute with parentRefs: no Gateway, no class, no Certificate, and no
+# implementation-specific policy object. Class and certificate sit on the
+# Gateway and its listeners and belong to the platform (cluster-config), which
+# is what keeps the Gateway implementation replaceable without touching this
+# chart again.
+#
+# ONE ROUTE, ONE RULE, AT THE ROOT. "/" is as permanent here as it is on the
+# Ingress, for the same reason: NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the
+# bundle, so Bulwark cannot be served under a sub-path and there is nothing for
+# a URLRewrite filter to strip. This chart renders no such filter and needs
+# none - which also means the #118 prefix/redirect assurance in
+# ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh has no precondition to meet here.
+#
+# WHAT THIS MODE COSTS, AND IT IS THE ONE ANNOTATION THIS INSTALLATION USES.
+# proxy-body-size: 25m is set on the live Ingress by the operator (see the
+# annotations block above). It is GONE in this mode and cannot be rebuilt here:
+# the Gateway API knows no body size, that is implementation policy, and
+# decision 2 of #114 says the limit is documented rather than reconstructed
+# with a policy object that would bind this chart to one implementation.
+#
+# What that looks like in practice, for THIS application: an attachment above
+# the GATEWAY's default is rejected before Bulwark sees a byte, and the 413
+# comes from the proxy. The user is composing mail with a file attached, so the
+# failure arrives at the least recoverable moment and reads like a webmail
+# fault. Set the equivalent next to the Gateway - in that implementation's own
+# object - BEFORE pointing DNS at it, and size it to what the MAIL SERVER
+# accepts (stalwart), not to what feels generous. NOTES.txt prints this in
+# Gateway mode.
+#
+# THE GATEWAY-API CRDs MUST BE PRESENT. The chart cannot detect them
+# (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template time) and an HTTPRoute
+# without them fails at install, so this is a value and not a guess.
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: false
+
+  # The Gateway(s) the route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
+  # another namespace, whose listener must allow this namespace in
+  # allowedRoutes. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference (name, and
+  # optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group, kind), passed through
+  # unchanged:
+  #
+  #   parentRefs:
+  #     - name: public
+  #       namespace: gateway
+  #       sectionName: https
+  #
+  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
+  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
+  # nothing, with no event to say so.
+  parentRefs: []
+
+  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
+  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
+  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
+  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
+  #
+  # AND IF YOU SET IT, REGISTER THAT ORIGIN WITH THE IDENTITY PROVIDER FIRST.
+  # NOTES.txt derives the OIDC redirect URI from the ACTIVE mode's hostname, so
+  # a second hostname means a second redirect URI - a login that returns to an
+  # unregistered origin is rejected at the provider, which says nothing about
+  # this chart.
+  hostnames: []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 443 -
+  # which covers Bulwark's two outbound dependencies, the JMAP server
+  # (bulwark.jmapServerUrl) and the OIDC provider.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO, and this is the one to check before upgrading: 443 is
+  # where a PUBLISHED JMAP endpoint lives. If jmapServerUrl points straight at
+  # Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP port (8080) or anywhere else, that traffic is
+  # BLOCKED - and Bulwark's probes only test its own port, so the pod comes up
+  # Ready and serves a broken, empty webmail with nothing in the events to say
+  # why. Put the real port in egress.extraPorts below.
+  #
+  # Inbound 3000 is not restricted by source in the default (probe port), and a
+  # policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # 8080 is the entry this chart needs most often: a jmapServerUrl pointing at
+    # Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP Service rather than at its published HTTPS
+    # name.
+    extraPorts: []

calibre-web-automated/Chart.yaml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ name: calibre-web-automated
 description: A Helm chart to deploy calibere-web-automated
 icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/crocodilestick/Calibre-Web-Automated/main/README_images/cwa-logo-round-dark.png
 
-version: 7.0.1+upv4.0.6
+version: 8.0.0+upv4.0.6
 appVersion: v4.0.6
 
 maintainers:

calibre-web-automated/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -2,11 +2,16 @@
 {{- $startup := fromYaml (include "calibre-web-automated.startupProbe" .Values.cwa.startupProbe) -}}
 {{- $sfs := printf "%s-%s-sfs" .Release.Name .Chart.Name -}}
 {{- $pod := printf "%s-0" $sfs -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list .Values.ingress.domain -}}
+{{- end -}}
 Calibre-Web Automated {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} — release {{ .Release.Name }} in namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
 
 {{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
 
-ACCESS
+ACCESS — INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false)
   https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}
 
   The certificate is requested by cert-manager through the "{{ .Values.ingress.clusterIssuer }}"
@@ -20,12 +25,59 @@ ACCESS
   controller before CWA ever sees it, so nothing about it reaches the app log.
   Both annotations are understood by the nginx-family controllers only, and this
   release uses ingressClassName "{{ .Values.ingress.className }}".
+{{- else if $httpRoute.enabled }}
+
+ACCESS — GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false)
+{{- range $hostnames }}
+  https://{{ . }}
+{{- end }}
+
+  This release renders an HTTPRoute ({{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute) and NOTHING
+  else of the routing path — no Gateway, no class, no Certificate. Three things
+  therefore belong to the cluster and not to this chart, and if any is missing
+  the address above does not answer:
+
+    1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed.
+    2. The Gateway named in httpRoute.parentRefs
+{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}
+{{- end }}
+       must exist AND its listener must allow routes from this namespace
+       ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment shows
+       up only in the route's status:
+
+         kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
+
+       Read status.parents[].conditions — "Accepted: True" and
+       "ResolvedRefs: True" is a working attachment. An empty status means no
+       controller has looked at the route at all.
+    3. The TLS certificate for the hostname, on the Gateway's listener.
+       ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required: the
+       chart renders no Certificate, so there is no
+       tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress secret and nothing for cert-manager to do.
+
+  YOUR UPLOAD LIMIT IS NOT cwa.maxUploadFileSize ANY MORE — IT IS THE GATEWAY'S.
+  cwa.maxUploadFileSize ({{ .Values.cwa.maxUploadFileSize }}) is NOT ENFORCED in this mode. The chart
+  renders it into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size, and the Gateway
+  API has NO counterpart — it knows no body size at all, that is
+  implementation-specific policy — so this chart deliberately renders no policy
+  object, which would bind it to one implementation. Whatever limit the Gateway
+  enforces is the limit your uploads get, and this is an e-book library: a book
+  above the Gateway's default is rejected before CWA sees a byte, the user gets
+  the proxy's error instead of a message from the application, and nothing says
+  a chart value was ignored. Set the limit at the Gateway, or through its
+  implementation's own policy object next to the Gateway — not here.
+
+  ingress.annotations is inert in this mode as well, for the same reason: the
+  Gateway API has no annotation channel.
 {{- else }}
 
-ACCESS — NO INGRESS
-  ingress.enabled is false, so this release has no Ingress and no certificate.
-  Neither ingress.domain nor ingress.clusterIssuer is needed: this chart reads
-  ingress.domain in the Ingress template and nowhere else. The app is reachable
+ACCESS — NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE
+  ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both false, so this release is not
+  published: no Ingress, no HTTPRoute and no certificate. Neither
+  ingress.domain nor ingress.clusterIssuer is needed — this chart reads
+  ingress.domain in the two routing templates and nowhere else, and with both
+  of them off nothing reads it. The app is reachable
   inside the cluster as {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service:80. To open it locally:
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service 8083:80
@@ -39,7 +91,9 @@ SCALED TO ZERO
   {{ if .Values.scaleDown }}scaleDown: true{{ else }}cwa.replicas: 0{{ end }} — the StatefulSet runs with replicas: 0, so nothing
   answers until you set it back and upgrade again. Both PVCs, the Secret and the
   Service{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and Ingress stay in place, so no data is lost and the certificate
-  is not re-issued.{{ else }} stay in place, so no data is lost.{{ end }}
+  is not re-issued.{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }} and HTTPRoute stay in place, so no data is lost — the route then
+  resolves to a Service with no endpoints and the Gateway answers its own
+  error.{{ else }} stay in place, so no data is lost.{{ end }}
 {{ end }}
 FIRST LOGIN — THE DEFAULT PASSWORD IS PUBLIC
   Username "admin", password "admin123". Those are the upstream defaults, they
@@ -163,3 +217,51 @@ TIME, AND THE ENVIRONMENT THE CHART ALREADY OCCUPIES
   variable to disable WAL: NETWORK_SHARE_MODE=true" — so a library claim backed
   by NFS or SMB, which is what cwa.storageClass decides, runs into exactly the
   locking problems that setting exists to avoid.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 8083 only. Outbound: DNS and TCP 443 (metadata providers){{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }},
+  plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}. A send-to-Kindle or e-mail setup needs its SMTP port
+  (587 or 465) in networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts — without it the send fails
+  silently from this side.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

calibre-web-automated/templates/calibre-web-automated.httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+{{/*
+The Gateway-API alternative to calibre-web-automated.ingress.yaml (Gitea #114).
+Form and reasoning: template-chart/templates/xxx.httproute.yaml and README,
+"Ingress and Gateway API".
+
+Only an HTTPRoute with parentRefs. No Gateway, no gatewayClassName, no
+Certificate, and no implementation-specific policy object - that subset looks
+identical on nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway and Istio, which is
+the whole reason the cluster's implementation can be swapped without touching
+this chart. Class and certificate therefore belong to the PLATFORM, on the
+Gateway and its listeners.
+
+ingress.clusterIssuer is meaningless here - this chart renders no Certificate
+in this mode - and it is not demanded either: its only required() sits inside
+calibre-web-automated.ingress.yaml, behind ingress.enabled.
+
+THE UPLOAD LIMIT IS THE ONE THING THIS MODE LOSES, AND IT IS NOT REBUILT
+
+cwa.maxUploadFileSize is rendered into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size
+and nginx.org/client-max-body-size by the Ingress template. The Gateway API has
+NO counterpart: it knows no body size at all, because a request-body limit is
+implementation-specific policy and lives in an implementation's own object
+(ClientSettingsPolicy on nginx-gateway-fabric, ClientTrafficPolicy on Istio,
+and so on). Rendering one here would bind this chart to one implementation and
+to a CRD whose presence it cannot check, so the limit is DOCUMENTED instead -
+NOTES.txt says in this mode that the value is not enforced and names where to
+set it. The price is named and deliberate: whoever overlooks that output gets
+the Gateway's default limit, and an oversized book fails as a proxy error
+rather than as a message from CWA. This chart is an e-book library, so the
+value is not decoration - a book above the Gateway's default is rejected, and
+the rejection carries no hint that a chart value was ignored.
+
+ingress.domain, AND WHY THIS FILE CHANGES WHAT CAN BE CLAIMED ABOUT IT
+
+Checked for this chart rather than copied: ingress.domain is read in the
+Ingress template and - until this file existed - NOWHERE else. No environment
+variable, no probe Host header, no URL the app builds itself; CWA is told its
+address by nothing. That is why values.yaml could say that switching the
+Ingress off makes domain unnecessary along with clusterIssuer.
+
+This file is now a second reader (when httpRoute.hostnames is empty), so that
+sentence holds only while BOTH modes are off. It is corrected in values.yaml
+and in values.schema.json rather than left standing. In Gateway mode with
+hostnames empty, domain is required again - by the required() below.
+*/}}
+{{- /*
+Null-safe like every other block this chart dereferences (#99): an override
+written without children - "httpRoute:" with the keys below it deleted - is
+YAML null, and `.Values.httpRoute.enabled` would abort the render with a nil
+pointer. An empty block means "chart defaults apply", and all three defaults
+are empty or false, so the whole block collapses to "no HTTPRoute".
+*/ -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- if and $httpRoute.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
+{{- fail "ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true - set exactly one of them. The Ingress and the HTTPRoute would publish the same Service under the same hostname over two different data paths, which is already a conflict at DNS level: one name, two addresses, and which one a client reaches is luck. A migration runs over a SECOND hostname (set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain), never over parallel operation of both." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $parentRefs := $httpRoute.parentRefs | default list -}}
+{{- if not $parentRefs -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but httpRoute.parentRefs is empty - an HTTPRoute without a parent attaches to no Gateway. It is created, it is schema-valid, and it routes NOTHING, with no event and no condition that says so; the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer. Name the cluster's Gateway, e.g. httpRoute.parentRefs: [{name: public, namespace: gateway}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- /*
+One source of truth for the hostname: an empty httpRoute.hostnames means
+[ingress.domain], so the two cannot drift apart. ingress.domain is read here
+even though no Ingress is rendered in this mode - the value names the public
+hostname of this release, which both modes need; it is not an Ingress switch.
+Nothing inside the pod follows it, so a hostname set explicitly here needs no
+second value changed with it - which is what makes a migration over a second
+hostname cheap in THIS chart and expensive in others.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list (required "A Domain/Host must be provided: set ingress.domain (used as the HTTPRoute's single hostname when httpRoute.hostnames is empty) or set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly" .Values.ingress.domain) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    {{- toYaml $hostnames | nindent 4 }}
+  rules:
+    # The Ingress counterpart is `path: / , pathType: Prefix` on the one
+    # backend Service - CWA serves its whole UI, including the OPDS feed and
+    # the ingest views, from one process on one port, so a single path covers
+    # it. The port is the Service's port NUMBER and not its name ("http"):
+    # backendRefs takes a PortNumber, so unlike the Ingress this reference
+    # cannot be made by name and the 80 below has to track
+    # calibre-web-automated.service.yaml by hand.
+    # ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh is what holds that pair - it fails when a
+    # backendRef names a Service, or a port, the same render does not create.
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service
+          port: 80
+{{- end }}

calibre-web-automated/templates/calibre-web-automated.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for calibre-web-automated (Gitea #5).
+
+Calibre-Web-Automated keeps its library on a PVC and has no database and no
+cache of its own, so the only outbound traffic that matters is metadata
+lookups: cover art and book details fetched from public providers over HTTPS.
+
+That is why 443 is allowed and nothing else is. The failure mode if it were
+not: metadata lookups return nothing, which looks like a provider being down
+rather than like a policy - so the rule is here rather than left to
+extraPorts.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict: this workload
+    needs DNS and the ports named below, and nothing else. A chart whose
+    workload opens no outbound connection of its own must NOT list Egress -
+    valkey is the example - because a rule that constrains nothing makes the
+    object look stricter than it is.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    8083 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service forwards 80 to, and
+    the port all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8083
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress goes dark the
+      moment this list is filled.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound HTTPS for metadata providers (covers, book details). To any
+    destination, because the providers are hostnames and this object matches CIDRs
+    and selectors only.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

calibre-web-automated/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },
@@ -42,7 +93,7 @@
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "maxUploadFileSize": {
-          "description": "Rendered into the ingress-nginx proxy-body-size annotation, so it only takes effect while the Ingress is enabled.",
+          "description": "Rendered into the ingress-nginx proxy-body-size and nginx.org/client-max-body-size annotations, so it is enforced by the ingress controller and by nothing inside CWA. It does nothing with ingress.enabled: false, and it is NOT ENFORCED in Gateway mode either (Gitea #114): the Gateway API has no body-size field, the effective limit is the Gateway's, and this chart deliberately renders no implementation-specific policy object to set it. NOTES.txt says so in that mode.",
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "livenessProbe": {
@@ -70,7 +121,7 @@
       "additionalProperties": false,
       "properties": {
         "enabled": {
-          "description": "Gates the whole Ingress template (issue #93). ingress.domain is read nowhere else in this chart, so switching the Ingress off makes both domain and clusterIssuer unnecessary.",
+          "description": "Gates the whole Ingress template (issue #93). Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. Nothing inside the pod reads ingress.domain, so switching the Ingress off makes both domain and clusterIssuer unnecessary - but only while the Gateway mode is off as well: the HTTPRoute is a second reader of domain while httpRoute.hostnames is empty.",
           "type": "boolean"
         },
         "clusterIssuer": {
@@ -83,13 +134,42 @@
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "annotations": {
-          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager and proxy-body-size annotations the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature.",
+          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager and proxy-body-size annotations the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature. No counterpart in Gateway mode: the Gateway API has no annotation channel, so these are gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - including the upload cap the chart itself sets from cwa.maxUploadFileSize.",
           "type": "object"
         }
       }
+    },
+    "httpRoute": {
+      "description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. The chart renders only an HTTPRoute with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them. cwa.maxUploadFileSize is not enforced in this mode.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "parentRefs": {
+          "description": "The Gateway(s) the route attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef"
+          }
+        },
+        "hostnames": {
+          "description": "Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has a single source of truth. Nothing inside the pod follows the hostname in this chart, so a name set here needs no second value changed with it.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        }
+      }
     }
   },
   "definitions": {
+    "parentRef": {
+      "description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["name"]
+    },
     "resources": {
       "description": "May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to its default requests and computed limits (issue #99) instead of rendering a container without resource accounting.",
       "type": ["object", "null"],

calibre-web-automated/values.yaml

@@ -23,6 +23,15 @@ cwa:
   storage: 10Gi
   storageClass: longhorn
   timezone: "UTC"
+  # The upload cap, and it lives entirely in the INGRESS: the chart renders it
+  # into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size and
+  # nginx.org/client-max-body-size, so it is enforced by the nginx-family
+  # controllers and by nothing inside CWA. Consequences worth knowing before
+  # trusting it: with ingress.enabled: false it does nothing at all, and in
+  # Gateway mode (httpRoute.enabled) it is NOT ENFORCED either - the Gateway
+  # API has no body-size field, the limit is the Gateway's own, and this chart
+  # deliberately renders no implementation-specific policy object to set it
+  # (Gitea #114). NOTES.txt says so in both modes.
   maxUploadFileSize: "10m"
   livenessProbe:
     httpGet:
@@ -107,13 +116,151 @@ cwa:
   env: []
 
 ingress:
-  # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. Unlike some other charts here,
-  # ingress.domain is read nowhere but in the Ingress template, so switching
-  # the Ingress off makes both domain and clusterIssuer unnecessary.
+  # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. Nothing inside the pod reads
+  # ingress.domain - no environment variable, no probe Host header, no URL the
+  # app builds itself - so with the Ingress off, clusterIssuer and domain are
+  # both unnecessary. That is still true, but no longer the whole sentence:
+  # the HTTPRoute below is a SECOND reader of ingress.domain (while
+  # httpRoute.hostnames is empty), so "domain is not needed" holds only while
+  # BOTH routing modes are off.
+  #
+  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
+  # true the render aborts, naming both values.
   enabled: true
   clusterIssuer: null
+  # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress and - when
+  # httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by the HTTPRoute, and by nothing else.
   domain: null
   className: nginx
   # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
   # cluster-issuer and proxy-body-size annotations the chart always sets.
+  #
+  # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no
+  # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything configured here is
+  # simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - it is then the
+  # Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy object
+  # this chart deliberately does not render. For THIS chart that includes the
+  # upload cap: see cwa.maxUploadFileSize above.
   annotations: {}
+
+# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
+# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
+# httpRoute.enabled may be true.
+#
+# The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
+# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
+# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
+# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
+# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
+#
+# WHAT THIS MODE COSTS HERE: cwa.maxUploadFileSize is not enforced. It exists
+# only as an ingress-nginx annotation and the Gateway API has no body-size
+# field, so the limit becomes whatever the Gateway enforces. For an e-book
+# library that is the one value worth checking before switching - a book above
+# the Gateway's default is rejected by the proxy, and nothing in CWA's log says
+# a chart value was ignored. NOTES.txt prints this in Gateway mode.
+#
+# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
+# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
+# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: false
+  # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
+  # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's
+  # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's
+  # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group,
+  # kind), passed through unchanged:
+  #
+  #   parentRefs:
+  #     - name: public
+  #       namespace: gateway
+  #       sectionName: https
+  #
+  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
+  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
+  # nothing, with no event to say so.
+  parentRefs: []
+  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
+  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
+  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
+  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
+  #
+  # Cheap in this chart, because nothing inside the pod follows the hostname:
+  # CWA is told its address by nothing, so a second name needs no second value
+  # changed with it.
+  hostnames: []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8083 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 443
+  # for metadata lookups (covers and book details from public providers).
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: 443 goes to any destination - the providers are
+  # hostnames, which this object cannot match. Inbound 8083 is not restricted
+  # by source in the default, because it is the probe port. And a policy is
+  # only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8083, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # Add a port only for a metadata provider or an e-mail/send-to-Kindle setup
+    # that does not use 443 - SMTP submission would be 587 or 465.
+    extraPorts: []

ci/bulwark/test-values.yaml

@@ -160,3 +160,15 @@ ingress:
     # also the annotation this chart's NOTES.txt tells operators to add, so the
     # fixture is the shape a real install has.
     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: "25m"
+
+# The egress cap of this chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5) allows the STANDARD
+# ports of its dependencies. The CI JMAP server does not: fixtures.yaml serves it over plain HTTP on 8080 rather than over HTTPS on 443 - which is exactly the asymmetry values.yaml warns about for an in-cluster jmapServerUrl.
+#
+# So this is not a workaround for the test: it is the chart's documented escape
+# hatch, used for exactly the case values.yaml names. The fixtures are the one
+# place in the repository where that case is exercised, and removing this entry
+# shows what the cap costs a dependency on a non-standard port.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 8080

ci/httproute/bulwark.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/bulwark/test-values.yaml: the install-test
+# runs exactly ONE configuration per chart, and this chart's fixture installs
+# the StatefulSet with its PVC and both 1Password items. Trading its Ingress
+# for a CRD schema check that cyberchef's fixture already performs against the
+# real Gateway-API CRDs would be a bad swap. The install keeps the Ingress; the
+# route is held here, at render level, which is where its silent failure modes
+# live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - ingress.enabled is this chart's
+# routing switch and defaults to TRUE, so without this line the chart aborts
+# its own render with both modes on.
+#
+# ONE ROUTING OBJECT, WHICH IS ALL THIS CHART HAS. #114's measured table and
+# the header of ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh both expected two Ingresses and
+# a rewrite-target here; neither is the case, and the reason is in
+# bulwark.httproute.yaml. In short: Bulwark cannot be served under a sub-path
+# (NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the bundle), so there is one object,
+# one rule, at "/", and no URLRewrite filter for the #118 prefix/redirect
+# assurance to pair up with. Every "rewrite-target" string in this chart is an
+# explanation of why it does not work, and a grep counted those as
+# occurrences.
+#
+# WHAT THIS OVERLAY COVERS:
+#
+#   - ingress.domain comes from the fixture, so the route renders with its
+#     hostname from that single source of truth - httpRoute.hostnames stays
+#     empty on purpose, because the fallback is the path every installation
+#     will actually use.
+#   - the route's backendRef is checked against the serving Service of the same
+#     render, by PORT NUMBER (bulwark.port) rather than by the name "http" the
+#     Ingress uses, because backendRefs takes a PortNumber. This overlay is
+#     what holds that number against the Service's.
+#
+# NOT covered here, and it cannot be: that the hostname answers. No Gateway
+# controller runs in CI and no route reaches "Accepted: True". Nor the thing
+# this chart actually loses in this mode - the operator's
+# proxy-body-size: 25m, which has no counterpart in the specification. That
+# loss is documented in values.yaml and printed by NOTES.txt, and documentation
+# is not something a test can assert.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/calibre-web-automated.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/calibre-web-automated/test-values.yaml: the
+# install-test runs exactly ONE configuration per chart and the two modes are
+# mutually exclusive, so switching the fixture would drop this chart's Ingress
+# from the install for a CRD schema cyberchef's fixture already exercises
+# against the real Gateway-API CRDs. The install keeps the Ingress; the route is
+# held here, at render level, which is where its two silent failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - the chart aborts its own render
+# when both modes are true.
+#
+# ingress.domain comes from ci/calibre-web-automated/test-values.yaml;
+# httpRoute.hostnames is left empty on purpose, so the fallback to
+# ingress.domain is what the test exercises and the two cannot disagree here.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/freesailarr.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/freesailarr/test-values.yaml: the
+# install-test runs exactly ONE configuration per chart, and this chart's
+# fixture is the expensive one - it brings up a real Wireguard tunnel so that
+# ten containers can become Ready. Switching it into Gateway mode would trade
+# its Ingress objects for a CRD schema cyberchef's fixture already exercises
+# against the real Gateway-API CRDs. The install keeps the Ingresses; the
+# routes are held here, at render level, which is where their two silent
+# failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - ingress.enabled is this chart's
+# MASTER switch and defaults to true, so without this line the chart aborts its
+# own render with both modes on.
+#
+# WHAT THIS OVERLAY ACTUALLY COVERS, which is more than one route:
+#
+#   - ingress.host comes from the fixture (freesailarr.example.com), so the
+#     SHARED-domain shape is what renders: one HTTPRoute with one rule per app.
+#   - qbittorrent is enabled in the fixture, so its rule is in that route WITH
+#     the URLRewrite filter - the per-rule equivalent of the rewrite-target
+#     annotation, and the reason this chart needs no second routing object in
+#     this mode.
+#   - mediathekarr is enabled in the fixture with its ingress off, so the
+#     per-app selector is exercised in the negative direction too.
+#   - every rule's backendRef is checked against the per-app Services of the
+#     same render, which is where this chart differs from the rest of the
+#     sweep: it has one Service per app and the route carries the port NUMBER,
+#     not the name the Ingress uses.
+#
+# There is no httpRoute.hostnames key in this chart (see values.yaml): the
+# hostnames come from ingress.host and <app>.ingress.host, which the fixture
+# already sets.
+#
+# A SECOND APP IS GIVEN A HOST OF ITS OWN so the MIXED shape is covered as
+# well: bazarr then renders its own route (ci-freesailarr-bazarr-httproute)
+# while the rest stay on the shared host. Without it the per-app branch of the
+# template would never be entered by any test. Bazarr is the right one to move
+# because its sub-path mode needs a manual step inside the application anyway.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+bazarr:
+  ingress:
+    host: bazarr.ci.local

ci/httproute/homeassistant.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/homeassistant/test-values.yaml, and here
+# that is more than the usual reason. This chart's ingress.enabled DEFAULT IS
+# false and the install-test fixture does not switch it on, so the install
+# exercises no routing object at all - as with garage. There is nothing to
+# trade away: this overlay ADDS coverage that the install-test never had,
+# rather than swapping one object for another.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is restated anyway. It is already the default, but the
+# two modes are mutually exclusive and the chart aborts its own render when
+# both are true, so writing it down here keeps this overlay correct if that
+# default ever changes.
+#
+# AND THIS OVERLAY HAS TO SUPPLY HOSTS, which no other overlay in the sweep
+# does. This chart is the DOCUMENTED INGRESS EXCEPTION: it has no
+# ingress.domain, so there is no httpRoute.hostnames either - the hostnames and
+# the paths come from ingress.hosts, and the chart renders ONE HTTPRoute PER
+# ENTRY there. The chart's default entry is the placeholder
+# "chart-example.local" with pathType ImplementationSpecific, which WOULD
+# render (the chart maps ImplementationSpecific to PathPrefix on "/"), but it
+# would exercise exactly one route with one rule and would leave the
+# interesting half of this chart's flexible style untested.
+#
+# So the list below is deliberate, and each entry earns its place:
+#
+#   1. ha.ci.local with "/" and pathType Prefix - the ordinary case, and the
+#      clean Prefix -> PathPrefix mapping.
+#   2. ha-alt.ci.local with TWO paths, one Prefix and one Exact - this is the
+#      part that cannot be expressed in a single HTTPRoute together with entry
+#      1, because an HTTPRoute's rules apply to EVERY hostname of the object.
+#      It is therefore the test that the chart really renders one object per
+#      host entry rather than one object with several hostnames, and it
+#      exercises the Exact mapping and the multi-rule path at the same time.
+#
+# Both entries' rules are checked against the Service of the same render. The
+# reference is by PORT NUMBER (service.port) rather than by the name "http" the
+# Ingress uses, because backendRefs takes a PortNumber - so this overlay is
+# what holds that number against the Service's.
+#
+# NOT covered here, and it cannot be:
+#
+#   - that either hostname answers. No Gateway controller runs in CI and no
+#     route reaches "Accepted: True".
+#   - the pathType ImplementationSpecific ABORT on a non-root path. That is a
+#     render-failure path, and this test only runs renders it expects to
+#     succeed; it was exercised by hand instead (see the PR).
+#   - that Home Assistant accepts the Host header or reads X-Forwarded-For.
+#     Both live in the application's own configuration, which arrives from
+#     1Password, and changing the data path changes the proxy address the
+#     trusted_proxies list has to name. NOTES.txt says so; nothing can assert
+#     it here.
+#
+# No URLRewrite filter is rendered by this chart in either mode, so the #118
+# prefix/redirect assurance has no precondition to meet here.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+  hosts:
+    - host: ha.ci.local
+      paths:
+        - path: /
+          pathType: Prefix
+    - host: ha-alt.ci.local
+      paths:
+        - path: /
+          pathType: Prefix
+        - path: /api/websocket
+          pathType: Exact
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/keycloak.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/keycloak/test-values.yaml: the install-test
+# runs exactly ONE configuration per chart, and this chart's fixture is the
+# expensive and informative one - two replicas against a throwaway PostgreSQL,
+# two init containers, `kc.sh build` under readOnlyRootFilesystem, and the
+# Infinispan cluster forming over jdbc-ping (see that file for the four things
+# only a real install can prove). Trading all of it for a CRD schema check that
+# cyberchef's fixture already performs against the real Gateway-API CRDs would
+# be a bad swap. The install keeps the two Ingresses; the two routes are held
+# here, at render level, which is where their silent failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here. The two modes are mutually
+# exclusive and the chart aborts its own render when both are true, so an
+# overlay that only switched httpRoute on would turn this test red.
+#
+# WHAT THIS OVERLAY COVERS, WHICH IS BOTH ROUTING OBJECTS:
+#
+#   - ingress.domain comes from the fixture (keycloak.ci.example.com), so the
+#     PUBLIC route renders with its hostname from that single source of truth
+#     (httpRoute.hostnames stays empty on purpose - the fallback is the path
+#     that every installation will actually use).
+#   - ingress.admin.enabled is true in the fixture with
+#     ingress.admin.domain set, so the ADMIN route renders too, and its
+#     parentRefs fall back to httpRoute.parentRefs below - the empty-admin
+#     branch, which is the one an installation hits unless it wants an
+#     internal Gateway.
+#   - every route's backendRef is checked against the serving Service of the
+#     same render. They all point at the SAME Service, by PORT NUMBER
+#     (keycloak.ports.http) rather than by the name "http" the Ingress uses,
+#     because backendRefs takes a PortNumber - so this overlay is what holds
+#     that number against the Service's.
+#   - THE TWO REALM ROUTES (Gitea #122), which come from keycloak.realmHosts in
+#     the fixture rather than from this file. Nothing is repeated here on
+#     purpose: the fixture installs them as Ingress objects and this overlay
+#     turns the same two entries into HTTPRoutes, so one definition covers both
+#     modes and the two halves cannot drift into describing different hostnames.
+#     What the routes add to the two above is a SECOND RULE SHAPE - an Exact
+#     match on / carrying a RequestRedirect filter and no backendRefs at all.
+#     That rule is reported as "not checked" by this test, correctly and by
+#     design: a filter-only rule has no backend to resolve. The assertion it
+#     does earn is on its sibling rule, the PathPrefix one that points at the
+#     Service. The prefix/redirect pairing check of #118 does NOT fire for these
+#     routes and must not: it is scoped to rules that STRIP a prefix with a
+#     ReplacePrefixMatch rewrite, and these strip nothing - they redirect the
+#     bare root of a hostname that serves one realm.
+#     The entries also cover the two Ingress-mode forms (one with a
+#     clusterIssuer, one without) and what this test holds about them is their
+#     INERTNESS: neither tlsSecretName nor clusterIssuer nor the per-entry
+#     annotation may appear anywhere in a rendered route.
+#
+# NOT covered here, and it cannot be: that either hostname answers. No Gateway
+# controller runs in CI, no route reaches "Accepted: True", and the
+# proxy-buffer-size/proxy-buffers-number annotations this chart's live
+# installation relies on have no counterpart in this mode at all - that loss is
+# documented in values.yaml and printed by NOTES.txt, and documentation is not
+# something a test can assert.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/matrix-synapse.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/matrix-synapse/test-values.yaml: the
+# install-test runs exactly ONE configuration per chart, and this chart's
+# fixture installs the StatefulSet with its PVC and the delegation Deployment.
+# Trading its Ingress for a CRD schema check that cyberchef's fixture already
+# performs against the real Gateway-API CRDs would be a bad swap. The install
+# keeps the Ingress; the routes are held here, at render level, which is where
+# their silent failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - ingress.enabled is this chart's
+# routing switch and defaults to TRUE, so without this line the chart aborts
+# its own render with both modes on.
+#
+# WHAT THIS OVERLAY COVERS, WHICH IS BOTH ROUTING OBJECTS - and this chart is
+# the one in group 3 where "both" means two different hostnames, two different
+# paths and two different backends:
+#
+#   - ingress.domain comes from the fixture (matrix.ci.local), so the
+#     HOMESERVER route renders with its hostname from that single source of
+#     truth. httpRoute.hostnames stays empty on purpose: the fallback is the
+#     path every installation will actually use.
+#   - matrix.delegation.enabled is TRUE in the fixture with
+#     matrix.delegation.serverUrl: ci.local, so the DELEGATION route renders
+#     too - on its own hostname, matching PathPrefix /.well-known/matrix, and
+#     pointing at the delegation Service rather than at Synapse. Its
+#     parentRefs fall back to httpRoute.parentRefs below, which is the branch
+#     an installation hits unless the server name sits behind a different
+#     Gateway.
+#   - both routes' backendRefs are checked against the Services of the same
+#     render, and they are DIFFERENT Services. Both references are by PORT
+#     NUMBER rather than by the name "http" the Ingress uses, because
+#     backendRefs takes a PortNumber - so this overlay is what holds those
+#     numbers against the Services'.
+#
+# No URLRewrite filter is rendered by this chart in either mode: the delegation
+# nginx answers on the full /.well-known/matrix/* path, so nothing is stripped
+# and the #118 prefix/redirect assurance has no precondition to meet here.
+#
+# NOT covered here, and it cannot be: that either hostname answers, which for
+# Matrix is also whether FEDERATION works. No Gateway controller runs in CI, no
+# route reaches "Accepted: True", and Matrix federation is HTTPS-only while
+# nothing in this mode renders a certificate. Nor is the body-size limit
+# covered - proxy-body-size: 50m is on the live Ingress and has no counterpart
+# in the specification; that loss is documented in values.yaml and printed by
+# NOTES.txt, and documentation is not something a test can assert.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/outline.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/outline/test-values.yaml: the install-test
+# runs exactly ONE configuration per chart and the two modes are mutually
+# exclusive, so switching the fixture would drop this chart's Ingress from the
+# install for a CRD schema cyberchef's fixture already exercises against the
+# real Gateway-API CRDs. The install keeps the Ingress; the route is held here,
+# at render level, which is where its two silent failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - the chart aborts its own render
+# when both modes are true.
+#
+# ingress.domain comes from ci/outline/test-values.yaml and keeps feeding
+# Outline's URL variable in this mode too; httpRoute.hostnames is left empty on
+# purpose, so the fallback to ingress.domain is what the test exercises - and
+# the two therefore cannot disagree here, which is the state this chart needs
+# for its OIDC redirect URI to match.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/paperless-ngx.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/paperless-ngx/test-values.yaml: that
+# fixture is the ONLY install of the valkey-subchart path anywhere in this
+# repository (see its header), and the install-test runs exactly one
+# configuration per chart. Switching it into Gateway mode would trade that
+# coverage, plus this chart's Ingress, for a CRD schema cyberchef's fixture
+# already exercises against the real Gateway-API CRDs. The install keeps the
+# Ingress and the subchart; the route is held here, at render level, which is
+# where its two silent failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here, and in THIS chart it is also
+# new: the switch was added with the Gateway mode (#114) and defaults to true,
+# so without this line the chart aborts its own render with both modes on.
+#
+# ingress.domain comes from ci/paperless-ngx/test-values.yaml and keeps feeding
+# PAPERLESS_URL in this mode too; httpRoute.hostnames is left empty on purpose,
+# so the fallback to ingress.domain is what the test exercises - and the two
+# therefore cannot disagree here, which is the state Django's CSRF check needs.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/rss-bridge.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/rss-bridge/test-values.yaml, and for this
+# chart the reason is sharper than for its siblings. The install-test runs
+# exactly ONE configuration per chart and the two modes are mutually exclusive,
+# so switching the fixture would trade this chart's Ingress away - and that
+# fixture's Ingress is the only thing that exercises rss-bridge.tlsGroups, the
+# secret-grouping helper that keeps the three grown certificates of the real
+# installation on their existing names. That helper is inert in Gateway mode
+# (nothing to group once TLS sits on the listener), so a fixture switched to
+# this mode would stop covering it entirely. The CRD schema check the pilot
+# paid for is already performed by cyberchef's fixture against the real
+# Gateway-API CRDs; what is missing without this file is the render-level
+# assurance, and that is what this overlay buys.
+#
+# A note on this chart's install-test, because it has a history. It had failed
+# on the Gitea runner since the move - php-fpm unable to read /app/index.php,
+# the startup probe 403ing through its whole budget, the pod never Ready (Gitea
+# #51), reproduced on two images while the same chart and image ran healthy in
+# the cluster. The chart was deliberately kept OUT of ci/excluded-charts.txt so
+# that a pass would be noticed rather than silenced, and in the PR that added
+# this overlay it PASSED: pod 1/1 Ready in 22s, 0 restarts, no permission error
+# in the job. Since that PR's rendered defaults are byte-identical to
+# origin/main, the chart is ruled out as the cause and the runner is the
+# implicated layer - which is where #51 had already placed it. It reproduced
+# on every run of that branch since, so it is not a fluke, and #51 was closed
+# on that round. What was NEVER identified is the cause: nobody established
+# what changed on the runner, and the diagnostic programme in that issue
+# (docker info for userns and the dind configuration, the same image in a
+# local k3d without remapping) was not executed. So if this chart's
+# install-test goes red again, that is a fresh finding and not a known quirk -
+# and this comment is the context it should be read against.
+#
+# Either way this overlay stays load-bearing: the install-test installs the
+# INGRESS mode (that is what the fixture sets), so the Gateway mode of this
+# chart is covered here at render level and nowhere else - the same situation
+# as every other chart in the sweep.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - the chart ships it as TRUE and
+# aborts its own render when both modes are on.
+#
+# httpRoute.hostnames MUST be supplied, and this overlay is the second in the
+# repository that has to (homeassistant's was the first). The other charts let
+# an empty hostnames list fall back to ingress.domain; this chart has no
+# ingress.domain, and it deliberately does not reuse ingress.hosts from the
+# fixture, because those entries carry tlsSecretName values that address
+# nothing once the certificate sits on the Gateway's listener. The render
+# aborts on an empty list rather than publishing a route that matches every
+# request reaching its listener.
+#
+# THREE hostnames on ONE object, which is the shape this chart's production
+# installation has (three hosts, all serving the same Service at "/"). It is
+# also the shape the test should see: one HTTPRoute, one rule, one backendRef,
+# several hostnames - as opposed to homeassistant's one-object-per-host or
+# matrix-synapse's two objects with different paths and backends. The three
+# names are kept recognisably parallel to ci/rss-bridge/test-values.yaml so the
+# two modes can be read side by side, but they are NOT the same values: these
+# are the route's hostnames, and the fixture's are the Ingress's hosts.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+  hostnames:
+    - rss-bridge.ci.local
+    - rssbridge.ci.local
+    - rss-bridge.ci.example

ci/httproute/stalwart.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/stalwart/test-values.yaml: the install-test
+# runs exactly ONE configuration per chart, and this chart's fixture brings up
+# the node groups against a throwaway Postgres. Trading its Ingress for a CRD
+# schema check that cyberchef's fixture already performs against the real
+# Gateway-API CRDs would be a bad swap. The install keeps the Ingress; the
+# route is held here, at render level, which is where its silent failure modes
+# live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - ingress.enabled is this chart's
+# HTTP routing switch and defaults to TRUE, so without this line the chart
+# aborts its own render with both modes on.
+#
+# WHAT THIS OVERLAY COVERS:
+#
+#   - ingress.domain comes from the fixture, so the route renders with its
+#     hostname from that single source of truth. httpRoute.hostnames stays
+#     empty on purpose: the fallback is the path every installation will
+#     actually use.
+#   - ingress.nodeGroup comes from the fixture too, so the route is checked to
+#     point at THAT GROUP'S http Service and no other. This chart is the one in
+#     group 3 where the backend is group-scoped, and the ONE-route-not-one-
+#     per-group property is exactly what would be easy to get wrong on a copy.
+#   - the backendRef is checked against the per-group http Service of the same
+#     render, by PORT NUMBER (ports.http.containerPort) rather than by the name
+#     "http" the Ingress uses, because backendRefs takes a PortNumber. Note
+#     that this chart's NodePort Services publish a DIFFERENT number
+#     (ports.<name>.nodePort) than the container binds, so naming the wrong one
+#     here would be a plausible mistake - this overlay is what catches it.
+#
+# No URLRewrite filter is rendered by this chart in either mode, so the #118
+# prefix/redirect assurance has no precondition to meet here.
+#
+# NOT covered here, and none of it can be:
+#
+#   - that the hostname answers. No Gateway controller runs in CI and no route
+#     reaches "Accepted: True".
+#   - THE CORS CONFIGURATION, which is the thing this chart actually loses in
+#     this mode and the one that breaks the bulwark webmail. It lives in the
+#     operator's ingress.annotations, the chart has no values for it, and the
+#     Gateway API's own CORS filter is Extended-support with observed
+#     implementation variance - all of which is documented in values.yaml and
+#     printed by NOTES.txt. Documentation is not something a test can assert.
+#   - that SMTP/IMAP still work. They never went through the Ingress and do not
+#     go through the route; the mail Certificate that serves them keeps being
+#     rendered in this mode, which is this chart's distinguishing feature in
+#     the sweep, and no render test looks at whether it was left alone.
+#   - THE MTA-STS ROUTE (Gitea #123), which is the second HTTPRoute this chart
+#     renders. Its backendRef is held against the same per-group http Service
+#     by the same port number, so the one place information travels from the
+#     Service object into a route template is checked twice rather than once.
+#     What the list below is shaped for is the three cases the entry form has:
+#     an entry WITH a clusterIssuer, an entry WITHOUT one, and a host on a
+#     SUBDOMAIN - the last because mta-sts.sub.<domain> is one label deeper
+#     than *.<domain> and a parent wildcard does not cover it.
+#
+#     Both TLS fields are INERT IN THIS MODE: TLS sits on the Gateway's
+#     listener and this chart renders no certificate for an HTTP hostname
+#     here. They are set anyway, and that is the assertion - the render has to
+#     ACCEPT them in Gateway mode without requiring them, because the mirror
+#     image (tlsSecretName required in Ingress mode) is what makes them
+#     mode-specific rather than optional-everywhere.
+#
+#     The Ingress half of this feature is NOT exercised here - this overlay's
+#     whole job is to switch the mode off. It is exercised by
+#     ci/stalwart/test-values.yaml instead, which installs in Ingress mode and
+#     therefore has the MTA-STS Ingress objects accepted by a real API server.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https
+mtaSts:
+  hosts:
+    - host: mta-sts.ci.example.com
+      tlsSecretName: tls-mta-sts-ci-example-com-ingress
+      clusterIssuer: ci-selfsigned
+    # One label deeper: its own secret, because the parent's wildcard would not
+    # reach it. In this mode that is the Gateway listener's problem, which is
+    # exactly why the entry is here and why the values are inert.
+    - host: mta-sts.sub.ci.example.com
+      tlsSecretName: tls-mta-sts-sub-ci-example-com-ingress
+      clusterIssuer: ci-selfsigned
+    # No clusterIssuer: "the certificate comes from somewhere else". Nothing in
+    # this mode reads it either way; the point is that the render accepts the
+    # entry without it.
+    - host: mta-sts.other.ci.example
+      tlsSecretName: tls-some-existing-wildcard-ingress

ci/httproute/ytdlp-web-player.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/ytdlp-web-player/test-values.yaml: the
+# install-test runs exactly ONE configuration per chart, and this chart's
+# fixture is the one that resolves and installs the oauth2-proxy SUBCHART.
+# Trading its Ingress for a CRD schema check that cyberchef's fixture already
+# performs against the real Gateway-API CRDs would be a bad swap. The install
+# keeps the Ingress; the route is held here, at render level.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - ingress.enabled defaults to
+# TRUE in this chart, so without this line the chart aborts its own render with
+# both modes on.
+#
+# THE SUBCHART IS LEFT DISABLED, as the fixture has it, and that is deliberate
+# rather than lazy. The oauth2-proxy chart HAS NO GATEWAY-API SUPPORT - it
+# renders an Ingress or nothing - so switching it on here would add a second
+# object this test does not look at, while the thing worth exercising in
+# Gateway mode is this chart's own route. The interesting interaction between
+# the two (one hostname claimed by the proxy's Ingress AND by this chart's
+# HTTPRoute, which the ingress-nginx admission webhook cannot catch because the
+# kinds differ) is a RENDER-FAILURE path: the chart refuses it. This test only
+# runs renders it expects to succeed, so that guard was exercised by hand
+# instead - see the PR.
+#
+# WHAT THIS OVERLAY COVERS:
+#
+#   - ingress.domain comes from the fixture (ytdlp-web-player.example.com), so
+#     the route renders with its hostname from that single source of truth.
+#     httpRoute.hostnames stays empty on purpose: the fallback is the path an
+#     installation will actually use.
+#   - the backendRef is checked against the application Service of the same
+#     render, by PORT NUMBER rather than by the name "http" the Ingress uses,
+#     because backendRefs takes a PortNumber. That number also has to agree
+#     with ytdlp-web-player.appServiceAddress, which is what the proxy gets as
+#     its upstream - three places, and this overlay holds two of them together.
+#
+# No URLRewrite filter is rendered by this chart in either mode, so the #118
+# prefix/redirect assurance has no precondition to meet here.
+#
+# NOT covered here, and it cannot be:
+#
+#   - that the hostname answers. No Gateway controller runs in CI and no route
+#     reaches "Accepted: True".
+#   - that authentication is in front of the application. With the proxy off
+#     this route IS the unauthenticated path, which is correct for a fixture
+#     and is exactly what NOTES.txt warns about for a real installation.
+#   - anything about how this release is published in the real cluster. There
+#     is no live Ingress of this chart to compare against: measured 2026-10-12,
+#     the release runs in namespace jlab-player with both Deployments Ready and
+#     not one of the cluster's 23 Ingress objects is in that namespace. What
+#     publishes it could not be determined from the workspace.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/httproute/zipline.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Render-only overlay for ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh, applied LAST.
+#
+# Its one job is to put this chart into Gateway mode, because the convention
+# ships with httpRoute.enabled: false and the test would otherwise be green
+# over nothing. A chart that has an overlay here and still renders no
+# HTTPRoute FAILS the test - that is the whole point of the file existing.
+#
+# An overlay and not a change to ci/zipline/test-values.yaml: the install-test
+# runs exactly ONE configuration per chart and the two modes are mutually
+# exclusive, so switching the fixture would drop this chart's Ingress from the
+# install for a CRD schema cyberchef's fixture already exercises against the
+# real Gateway-API CRDs. The install keeps the Ingress; the route is held here,
+# at render level, which is where its two silent failure modes live.
+#
+# ingress.enabled: false is not optional here - the chart aborts its own render
+# when both modes are true.
+#
+# ingress.domain comes from ci/zipline/test-values.yaml and keeps feeding
+# CORE_DEFAULT_DOMAIN in this mode too; httpRoute.hostnames is left empty on
+# purpose, so the fallback to ingress.domain is what the test exercises - and
+# the two therefore cannot disagree here.
+ingress:
+  enabled: false
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: true
+  parentRefs:
+    - name: public
+      namespace: gateway
+      sectionName: https

ci/keycloak/test-values.yaml

@@ -203,6 +203,43 @@ keycloak:
       mountPath: /opt/keycloak/themes/ci-theme
       readOnly: true
 
+  # TWO REALM HOSTNAMES (Gitea #122), and they are set HERE rather than in the
+  # Gateway overlay on purpose: ci/httproute/keycloak.yaml is applied on top of
+  # this file, so one definition covers BOTH modes - two Ingress objects in this
+  # install, two HTTPRoutes in the render-only test, from the same two entries.
+  # Defining them in the overlay instead would leave the Ingress half of the
+  # feature with no coverage at all, and it is the half that carries the
+  # required value and the convention deviation.
+  #
+  # WHAT THIS INSTALL ADDS TO THE RENDER TEST, which is the part a cluster-less
+  # check cannot reach: the API server accepts both objects, including the
+  # Service port named BY NAME ("http") - a typo there is invisible until
+  # somebody opens the URL - and the second entry's cert-manager annotation does
+  # not make the apply fail in a cluster without cert-manager. No ingress
+  # controller answers in CI, so neither app-root nor the proxy buffers are
+  # exercised; that is the same gap the two objects above have.
+  #
+  # THE TWO ENTRIES ARE THE TWO FORMS, deliberately:
+  #   [0] NO clusterIssuer - the normal case, where the certificate comes from
+  #       elsewhere (a wildcard, another release) and this object only consumes
+  #       the secret. It also carries a per-entry annotation, which is what
+  #       makes the per-entry (rather than chart-global) annotations block a
+  #       tested shape rather than an intended one.
+  #   [1] WITH clusterIssuer - the case where the certificate is issued for this
+  #       entry's own secret.
+  # Both are inert in Gateway mode, and the render test is what holds that: the
+  # routes it renders from these entries must show no trace of either field.
+  realmHosts:
+    - host: realm-one.ci.example.com
+      realm: ci-realm-one
+      tlsSecretName: tls-ci-realm-shared-ingress
+      annotations:
+        nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size: 16k
+    - host: realm-two.ci.example.com
+      realm: ci-realm-two
+      tlsSecretName: tls-ci-realm-two-ingress
+      clusterIssuer: ci-selfsigned
+
 ingress:
   # Left ON although no ingress controller answers in CI: the point is that
   # both objects are accepted and that the Service port they name BY NAME

ci/networkpolicy/gotenberg.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Overlay for the NetworkPolicy render test (Gitea #5), applied last.
+#
+# Two code paths this chart's own defaults never reach, and both are held
+# against the four assertions on every pull request rather than checked once by
+# hand:
+#
+# 1. networkPolicy.egress.remoteAssets: true - the named switch that lets
+#    Chromium fetch over 80/443. Its default is OFF, so the rule it renders
+#    existed in no render at all. It is an EGRESS rule, which is exactly why it
+#    is worth asserting: assertions 2 and 3 look at INGRESS rules, so a mistake
+#    on the egress side has no mechanical check except that the render still
+#    parses and the policy still holds together.
+#
+# 2. The source-restricted probe rule, which only appears once probeSources is
+#    non-empty - the same branch ci/networkpolicy/template-chart.yaml exists
+#    for, and the one the overlay guard demands of any chart that offers the
+#    value. It carries the expensive mistake: a namespaceSelector and a
+#    podSelector written as two list entries instead of one would be an OR.
+#
+# Note what this overlay does NOT do: it changes no release. gotenberg's
+# install-test uses ci/gotenberg/test-values.yaml, which this file does not
+# touch - the policy installed there keeps the restrictive default, because
+# that is the default the convention ships.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    remoteAssets: true
+  # Not the real node addresses of any cluster; documentation CIDRs
+  # (RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1) so nobody can mistake these for something to copy.
+  probeSources:
+    - 192.0.2.11/32
+  allowedNamespaces:
+    - paperless-jk

ci/networkpolicy/minecraft-server.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Overlay for the NetworkPolicy render test (Gitea #5), applied last.
+#
+# This chart's policy has two branches that its own CI fixture never renders,
+# and both carry a mistake worth catching mechanically.
+#
+# 1. THE NODEPORT BRANCH OF THE GAME-PORT RULE. The rule is OPEN when
+#    server.service.type is NodePort - players arrive from the internet,
+#    already masqueraded - and RESTRICTED to the namespace otherwise. The
+#    install-test fixture uses ClusterIP (as all four releases in this cluster
+#    do), so without this overlay the open branch was rendered NOWHERE: not by
+#    the defaults, not by the fixture, not by lint. It is also the branch where
+#    writing server.service.outwardPort instead of server.port would be the
+#    classic NodePort mistake, and assertion 2 only sees a rule it has been
+#    given.
+#
+# 2. THE RCON RULE, which is gated on server.rcon.enabled exactly as the
+#    containerPort is. That pairing was wrong once while this chart was being
+#    written - the rule had no gate, so it named a port the pod does not
+#    declare - and assertion 2 caught it. Switching RCON on here keeps the
+#    PAIR under test rather than just the gate.
+#
+# Note why this chart's overlay does NOT have to render a source-restricted
+# probe rule, which is what the test demands of an overlay elsewhere: all three
+# of this chart's probes are exec probes, so it has no probe rule at all and
+# offers no networkPolicy.probeSources. The guard is conditional on that value
+# for this reason.
+server:
+  service:
+    type: NodePort
+  rcon:
+    enabled: true

ci/networkpolicy/template-chart.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Overlay for the NetworkPolicy render test (Gitea #5), applied last.
+#
+# Its only job is to render a code path the chart's own defaults never reach:
+# the SOURCE-RESTRICTED ingress rule. With probeSources empty - the default, and
+# deliberately so - the probe port's rule carries no "from" at all, so the whole
+# restricted branch of the template, the one containing the ingress-controller
+# AND, the namespace list and the ipBlock peers, is never rendered and never
+# checked. That branch is also the one with the expensive mistake in it: a
+# namespaceSelector and a podSelector written as two list entries instead of one
+# would be an OR, and would open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+#
+# ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh FAILS a chart that has an overlay here and still
+# renders no restricted rule. That guard is the point: without it the overlay
+# could silently stop reaching the branch, and the test would stay green over a
+# code path nobody entered.
+#
+# template-chart carries it rather than a real chart because it is installed
+# nowhere (ci/excluded-charts.txt) - so the restricted form is exercised on
+# every pull request with no release depending on these values.
+networkPolicy:
+  # Not the real node addresses of any cluster; a documentation CIDR
+  # (RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1) so nobody can mistake these for something to copy.
+  probeSources:
+    - 192.0.2.11/32
+    - 192.0.2.12/32
+  allowedNamespaces:
+    - monitoring
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 5432

ci/outline/test-values.yaml

@@ -8,3 +8,20 @@ ingress:
   # clusterIssuer is strictly required (no default); the Ingress just has to
   # apply - there is no cert-manager in the CI cluster.
   clusterIssuer: ci
+
+# The egress cap of the chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5) allows 443 for the
+# OIDC provider, because that is where an OIDC provider normally listens. The
+# CI one does not: fixtures.yaml runs dex at
+# http://dex.default.svc.cluster.local:5556/dex, and Outline fetches the
+# issuer's discovery document at boot.
+#
+# So this entry is not a workaround for the test - it is the chart's documented
+# escape hatch, used for exactly the case values.yaml names, and the fixture is
+# the one place in the repository where that case is actually exercised. Remove
+# it and the install-test shows what the cap does to a dependency on a
+# non-standard port, which is the risk this convention carries into every
+# release.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 5556

ci/patchmon/test-values.yaml

@@ -7,3 +7,15 @@ secrets:
 ingress:
   clusterIssuer: ci
   domain: patchmon.ci.local
+
+# The egress cap of this chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5) allows the STANDARD
+# ports of its dependencies. The CI OIDC provider does not: fixtures.yaml runs dex on 5556 rather than on 443.
+#
+# So this is not a workaround for the test: it is the chart's documented escape
+# hatch, used for exactly the case values.yaml names. The fixtures are the one
+# place in the repository where that case is exercised, and removing this entry
+# shows what the cap costs a dependency on a non-standard port.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 5556

ci/rallly/test-values.yaml

@@ -10,3 +10,15 @@ rallly:
 ingress:
   clusterIssuer: ci
   domain: rallly.ci.local
+
+# The egress cap of this chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5) allows the STANDARD
+# ports of its dependencies. The CI OIDC provider does not: fixtures.yaml runs dex on 5556 rather than on 443.
+#
+# So this is not a workaround for the test: it is the chart's documented escape
+# hatch, used for exactly the case values.yaml names. The fixtures are the one
+# place in the repository where that case is exercised, and removing this entry
+# shows what the cap costs a dependency on a non-standard port.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 5556

ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh

@@ -11,23 +11,56 @@
 # failing the `build-chart` version-bump check. This script closes that gap and
 # is wired up as a `postUpgradeTasks` command in renovate.json5.
 #
-# Usage: ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh <chart-directory>
+# Usage: ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh <chart-directory> [update-type]
 #
-# Bump level (README "Versioning"):
-#   - app major changed  -> chart major, minor/patch reset to 0
-#   - anything else      -> chart patch (plain app updates, sidecar images)
+# Bump level (README "Versioning", decided in Gitea #128):
+#   - update type major        -> chart major, minor/patch reset to 0
+#   - update type minor        -> chart MINOR, patch reset to 0
+#   - patch / digest / pin     -> chart patch
+#   - no or unknown update type -> the appVersion comparison below, i.e. the
+#                                 behaviour this script had before #128
+#   - and never BELOW what the branch already carries (see the maximum rule
+#     further down)
+#
+# THE UPDATE TYPE COMES FROM RENOVATE, AND THAT IS THE POINT (Gitea #128).
+# Renovate has already classified the jump; passing `{{{updateType}}}` in is
+# what makes a chart minor possible at all. Deriving it here from appVersion
+# would be blind to exactly the case that prompted the rule: `freesailarr`
+# carries a hand-maintained `appVersion: "1.0.0"` for ten upstreams and it never
+# moves, so prowlarr's 2.5.2 -> 2.6.5 — an image tag in values.yaml — is a
+# minor with an unchanged appVersion. README, "Dependency updates (Renovate)".
+#
+# WHAT A CHART MINOR BUYS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT. It makes the number honest: an
+# app minor stops arriving as a chart patch. It does NOT oblige anyone to read
+# the release notes — that variant was decided against — so an app minor that
+# changes a default can still reach `main` unremarked. What the number does is
+# make the jump VISIBLE to everything downstream that sees only our chart
+# version (Fleet's `fleet.yaml` in `cluster-config` among them), where a patch
+# is invisible. See the wiki, Lessons-Learned.
+#
+# THE SECOND ARGUMENT IS OPTIONAL ON PURPOSE. `postUpgradeTasks` only runs when
+# the command is allow-listed in the *instance* config, which is not visible
+# from this repository, and a command that does not match the allow-list is
+# skipped SILENTLY. So a missing update type — a narrower allow-list pattern, an
+# older Renovate, a template field that is not populated — must not be a
+# failure: without it the script falls back to what it did before #128 and every
+# chart PR still gets its version bump.
 #
 # Everything is derived from the base commit (HEAD, which during
 # postUpgradeTasks still points at the base branch), never from the working
 # tree's `version:`. That makes repeated runs on the same branch idempotent —
 # Renovate calls the script once per dependency update, and a branch may carry
-# more than one update for the same chart.
+# more than one update for the same chart. The one place the working tree IS
+# read is the maximum rule below, and only to keep a higher version.
 #
 # Runs inside the Renovate container, so: POSIX sh, no bashisms, no jq/yq.
+#
+# Tested by ci/run-bump-level-test.sh, which is where the cases live.
 
 set -eu
 
 dir=${1:-}
+update_type=${2:-}
 [ -n "$dir" ] || exit 0
 
 # Strip a trailing slash so "outline/" and "outline" behave the same.
@@ -49,6 +82,72 @@ field() {
   sed -n "s/^$1:[[:space:]]*//p" | head -n 1 | tr -d "\"' "
 }
 
+# Splits "<major>.<minor>.<patch>" into p_major/p_minor/p_patch. Returns 1 if
+# the string is not exactly three numeric parts, which is also how a four-part
+# version (3.3.1.0) and a suffixed one (9.1.2-alpine) are rejected: the last
+# part then is not numeric.
+parse_semver() {
+  _sv=$1
+  case "$_sv" in
+    *.*.*) ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+  p_major=${_sv%%.*}
+  _rest=${_sv#*.}
+  p_minor=${_rest%%.*}
+  p_patch=${_rest#*.}
+  for _part in "$p_major" "$p_minor" "$p_patch"; do
+    case "$_part" in
+      '' | *[!0-9]*) return 1 ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  return 0
+}
+
+# Is <a.b.c> strictly greater than <d.e.f>? Six arguments, componentwise.
+semver_gt() {
+  if [ "$1" -ne "$4" ]; then
+    if [ "$1" -gt "$4" ]; then return 0; else return 1; fi
+  fi
+  if [ "$2" -ne "$5" ]; then
+    if [ "$2" -gt "$5" ]; then return 0; else return 1; fi
+  fi
+  if [ "$3" -gt "$6" ]; then return 0; else return 1; fi
+}
+
+# Does this app version's MINOR POSITION carry a statement about jump width?
+# Only a plain [v]X.Y.Z does. Everything else keeps the pre-#128 behaviour, i.e.
+# a patch, and the reason is in the convention rather than in a footnote: in
+# CalVer and in date tags the second position is a MONTH, so following it would
+# produce a chart minor every month that says nothing about the risk, and in a
+# four-part or suffixed version the positions are not semver positions at all.
+#
+# Measured on origin/main, this covers seven charts and only those seven:
+#   rss-bridge       2026-09-30            (no dots at all)
+#   homeassistant    2026.8.3              (CalVer — caught by the year guard)
+#   searxng          2026.9.13-3b8009065   (CalVer plus a commit hash)
+#   minecraft-server 2026.8.2-java25       (CalVer plus a JRE suffix)
+#   apache-tika      3.3.1.0-full          (four parts plus a flavour)
+#   teamspeak-server 6.0.0-beta13.1        (prerelease line)
+#   valkey           9.1.2-alpine          (flavour suffix)
+#
+# The last two are the honest edge of this rule: their numeric part IS a semver
+# line, so the fallback understates a real minor there. That is the decided
+# trade — conservative by default, and a chart that wants the minor gets a
+# documented exception rather than a widened pattern.
+#
+# A `major` update type is NOT subject to this: a year rolling over in a date
+# tag arrives as a major, and that was a chart major before #128 too.
+app_minor_is_meaningful() {
+  _av=${1#v}
+  _av=${_av#V}
+  parse_semver "$_av" || return 1
+  # A four-digit leading component from 2000 on is a calendar year, not a
+  # semver major.
+  if [ "$p_major" -ge 2000 ]; then return 1; fi
+  return 0
+}
+
 base=$(git show "HEAD:$chart" 2>/dev/null) || {
   echo "renovate-bump: $chart is new on this branch, leaving its version alone"
   exit 0
@@ -57,6 +156,7 @@ base=$(git show "HEAD:$chart" 2>/dev/null) || {
 base_version=$(printf '%s\n' "$base" | field version)
 base_app=$(printf '%s\n' "$base" | field appVersion)
 new_app=$(field appVersion <"$chart")
+tree_version=$(field version <"$chart")
 
 if [ -z "$base_version" ] || [ -z "$new_app" ]; then
   echo "renovate-bump: $chart has no version/appVersion to work with" >&2
@@ -65,27 +165,13 @@ fi
 
 # <chart-semver> is everything before the +up build suffix.
 semver=${base_version%%+*}
-case "$semver" in
-  *.*.*) ;;
-  *)
-    echo "renovate-bump: cannot parse chart semver '$semver' in $chart" >&2
-    exit 1
-    ;;
-esac
-
-major=${semver%%.*}
-rest=${semver#*.}
-minor=${rest%%.*}
-patch=${rest#*.}
-
-for part in "$major" "$minor" "$patch"; do
-  case "$part" in
-    '' | *[!0-9]*)
-      echo "renovate-bump: non-numeric component in chart semver '$semver'" >&2
-      exit 1
-      ;;
-  esac
-done
+parse_semver "$semver" || {
+  echo "renovate-bump: cannot parse chart semver '$semver' in $chart" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+major=$p_major
+minor=$p_minor
+patch=$p_patch
 
 # Leading major of an app version: v1.159.0 -> 1, 3.3.1.0-full -> 3,
 # 2025-06-03 -> 2025.
@@ -93,17 +179,87 @@ app_major() {
   printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/^[vV]//' -e 's/[^0-9].*$//'
 }
 
-if [ "$new_app" != "$base_app" ] && [ "$(app_major "$new_app")" != "$(app_major "$base_app")" ]; then
-  reason="app major $base_app -> $new_app"
-  new_semver="$((major + 1)).0.0"
-else
-  reason="patch-level change"
-  new_semver="$major.$minor.$((patch + 1))"
+# The pre-#128 level: app major changed -> major, anything else -> patch. Also
+# the fallback whenever no usable update type arrives.
+app_version_level() {
+  if [ "$new_app" != "$base_app" ] && [ "$(app_major "$new_app")" != "$(app_major "$base_app")" ]; then
+    echo major
+  else
+    echo patch
+  fi
+}
+
+case "$update_type" in
+  major)
+    level=major
+    reason="update type major"
+    ;;
+  minor)
+    if app_minor_is_meaningful "$new_app"; then
+      level=minor
+      reason="update type minor"
+    else
+      level=$(app_version_level)
+      reason="update type minor, but appVersion '$new_app' is not a plain semver line -> $level"
+    fi
+    ;;
+  patch | digest | pin | pinDigest)
+    level=patch
+    reason="update type $update_type"
+    ;;
+  '')
+    level=$(app_version_level)
+    reason="no update type given, derived from appVersion -> $level"
+    ;;
+  *)
+    level=$(app_version_level)
+    reason="unknown update type '$update_type', derived from appVersion -> $level"
+    ;;
+esac
+
+case "$level" in
+  major)
+    new_major=$((major + 1))
+    new_minor=0
+    new_patch=0
+    ;;
+  minor)
+    new_major=$major
+    new_minor=$((minor + 1))
+    new_patch=0
+    ;;
+  *)
+    new_major=$major
+    new_minor=$minor
+    new_patch=$((patch + 1))
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# THE MAXIMUM RULE (Gitea #128): the chart level is the GREATER of the chart's
+# own classification and the app jump — never a replacement. Two cases, and the
+# second is the mechanical one:
+#
+#   - a chart-own bump already in the working tree stands. A value that becomes
+#     required is a chart major even when the app jump is a patch, and the chart
+#     version must not stop reporting the chart's own breaks.
+#   - a branch carrying SEVERAL updates. Renovate calls this script once per
+#     update and every call recomputes from the same base commit, so without
+#     this the last call would win: `freesailarr`'s grouped PR has arrived with
+#     three minors among five patches, and the chart level would then depend on
+#     the order the hook happened to run in.
+#
+# It only ever keeps a HIGHER version, so repeated runs stay idempotent.
+if parse_semver "${tree_version%%+*}" &&
+  semver_gt "$p_major" "$p_minor" "$p_patch" "$new_major" "$new_minor" "$new_patch"; then
+  reason="$reason, kept the higher $p_major.$p_minor.$p_patch already on the branch"
+  new_major=$p_major
+  new_minor=$p_minor
+  new_patch=$p_patch
 fi
 
 # Dashes in the app version become dots in the +up suffix.
 suffix=$(printf '%s' "$new_app" | tr '-' '.')
-new_version="$new_semver+up$suffix"
+new_version="$new_major.$new_minor.$new_patch+up$suffix"
 
 sed -i.bak "s|^version:.*|version: $new_version|" "$chart"
 rm -f "$chart.bak"

ci/run-bump-level-test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Bump-level test: every case of ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh, held against the
+# version string it writes into a throwaway chart.
+#
+# Usage: ci/run-bump-level-test.sh
+#
+# WHY THIS TEST EXISTS (Gitea #128)
+#
+# Until #128 the hook was a calculator with one branch: app major -> chart
+# major, everything else -> chart patch. With the update type coming from
+# Renovate it became DECIDING LOGIC — it is now the thing that says how big a
+# change the cluster is being offered, and the chart version is the only signal
+# anything downstream sees (README, "Chart dependencies": Fleet's `fleet.yaml`
+# in `cluster-config` sees our chart version and nothing inside the package).
+#
+# And its failure mode is silence. A wrong level is a valid version string: the
+# PR goes green, the chart publishes, and the only symptom is a number that
+# understates what it ships. Nothing in the pipeline reads it, so nothing but a
+# test can.
+#
+# HOW A CASE IS BUILT, AND WHY A REAL GIT REPO
+#
+# The script reads the BASE commit (`git show HEAD:<chart>/Chart.yaml`) and the
+# working tree, so a case is not a function call — it is a repository with a
+# commit and a dirty file. Each case therefore gets a throwaway `git init` in a
+# unique temp directory, one commit carrying the base Chart.yaml, and the new
+# Chart.yaml written over it uncommitted. That is exactly the state Renovate's
+# `postUpgradeTasks` hook runs in.
+#
+# Signing is switched off per command (`-c commit.gpgsign=false`): this
+# workspace signs every commit through an SSH signer, and a throwaway repo has
+# no business invoking it. The temp root comes from `mktemp -d`, because /tmp is
+# shared with whatever else runs on this machine.
+#
+# The runners have no pyyaml, no yq and no Docker — the same constraint
+# ci/run-selector-match-test.sh and ci/run-quantity-render-test.sh work under.
+# None is needed: the fixtures are six-line Chart.yaml files written by printf,
+# and the assertion is one `version:` line read back with sed. Helm is not
+# needed either, which is why this job carries no Helm step.
+#
+# WHAT IS ASSERTED, AND WHAT IS NOT
+#
+# Asserted: the full `version:` line (so the `+up` suffix and its dash-to-dot
+# normalization are covered by every case), the exit code, and for the cases
+# that must leave the chart alone, that the line is untouched.
+#
+# NOT asserted, and not assertable from here: that Renovate passes the update
+# type at all. The hook only runs when the command is allow-listed in the
+# *instance* config, which lives outside this repository — and a pattern that
+# does not match is skipped silently. That is why a missing second argument is
+# itself a case here (it must fall back, not fail), and why the PR that
+# introduced this carries a dry-run instead of a claim.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+SCRIPT="$ROOT/ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh"
+
+[ -x "$SCRIPT" ] || {
+  echo "FAIL: $SCRIPT is not executable" >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+TMP="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/bump-level-test.XXXXXX")"
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+
+GIT_OPTS=(-c user.name=ci -c user.email=ci@example.invalid -c commit.gpgsign=false -c tag.gpgsign=false)
+
+passed=0
+failed=0
+
+chart_yaml() { # <name> <version> <appVersion>
+  printf 'apiVersion: v2\nname: %s\ndescription: test fixture\ntype: application\nversion: %s\nappVersion: "%s"\nicon: https://example.com/icon.png\n' \
+    "$1" "$2" "$3"
+}
+
+# Builds a repository whose HEAD carries <base-content> for <dir>/Chart.yaml
+# (skipped when empty, which is the "new chart on this branch" case) and whose
+# working tree carries <tree-content>. Prints the repository path.
+scenario() { # <dir> <base-content> <tree-content>
+  local dir=$1 base=$2 tree=$3 repo
+  repo="$(mktemp -d "$TMP/case.XXXXXX")"
+  git -C "$repo" init -q
+  printf 'root commit so HEAD exists\n' >"$repo/README.md"
+  git -C "$repo" add README.md
+  git -C "$repo" "${GIT_OPTS[@]}" commit -qm "root"
+  mkdir -p "$repo/$dir"
+  if [ -n "$base" ]; then
+    printf '%s' "$base" >"$repo/$dir/Chart.yaml"
+    git -C "$repo" add "$dir/Chart.yaml"
+    git -C "$repo" "${GIT_OPTS[@]}" commit -qm "base chart"
+  fi
+  [ -z "$tree" ] || printf '%s' "$tree" >"$repo/$dir/Chart.yaml"
+  printf '%s' "$repo"
+}
+
+version_of() { sed -n 's/^version:[[:space:]]*//p' "$1" | head -n 1; }
+
+report() { # <name> <expected> <got> <expected-rc> <got-rc> <output>
+  if [ "$2" = "$3" ] && [ "$4" = "$5" ]; then
+    passed=$((passed + 1))
+    printf '  ok   %s\n' "$1"
+  else
+    failed=$((failed + 1))
+    printf '  FAIL %s\n       expected version %-24s rc %s\n       got      version %-24s rc %s\n       output:  %s\n' \
+      "$1" "$2" "$4" "$3" "$5" "$6"
+  fi
+}
+
+# The ordinary case: one chart, a base version, an app version that may or may
+# not have moved, and an update type. UPDATE_TYPE of "-" calls the script with
+# ONE argument (the allow-list / older-Renovate case), "" passes an empty
+# second argument (a template field that resolved to nothing).
+bump() { # <name> <base-version> <base-app> <tree-version> <tree-app> <update-type> <expected-version> [expected-rc]
+  local name=$1 base_version=$2 base_app=$3 tree_version=$4 tree_app=$5 utype=$6 expected=$7 rc_expected=${8:-0}
+  local repo out rc got
+  repo="$(scenario demo "$(chart_yaml demo "$base_version" "$base_app")" "$(chart_yaml demo "$tree_version" "$tree_app")")"
+  rc=0
+  if [ "$utype" = "-" ]; then
+    out="$(cd "$repo" && "$SCRIPT" demo 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+  else
+    out="$(cd "$repo" && "$SCRIPT" demo "$utype" 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+  fi
+  got="$(version_of "$repo/demo/Chart.yaml")"
+  report "$name" "$expected" "$got" "$rc_expected" "$rc" "$out"
+}
+
+echo "== update type decides the level (plain semver appVersion) =="
+bump "major -> chart major"            1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 2.0.0 major 2.0.0+up2.0.0
+bump "minor -> chart minor"            1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.5.0 minor 1.3.0+up1.5.0
+bump "patch -> chart patch"            1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.1 patch 1.2.4+up1.4.1
+bump "digest -> chart patch"           1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 digest 1.2.4+up1.4.0
+bump "pin -> chart patch"              1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 pin 1.2.4+up1.4.0
+bump "pinDigest -> chart patch"        1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 pinDigest 1.2.4+up1.4.0
+bump "minor resets the patch"          1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.5.0 minor 1.3.0+up1.5.0
+bump "major resets minor and patch"    4.5.6+up1.4.0 1.4.0 4.5.6+up1.4.0 2.0.0 major 5.0.0+up2.0.0
+
+echo "== the case that prompted the rule: appVersion never moves (freesailarr) =="
+# prowlarr 2.5.2 -> 2.6.5 is an image tag in values.yaml; freesailarr's
+# appVersion is a hand-maintained marker and stays at 1.0.0. An appVersion
+# comparison sees nothing and would bump the patch.
+bump "sidecar/bundle minor, appVersion unchanged" 3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 minor 3.2.0+up1.0.0
+bump "sidecar/bundle patch, appVersion unchanged" 3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 patch 3.1.2+up1.0.0
+
+echo "== non-semver app versions stay at patch (all seven on origin/main) =="
+bump "rss-bridge date tag, month roll"  2.1.1+up2026.09.30 2026-09-30 2.1.1+up2026.09.30 2026-10-05 minor 2.1.2+up2026.10.05
+bump "homeassistant CalVer"             6.2.0+up2026.8.3 2026.8.3 6.2.0+up2026.8.3 2026.9.0 minor 6.2.1+up2026.9.0
+bump "searxng CalVer plus hash"         1.1.0+up2026.9.13.3b8009065 2026.9.13-3b8009065 1.1.0+up2026.9.13.3b8009065 2026.10.1-aa12bb34c minor 1.1.1+up2026.10.1.aa12bb34c
+bump "minecraft-server CalVer plus JRE" 6.0.1+up2026.8.2.java25 2026.8.2-java25 6.0.1+up2026.8.2.java25 2026.9.1-java25 minor 6.0.2+up2026.9.1.java25
+bump "apache-tika four parts"           10.0.2+up3.3.1.0.full 3.3.1.0-full 10.0.2+up3.3.1.0.full 3.4.0.0-full minor 10.0.3+up3.4.0.0.full
+bump "teamspeak prerelease line"        5.1.3+up6.0.0.beta13.1 6.0.0-beta13.1 5.1.3+up6.0.0.beta13.1 6.0.0-beta14.1 minor 5.1.4+up6.0.0.beta14.1
+bump "valkey flavour suffix"            1.0.0+up9.1.2.alpine 9.1.2-alpine 1.0.0+up9.1.2.alpine 9.2.0-alpine minor 1.0.1+up9.2.0.alpine
+# A major is NOT subject to the fallback - a year rolling over was a chart major
+# before #128 as well.
+bump "date tag, year roll, major"       2.1.1+up2026.09.30 2026-09-30 2.1.1+up2026.09.30 2027-01-05 major 3.0.0+up2027.01.05
+bump "four parts, app major, major"     10.0.2+up3.3.1.0.full 3.3.1.0-full 10.0.2+up3.3.1.0.full 4.0.0.0-full major 11.0.0+up4.0.0.0.full
+# The year guard is a guard, not a blanket: a v-prefixed plain line still counts.
+bump "v-prefixed plain semver, minor"   7.2.0+upv1.159.0 v1.159.0 7.2.0+upv1.159.0 v1.160.0 minor 7.3.0+upv1.160.0
+
+echo "== maximum, not replacement =="
+# A chart-own bump already in the working tree stands, whatever the app jump is.
+bump "chart major already on branch, app patch" 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 2.0.0+up1.4.0 1.4.1 patch 2.0.0+up1.4.1
+bump "chart minor already on branch, app patch" 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.3.0+up1.4.0 1.4.1 patch 1.3.0+up1.4.1
+# A grouped branch: the hook runs once per update from the same base, so the
+# minor must survive a patch call that follows it.
+bump "minor on branch, later patch call"        3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.2.0+up1.0.0 1.0.0 patch 3.2.0+up1.0.0
+bump "patch on branch, later minor call"        3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.1.2+up1.0.0 1.0.0 minor 3.2.0+up1.0.0
+bump "repeated minor call is idempotent"        3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.2.0+up1.0.0 1.0.0 minor 3.2.0+up1.0.0
+bump "repeated major call is idempotent"        1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 2.0.0+up2.0.0 2.0.0 major 2.0.0+up2.0.0
+bump "major on branch wins over a later minor"  1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 2.0.0+up1.4.0 1.5.0 minor 2.0.0+up1.5.0
+# Stale branch after a rebase: the base moved ahead of what the branch carries,
+# so the recomputed version wins and nothing is kept.
+bump "stale branch version is not kept"         3.3.0+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.1.2+up1.0.0 1.0.0 patch 3.3.1+up1.0.0
+
+echo "== missing and unknown update type fall back to the pre-#128 behaviour =="
+bump "no second argument, app major"   1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 2.0.0 - 2.0.0+up2.0.0
+bump "no second argument, app minor"   1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.5.0 - 1.2.4+up1.5.0
+bump "no second argument, app patch"   1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.1 - 1.2.4+up1.4.1
+bump "no second argument, unchanged"   3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 3.1.1+up1.0.0 1.0.0 - 3.1.2+up1.0.0
+bump "empty second argument, app major" 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 2.0.0 "" 2.0.0+up2.0.0
+bump "empty second argument, app minor" 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.5.0 "" 1.2.4+up1.5.0
+bump "unknown type, app minor"         1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.5.0 replacement 1.2.4+up1.5.0
+bump "unknown type, app major"         1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 2.0.0 lockFileMaintenance 2.0.0+up2.0.0
+bump "unknown type, maximum still holds" 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 2.0.0+up1.4.0 1.4.1 nonsense 2.0.0+up1.4.1
+
+echo "== charts the script must leave alone, and the hard failures =="
+bump "unparsable chart semver fails loudly" 1.2+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2+up1.4.0 1.5.0 minor 1.2+up1.4.0 1
+bump "missing appVersion fails loudly"      1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0 1.2.3+up1.4.0 "" minor 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1
+
+new_chart_repo="$(scenario demo "" "$(chart_yaml demo 0.1.0+up1.0.0 1.0.0)")"
+rc=0
+out="$(cd "$new_chart_repo" && "$SCRIPT" demo minor 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+report "a chart new on the branch keeps its version" \
+  "0.1.0+up1.0.0" "$(version_of "$new_chart_repo/demo/Chart.yaml")" 0 "$rc" "$out"
+case "$out" in
+  *"new on this branch"*) passed=$((passed + 1)); printf '  ok   and says so\n' ;;
+  *) failed=$((failed + 1)); printf '  FAIL new chart: no explanation in the output: %s\n' "$out" ;;
+esac
+
+tpl_repo="$(scenario template-chart "$(chart_yaml template-chart 4.2.0+upxxx xxx)" "$(chart_yaml template-chart 4.2.0+upxxx xxx)")"
+rc=0
+out="$(cd "$tpl_repo" && "$SCRIPT" template-chart minor 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+report "template-chart is never touched" \
+  "4.2.0+upxxx" "$(version_of "$tpl_repo/template-chart/Chart.yaml")" 0 "$rc" "$out"
+
+# Renovate calls the hook for every update it makes, chart or not.
+other_repo="$(scenario demo "$(chart_yaml demo 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0)" "$(chart_yaml demo 1.2.3+up1.4.0 1.4.0)")"
+for arg in ".github/workflows" "ci/gateway-api-crds.sh" "." "" "not-a-chart"; do
+  rc=0
+  out="$(cd "$other_repo" && "$SCRIPT" "$arg" major 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+  report "non-chart argument '$arg' is a no-op" \
+    "1.2.3+up1.4.0" "$(version_of "$other_repo/demo/Chart.yaml")" 0 "$rc" "$out"
+done
+
+rc=0
+out="$(cd "$other_repo" && "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+report "no arguments at all is a no-op" \
+  "1.2.3+up1.4.0" "$(version_of "$other_repo/demo/Chart.yaml")" 0 "$rc" "$out"
+
+rc=0
+out="$(cd "$other_repo" && "$SCRIPT" demo/ patch 2>&1)" || rc=$?
+report "a trailing slash is accepted" \
+  "1.2.4+up1.4.0" "$(version_of "$other_repo/demo/Chart.yaml")" 0 "$rc" "$out"
+
+echo
+if [ "$failed" -gt 0 ]; then
+  printf 'bump-level test: %d passed, %d FAILED\n' "$passed" "$failed"
+  exit 1
+fi
+printf 'bump-level test: %d cases passed\n' "$passed"

ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh

@@ -22,6 +22,39 @@
 #     yields a route that resolves to no endpoint. ResolvedRefs goes False in
 #     the route's STATUS, which only exists once a controller has looked at it
 #     - so in CI, where no Gateway controller runs, nothing reports it at all.
+#   A PREFIX STRIPPED WITHOUT THE BARE PREFIX REDIRECTED (#118) - the third
+#     finding, and the one that is not about an object pointing nowhere but
+#     about an object pointing somewhere WRONG. A rule that matches
+#     PathPrefix "<path>" (anything but "/") and carries a URLRewrite filter
+#     with ReplacePrefixMatch strips the prefix before the app sees the
+#     request. For the slashed form that is correct. For the BARE form -
+#     "<path>", no trailing slash - the request becomes "/" and the app
+#     answers 200, while the browser's document URL keeps the prefixless form:
+#     every relative link in that page then resolves against the PARENT of
+#     that path, which is the host root. On a shared host the root belongs to
+#     a different application, so the app's own assets and XHRs are answered
+#     by its neighbour. Nothing in the chart, the render, the schema or the
+#     install reports any of it; the symptom is a half-working UI and a
+#     neighbour in the access log, which points nowhere useful.
+#
+#     So: wherever a route strips a prefix, the SAME route must also carry a
+#     rule matching that path with type Exact and a RequestRedirect filter.
+#     Per HTTPRoute object, because Gateway-API matching precedence is a
+#     property of one route - a different route is a different hostname and
+#     says nothing about this one. Exact outranks every prefix match in that
+#     precedence, so the pairing is about existence and not about order.
+#     freesailarr is the FIRST AND, AS OF GROUP 3 OF #114, THE ONLY chart this
+#     applies to. The line that used to stand here said bulwark was the second
+#     rewrite-target chart and would meet the same check when group 3 landed.
+#     Group 3 landed and it does not: bulwark has ONE Ingress object, no
+#     rewrite-target annotation, and cannot have one - NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is
+#     compiled into its bundle, so it cannot be served under a sub-path at all
+#     and its route is one rule at "/" with no URLRewrite filter. Every
+#     occurrence of the string "rewrite-target" in that chart is an explanation
+#     of why it does not help, and #114's measured table arrived at "bulwark,
+#     freesailarr" by grepping for the string rather than for the annotation.
+#     The check stays over all charts for the reason below - the mistake
+#     arrives by copy - not because a second chart is known to need it.
 #
 # And the install-test cannot close either gap, even with the real CRDs in the
 # cluster: schema validation accepts an empty parentRefs list and accepts a
@@ -69,6 +102,19 @@
 #     added here").
 #   - A RULE WITHOUT backendRefs. Legal - a rule carrying only a
 #     RequestRedirect filter needs no backend - so it is reported, not failed.
+#     The redirect rule the prefix check below demands is exactly such a rule,
+#     so a chart that satisfies that check also earns one "not checked" line
+#     here. Both are correct: the pairing is an assertion, the missing backend
+#     is an honest gap.
+#   - THAT ANY REDIRECT IS EVER SERVED. The prefix/redirect pairing proves the
+#     rendered OBJECT carries a RequestRedirect rule on the bare prefix. It
+#     does not prove that a 301 ever reaches a client, and it cannot: no
+#     Gateway controller runs in CI, nothing evaluates matching precedence,
+#     and no route reaches "Accepted: True" - so whether the implementation
+#     honours the statusCode, or declines it and fails the whole route, is
+#     outside what this test can see. What is proven is that the rule exists,
+#     that it matches the right path, and that the chart did not silently stop
+#     rendering it.
 #
 # AND THE ANTI-VACUUM GUARDS, because this test can be green over nothing. The
 # convention ships with httpRoute.enabled: false, so a chart renders no route
@@ -344,6 +390,76 @@ for doc in routes:
             lines.append("OK|%s: %s resolves to Service %s:%s, created by the same "
                          "render" % (chart, where, target, port))
 
+    # 3. A stripped prefix needs the BARE prefix redirected, in THIS route
+    #    (#118). Collected over all rules of this one object first, because the
+    #    pairing is a property of the route and not of a rule: the Gateway API
+    #    ranks an Exact path match above every prefix match, so the redirect
+    #    rule may sit anywhere in the list and still win.
+    stripped = {}    # prefix -> index of the rule that strips it
+    redirected = {}  # path -> index of the rule that redirects it exactly
+    for i, rule in enumerate(rules):
+        if not isinstance(rule, dict):
+            continue
+        filter_types = set()
+        strips_prefix = False
+        filters = rule.get("filters")
+        for f in (filters if isinstance(filters, list) else []):
+            if not isinstance(f, dict):
+                continue
+            ftype = str(f.get("type") or "")
+            filter_types.add(ftype)
+            if ftype != "URLRewrite":
+                continue
+            rewrite = f.get("urlRewrite")
+            rewrite = rewrite if isinstance(rewrite, dict) else {}
+            rpath = rewrite.get("path")
+            rpath = rpath if isinstance(rpath, dict) else {}
+            if str(rpath.get("type") or "") == "ReplacePrefixMatch":
+                strips_prefix = True
+        matches = rule.get("matches")
+        for m in (matches if isinstance(matches, list) else []):
+            if not isinstance(m, dict):
+                continue
+            mpath = m.get("path")
+            mpath = mpath if isinstance(mpath, dict) else {}
+            # The API's own defaults for HTTPPathMatch.
+            ptype = str(mpath.get("type") or "PathPrefix")
+            value = str(mpath.get("value") or "/")
+            if strips_prefix and ptype == "PathPrefix" and value != "/":
+                stripped.setdefault(value, i)
+            if ptype == "Exact" and "RequestRedirect" in filter_types:
+                redirected.setdefault(value, i)
+
+    for prefix in sorted(stripped):
+        if prefix in redirected:
+            lines.append("OK|%s: %s strips the prefix %r (rules[%d]) and "
+                         "redirects the bare, slashless %r to the slashed form "
+                         "(rules[%d]) - so the prefixless entry point cannot be "
+                         "answered under a URL whose relative links leave the app"
+                         % (chart, route, prefix, stripped[prefix], prefix,
+                            redirected[prefix]))
+        else:
+            lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s rules[%d] strips the prefix %r with a "
+                         "ReplacePrefixMatch rewrite, but NO rule of this route "
+                         "redirects the bare prefix: there is no match of type "
+                         "Exact on %r carrying a RequestRedirect filter. A "
+                         "request for %r WITHOUT the trailing slash is then "
+                         "rewritten to \"/\" and the app answers it 200, so "
+                         "nothing anywhere reports a problem - but the browser's "
+                         "document URL stays prefixless, every relative link in "
+                         "that page resolves against the host ROOT, and on a "
+                         "shared host the root is a DIFFERENT application, which "
+                         "then answers the app's own assets and XHRs. The fix is "
+                         "a rule matching %r exactly with a RequestRedirect to "
+                         "'%s/' and statusCode 301 written out (302 is the API's "
+                         "default, and 308 is Extended - an implementation that "
+                         "declines it sets Accepted=False on the WHOLE route, "
+                         "taking every other app on it down). Exact outranks "
+                         "every prefix match, so where the rule sits in the list "
+                         "does not matter. Gitea #118"
+                         % (chart, route, stripped[prefix], prefix, prefix,
+                            prefix, prefix, prefix))
+
 for line in lines:
     print(line)
 PY
@@ -420,7 +536,11 @@ SUMMARY="${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY:-/dev/null}"
   echo "\`backendRefs\` entry naming a Service or a port that does not exist resolves to"
   echo "nothing — both are schema-valid, so neither the real CRDs in the install-test nor"
   echo "any render error catches them, and the only report would be a route status that no"
-  echo "controller writes in CI."
+  echo "controller writes in CI. A third finding is not about pointing nowhere but about"
+  echo "pointing somewhere wrong: a rule that strips a prefix with \`ReplacePrefixMatch\`"
+  echo "while the same route carries no \`Exact\` match on that prefix with a"
+  echo "\`RequestRedirect\` filter leaves the slashless form answered 200 under a URL whose"
+  echo "relative links resolve to the host root — a neighbouring app (Gitea #118)."
   echo
   echo "| Result | Count | Charts |"
   echo "|---|---|---|"

ci/run-selector-match-test.sh

@@ -52,10 +52,22 @@
 #
 # WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT CHECKED
 #
-#   - podAffinity / podAntiAffinity. They carry labelSelectors too, but their
-#     semantics are "relative to pods that exist", and an anti-affinity term
-#     matching nothing is a legitimate configuration rather than a mistake.
-#     Out of scope, and named so that the gap is not mistaken for coverage.
+#   - preferred podAffinity and podAntiAffinity of either strength. They carry
+#     labelSelectors too, but their semantics are "relative to pods that exist",
+#     and a term matching nothing is a legitimate configuration rather than a
+#     mistake: a preference that cannot be met is dropped and an anti-affinity
+#     over zero pods is satisfied. Out of scope, and named so that the gap is
+#     not mistaken for coverage.
+#
+#     requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution podAffinity is NOT in that
+#     gap and is checked (Gitea #101). Its failure is not a preference quietly
+#     dropped: a required term whose selector matches no pod in the release can
+#     never be satisfied, so the pod stays Pending forever. For the workload
+#     that introduced one here - paperless-ngx' consume CronJob, pinned onto the
+#     node of its StatefulSet pod so that Longhorn will mount the shared RWX
+#     volume - that would mean a mover that silently stops moving, with one
+#     Pending pod per schedule and a green render behind it. The term names a
+#     label written in ANOTHER template, which is the copy this test holds.
 #   - selectors expressed ONLY through matchExpressions. Evaluating a set-based
 #     requirement means reimplementing label-selector semantics, which is a
 #     second parser by another name. Those are REPORTED as "not checked" and
@@ -343,6 +355,55 @@ for doc in pdbs:
                         ", ".join("%s=%s" % kv for kv in sorted(match_labels.items())),
                         len(all_templates), "; ".join(known) or "none"))
 
+# 3. Every REQUIRED podAffinity term, against ALL pod templates of the render
+#    (Gitea #101). Not against its own template: the whole point of such a term
+#    is to select a DIFFERENT workload's pod, so the correct question is whether
+#    anything in this release carries the labels it asks for. Preferred terms and
+#    anti-affinity of either strength are left alone - see the header.
+for where, template in all_templates:
+    affinity = template.get("spec", {}).get("affinity")
+    if not isinstance(affinity, dict):
+        continue
+    pod_affinity = affinity.get("podAffinity")
+    if not isinstance(pod_affinity, dict):
+        continue
+    terms = pod_affinity.get("requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution")
+    if not isinstance(terms, list):
+        continue
+    for i, term in enumerate(terms):
+        if not isinstance(term, dict):
+            lines.append("FAIL|%s: required podAffinity[%d] at %s is not a mapping"
+                         % (chart, i, where))
+            continue
+        tag = "required podAffinity[%d] on %s at %s" % (
+            i, term.get("topologyKey", "<no topologyKey>"), where)
+        match_labels, reason = classify(term.get("labelSelector"), tag)
+        if match_labels is None:
+            if term.get("labelSelector") is None:
+                lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s" % (chart, reason))
+            else:
+                lines.append("SKIP|%s: %s" % (chart, reason))
+            continue
+        hits = [w for w, t in all_templates if matches(match_labels, labels_of(t))]
+        if hits:
+            lines.append("OK|%s: %s matches %d pod template(s): %s"
+                         % (chart, tag, len(hits), ", ".join(hits)))
+        else:
+            known = sorted({"%s=%s" % kv for _, t in all_templates for kv in labels_of(t).items()})
+            lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s selects %s, which matches NONE of the %d "
+                         "pod template(s) in the same render. A REQUIRED "
+                         "podAffinity term that matches no pod can never be "
+                         "satisfied, so the pod it is attached to stays Pending "
+                         "forever - for a CronJob that means one Pending pod per "
+                         "schedule and a workload that silently stopped running, "
+                         "with nothing in the render to show for it. The usual "
+                         "cause is a label renamed in the template that carries "
+                         "the selected pod. Labels actually present on the pod "
+                         "templates: %s"
+                         % (chart, tag,
+                            ", ".join("%s=%s" % kv for kv in sorted(match_labels.items())),
+                            len(all_templates), "; ".join(known) or "none"))
+
 for line in lines:
     print(line)
 PY

ci/run-yaml-scalar-render-test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# YAML-scalar render test: an operator value that must arrive in the manifest as
+# a STRING is held against the manifest it actually produced.
+#
+# Usage: ci/run-yaml-scalar-render-test.sh [chart ...]   (no argument = all charts)
+#
+# WHAT IT GUARDS AGAINST (Gitea #11, and #112 turned out to be the same genus)
+#
+# A value is rendered into a YAML scalar without `| quote`. The operator quotes
+# it correctly in their values file, Helm passes the string's CONTENT through,
+# and the quotes are gone again in the manifest. Two outcomes, and the quiet one
+# is the worse one:
+#
+#   1. LOUD, but misdirected - the content is not a legal plain scalar and the
+#      render aborts. Measured on paperless-ngx' consume CronJob, whose schedule
+#      was unquoted: a schedule in the commonest cron notation of all (a star, a
+#      slash, an interval) made `helm template` exit 1 with
+#
+#        error converting YAML to JSON: yaml: line 6: did not find expected
+#        alphabetic or numeric character
+#
+#      YAML read the leading "*" as an alias indicator. The message names the
+#      TEMPLATE and the operator's own value is nowhere in it, so the search
+#      starts in the wrong place. "@daily" fails the same way.
+#   2. SILENT until the API server - the content IS a legal plain scalar, just
+#      not a string. "true" becomes a bool, "0755" becomes an integer, and the
+#      chart renders perfectly. Kubernetes then rejects the object with
+#      "cannot unmarshal number into Go struct field EnvVar.value of type
+#      string" - at apply time, which for this repository means in the
+#      install-test or in a cluster, never in the render.
+#
+# Neither is caught by "does helm template exit 0" alone: the first one is, but
+# only if something actually renders the object, and the second one is not
+# caught at all.
+#
+# WHAT IS ASSERTED, and all three are properties Kubernetes itself requires -
+# there is no chart for which the opposite is a legitimate configuration, which
+# is why this needs no per-chart expectations:
+#
+#   1. CronJob .spec.schedule is a non-empty string.
+#   2. Every env[].value of every container and initContainer is a string.
+#   3. Every metadata.labels and metadata.annotations value is a string
+#      (the API types both as map[string]string).
+#
+# WHY OVER ALL CHARTS, not the changed ones: the same reason as
+# ci/run-quantity-render-test.sh and ci/run-selector-match-test.sh. The env
+# block is copied into every chart rather than shared, so the unquoted form
+# travels by copy into whatever chart is started from an older one - and that
+# chart's own pull request is not where anyone would look for it. Running over
+# everything also means there is no list to maintain: adding a chart enrols it.
+#
+# THE OVERLAYS, AND WHY THIS TEST IS USELESS WITHOUT THEM
+#
+# The defect above survived in a shipped chart for months for one reason: the
+# object that carried it is rendered by NO fixture. paperless-ngx' CronJob sits
+# behind smbConnection.enabled, which is false in the chart defaults and in
+# every committed fixture, so neither lint, nor the render tests, nor the
+# install-test ever produced it. A test that renders only what the fixtures
+# already render would have been just as blind.
+#
+# So ci/yaml-scalar/<chart>.yaml is an overlay applied LAST whose job is to
+# switch such objects on AND to feed them the hostile values - a schedule
+# beginning with a star, an env value that is a bare "true". Two rules follow,
+# the same ones ci/run-selector-match-test.sh works under:
+#
+#   1. A chart that HAS an overlay and still renders none of the three things
+#      above FAILS. The overlay exists for exactly that, so an overlay that
+#      stopped reaching its object is a finding and not a shrug.
+#   2. If nothing at all was asserted across the whole run, the run fails. A
+#      pass over zero assertions is not a pass.
+#
+# WHAT IS DELIBERATELY NOT CHECKED, so the gap is not mistaken for coverage:
+#
+#   - Values rendered into a scalar that is hand-quoted in the template
+#     ("{{ .Values.x }}"). Those are strings in the output, so this test is
+#     blind to them by construction; what they can still do is break the YAML
+#     when the value itself contains a quote or a backslash, and only `| quote`
+#     fixes that. Reported here rather than silently implied.
+#   - Everything that is not a label, an annotation, an env value or a schedule.
+#     A bare `storage:` or `className:` is just as unquoted, but its value space
+#     is DNS labels and quantities, where no legal value is YAML-ambiguous. The
+#     three above are where operator free text actually lands.
+#   - Whether a cron schedule is a VALID schedule. That is the cron
+#     controller's judgement, and narrowing the schema to a regex was considered
+#     and rejected: the defect was never a wrong schedule, it was a correct one
+#     rendered bare.
+#
+# How the YAML is parsed: with helm, via ci/yaml2json, exactly as in
+# ci/run-selector-match-test.sh - the runners have neither pyyaml nor yq, and a
+# YAML reader written in awk here would fail by quietly reading nothing and
+# staying green. That script's header carries the full argument.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+CI_DIR="$ROOT/ci"
+YAML2JSON="$CI_DIR/yaml2json"
+OVERLAY_DIR="$CI_DIR/yaml-scalar"
+RELEASE="scalar"
+
+WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
+
+# --- Which charts -----------------------------------------------------------
+CHARTS=()
+if [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; then
+  CHARTS=("$@")
+else
+  for DIR in "$ROOT"/*/; do
+    [ -f "$DIR/Chart.yaml" ] || continue
+    CHARTS+=("$(basename "$DIR")")
+  done
+fi
+if [ "${#CHARTS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: no chart directories found under $ROOT" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+FAILED=""
+CHECKED=""
+NOT_EXERCISED=""
+TOTAL_ASSERTIONS=0
+SUMMARY_ROWS=""
+
+for CHART in "${CHARTS[@]}"; do
+  if [ ! -f "$ROOT/$CHART/Chart.yaml" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: '$CHART' is not a chart directory" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # A chart with a declared dependency cannot be rendered at all while charts/
+  # is empty, and this job runs over EVERY chart on EVERY pull request.
+  "$ROOT/ci/helm-dependencies.sh" "$ROOT/$CHART"
+
+  VALUES_ARGS=()
+  VALUES_LABEL="chart defaults"
+  if [ -f "$CI_DIR/$CHART/test-values.yaml" ]; then
+    VALUES_ARGS=(-f "$CI_DIR/$CHART/test-values.yaml")
+    VALUES_LABEL="ci/$CHART/test-values.yaml"
+  elif [ -f "$CI_DIR/trivy/values/$CHART.yaml" ]; then
+    VALUES_ARGS=(-f "$CI_DIR/trivy/values/$CHART.yaml")
+    VALUES_LABEL="ci/trivy/values/$CHART.yaml"
+  fi
+  HAS_OVERLAY=""
+  if [ -f "$OVERLAY_DIR/$CHART.yaml" ]; then
+    # Last, so it wins over the install-test values.
+    VALUES_ARGS+=(-f "$OVERLAY_DIR/$CHART.yaml")
+    VALUES_LABEL="$VALUES_LABEL + ci/yaml-scalar/$CHART.yaml"
+    HAS_OVERLAY=1
+  fi
+
+  echo "::group::$CHART ($VALUES_LABEL)"
+
+  RENDER="$WORK/$CHART.manifest.yaml"
+  if ! helm template "$RELEASE" "$ROOT/$CHART" \
+      ${VALUES_ARGS[@]+"${VALUES_ARGS[@]}"} >"$RENDER" 2>"$WORK/err"; then
+    sed 's/^/  /' "$WORK/err"
+    echo "::endgroup::"
+    echo "::error title=yaml-scalar $CHART::$CHART does not render with these values. If the error is a YAML parse error naming a template line, that IS the finding this test exists for: a value reached a scalar unquoted. Reproduce: helm template $RELEASE $CHART $(printf '%s ' "${VALUES_ARGS[@]+${VALUES_ARGS[@]}}")"
+    FAILED="$FAILED $CHART"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  # The document split, the only textual step. A wrong split cannot produce a
+  # false pass: the result stops being parsable and helm exits 1.
+  DOCS="$WORK/$CHART.docs.yaml"
+  awk '
+    BEGIN { print "docs:"; started = 0 }
+    /^---[ \t]*$/ { print "  -"; started = 1; next }
+    {
+      if (!started) { print "  -"; started = 1 }
+      if (length($0) == 0) print ""; else print "    " $0
+    }
+  ' "$RENDER" >"$DOCS"
+
+  JSON="$WORK/$CHART.json"
+  if ! helm template y2j "$YAML2JSON" -f "$DOCS" 2>"$WORK/err" \
+      | awk '/^\{/ { print; exit }' >"$JSON"; then
+    sed 's/^/  /' "$WORK/err"
+    echo "::endgroup::"
+    echo "::error title=yaml-scalar $CHART::the rendered manifests of $CHART could not be re-read as YAML by ci/yaml2json. That is a parse failure, not a scalar finding."
+    FAILED="$FAILED $CHART"
+    continue
+  fi
+  if [ ! -s "$JSON" ]; then
+    echo "::endgroup::"
+    echo "::error title=yaml-scalar $CHART::ci/yaml2json produced no JSON for $CHART - the manifests were not re-read, so nothing was checked."
+    FAILED="$FAILED $CHART"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  # --- The comparison --------------------------------------------------------
+  # Standard library only, and it never decides the exit code itself: it writes
+  # "VERDICT|detail" lines and the loop below decides, so a verdict can never
+  # be lost to a swallowed status.
+  set +e
+  python3 - "$CHART" "$JSON" >"$WORK/$CHART.out" 2>"$WORK/$CHART.pyerr" <<'PY'
+import json, sys
+
+chart, path = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+docs = json.load(open(path)).get("docs") or []
+lines = []
+
+
+def name_of(doc):
+    meta = doc.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(meta, dict) and meta.get("name"):
+        return str(meta["name"])
+    return "<unnamed %s>" % doc.get("kind", "object")
+
+
+def typename(value):
+    return {bool: "bool", int: "int", float: "float", type(None): "null",
+            dict: "mapping", list: "list"}.get(type(value), type(value).__name__)
+
+
+def pod_templates(node, path="$"):
+    """Any value of a key named "template" carrying a spec with containers.
+    Found by walking, so a CronJob's spec.jobTemplate.spec.template needs no
+    special case and neither does whatever workload kind a chart adds next."""
+    out = []
+    if isinstance(node, dict):
+        for key, value in node.items():
+            here = "%s.%s" % (path, key)
+            if (key == "template" and isinstance(value, dict)
+                    and isinstance(value.get("spec"), dict)
+                    and "containers" in value["spec"]):
+                out.append((here, value))
+            out.extend(pod_templates(value, here))
+    elif isinstance(node, list):
+        for i, value in enumerate(node):
+            out.extend(pod_templates(value, "%s[%d]" % (path, i)))
+    return out
+
+
+def metadatas(node, path="$"):
+    """Every metadata mapping anywhere in the render - top level and inside pod
+    templates both, because labels and annotations exist at both levels."""
+    out = []
+    if isinstance(node, dict):
+        for key, value in node.items():
+            here = "%s.%s" % (path, key)
+            if key == "metadata" and isinstance(value, dict):
+                out.append((here, value))
+            out.extend(metadatas(value, here))
+    elif isinstance(node, list):
+        for i, value in enumerate(node):
+            out.extend(metadatas(value, "%s[%d]" % (path, i)))
+    return out
+
+
+# --- 1. CronJob schedules ---------------------------------------------------
+for doc in docs:
+    if not isinstance(doc, dict) or doc.get("kind") != "CronJob":
+        continue
+    where = "CronJob %s .spec.schedule" % name_of(doc)
+    spec = doc.get("spec") if isinstance(doc.get("spec"), dict) else {}
+    schedule = spec.get("schedule", "<absent>")
+    if isinstance(schedule, str) and schedule.strip():
+        lines.append("OK|%s: %s is the string %r" % (chart, where, schedule))
+    elif schedule == "<absent>":
+        lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s is missing entirely - a CronJob without a "
+                     "schedule is rejected by the API server" % (chart, where))
+    else:
+        lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s rendered as %s (%r), not a string. A schedule "
+                     "is operator free text and has to leave the template "
+                     "through | quote; without it YAML re-reads the content and "
+                     "a schedule beginning with a digit survives by luck while "
+                     "one beginning with * or @ does not"
+                     % (chart, where, typename(schedule), schedule))
+
+# --- 2. env values ----------------------------------------------------------
+for where, template in pod_templates({"docs": docs}):
+    spec = template.get("spec") if isinstance(template.get("spec"), dict) else {}
+    for kind in ("initContainers", "containers"):
+        for container in spec.get(kind) or []:
+            if not isinstance(container, dict):
+                continue
+            cname = container.get("name", "<unnamed>")
+            for entry in container.get("env") or []:
+                if not isinstance(entry, dict) or "value" not in entry:
+                    continue  # valueFrom entries carry no literal to check
+                value = entry["value"]
+                tag = "env %s of container %s at %s" % (
+                    entry.get("name", "<unnamed>"), cname, where)
+                if isinstance(value, str):
+                    lines.append("OK|%s: %s is a string" % (chart, tag))
+                else:
+                    lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s rendered as %s (%r), not a string. "
+                                 "Kubernetes types env[].value as a string and "
+                                 "the API server rejects the whole manifest with "
+                                 "\"cannot unmarshal %s into Go struct field "
+                                 "EnvVar.value of type string\" - at apply time, "
+                                 "not in the render. The fix is | quote at the "
+                                 "render site; template-chart carries the form"
+                                 % (chart, tag, typename(value), value,
+                                    "number" if not isinstance(value, bool) else "bool"))
+
+# --- 3. labels and annotations ----------------------------------------------
+for where, meta in metadatas({"docs": docs}):
+    for field in ("labels", "annotations"):
+        block = meta.get(field)
+        if not isinstance(block, dict):
+            continue
+        for key, value in block.items():
+            tag = "%s[%r] at %s" % (field, key, where)
+            if isinstance(value, str):
+                lines.append("OK|%s: %s is a string" % (chart, tag))
+            else:
+                lines.append("FAIL|%s: %s rendered as %s (%r), not a string. "
+                             "Kubernetes types %s as map[string]string, so the "
+                             "API server rejects the object - the render stays "
+                             "green. The fix is | quote at the render site"
+                             % (chart, tag, typename(value), value, field))
+
+for line in lines:
+    print(line)
+PY
+  RC=$?
+  set -e
+  if [ "$RC" -gt 1 ]; then
+    sed 's/^/  /' "$WORK/$CHART.pyerr"
+    echo "::endgroup::"
+    echo "::error title=yaml-scalar $CHART::the scalar comparison itself failed for $CHART (python exit $RC). Treated as a failure, never as a pass."
+    FAILED="$FAILED $CHART"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  CHART_FAIL=""
+  CHART_OK=0
+  while IFS='|' read -r VERDICT DETAIL; do
+    case "$VERDICT" in
+      OK)
+        CHART_OK=$((CHART_OK + 1))
+        echo "  ok     $DETAIL"
+        ;;
+      FAIL)
+        CHART_FAIL=1
+        echo "  FAIL   $DETAIL"
+        echo "::error title=yaml-scalar $CHART::$DETAIL"
+        ;;
+      *)
+        [ -n "$VERDICT" ] && echo "  $VERDICT $DETAIL"
+        ;;
+    esac
+  done <"$WORK/$CHART.out"
+  echo "::endgroup::"
+
+  TOTAL_ASSERTIONS=$((TOTAL_ASSERTIONS + CHART_OK))
+
+  if [ -n "$CHART_FAIL" ]; then
+    FAILED="$FAILED $CHART"
+    SUMMARY_ROWS="${SUMMARY_ROWS}| \`$CHART\` | **failed** | $CHART_OK |"$'\n'
+    echo "$CHART: FAILED"
+  elif [ "$CHART_OK" -gt 0 ]; then
+    CHECKED="$CHECKED $CHART"
+    SUMMARY_ROWS="${SUMMARY_ROWS}| \`$CHART\` | ok | $CHART_OK |"$'\n'
+    echo "$CHART: ok ($CHART_OK scalar(s) checked)"
+  elif [ -n "$HAS_OVERLAY" ]; then
+    FAILED="$FAILED $CHART"
+    SUMMARY_ROWS="${SUMMARY_ROWS}| \`$CHART\` | **failed** | 0 |"$'\n'
+    echo "::error title=yaml-scalar $CHART::$CHART has an overlay at ci/yaml-scalar/$CHART.yaml but its render carried no schedule, no env value and no label or annotation at all, so nothing was checked. That overlay exists only to make such a scalar render; a green tick here would be a tick for a check that ran over nothing."
+    echo "$CHART: FAILED (overlay present, nothing asserted)"
+  else
+    NOT_EXERCISED="$NOT_EXERCISED $CHART"
+    echo "$CHART: nothing of the three kinds rendered - nothing to check."
+  fi
+done
+
+# --- Report ------------------------------------------------------------------
+count() { set -- $1; echo "$#"; }
+listing() { set -- $1; [ "$#" -eq 0 ] && { echo "–"; return; }; printf '`%s`' "$1"; shift; for C in "$@"; do printf ', `%s`' "$C"; done; echo; }
+SUMMARY="${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY:-/dev/null}"
+{
+  echo "### YAML-scalar render test (Gitea #11)"
+  echo
+  echo "Every \`CronJob.spec.schedule\`, every \`env[].value\` and every label and"
+  echo "annotation value in a chart's render, held against the type Kubernetes requires"
+  echo "for it. A value rendered without \`| quote\` either aborts the render with an"
+  echo "error pointing at the template instead of at the value, or arrives as a bool or"
+  echo "an integer and is rejected by the API server at apply time - never in the render."
+  echo
+  echo "| Result | Count | Charts |"
+  echo "|---|---|---|"
+  echo "| Scalars checked | $(count "$CHECKED") | $(listing "$CHECKED") |"
+  echo "| Nothing of the kind rendered | $(count "$NOT_EXERCISED") | $(listing "$NOT_EXERCISED") |"
+  echo "| Failed | $(count "$FAILED") | $(listing "$FAILED") |"
+  echo
+  echo "$TOTAL_ASSERTIONS scalar(s) verified in total."
+  if [ -n "$SUMMARY_ROWS" ]; then
+    echo
+    echo "| Chart | Result | Checked |"
+    echo "| --- | --- | --- |"
+    printf '%s' "$SUMMARY_ROWS"
+  fi
+} >>"$SUMMARY"
+
+echo "===================== yaml scalar render test ======================"
+echo "checked:       $(count "$CHECKED")${CHECKED:+ -$CHECKED}"
+echo "not exercised: $(count "$NOT_EXERCISED")${NOT_EXERCISED:+ -$NOT_EXERCISED}"
+echo "failed:        $(count "$FAILED")${FAILED:+ -$FAILED}"
+echo "scalars verified: $TOTAL_ASSERTIONS"
+echo "==================================================================="
+
+if [ -n "$FAILED" ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: a value that has to arrive as a string did not, in:$FAILED" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ "$TOTAL_ASSERTIONS" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: not a single scalar was checked in this run. Either no chart renders a schedule, an env value, a label or an annotation any more, or the overlays under ci/yaml-scalar/ no longer reach their objects. A pass over zero assertions is not a pass." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi

ci/selector-match/paperless-ngx.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Selector-match overlay for paperless-ngx (Gitea #101).
+#
+# Its one job: make the consume CronJob render, so that the required podAffinity
+# it carries is actually held against the StatefulSet's pod labels. The template
+# sits behind smbConnection.enabled, false in the chart defaults and in
+# ci/paperless-ngx/test-values.yaml, so without this overlay the affinity term
+# exists in the repository and in no render - and the test would pass over it.
+#
+# What it guards: the term selects the StatefulSet pod by a label written in
+# ANOTHER template (paperless-server.sfs.yaml). Renaming that label leaves both
+# files rendering perfectly while the mover can never be scheduled again, one
+# Pending pod per schedule, nothing in the render to show for it.
+#
+# Kept separate from ci/yaml-scalar/paperless-ngx.yaml although both switch SMB
+# on: that one feeds the CronJob a hostile SCHEDULE and hostile env values for a
+# different test, and folding the two would make each test's failure depend on
+# the other's fixture.
+smbConnection:
+  enabled: true
+  server: "//smb.ci.local/scans"
+
+secrets:
+  # Satisfies the required() behind the SMB PersistentVolume's
+  # nodeStageSecretRef. Nothing is mounted in a render.
+  smbConnectionSecretRef: op://ci/paperless-smb

ci/stalwart/test-values.yaml

@@ -83,6 +83,37 @@ ingress:
   clusterIssuer: ci-selfsigned
   nodeGroup: full
 
+# MTA-STS policy routes (Gitea #123). Set HERE and not only in the render
+# overlay, because this is the ONLY stage that puts the INGRESS half of the
+# feature in front of a real API server: ci/httproute/stalwart.yaml switches
+# the chart into Gateway mode, so it never renders these objects at all.
+#
+# WHAT THIS ADDS OVER THE RENDER TEST: that two Ingress objects whose names
+# differ only by the issuer suffix are both accepted, that a `pathType: Exact`
+# on `/.well-known/mta-sts.txt` is valid, and that a tls: list grouping several
+# hosts under one secret is accepted as written. None of that is a template
+# question any more once the API server has taken it.
+#
+# THE TWO ENTRIES ARE TWO OBJECTS, and that is the point of the pair: the first
+# carries a clusterIssuer and gets the cert-manager annotation, the second has
+# none and gets no annotation - which cannot be one object, because the
+# annotation is object-scoped. The second is also a SUBDOMAIN, one label deeper
+# than the first, carrying the case a parent wildcard certificate would not
+# cover.
+#
+# NOTHING ISSUES EITHER CERTIFICATE here: cert-manager is not installed in the
+# k3d cluster, so the annotation is inert and the named Secrets never exist.
+# That is the same deliberate trade as certificate: below - the objects are
+# asserted, the issuance is not, and no Secret is needed for the install to
+# reach Ready because nothing mounts these.
+mtaSts:
+  hosts:
+    - host: mta-sts.ci.example.com
+      tlsSecretName: tls-mta-sts-ci-example-com-ingress
+      clusterIssuer: ci-selfsigned
+    - host: mta-sts.sub.ci.example.com
+      tlsSecretName: tls-mta-sts-sub-ci-example-com-ingress
+
 certificate:
   # On, against a STUB CRD (fixtures.yaml). Nothing issues the Secret it names,
   # which is the interesting case: the volume is mounted optional, so the pods

ci/urlaubsverwaltung/test-values.yaml

@@ -7,3 +7,15 @@ ingress:
   # clusterIssuer is strictly required (no default); the Ingress just has to
   # apply - there is no cert-manager in the CI cluster.
   clusterIssuer: ci
+
+# The egress cap of this chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5) allows the STANDARD
+# ports of its dependencies. The CI OIDC provider does not: fixtures.yaml runs dex on 5556 rather than on 443 - and this application has no login path besides OIDC.
+#
+# So this is not a workaround for the test: it is the chart's documented escape
+# hatch, used for exactly the case values.yaml names. The fixtures are the one
+# place in the repository where that case is exercised, and removing this entry
+# shows what the cap costs a dependency on a non-standard port.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 5556

ci/voucher-vault/test-values.yaml

@@ -6,3 +6,15 @@ secrets:
 ingress:
   clusterIssuer: ci
   domain: vv.ci.local
+
+# The egress cap of this chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5) allows the STANDARD
+# ports of its dependencies. The CI OIDC provider does not: fixtures.yaml runs dex on 5556 rather than on 443.
+#
+# So this is not a workaround for the test: it is the chart's documented escape
+# hatch, used for exactly the case values.yaml names. The fixtures are the one
+# place in the repository where that case is exercised, and removing this entry
+# shows what the cap costs a dependency on a non-standard port.
+networkPolicy:
+  egress:
+    extraPorts:
+      - 5556

ci/yaml-scalar/paperless-ngx.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# YAML-scalar overlay for paperless-ngx (Gitea #11).
+#
+# THIS FILE IS THE TEST CASE the issue asked for, and its first job is to make
+# an object exist at all. templates/paperless-consume.cronjob.yaml sits behind
+# smbConnection.enabled, which is false in the chart defaults and false in
+# ci/paperless-ngx/test-values.yaml - deliberately, because the install-test has
+# no SMB CSI driver. So before this overlay NOTHING in the repository rendered
+# that CronJob: not lint, not the render tests, not the install-test. That is
+# the whole reason an unquoted schedule survived in a shipped chart, and it is
+# why the fix comes with a render test rather than with a fixture change.
+#
+# The values below are hostile on purpose. Against the chart before 13.0.0 this
+# overlay does not produce a finding - it produces an aborted render, which this
+# test reports as the finding it is:
+#
+#   Error: YAML parse error on paperless-ngx/templates/paperless-consume.cronjob.yaml:
+#   error converting YAML to JSON: yaml: line 6: did not find expected
+#   alphabetic or numeric character
+smbConnection:
+  enabled: true
+  server: "//smb.ci.local/scans"
+  # A schedule beginning with "*" - the commonest cron notation there is, and
+  # the one that YAML reads as an alias indicator. Written here as a quoted
+  # string, which is exactly how an operator would write it and exactly what
+  # does NOT help: Helm passes the content through, and without | quote in the
+  # template the star stands bare in the manifest again.
+  cronJob: "*/15 * * * *"
+
+secrets:
+  # The CronJob's SMB volume has a required() secret ref behind it; the
+  # PersistentVolume names it as nodeStageSecretRef. Nothing is mounted in a
+  # render, so no fixture Secret is needed - only a value that satisfies the
+  # required().
+  smbConnectionSecretRef: op://ci/paperless-smb
+
+paperless:
+  # The silent half of the genus, on the chart's additive env block: both of
+  # these are STRINGS in this file and both are schema-valid, and before 13.0.0
+  # the first one aborted the render while the second arrived in the manifest as
+  # a YAML bool - which the API server rejects at apply time with "cannot
+  # unmarshal bool into Go struct field EnvVar.value of type string", so the
+  # render test is the only place it can be caught cheaply.
+  env:
+    - name: PAPERLESS_STAR_VALUE
+      value: "*never-interpreted*"
+    - name: PAPERLESS_BOOLEAN_LOOKING_VALUE
+      value: "true"
+    # The variable the whole env block was asked for (Gitea #112): the log off
+    # the NFS-backed RWX data volume and onto the /tmp emptyDir this pod already
+    # mounts. Harmless in a render, and it keeps the worked example honest by
+    # being the one an operator will actually copy.
+    - name: PAPERLESS_LOGGING_DIR
+      value: "/tmp/paperless-log"

cyberchef/Chart.yaml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/gchq/CyberChef/master/src/web/static/ima
 
 type: application
 
-version: 9.1.0+up11.4.0
+version: 10.0.0+up11.4.0
 appVersion: "11.4.0"
 
 maintainers:

cyberchef/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -108,3 +108,49 @@ cyberchef.env HAS NO EFFECT ON THE APP
   files, but the served CyberChef bundle is static and reads none of them —
   configuration has to happen in the browser.
 {{- end }}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 8080 only, the single port this pod declares. Outbound: DNS{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }}
+  plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }} — a static file server needs nothing more.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

cyberchef/templates/cyberchef.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for cyberchef (Gitea #5).
+
+CyberChef is a static web app: nginx serves files, the recipes run in the
+visitor's browser, and the pod holds no state and talks to nothing. That makes
+this the simplest policy in the repository and a good one to read first.
+
+What it is worth here is almost entirely the two CEILINGS rather than any
+source restriction: only 8080 is reachable, and outbound traffic is capped at
+DNS. The pod has no reason to open a single outbound connection - it serves
+static files - so the egress cap is as tight as the object allows. Were this
+image ever to gain a second listener, or were the container ever compromised,
+neither could be reached or could reach out.
+
+The ingress direction is NOT restricted by source in the default, and that is
+not an oversight: 8080 is the port all three probes address. See the probe note
+on the rule below.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the Deployment's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict, and here the
+    restriction is close to total: a static file server needs name resolution and
+    nothing else, so DNS is the only rule. That is as tight as this object can be
+    made without breaking the pod.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    8080 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service targets, and the
+    one all three probes address. It is therefore the probe path, and the shape
+    below is the whole reason networkPolicy.probeSources exists.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8080
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress (and the
+      HTTPRoute - the same Traefik serves both here) goes dark the moment this list
+      is filled.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

cyberchef/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },

cyberchef/values.yaml

@@ -125,3 +125,81 @@ httpRoute:
   # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
   # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
   hostnames: []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8080 only - the single port this pod
+  # declares - and outbound nothing but DNS. CyberChef is a static web app
+  # whose recipes run in the browser, so the pod has no reason to open an
+  # outbound connection at all, which makes the egress cap unusually tight.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: the 8080 rule is NOT restricted by source in the
+  # default, because 8080 is the port all three probes address - see
+  # probeSources below. So this policy is a port and egress ceiling, not
+  # pod-level isolation. And it is only a boundary where the CNI enforces
+  # policies; unenforced, it is accepted and filters nothing.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8080, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # Nothing is needed here for CyberChef itself. Add 443 only if something
+    # is put in front of the pod that has to call out.
+    extraPorts: []

freesailarr/Chart.yaml

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ description: A Helm chart to deploy a Wireguard-tunneled media automation stack
 
 type: application
 
-version: 3.1.1+up1.0.0
+version: 5.0.0+up1.0.0
 # The chart's own version marker, freely chosen and tied to no upstream. The
 # stack bundles ten independently versioned projects (nine of them on by
 # default), so there is no single "app version" to track here.

freesailarr/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@
 {{- $shared := include "freesailarr.sharedIngressApps" . | fromJsonArray -}}
 {{- $sharedNames := list -}}
 {{- range $shared }}{{ $sharedNames = append $sharedNames .name }}{{ end -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $published := include "freesailarr.published" . -}}
+{{- /* NOTHING IN CI READS THIS FILE, so every claim below is unverified by any
+       pipeline stage. `helm template` does not emit NOTES.txt at all, and no
+       workflow or script under ci/ reads it (measured for Gitea #118: the
+       three hits for "NOTES" under ci/ are comments in fixtures, not reads).
+       The render tests therefore cannot catch a statement here that has gone
+       stale, and the install-test never sees it either — it is prose checked
+       by review only. Treat an edit to it with the same care as the templates
+       it describes, because nothing else will. */ -}}
 freesailarr — release {{ .Release.Name }} in namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
 {{ if .Values.mediathekarr.enabled }}Ten{{ else }}Nine{{ end }} containers in ONE pod, sharing gluetun's network namespace.
 
@@ -42,9 +52,53 @@ SET gluetun.vpn.firewallOutboundSubnets — IT IS EMPTY RIGHT NOW
   fail, in a way that looks like an application bug. Set it to the cluster pod
   and service CIDRs, e.g. "10.42.0.0/16,10.43.0.0/16" on k3s.
 {{- end }}
+{{- /* The servarr apps that are published through a routing object AND have no
+       trusted proxy network set - the one combination in which the empty
+       default actually costs something. Gated on freesailarr.published plus
+       membership in freesailarr.ingressApps, the same pair the ACCESS section
+       below uses, so it holds in Gateway mode too: reading ingress.enabled
+       directly would silence this warning in exactly the mode whose routes
+       still publish the apps. */}}
+{{- $noTrust := list }}
+{{- if $published }}
+{{- range $a := $ingressApps }}
+{{- if and (has $a.name (list "prowlarr" "radarr" "sonarr")) (not (index $.Values $a.name).trustedNetworks) }}
+{{- $noTrust = append $noTrust $a.name }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- if $noTrust }}
+
+FORWARDED HEADERS ARE NOT TRUSTED — {{ join ", " $noTrust }}
+  These apps are published through a routing object and their trustedNetworks
+  value is empty, which is the chart's default. They therefore trust no proxy:
+  the client address each one logs and displays is your ingress controller's
+  pod IP rather than the real client, and each sees the scheme as http even
+  where TLS is terminated in front of it. If an app's authentication is set to
+  "Disabled for Local Addresses", a proxied request no longer counts as local
+  and is asked to authenticate.
+
+  This is not a regression introduced by your values. Upstream removed the
+  hard-coded private networks (prowlarr 2.6.3, radarr 6.4.3; sonarr before
+  4.0.19) because trusting X-Forwarded-For from any private network is a
+  spoofing vector, and this chart follows that default rather than reinstating
+  it behind your back.
+
+  To honour the headers, set the network your ingress controller's pods sit in
+  — the chart cannot know it, as it is a property of the cluster:
+
+    prowlarr.trustedNetworks: "10.42.0.0/16"   # e.g. the k3s pod CIDR
+
+  Leaving it empty is a valid choice; it is only not a silent one.
+{{- end }}
 
 ACCESS
-{{- if and .Values.ingress.enabled $ingressApps }}
+{{- if and $published $ingressApps }}
+{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+  INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false)
+{{- else }}
+  GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false)
+{{- end }}
 {{- range $shared }}
   {{ .name }}: https://{{ $sharedHost }}{{ if ne .path "/" }}{{ .path }}{{ end }}
 {{- end }}
@@ -56,7 +110,8 @@ ACCESS
 {{- end }}
 {{- if $shared }}
 
-  These apps share one host, one Ingress and one certificate.
+  These apps share one host{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}, one Ingress and one certificate{{ else }} and one HTTPRoute ({{ $name }}-httproute), one
+  rule each{{ end }}.
 {{- if has "bazarr" $sharedNames }}
 
   BAZARR NEEDS ONE MANUAL STEP UNDER A SUB-PATH
@@ -73,14 +128,45 @@ ACCESS
 {{- if has "qbittorrent" $sharedNames }}
 
   QBITTORRENT SITS BEHIND A PREFIX-STRIPPING REWRITE
-    It has no base path of its own, so it gets a second Ingress object on the
-    same host whose rewrite cuts the prefix off. Two things there look exactly
-    like a login failure and send you looking in the wrong place: its session
-    cookie is marked "Secure" (over plain HTTP the browser never sends it back
-    and every click bounces to the login form), and it bans the client IP for a
-    while after a few failed attempts. If it does not work at all, set
-    qbittorrent.ingress.host and it is back on a host of its own - no chart
-    change needed.
+    It has no base path of its own, so the prefix has to be cut off before the
+    request reaches it.
+    {{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }} Under an Ingress that costs a SECOND object on the
+    same host, because nginx applies rewrite-target per object and the other
+    apps must not be rewritten.
+    {{- else }} In Gateway mode that second object is gone: a
+    URLRewrite filter belongs to a RULE, so qBittorrent is a rule of
+    {{ $name }}-httproute with the filter on it and its neighbours are
+    untouched by construction — no extra object, no regex path.
+    {{- end }}
+
+    OPEN IT WITH THE TRAILING SLASH:
+
+      https://{{ $sharedHost }}{{ include "freesailarr.appPath" (dict "root" $ "app" "qbittorrent") }}/
+
+{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}    Without the slash the prefix is stripped to "/", qBittorrent answers 200,
+    and every RELATIVE link in that page resolves against the ROOT of this
+    host — which is {{ if has "seerr" $sharedNames }}seerr{{ else }}whatever serves "/" here{{ end }}, not qBittorrent. The login form then looks
+    unstyled and does nothing while another application answers its requests.
+    This chart does NOT render that redirect in Ingress mode: nginx offers only
+    a configuration-snippet annotation for it, and snippets are ignored unless
+    the controller runs with allow-snippet-annotations=true, which has been off
+    by default since ingress-nginx 1.9 and means accepting annotation risk
+    level "Critical". The working snippet, and its price, are in values.yaml at
+    qbittorrent.ingress (Gitea #118).
+
+{{ else }}    The bare, slashless path is redirected 301 to the slashed form by a rule of
+    {{ $name }}-httproute — an Exact path match, which the Gateway API ranks
+    above every prefix match, so it wins wherever it sits in the list. Without
+    it qBittorrent would answer 200 under a URL whose relative links resolve to
+    the root of this host, which is a different application (Gitea #118). This
+    is the one thing the Gateway mode does here that the Ingress mode cannot.
+
+{{ end }}    Two further things look exactly like a login failure and send you
+    looking in the wrong place: its session cookie is marked "Secure" (over
+    plain HTTP the browser never sends it back and every click bounces to the
+    login form), and it bans the client IP for a while after a few failed
+    attempts. If it does not work at all, set qbittorrent.ingress.host and it
+    is back on a host of its own - no chart change needed.
 {{- end }}
 {{- if not (has "seerr" $sharedNames) }}
 
@@ -90,12 +176,48 @@ ACCESS
 {{- end }}
 {{- end }}
 
+{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
   Every app listed with a host of its own has its OWN Ingress and its own TLS
   secret. While cert-manager is still issuing, the browser warns:
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get certificate
 {{- else }}
-  No Ingress is rendered{{ if not .Values.ingress.enabled }} (ingress.enabled is false){{ end }}. Reach an app through its own service:
+  Every app listed with a host of its own has its OWN HTTPRoute
+  ({{ $name }}-<app>-httproute).
+
+  THREE THINGS BELONG TO THE CLUSTER AND NOT TO THIS CHART IN THIS MODE, and if
+  any is missing the addresses above do not answer:
+
+    1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed.
+    2. The Gateway named in httpRoute.parentRefs
+{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}
+{{- end }}
+       must exist AND its listener must allow routes from this namespace
+       ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. Every route of this release
+       attaches to that same parent. A rejected attachment shows up only in a
+       route's status:
+
+         kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute -o yaml
+
+       Read status.parents[].conditions — "Accepted: True" and
+       "ResolvedRefs: True" is a working attachment. An empty status means no
+       controller has looked at the route at all.
+    3. The TLS certificates for these hostnames, on the Gateway's listener.
+       ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required, and
+       neither are ingress.className or the per-app overrides of either: the
+       chart renders no Certificate and no class, so there are no
+       tls-{{ $name }}-* secrets and nothing for cert-manager to do.
+
+  ingress.annotations HAS NO COUNTERPART HERE, per-app overrides included: the
+  Gateway API has no annotation channel. The chart needs nothing from it —
+  qBittorrent's rewrite is a filter in this mode — but an annotation you added
+  yourself is gone without a word. A body-size cap for qBittorrent's
+  torrent-file uploads is the likely one; set it at the Gateway or through its
+  implementation's own policy object.
+{{- end }}
+{{- else }}
+  Nothing is published{{ if and (not .Values.ingress.enabled) (not $httpRoute.enabled) }} — ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both false{{ else if not $ingressApps }} — no enabled app carries <app>.ingress.enabled: true{{ end }}. Reach an app through its own service:
 {{- range $portApps }}
 
     kubectl -n {{ $.Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ $name }}-{{ .name }}-service {{ .port }}:{{ .port }}
@@ -105,7 +227,8 @@ ACCESS
 
   qBittorrent's WebUI rejects a Host header whose port differs from its own
   ({{ "8080" }}) with a plain 401. A port-forward on a different local port therefore
-  looks like a login failure — forward 8080:8080, or go through the ingress.
+  looks like a login failure — forward 8080:8080, or go through the published
+  address above.
 {{- if .Values.qbittorrent.savePath }}
 
 QBITTORRENT DOWNLOADS GO TO {{ .Values.qbittorrent.savePath }}
@@ -158,8 +281,8 @@ MEDIATHEKARR: TWO PORTS, AND THE SABNZBD API IS NOT AT /api
   back as the SABnzbd complete_dir. Any deviation — a remote path mapping, a
   different mount — imports NOTHING, without an error.
 
-  The UI (setup wizard and download queue) has no ingress{{ if and .Values.mediathekarr.ingress.enabled .Values.mediathekarr.ingress.host }}, other than the one
-  you gave it on {{ .Values.mediathekarr.ingress.host }}{{ end }}:
+  The UI (setup wizard and download queue) is not published{{ if and .Values.mediathekarr.ingress.enabled .Values.mediathekarr.ingress.host }}, other than on the
+  host you gave it, {{ .Values.mediathekarr.ingress.host }}{{ end }}:
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ $name }}-mediathekarr-service 5007:5007
 {{- if $gate.enabled }}
@@ -286,7 +409,7 @@ THE MEDIA CLAIMS ARE YOURS, THE CONFIG VOLUMES ARE THE CHART'S
 
 SCALED TO ZERO
   {{ if .Values.scaleDown }}scaleDown: true{{ else }}replicas: 0{{ end }} — the StatefulSet runs with replicas: 0. PVCs, secrets,
-  services{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and ingresses{{ end }} stay in place; set it back and upgrade to bring the
+  services{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and ingresses{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }} and HTTPRoutes{{ end }} stay in place; set it back and upgrade to bring the
   stack up again.
 {{- else if ne $replicas "1" }}
 
@@ -295,3 +418,72 @@ MORE THAN ONE REPLICA IS NOT MEANINGFUL
   config volumes, all of them fighting over the same media claims and the same
   VPN credentials.
 {{- end }}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: the nine probed ports — gluetun's health server (9999) and the eight
+  web interfaces (8080, 9696, 8191, 7878, 8989, 5055, 6767, 5007) — plus
+  mediathekarr's newznab port (5008), which is RESTRICTED by source because
+  nothing probes it and its only consumer is Prowlarr in this same pod.
+  Outbound: DNS, UDP 51820 (the WireGuard tunnel) and TCP 443 (gluetun's
+  server-list API){{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }}, plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+
+  THE TEN CONTAINERS TALK TO EACH OTHER OVER LOCALHOST, so none of that traffic
+  is governed by this object at all — they share a network namespace. And
+  because that namespace belongs to gluetun, everything the *arr containers
+  send is encapsulated into the tunnel before it leaves the pod: indexer and
+  tracker traffic needs no egress rule of its own.
+
+  IF THIS POD WILL NOT BECOME READY, SUSPECT THE TUNNEL RULE. gluetun's health
+  server answers 200 only while the tunnel is up, and all three of its probes
+  address it, so a blocked UDP 51820 shows up as a pod that never goes Ready
+  rather than as a network error. 51820 is WireGuard's and Mullvad's standard
+  port; Mullvad also offers 53, 123, 500 and 4500 for obfuscation, and a
+  release on one of those has to widen the rule in the template —
+  networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is TCP only.
+
+  AND IF SEERR CANNOT REACH AN IN-CLUSTER SERVICE (Jellyfin, say), two things
+  have to be true, not one: its port in networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and
+  gluetun.vpn.firewallOutboundSubnets set — gluetun's own firewall blocks
+  cluster-internal egress before this policy is ever consulted.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

freesailarr/templates/_helpers.tpl

@@ -205,8 +205,49 @@ in the ingress, which addresses a service port by name.
 {{- end -}}
 
 {{/*
-The apps that render an Ingress: the enabled port apps whose values carry an
-ingress block with enabled: true. Used by the ingress template.
+Is this release published through a routing object at all? Returns the string
+"true" or the empty string (falsy in a template "if").
+
+Input: the root context.
+
+ONE PLACE, BECAUSE THE WRONG ANSWER IS INVISIBLE (Gitea #114)
+
+ingress.enabled is the chart's master switch, and until the Gateway-API mode
+existed it was also the answer to "is anything published". It stopped being
+that answer in exactly one configuration - and that configuration is the whole
+point of the new mode: httpRoute.enabled: true forces ingress.enabled: false
+(the two are mutually exclusive, the render aborts otherwise), while the apps
+ARE published, now through HTTPRoutes.
+
+The consumer that makes this load-bearing is NOT the routing templates - those
+know their own mode - but freesailarr.sharedIngressApps below, which is also
+read by the <APP>__SERVER__URLBASE environment variables (see
+freesailarr.urlBase). Read from ingress.enabled alone, that list would come out
+EMPTY in Gateway mode, so Radarr, Sonarr and Prowlarr would be told no base
+path while their routes serve them under /radarr, /sonarr and /prowlarr. Each
+app would then answer at the sub-path with a page whose assets and API calls
+are linked at the host root, i.e. a broken UI behind a Ready pod - the same
+silent class as sure's TLS flags, found in the same sweep. The duplicate-path
+and root-only guards in that helper would also have gone unenforced in Gateway
+mode, for the same reason.
+
+With httpRoute.enabled at its default of false this expression IS
+ingress.enabled, which is why adding it changes nothing for an existing
+release: `helm template` with unchanged values renders byte-identically.
+*/}}
+{{- define "freesailarr.published" -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- if or .Values.ingress.enabled $httpRoute.enabled -}}true{{- end -}}
+{{- end -}}
+
+{{/*
+The apps that are published through a routing object: the enabled port apps
+whose values carry an ingress block with enabled: true. Used by BOTH routing
+templates - the per-app <app>.ingress.enabled toggle selects which apps are
+exposed in Ingress mode and in Gateway mode alike, and only the Ingress-only
+fields of that block (clusterIssuer, className, annotations) have no meaning in
+the second one. The name is historical; renaming it would churn every call site
+for no behaviour.
 
   {{- $apps := include "freesailarr.ingressApps" . | fromJsonArray }}
 */}}
@@ -252,14 +293,19 @@ The apps served under the shared domain (ingress.host), as a JSON array of
 is deterministic.
 
 The shared-domain mode is off unless ingress.host is set; then it covers the
-apps whose ingress renders at all (freesailarr.ingressApps, i.e. the enabled
-port apps with ingress.enabled) and which do not carry a host of their own. A
-per-app host always wins and keeps rendering its own object exactly as before,
-which is what makes mixed operation fall out for free.
+apps whose routing object renders at all (freesailarr.ingressApps, i.e. the
+enabled port apps with ingress.enabled) and which do not carry a host of their
+own. A per-app host always wins and keeps rendering its own object exactly as
+before, which is what makes mixed operation fall out for free.
 
-Two guards live here rather than in the ingress template, so that every
-consumer - the ingress objects, the UrlBase env vars and NOTES.txt - sees the
-same validated list:
+Gated on freesailarr.published and NOT on ingress.enabled (Gitea #114): this
+list is read by the UrlBase env vars too, and in Gateway mode ingress.enabled
+is false by construction while the apps are published all the same. See that
+helper for what reading the switch directly would have broken silently.
+
+Two guards live here rather than in the routing templates, so that every
+consumer - the Ingress objects, the HTTPRoutes, the UrlBase env vars and
+NOTES.txt - sees the same validated list:
 
   1. seerr or mediathekarr under any path other than "/". seerr has no base-path
      support (upstream request open since May 2022) and MediathekArr's UI links
@@ -277,7 +323,7 @@ same validated list:
 {{- $root := . -}}
 {{- $apps := list -}}
 {{- $host := $root.Values.ingress.host | default "" -}}
-{{- if and $root.Values.ingress.enabled $host -}}
+{{- if and (include "freesailarr.published" $root) $host -}}
 {{- $seen := dict -}}
 {{- range $app := include "freesailarr.ingressApps" $root | fromJsonArray -}}
 {{- $config := (index $root.Values $app.name).ingress -}}
@@ -320,9 +366,16 @@ base path from this environment variable (schema
 <APP>__CONFIGNAMESPACE__CONFIGITEM, https://wiki.servarr.com/sonarr/environment-variables),
 so the chart can configure them itself as soon as they render under a sub-path.
 
+Mode-independent by construction (Gitea #114): the sub-path an app is served
+under is the same in Ingress and in Gateway mode, so this variable follows
+freesailarr.sharedIngressApps and not the routing object. That is only true
+because that helper asks freesailarr.published rather than ingress.enabled -
+reading the switch directly would have emptied this variable in Gateway mode
+while the route still served the app under its prefix.
+
 Empty - i.e. the chart sets nothing - in three cases:
 
-  - the app does not render under the shared host, or renders at "/";
+  - the app is not served under the shared host, or is served at "/";
   - the app's own env block already carries the variable. The env blocks are
     documented as additive; emitting a second entry with the same name would
     break that promise, and two identically named variables in one container
@@ -353,6 +406,46 @@ Input: dict "root" $ "app" <"radarr"|"sonarr"|"prowlarr">.
 {{- $path -}}
 {{- end -}}
 
+{{/*
+The value for a servarr app's <APP>__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS variable, or the
+empty string when the chart must not set it. Same env schema as the UrlBase
+variable above (<APP>__CONFIGNAMESPACE__CONFIGITEM): verified for all three
+apps at the tags this chart pins, where Bootstrap.cs binds
+services.Configure<ServerOptions>(config.GetSection("<App>:Server")) next to a
+plain .AddEnvironmentVariables().
+
+The variable is emitted ONLY when the value is non-empty. An empty
+TRUSTEDNETWORKS would be indistinguishable from an unset one for the app -
+upstream reads string.Empty either way - but not for a reader of the manifest,
+to whom it would look like a setting that had been taken care of.
+
+Empty - i.e. the chart sets nothing - in two cases:
+
+  - the app's trustedNetworks value is empty, which is the DEFAULT. The apps
+    then trust no proxy at all; see the value's comment in values.yaml for what
+    that costs and why it is not a preserved behaviour;
+  - the app's own env block already carries the variable, for the same reason
+    the UrlBase helper above stays out of that case: the env blocks are
+    additive, and two identically named variables in one container are not a
+    defined state to build on.
+
+Input: dict "root" $ "app" <"radarr"|"sonarr"|"prowlarr">.
+*/}}
+{{- define "freesailarr.trustedNetworks" -}}
+{{- $root := .root -}}
+{{- $app := .app -}}
+{{- $var := printf "%s__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS" (upper $app) -}}
+{{- $value := (index $root.Values $app).trustedNetworks | default "" -}}
+{{- if $value -}}
+{{- range $entry := (index $root.Values $app).env -}}
+{{- if eq (toString $entry.name) $var -}}
+{{- $value = "" -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $value -}}
+{{- end -}}
+
 {{/*
 Comma-separated FIREWALL_INPUT_PORTS for gluetun: the ports of the enabled app
 containers (ingress traffic and the kubelet probes both arrive on the pod IP)

freesailarr/templates/freesailarr.httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+{{/*
+The Gateway-API alternative to freesailarr.ingress.yaml (Gitea #114). Form and
+reasoning: template-chart/templates/xxx.httproute.yaml and README, "Ingress and
+Gateway API".
+
+Only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs. No Gateway, no gatewayClassName, no
+Certificate, and no implementation-specific policy object - that subset looks
+identical on nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway and Istio, which is
+the whole reason the cluster's implementation can be swapped without touching
+this chart. Class and certificate therefore belong to the PLATFORM, on the
+Gateway and its listeners. ingress.clusterIssuer, ingress.className,
+ingress.annotations and their per-app overrides are all inert in this mode.
+
+THE SAME TWO SHAPES AS THE INGRESS, AND THEY STILL MIX
+
+  1. One host per app (the default): every published app gets its own
+     HTTPRoute with its own hostname, pointing at its own app's Service.
+  2. One shared domain with sub-paths (ingress.host): the apps that carry no
+     host of their own move into ONE route with one rule each.
+
+THIS CHART HAS NO ingress.domain, SO httpRoute HAS NO hostnames
+
+It is the documented exception on that point (README, guideline 4): the chart
+bundles ten independently exposed apps, so there is no single hostname to put
+in a chart-global list - a hostnames entry could not say which app it belonged
+to. The hostnames therefore come from the values that already hold them,
+ingress.host and <app>.ingress.host, which keeps the single source of truth the
+convention is actually about. Those two are not Ingress switches: they name the
+public addresses of this release, and both modes read them.
+
+Consequence for a migration: the "second hostname" the convention offers
+elsewhere is done here by changing <app>.ingress.host, which in Gateway mode
+feeds only the route - there is no Ingress rendered to disagree with it.
+
+WHERE THE GATEWAY API IS BETTER THAN WHAT IT REPLACES, AND IT IS NOT A
+TRANSLATION
+
+qBittorrent has no base-path setting: it serves its WebUI at the root and the
+proxy has to strip the prefix. nginx applies rewrite-target per INGRESS OBJECT
+and not per path, and the other apps must NOT be rewritten - their UrlBase
+contains the prefix, so they expect the full path. That is why
+freesailarr.ingress.yaml splits qBittorrent into a SECOND Ingress object on the
+same host, which then has to
+
+  - repeat the same TLS secret name as the main object, so that neither object
+    depends on an assumption about whether nginx applies the other one's TLS
+    configuration to its paths,
+  - OMIT the cert-manager annotation so only one Certificate is requested for
+    that one secret - except when no main object renders at all, which is a
+    conditional inside the annotation block, and
+  - match on an ImplementationSpecific path with a regex
+    ("<path>(/|$)(.*)") whose capture group 2 the rewrite refers to.
+
+The Gateway API's URLRewrite filter is per RULE. All of that disappears: one
+route, one rule per app, and qBittorrent's rule carries the filter while its
+neighbours do not. The path match goes back to a plain PathPrefix, there is no
+second object, no duplicated TLS block, no conditional annotation and no
+regex. The convention's own summary says rewrite-target "has a real
+equivalent"; in this chart the equivalent is strictly less machinery than the
+original, and that is the reason this chart was worth converting rather than
+merely translating.
+
+qBittorrent is the one app that contributes a SECOND rule, and it is not part
+of the rewrite: a 301 from the bare, slashless prefix to the slashed form
+(Gitea #118). Without it qBittorrent answers 200 under a URL whose relative
+links resolve to the host root, which on the shared host is a DIFFERENT
+application. In Ingress mode the chart does not render that redirect - it
+cannot, as the only mechanism nginx offers for it is a snippet annotation that
+most clusters refuse (values.yaml, qbittorrent.ingress, has the full price).
+This is therefore the one place where the Gateway mode is not merely less
+machinery but closes a gap the Ingress mode leaves open.
+
+WHAT IS NOT BETTER: ANYTHING THAT WAS AN ANNOTATION AND IS NOT A FILTER. The
+per-app and global ingress.annotations have no counterpart at all here. This
+chart sets no body-size annotation of its own, so nothing it NEEDS is lost -
+but an operator who added one through ingress.annotations (qBittorrent takes
+torrent file uploads) loses it silently in this mode. NOTES.txt says so.
+*/}}
+{{- /*
+Null-safe like every other block this chart dereferences (#99): an override
+written without children - "httpRoute:" with the keys below it deleted - is
+YAML null, and `.Values.httpRoute.enabled` would abort the render with a nil
+pointer. An empty block means "chart defaults apply", and both defaults are
+empty or false, so the whole block collapses to "no HTTPRoute".
+*/ -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- if and $httpRoute.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
+{{- fail "ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true - set exactly one of them. The Ingresses and the HTTPRoutes would publish the same Services under the same hostnames over two different data paths, which is already a conflict at DNS level: one name, two addresses, and which one a client reaches is luck. ingress.enabled is this chart's MASTER switch and defaults to true, so turning the Gateway mode on means setting ingress.enabled: false in the same values file. A migration runs over different hostnames (change ingress.host or <app>.ingress.host), never over parallel operation of both modes." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $parentRefs := $httpRoute.parentRefs | default list -}}
+{{- if not $parentRefs -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but httpRoute.parentRefs is empty - an HTTPRoute without a parent attaches to no Gateway. It is created, it is schema-valid, and it routes NOTHING, with no event and no condition that says so; the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer. Name the cluster's Gateway, e.g. httpRoute.parentRefs: [{name: public, namespace: gateway}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $sharedHost := .Values.ingress.host | default "" }}
+{{- /* The same validated list the Ingress uses, and the same list the UrlBase
+       env vars read: it is gated on freesailarr.published, so it is populated
+       in this mode as well. Its two guards - seerr/mediathekarr only at "/",
+       no duplicate paths on the shared host - therefore apply here unchanged,
+       which is the whole reason they live in the helper. */}}
+{{- $shared := include "freesailarr.sharedIngressApps" $ | fromJsonArray }}
+{{- range $app := include "freesailarr.ingressApps" $ | fromJsonArray }}
+{{- $config := (index $.Values $app.name).ingress }}
+{{- /* Skip the apps that live on the shared domain; they are one rule each in
+       the single route below. */}}
+{{- if or (not $sharedHost) ($config.host | default "") }}
+{{- $host := required (printf "%s.ingress.host must be provided while %s.ingress.enabled is true (or set the shared ingress.host to serve the app under a sub-path instead). The value is the app's public hostname and is read in Gateway mode as well - it is not an Ingress switch." $app.name $app.name) $config.host }}
+---
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-{{ $app.name }}-httproute
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    - {{ $host | quote }}
+  rules:
+    {{- /* The Ingress counterpart is `path: / , pathType: Prefix` on this
+           app's own Service. An app on a host of its own is served at the
+           root, so no rewrite is involved in either mode - that question only
+           arises under the shared host below.
+
+           The port is the Service's port NUMBER and not its name (the Ingress
+           addresses it by name, which is the app name): backendRefs takes a
+           PortNumber, so this reference cannot be made by name and the number
+           has to track freesailarr.service.yaml. Both come from
+           freesailarr.portApps, which is also what the Service renders from,
+           so they cannot drift - and
+           ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh fails when a backendRef names a
+           Service, or a port, the same render does not create. */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-{{ $app.name }}-service
+          port: {{ int $app.port }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- if $shared }}
+{{/*
+The shared-domain route: ONE object for every app under ingress.host, one rule
+each, rendered only when at least one app actually contributes a path - so
+switching every app off while leaving ingress.host set produces no object
+rather than an empty one without rules.
+
+qBittorrent is in here with the others, which is the difference to the Ingress:
+a filter in the Gateway API belongs to a RULE, so it contributes TWO rules of
+its own and the apps around it stay untouched by construction - a PathPrefix
+rule with the URLRewrite filter that strips the prefix, and an Exact rule on
+the bare, slashless prefix that redirects 301 to the slashed form (Gitea #118;
+the long reasoning is on that rule). No second object, no repeated TLS secret,
+no conditional cert-manager annotation, no regex path - see the header.
+
+The rules come sorted by path length descending, as the Ingress paths do, and
+qBittorrent's redirect rule follows the rule it corrects. Neither placement
+carries meaning: the Gateway API specifies matching precedence by criteria
+before order - an Exact match outranks every prefix match, and among prefix
+matches the longest wins - and list order is consulted only when all of those
+tie. So the ordering here is about a deterministic, reviewable rendering, not
+about matching behaviour. That it is ALSO the order nginx would need is a
+coincidence of this chart's history and not a property to rely on.
+*/}}
+---
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    - {{ $sharedHost | quote }}
+  rules:
+    {{- range $app := $shared }}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: {{ $app.path | quote }}
+      {{- if eq $app.name "qbittorrent" }}
+      {{- /* qBittorrent has no base-path setting - it serves its WebUI at the
+             root, so the prefix has to be stripped
+             (https://github.com/qbittorrent/wiki/blob/master/NGINX-Reverse-Proxy-for-Web-UI.md).
+             ReplacePrefixMatch replaces exactly the PathPrefix matched above,
+             which is why the match must be a PathPrefix and not a regex.
+
+             The apps around it must NOT be rewritten: their UrlBase carries
+             the prefix, so they expect the full path. Under an Ingress that
+             made a second object unavoidable, because rewrite-target applies
+             per object; here the filter is scoped to this rule and the others
+             are untouched by construction. */}}
+      filters:
+        - type: URLRewrite
+          urlRewrite:
+            path:
+              type: ReplacePrefixMatch
+              replacePrefixMatch: /
+      {{- end }}
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-{{ $app.name }}-service
+          port: {{ int $app.port }}
+    {{- if and (eq $app.name "qbittorrent") (ne $app.path "/") }}
+    {{- /* THE BARE PREFIX, WITHOUT THE TRAILING SLASH (Gitea #118)
+
+           A request for the bare qbittorrent.ingress.path - "/qbittorrent"
+           by default, no trailing slash - is matched by the PathPrefix rule
+           above and the URLRewrite turns it into "/". That is a valid
+           request to qBittorrent, which answers 200 with its login
+           page, so nothing anywhere reports a problem. But the browser's
+           document URL stays prefixless, and a relative link in that page
+           resolves against the PARENT of that path - which is the host root.
+           Every asset, every XHR and every form target therefore goes to "/",
+           and "/" on this shared host is SEERR. The symptom is qBittorrent's
+           login page that is unstyled and does nothing, while the requests it
+           makes are answered by a different application entirely - and seerr
+           answering a qBittorrent request is not a clue anyone follows
+           quickly. One redirect to the slashed form fixes all of it, because
+           relative links then resolve against the slashed prefix.
+
+           PRECEDENCE IS NOT POSITION. This rule is matched by the Gateway API
+           on an Exact path, and the specification ranks "Exact path match"
+           ABOVE "Prefix path match with largest number of characters", with
+           list order consulted only when every earlier criterion ties
+           (gateway-api v1.6.3, apis/v1/httproute_types.go). So this rule wins
+           over the PathPrefix rule above AND over seerr's PathPrefix "/" no
+           matter where it is emitted. The length-descending sort of the rules
+           in this route therefore stays what the header says it is - a
+           deterministic, reviewable rendering - and emitting this rule
+           directly after the one it corrects is a readability choice, not a
+           correctness one.
+
+           301 AND NOT 308, deliberately, and the reason is not the HTTP
+           semantics but which values an implementation is obliged to support.
+           The Gateway API marks 301 and 302 as CORE and everything else -
+           308 included - as EXTENDED. An implementation that does not support
+           the value given here must set the Accepted condition of the ROUTE to
+           status False with reason UnsupportedValue: not of this rule, of the
+           whole object. On the shared host that is one route carrying every
+           app under it, so a 308 that one implementation declines takes
+           prowlarr, radarr, sonarr and seerr down with qBittorrent - and it
+           does so on a route that is schema-valid, in a status field no
+           controller writes in CI. It would also contradict decision 1 of
+           Gitea #114, which is that this chart renders only the subset
+           that looks identical on nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy
+           Gateway and Istio, so that the cluster's implementation can be
+           swapped without touching the chart.
+
+           What 308 would buy is method and body preservation, and this rule
+           does not need it: it fires on exactly one path, the prefixless entry
+           to the WebUI, which a browser reaches with GET. qBittorrent's API
+           lives under "<path>/api/..." - slashed, longer, and therefore
+           served by the PathPrefix rule above, which this rule never sees. A
+           POST to the API is not redirected at all, so there is no body to
+           lose.
+
+           statusCode MUST BE WRITTEN OUT: it defaults to 302 in the API, and
+           a temporary redirect here would be re-fetched by every client on
+           every visit forever, for a prefix that is a permanent property of
+           this release's layout.
+
+           THE ONE ASYMMETRY TO THE nginx SNIPPET (values.yaml, qbittorrent):
+           HTTPRequestRedirectFilter has exactly five fields - scheme,
+           hostname, path, port, statusCode - and says nothing about the query
+           string, while ReplaceFullPath is specified as replacing the full
+           PATH. The nginx remedy in Ingress mode appends "$is_args$args" and
+           so carries the query over explicitly; here the query's fate is left
+           to the implementation and is not something this chart can state.
+           It costs nothing on the path this rule actually serves - the UI
+           entry point takes no query parameters - but it is a real difference
+           and not a translation. */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: Exact
+            value: {{ $app.path | quote }}
+      filters:
+        - type: RequestRedirect
+          requestRedirect:
+            path:
+              type: ReplaceFullPath
+              replaceFullPath: {{ printf "%s/" $app.path | quote }}
+            statusCode: 301
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}

freesailarr/templates/freesailarr.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for freesailarr (Gitea #5).
+
+TEN CONTAINERS IN ONE POD, BEHIND A VPN, AND THE POLICY IS SIMPLER THAN THAT
+SOUNDS - for one reason worth stating first: the containers talk to each other
+over LOCALHOST. They share a network namespace, so none of that traffic ever
+reaches a network interface and NO NetworkPolicy has anything to say about it.
+Prowlarr reaching Radarr, Recyclarr reaching Sonarr, every one of those hops is
+invisible here. What this policy governs is only what enters or leaves the pod.
+
+INBOUND is the eight published web interfaces plus gluetun's health server, and
+almost all of them are probe ports - the kubelet opens an HTTP connection to
+each container's own interface - so they are one rule on the probe path. The
+newznab port of mediathekarr is the exception: nothing probes it, and its only
+consumer is Prowlarr in this same pod over localhost, so it is restricted by
+source and that costs nothing.
+
+OUTBOUND IS WHERE THIS CHART IS UNLIKE EVERY OTHER ONE HERE, because the pod's
+network namespace belongs to gluetun. Every connection the *arr containers make
+goes into the WireGuard tunnel and leaves the pod as UDP to the VPN endpoint -
+so a NetworkPolicy sees the OUTER packets and almost nothing else. Three rules
+cover it: DNS, UDP 51820 for the tunnel itself, and 443 for gluetun's own
+server-list API. Indexer and tracker traffic needs no rule of its own; it is
+already inside the tunnel.
+
+AND THE TUNNEL RULE IS THE ONE THAT CAN BREAK THIS CHART, which is also why it
+is well covered: gluetun's health server returns 200 only while the tunnel is
+up, and all three of its probes address it. A blocked UDP 51820 therefore means
+a pod that never becomes Ready - visibly, in the install-test, which brings up
+a real tunnel. 51820 is WireGuard's standard port and Mullvad's; Mullvad also
+offers 53, 123, 500 and 4500 for obfuscation, and a release using one of those
+needs networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts. Note that extraPorts is TCP only, so an
+alternative UDP port needs the rule here widened instead - said plainly,
+because it is a limit of the shared values shape and not an oversight.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed, and for this chart it is unusually meaningful: because the
+    pod's network namespace belongs to gluetun, the only things that leave it are
+    the tunnel, DNS and gluetun's control-plane calls. Everything the applications
+    do is encapsulated. So three narrow rules really do describe the pod's whole
+    outbound surface - which is rare here.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    THE PROBE PATH, nine ports of it. gluetun's health server (9999) plus the eight
+    web interfaces the kubelet probes directly: qBittorrent (8080), Prowlarr
+    (9696), FlareSolverr (8191), Radarr (7878), Sonarr (8989), Seerr (5055), Bazarr
+    (6767) and Mediathekarr (5007). Every one of them is addressed by at least one
+    httpGet probe, so none of them can be restricted by source without the worker
+    node's IP.
+
+    Recyclarr is absent from this list on purpose: it declares no port and its
+    probes are exec probes, so there is nothing to allow.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 9999
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8080
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 9696
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8191
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 7878
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8989
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 5055
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 6767
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 5007
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      The ingress controller is added to the same rule - this chart renders TWO
+      Ingresses, the main one and qBittorrent's, and both go dark the moment this
+      list is filled without it.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+    {{- /*
+    MEDIATHEKARR'S NEWZNAB PORT, and the one inbound port here that can be
+    restricted: no probe addresses it. Its only consumer is Prowlarr, which runs in
+    THIS pod and reaches it over localhost - traffic no NetworkPolicy sees at all -
+    so restricting this rule to the release's own namespace plus allowedNamespaces
+    costs nothing and removes a port from the cluster's reach.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 5008
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    THE WIREGUARD TUNNEL, and the rule this chart cannot live without. Everything
+    the *arr containers do leaves the pod inside this tunnel, so blocking it
+    blocks all of them at once - and gluetun's health server, which all three of
+    its probes address, returns 200 only while the tunnel is up. The pod would
+    never become Ready.
+
+    51820 is WireGuard's standard port and Mullvad's. Mullvad also offers 53, 123,
+    500 and 4500 for obfuscation; a release using one of those must widen THIS rule,
+    because networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is TCP only.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 51820
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound HTTPS, for gluetun's own control-plane traffic: it fetches and caches
+    the provider's server list over the API before the tunnel exists, so this
+    cannot go through the tunnel. Indexer and tracker traffic does NOT need a rule
+    here - it is already inside the tunnel by the time it leaves the pod.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

freesailarr/templates/freesailarr.sfs.yaml

@@ -279,6 +279,14 @@ spec:
             - name: PROWLARR__SERVER__URLBASE
               value: {{ . | quote }}
             {{- end }}
+            {{- /* Proxy networks whose forwarded headers prowlarr honours.
+                   Emitted only when set - empty is the default and means no
+                   proxy is trusted. See the freesailarr.trustedNetworks
+                   helper and the value's comment in values.yaml. */}}
+            {{- with (include "freesailarr.trustedNetworks" (dict "root" $ "app" "prowlarr")) }}
+            - name: PROWLARR__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS
+              value: {{ . | quote }}
+            {{- end }}
             {{- include "freesailarr.env" (dict "root" $ "env" .Values.prowlarr.env) | nindent 12 }}
           ports:
             - containerPort: 9696
@@ -348,6 +356,11 @@ spec:
             - name: RADARR__SERVER__URLBASE
               value: {{ . | quote }}
             {{- end }}
+            {{- /* See the prowlarr TRUSTEDNETWORKS comment above. */}}
+            {{- with (include "freesailarr.trustedNetworks" (dict "root" $ "app" "radarr")) }}
+            - name: RADARR__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS
+              value: {{ . | quote }}
+            {{- end }}
             {{- include "freesailarr.env" (dict "root" $ "env" .Values.radarr.env) | nindent 12 }}
           ports:
             - containerPort: 7878
@@ -424,6 +437,13 @@ spec:
             - name: SONARR__SERVER__URLBASE
               value: {{ . | quote }}
             {{- end }}
+            {{- /* See the prowlarr TRUSTEDNETWORKS comment above. Sonarr did
+                   not lose the trust with this chart version - 4.0.19 was
+                   already in the empty state. */}}
+            {{- with (include "freesailarr.trustedNetworks" (dict "root" $ "app" "sonarr")) }}
+            - name: SONARR__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS
+              value: {{ . | quote }}
+            {{- end }}
             {{- include "freesailarr.env" (dict "root" $ "env" .Values.sonarr.env) | nindent 12 }}
           ports:
             - containerPort: 8989

freesailarr/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },
@@ -127,11 +178,11 @@
       "additionalProperties": false,
       "properties": {
         "enabled": {
-          "description": "Master switch; false suppresses every app ingress regardless of the per-app toggles.",
+          "description": "Master switch; false suppresses every app ingress regardless of the per-app toggles. Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are true, and since this defaults to true it has to be switched off explicitly to use the Gateway mode.",
           "type": "boolean"
         },
         "host": {
-          "description": "Shared domain for the sub-path mode. Empty or null means the default: every app on a host of its own.",
+          "description": "Shared domain for the sub-path mode. Empty or null means the default: every app on a host of its own. Read by BOTH routing modes - it names the public address of the stack and is not an Ingress switch. This chart has no ingress.domain, so this value and the per-app <app>.ingress.host are also where the HTTPRoutes take their hostnames from.",
           "type": [
             "string",
             "null"
@@ -150,11 +201,28 @@
           ]
         },
         "annotations": {
-          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open.",
+          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open. No counterpart in Gateway mode, per-app overrides included: the Gateway API has no annotation channel, so anything set here is gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead. The chart needs nothing from it - qBittorrent's prefix-stripping rewrite has a per-rule URLRewrite filter as its equivalent there - but an annotation you added yourself is lost silently.",
           "type": "object"
         }
       }
     },
+    "httpRoute": {
+      "description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true, and ingress.enabled defaults to true in this chart. The chart renders only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. Both ingress shapes work unchanged, and the sub-path shape gets simpler: a URLRewrite filter is per rule, so qBittorrent needs no second routing object. There is deliberately no hostnames key - this chart has no ingress.domain either, and a chart-global hostname list could not say which of the ten apps it belonged to, so the hostnames stay in ingress.host and <app>.ingress.host. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "parentRefs": {
+          "description": "The Gateway(s) every route of this release attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "gluetun": {
       "type": "object",
       "additionalProperties": false,
@@ -312,6 +380,9 @@
         "env": {
           "$ref": "#/definitions/env"
         },
+        "trustedNetworks": {
+          "$ref": "#/definitions/trustedNetworks"
+        },
         "livenessProbe": {
           "$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
         },
@@ -378,6 +449,9 @@
         "env": {
           "$ref": "#/definitions/env"
         },
+        "trustedNetworks": {
+          "$ref": "#/definitions/trustedNetworks"
+        },
         "livenessProbe": {
           "$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
         },
@@ -447,6 +521,9 @@
         "env": {
           "$ref": "#/definitions/env"
         },
+        "trustedNetworks": {
+          "$ref": "#/definitions/trustedNetworks"
+        },
         "livenessProbe": {
           "$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
         },
@@ -608,6 +685,13 @@
     }
   },
   "definitions": {
+    "parentRef": {
+      "description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": [
+        "name"
+      ]
+    },
     "image": {
       "description": "Every image in this chart is pinned here, gluetun included; no tag comes from appVersion. This is also what puts them all under Renovate's helm-values manager, which reads exactly these two keys.",
       "type": "object",
@@ -666,6 +750,13 @@
         }
       }
     },
+    "trustedNetworks": {
+      "description": "Comma-separated CIDRs whose X-Forwarded-For/-Proto/-Host headers this servarr app honours, rendered as <APP>__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS and only when non-empty. Empty is the default and means no proxy is trusted - the app then reports the ingress controller's pod IP as the client and sees the scheme as http behind TLS termination. Kept null-safe deliberately: an erased value is the same permissive-to-nobody state as the default, so it must not fail the render.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
     "appStorage": {
       "description": "Size of this app's config volumeClaimTemplate. Not null-safe on purpose: an erased size yields an invalid claim template and fails loudly.",
       "type": "object",

freesailarr/values.yaml

@@ -227,8 +227,17 @@ media:
 #     startupProbe accordingly (they are values, precisely for cases like this).
 #   - qbittorrent: it has no base path at all, so the chart gives it its own
 #     Ingress object on the same host with an nginx rewrite that strips the
-#     prefix. Two traps from the upstream recipe, both of which look like a
-#     login failure and therefore point in the wrong direction:
+#     prefix. (In GATEWAY MODE that second object is gone: the Gateway API's
+#     URLRewrite filter is per RULE, not per object, so qBittorrent is one rule
+#     in the shared route while its neighbours stay unrewritten. The traps
+#     below are the application's and apply in both modes.) CALL ITS PATH WITH
+#     A TRAILING SLASH: the bare /qbittorrent is stripped to "/", answered 200
+#     by qBittorrent, and its relative links then resolve to the root of the
+#     shared host - which is seerr. Gateway mode renders a 301 for this itself;
+#     Ingress mode cannot, and the nginx remedy plus its price is written out
+#     at qbittorrent.ingress below (Gitea #118). Two further traps from the
+#     upstream recipe, both of which look like a login failure and therefore
+#     point in the wrong direction:
 #       * qBittorrent marks its session cookie "Secure". Reaching the UI over
 #         plain HTTP means the browser never sends the cookie back and every
 #         click bounces to the login form. Use https.
@@ -247,16 +256,87 @@ media:
 ingress:
   # Master switch: false suppresses every app ingress regardless of the
   # per-app toggles.
+  #
+  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
+  # true the render aborts, naming both values. Mind that this defaults to
+  # TRUE, so turning the Gateway mode on means setting enabled: false in the
+  # same values file.
   enabled: true
   # The shared domain for the sub-path mode, e.g. "media.example.com". Empty
   # means the default: each app on a host of its own.
+  #
+  # Read by BOTH routing modes: it names the public address of the stack and is
+  # not an Ingress switch. Same for the per-app <app>.ingress.host.
   host: ""
   clusterIssuer: null
   className: nginx
   # Extra annotations for the Ingress objects; merged with the cert-manager
   # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
+  #
+  # NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE, and the same goes for the per-app
+  # overrides: the Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller
+  # behaviour, so anything set here is simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is
+  # used instead. This chart NEEDS nothing from it - the one behaviour-bearing
+  # annotation it sets itself, qBittorrent's prefix-stripping rewrite, has a
+  # real and better equivalent in that mode (a per-rule URLRewrite filter). But
+  # an annotation YOU added here is lost without a word; a body-size cap for
+  # qBittorrent's torrent-file uploads is the likely candidate, and it then has
+  # to be set at the Gateway or through its implementation's own policy object.
+  #
+  # ONE ANNOTATION IS WORTH ADDING HERE IN INGRESS MODE and the chart cannot
+  # ship it: the configuration-snippet that redirects the bare /qbittorrent to
+  # /qbittorrent/. It is written out, with its allow-snippet-annotations price,
+  # at qbittorrent.ingress below (Gitea #118). In Gateway mode it is neither
+  # needed nor possible - the chart renders that redirect as a rule of the
+  # route - so an operator who set it here does not lose a behaviour on
+  # migration, unlike the body-size case above.
   annotations: {}
 
+# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
+# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
+# httpRoute.enabled may be true - and ingress.enabled defaults to true, so it
+# has to be switched off explicitly.
+#
+# The chart renders ONLY HTTPRoutes with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
+# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
+# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
+# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
+# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
+#
+# Both shapes above work unchanged, and the sub-path mode gets SIMPLER: the
+# Gateway API's URLRewrite filter is per rule, so qBittorrent no longer needs a
+# second routing object of its own. One route, one rule per app, the filter on
+# qBittorrent's rule only.
+#
+# There is deliberately NO httpRoute.hostnames here, unlike every other chart
+# in the repository: this chart has no ingress.domain either (it bundles ten
+# independently exposed apps - README, guideline 4, documented exception), so a
+# chart-global list of hostnames could not say which app it belonged to. The
+# hostnames come from ingress.host and <app>.ingress.host, which is where this
+# chart's single source of truth for them already is.
+#
+# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
+# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
+# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: false
+  # The Gateway(s) every route of this release attaches to - a platform object,
+  # usually in another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its
+  # listener's allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway
+  # API's ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port,
+  # group, kind), passed through unchanged:
+  #
+  #   parentRefs:
+  #     - name: public
+  #       namespace: gateway
+  #       sectionName: https
+  #
+  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
+  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
+  # nothing, with no event to say so. The same list is used for every route
+  # this chart renders; the hosts differ, the Gateway does not.
+  parentRefs: []
+
 gluetun:
   # Pinned here like every other image in this chart, so Renovate's helm-values
   # manager proposes gluetun updates too. Docker Hub tags carry a v prefix.
@@ -343,7 +423,7 @@ qbittorrent:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: docker.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent
-    tag: 5.2.3
+    tag: 5.2.4
   # Every app gets its own Ingress object (named <release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress)
   # with its own TLS secret tls-<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress, so the apps can
   # be exposed independently and under unrelated hosts.
@@ -354,6 +434,73 @@ qbittorrent:
   # path is only read in the shared-domain mode (see the ingress block above);
   # it defaults to /<app> and is ignored while this app has a host of its own.
   # (Same block for prowlarr, radarr, sonarr, seerr and bazarr below.)
+  #
+  # CALL THIS PATH WITH A TRAILING SLASH IN INGRESS MODE (Gitea #118)
+  #
+  # qBittorrent has no base-path setting, so the prefix is stripped before the
+  # request reaches it. A request for the bare path - https://host/qbittorrent,
+  # no trailing slash - is therefore stripped to "/", which qBittorrent answers
+  # 200 with its login page. Nothing reports an error anywhere. But the
+  # browser's document URL stays prefixless, so every RELATIVE link in that
+  # page resolves against the host root - and "/" on the shared host is SEERR.
+  # The result is an unstyled login form whose assets, XHRs and form posts are
+  # all answered by a different application, which is a symptom that points
+  # nowhere useful. https://host/qbittorrent/ works correctly. The same applies
+  # to any custom path set here; it is a property of prefix stripping, not of
+  # the default value.
+  #
+  # IN GATEWAY MODE THE CHART RENDERS THE REDIRECT ITSELF. qBittorrent's rule
+  # in the shared HTTPRoute is joined by a second rule matching the bare path
+  # EXACTLY, whose RequestRedirect filter answers 301 to the slashed form. The
+  # Gateway API ranks an Exact match above every prefix match, so it wins over
+  # both qBittorrent's own PathPrefix rule and seerr's "/" regardless of
+  # ordering. 301 rather than 308 because only 301 and 302 are Core in that
+  # API - an Extended value an implementation declines makes it set
+  # Accepted=False on the WHOLE route, taking the neighbouring apps' routing
+  # with it. One asymmetry to the nginx remedy below: the Gateway API's
+  # redirect filter has no field for the query string (it replaces the full
+  # PATH), while the nginx snippet carries it over explicitly with
+  # $is_args$args. It costs nothing on the UI entry path, which takes no query
+  # parameters, but it is a real difference.
+  #
+  # IN INGRESS MODE THE CHART RENDERS NO REDIRECT, and that is a limitation,
+  # not an oversight. The remedy exists but cannot be shipped: put an nginx
+  # snippet into the global ingress.annotations (it is merged into both of this
+  # chart's Ingress objects on the shared host, which is what makes it work
+  # from there):
+  #
+  #   ingress:
+  #     annotations:
+  #       nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/configuration-snippet: |
+  #         if ($uri = "/qbittorrent") { return 301 $scheme://$host/qbittorrent/$is_args$args; }
+  #
+  # ITS PRICE, which is why it is documented rather than added: snippet
+  # annotations are only honoured on a controller started with
+  # allow-snippet-annotations=true, and since ingress-nginx 1.9 that flag is
+  # OFF by default. Switching it on also means accepting
+  # annotations-risk-level: Critical, because a configuration snippet is
+  # arbitrary nginx configuration injected from a namespaced object. A chart
+  # that shipped this annotation would silently render a no-op on every cluster
+  # that keeps the default, which is worse than naming the gap. The decision
+  # belongs to whoever runs the ingress controller.
+  #
+  # AND A THIRD INGRESS OBJECT WITH pathType: Exact IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE here,
+  # which is the obvious-looking alternative and does not work. In
+  # ingress-nginx controller-v1.14.5, internal/ingress/controller/template/
+  # template.go, buildLocation() returns a plain regex location
+  # (~* "^<path>") in its enforceRegex branch and RETURNS THERE - before it
+  # ever reaches the PathTypeExact branch that would emit the = "<path>"
+  # location nginx gives precedence to. And enforceRegex is computed once per
+  # nginx SERVER, not per location: rootfs/etc/nginx/template/nginx.tmpl
+  # evaluates enforceRegexModifier over every location of a hostname, and it
+  # returns true as soon as one of them needs a rewrite. qBittorrent's own
+  # object carries rewrite-target on this very hostname, so enforceRegex is
+  # true for the whole server and an Exact path would render as an ordinary
+  # regex location. The exact-match precedence the idea depends on never comes
+  # into being. The unsuitability follows from that short-circuit alone; what
+  # an unanchored regex location would then do to ORDERING - shadow the app, or
+  # loop the redirect, depending on emission order - is inferred from the same
+  # sources and has NOT been observed on a running nginx.
   ingress:
     enabled: true
     host: null
@@ -481,7 +628,43 @@ prowlarr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: docker.io/linuxserver/prowlarr
-    tag: 2.5.2
+    tag: 2.6.5
+  # Networks whose X-Forwarded-For / -Proto / -Host headers prowlarr honours,
+  # as comma-separated CIDRs (e.g. "10.42.0.0/16"). Rendered as
+  # PROWLARR__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS, and only when this value is non-empty.
+  #
+  # EMPTY IS THE DEFAULT, AND WITH IT PROWLARR TRUSTS NO PROXY AT ALL. That is
+  # a change in behaviour and not a preserved one. Up to 2.5.2 the app
+  # hard-coded 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fc00::/7 and
+  # fe80::/10 as trusted proxy networks in Startup.cs; 2.6.3 removed all five
+  # and replaced them with this setting, whose own upstream default is
+  # string.Empty - ForwardedHeadersConfigurator returns without registering a
+  # single KnownNetwork while it is empty. Upstream's reason for the change is
+  # that trusting X-Forwarded-For from every private network is a spoofing
+  # vector, and this chart follows that intent rather than papering over it.
+  #
+  # What it costs while this stays empty and the app is published through an
+  # Ingress or an HTTPRoute: the client address prowlarr logs and shows is the
+  # ingress controller's pod IP rather than the real client, and the app sees
+  # the scheme as http even behind TLS termination. If its authentication is
+  # set to "Disabled for Local Addresses", a proxied request no longer counts
+  # as local and is asked to authenticate.
+  #
+  # The chart cannot fill this in for you. The network to trust is the one your
+  # ingress controller's pods sit in - the cluster pod CIDR, or that single
+  # controller pod's IP - which is a property of the cluster and not of the
+  # release. Set it yourself if you want the forwarded headers honoured.
+  #
+  # AllowedHosts, the other key 2.6.3 added, is deliberately NOT exposed as a
+  # value here. Its upstream default is string.Empty as well, and while it is
+  # empty the app accepts requests for any host ("Allowed Hosts is not
+  # configured, accepting requests for any host"), so there is nothing to
+  # repair. One trap to know before anyone sets it through the env block
+  # anyway: the app only ever appends localhost, 127.0.0.1, [::1] and its own
+  # hostname to that list, so neither the pod IP nor the in-cluster Service DNS
+  # name is covered - and the kubelet addresses the probes to the pod IP, so an
+  # incomplete list answers them with HTTP 400.
+  trustedNetworks: ""
   # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
   ingress:
     enabled: true
@@ -540,7 +723,7 @@ flaresolverr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: ghcr.io/flaresolverr/flaresolverr
-    tag: v3.5.0
+    tag: v3.5.2
   # No ingress and no config volume: flaresolverr is stateless and only
   # consumed by prowlarr over localhost.
   env: []
@@ -595,7 +778,13 @@ radarr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: docker.io/linuxserver/radarr
-    tag: 6.3.0
+    tag: 6.4.4
+  # The same setting, the same empty default and the same consequence as
+  # prowlarr's - read the trustedNetworks comment there for the whole picture.
+  # Radarr dropped the five hard-coded private networks in 6.4.3 (6.3.0, the
+  # version this chart shipped before, still had them) and reads this as
+  # RADARR__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS.
+  trustedNetworks: ""
   # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
   ingress:
     enabled: true
@@ -653,7 +842,7 @@ recyclarr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: ghcr.io/recyclarr/recyclarr
-    tag: 8.7.1
+    tag: 8.7.3
   # No ingress: recyclarr has no web UI, it syncs TRaSH guides to radarr and
   # sonarr on a schedule (daemon mode).
   storage:
@@ -706,7 +895,17 @@ sonarr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: docker.io/linuxserver/sonarr
-    tag: 4.0.19
+    tag: 4.0.20
+  # The same setting as prowlarr's - read the trustedNetworks comment there.
+  # Reads as SONARR__SERVER__TRUSTEDNETWORKS.
+  #
+  # One difference worth stating plainly: sonarr did NOT lose the forwarded
+  # header trust with this chart version. 4.0.19, the version this chart
+  # shipped before, already had no hard-coded networks and the same
+  # empty-default TrustedNetworks, so the value is being supplied here for a
+  # state that already existed rather than for a new one. It had arrived
+  # unnoticed in what the convention classes as a plain app-version bump.
+  trustedNetworks: ""
   # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
   ingress:
     enabled: true
@@ -764,7 +963,7 @@ seerr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr
-    tag: v3.4.1
+    tag: v3.5.0
   # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
   ingress:
     enabled: true
@@ -821,7 +1020,7 @@ bazarr:
   enabled: true
   image:
     repository: docker.io/linuxserver/bazarr
-    tag: 1.6.0
+    tag: 1.6.2
   # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
   ingress:
     enabled: true
@@ -1131,3 +1330,101 @@ mediathekarr:
     capabilities:
       drop:
         - ALL
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # TEN CONTAINERS IN ONE POD, AND THE FIRST THING TO KNOW: they talk to each
+  # other over LOCALHOST. They share a network namespace, so that traffic never
+  # touches an interface and no NetworkPolicy sees it. This object governs only
+  # what enters or leaves the pod.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT ALLOWS, inbound: the nine probed ports as one rule (gluetun's
+  # health server 9999, plus qBittorrent 8080, Prowlarr 9696, FlareSolverr
+  # 8191, Radarr 7878, Sonarr 8989, Seerr 5055, Bazarr 6767, Mediathekarr
+  # 5007), and mediathekarr's newznab port 5008 RESTRICTED by source - nothing
+  # probes it, and its only consumer is Prowlarr over localhost, so restricting
+  # it costs nothing.
+  #
+  # OUTBOUND, and this chart is unlike every other one here: the pod's network
+  # namespace belongs to gluetun, so everything the *arr containers do is
+  # encapsulated into the WireGuard tunnel before it leaves. Three rules
+  # describe the whole outbound surface - DNS, UDP 51820 for the tunnel, and
+  # 443 for gluetun's server-list API, which cannot go through the tunnel
+  # because it runs before the tunnel exists. Indexer and tracker traffic needs
+  # no rule: it is already inside.
+  #
+  # THE TUNNEL RULE IS THE ONE THAT CAN BREAK THIS CHART, and it is also the
+  # best-covered: gluetun's health server returns 200 only while the tunnel is
+  # up, and all three of its probes address it, so a blocked 51820 means a pod
+  # that never becomes Ready - visibly, and in the install-test, which brings
+  # up a real tunnel. 51820 is WireGuard's and Mullvad's standard port; Mullvad
+  # also offers 53, 123, 500 and 4500 for obfuscation, and a release using one
+  # of those must widen the rule in the TEMPLATE, because egress.extraPorts is
+  # TCP only. That is a limit of the shared values shape, said plainly.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach the nine probed ports (gluetun's health server and the eight web interfaces), which is every inbound port except mediathekarr's newznab port.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # TCP ONLY - an alternative WireGuard UDP port cannot be added here. The
+    # usual entry is an in-cluster service Seerr talks to outside the tunnel
+    # (Jellyfin on 8096), which also needs gluetun.vpn.firewallOutboundSubnets
+    # set, or gluetun's own firewall blocks it before this policy is reached.
+    extraPorts: []

garage/Chart.yaml

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ type: application
 # offer those as "updates", which is why the garage block in renovate.json5
 # carries a versioningTemplate anchored to ^v<major>.<minor>.<patch>$ - same
 # shape as the stalwart block, for the same reason.
-version: 1.1.0+upv2.4.1
+version: 2.0.0+upv2.4.1
 appVersion: "v2.4.1"
 
 maintainers:

garage/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -204,3 +204,63 @@ TRAPS WORTH KNOWING BEFORE YOU NEED THEM
   - THE RPC SECRET IS IN THE PROCESS ENVIRONMENT, not in a file. That is
     forced, not chosen: Garage rejects a secret file with any group bit set,
     and the kubelet sets one. values.yaml has the mechanism.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound, and the four ports split three ways:
+    - s3 ({{ $settings.ports.s3 | int64 }}) and web ({{ $settings.ports.web | int64 }}): RESTRICTED BY SOURCE — this namespace,
+      networkPolicy.allowedNamespaces, and the ingress controller.
+    - admin ({{ $settings.ports.admin | int64 }}): open inside the cluster, because all three probes address
+      it. This is the ADMIN API, so read that as a smaller ceiling rather than
+      a closed door; networkPolicy.probeSources closes the rest.
+    - rpc ({{ $settings.ports.rpc | int64 }}): this release's own pods only. It has no Service.
+  Outbound: DNS and TCP {{ $settings.ports.rpc | int64 }} (the cluster bus, outbound as well as in){{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }},
+  plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+
+  CHECK YOUR S3 CONSUMERS. Anything in another namespace that talks to this
+  endpoint on its in-cluster Service address — a backup job, a Zipline storing
+  uploads, a Stalwart blob store — is blocked until that namespace is in
+  networkPolicy.allowedNamespaces. Consumers using the published Ingress name
+  arrive through the controller and are already covered. The failure is an
+  application-level error with nothing pointing at this object.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

garage/templates/garage.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for garage (Gitea #5).
+
+Garage declares four ports and they split three ways, which makes this the
+second-clearest illustration of the convention after keycloak:
+
+  s3 (3900)     the S3 API. The Ingress points at it and no probe touches it,
+                so it is RESTRICTED by source.
+  web (3902)    static website serving, same treatment as s3.
+  admin (3903)  the port all three probes address - tcpSocket twice and a
+                httpGet /health - so it stays open inside the cluster. This is
+                also the admin API, which is the uncomfortable part and is
+                named in values.yaml: narrowing it means probeSources.
+  rpc (3901)    the node-to-node bus. It has NO Service at all, deliberately
+                (see garage.service.yaml), and it gets the narrowest rule this
+                object can express: the pods this policy itself selects.
+
+All four numbers are derived from garage.settings, so moving a port in values
+moves the policy with it.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $settings := fromYaml (include "garage.settings" .) }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed and it is narrow, which is the point: a storage node's only
+    outbound traffic is DNS and its own cluster bus. Not permitted, and named in
+    values.yaml because it is the plausible surprise: outbound HTTPS. Garage does
+    not need it for S3 serving, but a deployment that configures remote replication
+    or an external metrics sink does.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    THE S3 API AND THE STATIC WEB PORT, both genuinely restricted by source,
+    because no probe addresses either of them: this release's own namespace,
+    whatever allowedNamespaces adds, and the ingress controller.
+
+    THE SOURCE LIST IS THE THING TO GET RIGHT HERE. Every consumer of this S3
+    endpoint that lives in another namespace - a backup job, a Zipline using it for
+    uploads, a Stalwart blob store - is a pod in that namespace and is BLOCKED
+    unless the namespace is in allowedNamespaces. Consumers reaching the published
+    Ingress name instead arrive through the controller and are already covered. A
+    blocked S3 consumer fails at the application level, with nothing naming this
+    object.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.s3 | int64 }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.web | int64 }}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- /*
+    THE ADMIN PORT, and it is the probe path: liveness and startup open a TCP
+    socket against it and readiness fetches /health from it. So it stays open
+    inside the cluster by default.
+
+    That is worth stating rather than glossing, because this is the ADMIN API: key
+    management and cluster layout live here. The policy caps it at "reachable from
+    inside the cluster", not at "closed", and probeSources is what closes the rest -
+    at the usual price of needing the worker node IPs.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.admin | int64 }}
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      No ingress-controller entry on this rule: nothing should route to the admin API
+      from outside.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+    {{- /*
+    THE NODE-TO-NODE RPC BUS, restricted to the pods this policy already selects -
+    a podSelector with no namespaceSelector, which means "these labels, in this
+    namespace".
+
+    This port deliberately has no Service (garage.service.yaml says why: a Service
+    port would advertise a cluster interface that is not one), so this rule is the
+    only description of it anywhere in the chart. The matching egress rule below is
+    what lets a node dial OUT to its peers.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.rpc | int64 }}
+      from:
+        - podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound RPC to the other nodes of this cluster. Needed as well as the inbound
+    rule: policyTypes lists Egress, so a node dialling its peer is subject to this
+    policy too, and with only the inbound rule the bus would be permitted in one
+    direction - a layout that never converges while every node looks healthy.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.rpc | int64 }}
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

garage/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "description": "true renders the StatefulSet with replicas: 0 and takes precedence over garage.replicas.",
       "type": "boolean"

garage/values.yaml

@@ -501,3 +501,92 @@ httpRoute:
   # garage.s3.rootDomain - the two still have to be set in step, as they do for
   # the Ingress.
   hostnames: []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS, and Garage's four ports split three ways:
+  #   - s3 (3900) and web (3902): RESTRICTED BY SOURCE to this namespace,
+  #     allowedNamespaces and the ingress controller. No probe touches them,
+  #     which is what makes the restriction possible.
+  #   - admin (3903): open inside the cluster, because all three probes address
+  #     it. This is the ADMIN API - key management and cluster layout - so the
+  #     cap is "reachable from inside the cluster", not "closed". probeSources
+  #     closes the rest.
+  #   - rpc (3901): this release's own pods only. It has no Service at all.
+  # Outbound: DNS and the rpc bus, nothing else.
+  #
+  # THE SOURCE LIST FOR s3 IS THE THING TO GET RIGHT. Every S3 consumer in
+  # ANOTHER namespace - a backup job, a Zipline storing uploads, a Stalwart
+  # blob store - is blocked unless that namespace is in allowedNamespaces.
+  # Consumers that use the published Ingress name arrive through the controller
+  # and are already covered. A blocked consumer fails at the application level,
+  # with nothing naming this object.
+  #
+  # NOT allowed, and the plausible surprise: outbound HTTPS. Garage does not
+  # need it to serve S3, but remote replication or an external metrics sink
+  # does - see egress.extraPorts.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach the admin port (garage.ports.admin, 3903 by default), which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # 443 is the entry to add for remote replication or an external metrics
+    # sink. Nothing is needed for plain S3 serving.
+    extraPorts: []

gotenberg/Chart.yaml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ icon: https://gotenberg.dev/img/logo.png
 
 type: application
 
-version: 8.0.3+up8.37.0
+version: 9.0.0+up8.37.0
 appVersion: "8.37.0"
 
 maintainers:

gotenberg/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -80,3 +80,90 @@ REQUESTS TIME OUT AFTER 30 SECONDS
   cannot be changed here. This is the ceiling large conversions actually meet:
   an 18 MB HTML needs about 22 seconds, and a 25 MB one does not finish inside
   the 30. Callers that need longer must split the document instead.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 3000 only. Outbound: DNS{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }} plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+
+{{- /* Null-safe on purpose: networkPolicy.egress may be erased to null (the
+       schema permits it), and a bare .egress.remoteAssets then fails the whole
+       render with "nil pointer evaluating interface {}.remoteAssets" - an
+       error naming this file while the operator's value appears nowhere in it.
+       Same rule as issue #99: an erased block means "the default applies", not
+       a broken render. */}}
+{{- if (.Values.networkPolicy.egress | default dict).remoteAssets }}
+  REMOTE ASSETS ARE ALLOWED IN THIS RELEASE (networkPolicy.egress.remoteAssets:
+  true), so Chromium may fetch over TCP 80 and 443 to any destination. Know
+  what that opens: this service is reachable from the whole cluster by default
+  (3000 is the probe port), so anything that can POST here can now have
+  Chromium fetch an arbitrary URL — including one inside the cluster. Switch it
+  back off if nothing in this release renders HTML that references remote
+  images.
+{{- else }}
+  EGRESS IS DNS ONLY HERE, AND IT COSTS SOMETHING SILENTLY. Gotenberg drives a
+  headless Chromium, so an egress rule for 80/443 would turn a service the
+  whole cluster can POST to into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs — which is
+  why the default is off.
+
+  What it costs: in a rendered HTML document, EMBEDDED images are MIME parts
+  inside the file and convert fine, but REMOTE images (<img src="https://...">)
+  are fetched by Chromium at render time and are SILENTLY DROPPED. The PDF is
+  produced and is simply missing them. Nothing fails, nothing is logged here,
+  no probe notices.
+
+  If this release needs them — a paperless-ngx rendering mail bodies that
+  reference remote pictures is the case — set
+
+    networkPolicy:
+      egress:
+        remoteAssets: true
+
+  and not extraPorts: [80, 443]. The named value says why the ports are open;
+  a port list cannot.
+{{- end }}
+
+  THIS CHART HAS NO INGRESS AND ITS CONSUMERS ARE OTHER PODS. While
+  probeSources is empty the 3000 rule has no source selector; narrowing it
+  means listing the consumers' namespaces in allowedNamespaces in the same
+  change, or every conversion stops.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

gotenberg/templates/gotenberg.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for gotenberg (Gitea #5).
+
+Gotenberg here is a cluster-internal service: no Ingress, and its consumers are
+other pods (paperless-ngx converts mail HTML to PDF through it).
+
+EGRESS IS DNS ONLY BY DEFAULT, AND THAT IS A DELIBERATE, VISIBLE TRADE rather
+than an oversight. Gotenberg drives a headless Chromium, so an egress rule for
+80 and 443 would let anything that can POST to this service fetch arbitrary
+URLs through it - a textbook SSRF pivot, and the pod is reachable from the
+whole cluster by default because 3000 is the probe port. Blocking it costs the
+remote-asset half of HTML conversion: a converted page keeps its EMBEDDED
+content and loses the images it would have FETCHED, which degrades a PDF rather
+than failing a pod. The degradation is silent, which is why it is named here, in
+values.yaml and in NOTES.txt.
+
+A deployment that needs those images sets networkPolicy.egress.remoteAssets:
+true - a named switch rather than a line in extraPorts, so the trade is a
+decision someone made and not a port number nobody can place. Its default is
+off, because restrictive-by-default is the convention and the deployment is
+where reality is accommodated. The long form of what it buys, and of the one
+thing about it that was NOT verified, is on the rule itself.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the Deployment's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because this is the chart where the cap matters most: a
+    headless Chromium that can reach the internet turns a service anyone in the
+    cluster can POST to into an SSRF pivot. DNS is the only rule.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    3000 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service forwards 80 to, and
+    the one all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 3000
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      NO ingress controller is added here, because this chart renders no Ingress: its
+      consumers are other pods, and they have to be named in allowedNamespaces.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- if .remoteAssets }}
+    {{- /*
+    REMOTE ASSETS: the web, on both ports, to any destination. Off by default,
+    and the switch exists because the cost of leaving it off is invisible while
+    the cost of removing it is not.
+
+    WHAT IT BUYS, measured on the live cluster rather than assumed. paperless-ngx
+    splits a mail into two steps with two separate endpoints, both
+    cluster-internal: the .eml goes to TIKA for parsing
+    (PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT) and the resulting HTML comes here for rendering
+    (PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT). Of the images in that HTML:
+
+      - EMBEDDED images are MIME parts INSIDE the file. Neither Tika nor
+        Gotenberg needs the network for them, which is why apache-tika stays
+        DNS-only and why this switch is not needed for a mail that carries its
+        pictures with it.
+      - REMOTE images (<img src="https://..."> in the mail body) are fetched by
+        CHROMIUM, here, at render time. With this switch off they are silently
+        dropped: the PDF is produced, it is just missing them. Nothing fails,
+        nothing is logged by this chart, and no probe notices.
+
+    NOT CHECKED, and not claimed: whether paperless-ngx re-embeds the images
+    Tika extracted before handing the HTML over. If it does not, embedded
+    images would be lost as well - but that would be pre-existing paperless
+    behaviour and not this policy, so do not read the switch as a fix for it.
+
+    WHY IT IS A SWITCH AND NOT THE DEFAULT. Gotenberg drives a headless
+    Chromium and 3000 is its probe port, so the service is reachable from the
+    whole cluster by default. Allowing 80/443 outbound therefore turns anything
+    that can POST here into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs - an SSRF pivot
+    with the cluster's whole internal address space behind it. That argument is
+    unchanged by the switch; the switch only makes the trade a NAMED decision
+    with a default of "no" instead of a line in extraPorts that reads like
+    nothing in particular.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 80
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

gotenberg/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,47 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "remoteAssets": {
+              "description": "Lets Chromium fetch over TCP 80 and 443 to any destination, for the REMOTE images in a rendered HTML document (<img src=\"https://...\">). Off by default: Gotenberg drives a headless Chromium and 3000 is its probe port, so the service is reachable from the whole cluster, and allowing outbound web access turns anything that can POST here into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs. EMBEDDED images are MIME parts inside the file and need no network at all, which is the case this switch is NOT for. With it off, remote images are silently dropped - the PDF is produced and is simply missing them.",
+              "type": "boolean"
+            },
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },

gotenberg/values.yaml

@@ -92,3 +92,100 @@ gotenberg:
     limits:
       memory: 3Gi
       ephemeralStorage: 256Mi
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only and outbound nothing but DNS.
+  #
+  # THE EGRESS CAP IS THE POINT OF THIS ONE. Gotenberg drives a headless
+  # Chromium, so allowing 80/443 outbound would let anything that can POST to
+  # this service fetch arbitrary URLs through it - and 3000 is the probe port,
+  # so the whole cluster can POST to it by default. The cost is the
+  # remote-asset half of HTML conversion: a converted page keeps its inline
+  # content and silently loses the images it would have FETCHED. That is a
+  # degraded PDF, not a dead pod, which is exactly why it is written down here.
+  # A deployment that needs those images sets egress.remoteAssets: true below -
+  # a named switch, knowingly, rather than a port pair in extraPorts.
+  #
+  # And like every chart here: 3000 is not restricted by source in the default
+  # (probe port), and a policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  egress:
+    # REMOTE ASSETS: lets Chromium fetch over TCP 80 and 443, to any
+    # destination. OFF by default, and both halves of that are deliberate.
+    #
+    # WHAT IT BUYS, measured rather than assumed. paperless-ngx splits a mail
+    # into two steps with two separate cluster-internal endpoints: the .eml goes
+    # to TIKA for parsing (PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT) and the resulting HTML comes
+    # here for rendering (PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT). Of the images in
+    # that HTML:
+    #   - EMBEDDED images are MIME parts INSIDE the file. Neither Tika nor
+    #     Gotenberg needs the network for them - which is why apache-tika stays
+    #     DNS-only, and why a mail that carries its pictures with it needs
+    #     nothing from this switch.
+    #   - REMOTE images (<img src="https://..."> in the body) are fetched by
+    #     CHROMIUM, here, at render time. With this off they are SILENTLY
+    #     DROPPED: the PDF is produced and is simply missing them. Nothing
+    #     fails, nothing is logged by this chart, no probe notices.
+    #
+    # NOT CHECKED, and deliberately not claimed: whether paperless-ngx re-embeds
+    # the images Tika extracted before handing the HTML over. If it does not,
+    # embedded images would be lost as well - but that would be pre-existing
+    # paperless behaviour and not this policy. Do not read this switch as a fix
+    # for it.
+    #
+    # WHY IT IS OFF BY DEFAULT. Gotenberg drives a headless Chromium and 3000 is
+    # its probe port, so the service is reachable from the whole cluster by
+    # default. Allowing 80/443 outbound therefore turns anything that can POST
+    # here into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs - an SSRF pivot with the
+    # cluster's internal address space behind it. Switching this on is a trade,
+    # and it should be one somebody made on purpose.
+    remoteAssets: false
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # Use remoteAssets above rather than putting 80 and 443 here: the named
+    # value says WHY the ports are open, and this list cannot.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # Normally empty. Remote assets have their own switch above
+    # (egress.remoteAssets) and do NOT belong here, because a bare 80/443 in
+    # this list records no reason. Add a port here only for something neither
+    # the switch nor the chart covers.
+    extraPorts: []

homeassistant/Chart.yaml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: A Helm chart to deploy Home Assistant on Kubernetes
 icon: https://www.home-assistant.io/images/home-assistant-logo.svg
 type: application
 
-version: 6.1.1+up2026.8.3
+version: 7.0.0+up2026.8.3
 
 appVersion: "2026.8.3"
 

homeassistant/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -18,7 +18,20 @@ print as "1e+06" here just as it did in the rendered manifest.
 {{- $ctr := fromYaml (include "homeassistant.containerSecurityContext" .Values.securityContext) -}}
 {{- $caps := (index $ctr "capabilities") | default dict -}}
 {{- $netRaw := has "NET_RAW" ((index $caps "add") | default list) -}}
+{{- /*
+NOTHING IN CI READS THIS FILE. `helm template` does not emit notes and no
+workflow or script under ci/ reads it, so every claim below carries
+review-only assurance - it is checked by being read, not by a stage. A
+rendering ERROR here does fail `helm template`, which is all the pipeline can
+see of it.
+*/ -}}
 {{- $ing := .Values.ingress -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- /*
+"Published" rather than "has an Ingress": the two modes are alternatives, and
+both read ingress.hosts (Gitea #114).
+*/ -}}
+{{- $published := or $ing.enabled $httpRoute.enabled -}}
 {{- $hosts := $ing.hosts | default list -}}
 {{- $tls := $ing.tls | default list -}}
 {{- $ann := $ing.annotations | default dict -}}
@@ -33,7 +46,7 @@ Home Assistant {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} — release {{ .Release.Name }} in namesp
 
 {{- if $ing.enabled }}
 
-ACCESS
+ACCESS — INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false)
 {{- range $h := $hosts }}
 {{- $scheme := "http" }}
 {{- range $t := $tls }}
@@ -75,11 +88,73 @@ ACCESS
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get certificate {{ $certName | default "<your ingress.tls secretName>" }}
 {{- end }}
+{{- else if $httpRoute.enabled }}
+
+ACCESS — GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false)
+{{- range $h := $hosts }}
+{{- range $p := ($h.paths | default list) }}
+  https://{{ $h.host }}{{ $p.path }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+
+  ONE HTTPRoute PER ENTRY of ingress.hosts, and nothing else of the routing
+  path — no Gateway, no class, no Certificate, no policy object:
+{{- range $i, $h := $hosts }}
+    {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-httproute{{ if $i }}-{{ $i }}{{ end }}   {{ $h.host }}
+{{- end }}
+
+  This chart has no ingress.domain — it is the documented ingress exception and
+  keeps upstream's flexible host list — so there is no httpRoute.hostnames
+  either: the hostnames and the paths above come from ingress.hosts, which is
+  read in BOTH modes. ingress.className, ingress.tls and ingress.annotations
+  are NOT read in this mode.
+
+  Three things therefore belong to the cluster, and if any is missing the
+  hostnames above simply do not answer:
+
+    1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed, so
+       they are present — nothing to check.
+    2. The Gateway named in httpRoute.parentRefs
+{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}
+{{- end }}
+       must exist AND its listener must allow routes from this namespace
+       ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment is visible only
+       in the route's status:
+
+         kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
+
+       Read status.parents[].conditions — "Accepted: True" and
+       "ResolvedRefs: True" is what a working attachment looks like. An empty
+       status means no controller has looked at the route at all.
+    3. The TLS certificates for those hostnames, on the Gateway's listeners.
+       THE URLS ABOVE SAY https BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT A GATEWAY LISTENER
+       NORMALLY TERMINATES, not because this release arranged it: ingress.tls
+       is not read in this mode and this chart requests no certificate in
+       either mode (see the Ingress-mode text — it never did).
+
+  WHAT IS GONE IN THIS MODE, generally rather than specifically: the Gateway
+  API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour, so everything in
+  ingress.annotations is inert. For THIS chart there is no measured loss to
+  report — the installation this repository serves does not deploy
+  homeassistant at all, so unlike its five siblings in this sweep it had no
+  operator-supplied annotation to lose. That is an absence of evidence about
+  that installation, not a property of the chart: whatever YOU put in
+  ingress.annotations disappears here.
+
+  AND ONE THING TO CHECK IN HOME ASSISTANT ITSELF, because no Kubernetes object
+  reports it: Home Assistant refuses requests whose Host header is not in its
+  own configuration and builds absolute URLs from it, and it needs the proxy's
+  address in trusted_proxies to read X-Forwarded-For at all. Changing the data
+  path changes that address — the Gateway's data-plane pods are not the ingress
+  controller's. See the trusted-proxies section below; it applies to the
+  Gateway exactly as it did to ingress-nginx, with a different CIDR.
 {{- else }}
 
-ACCESS — NO INGRESS
-  ingress.enabled is false, so this release has no Ingress. Nothing else in
-  this chart reads ingress.hosts, so no other setting silently depends on it.
+ACCESS — NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE
+  ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both false, so this release
+  publishes nothing. Nothing else in this chart reads ingress.hosts, so no
+  other setting silently depends on it.
   Reach the instance inside the cluster with
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service 8123:{{ .Values.service.port }}
@@ -89,21 +164,25 @@ ACCESS — NO INGRESS
   because a browser that has already talked to another Home Assistant on
   localhost:8123 will otherwise mix up the stored tokens.
 {{- end }}
-{{- if and $ing.enabled $placeholder }}
+{{- if and $published $placeholder }}
 
-THE INGRESS IS PUBLISHED UNDER THE CHART'S PLACEHOLDER HOST
-  ingress.enabled is true while ingress.hosts still contains the default entry
-  "chart-example.local". That name resolves nowhere, so the Ingress exists,
-  ingress-nginx accepts it, and no request ever arrives. Set ingress.hosts to
+THIS RELEASE IS PUBLISHED UNDER THE CHART'S PLACEHOLDER HOST
+  {{ if $ing.enabled }}ingress.enabled{{ else }}httpRoute.enabled{{ end }} is true while ingress.hosts still contains the default entry
+  "chart-example.local". That name resolves nowhere, so the {{ if $ing.enabled }}Ingress{{ else }}HTTPRoute{{ end }} exists,
+  {{ if $ing.enabled }}ingress-nginx accepts it{{ else }}the Gateway accepts it{{ end }}, and no request ever arrives. Set ingress.hosts to
   the name you actually serve — for example example.com — before assuming the
   release is unreachable for some deeper reason.
+  {{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}ingress.hosts is read in Gateway mode too; it is not an "Ingress-only"
+  value.{{ end }}
 {{- end }}
 {{ if eq $replicas "0" }}
 SCALED TO ZERO
   {{ if .Values.scaleDown }}scaleDown: true{{ else }}replicas: 0{{ end }} — the StatefulSet runs with replicas: 0, so nothing answers
   until you set it back and upgrade again. The PVC, the OnePasswordItem and
   the Service{{ if $ing.enabled }} and Ingress stay in place, so no state is lost and no
-  certificate is re-issued.{{ else }} stay in place, so no state is lost.{{ end }}
+  certificate is re-issued.{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }} and the HTTPRoutes stay in place, so no state is
+  lost — the routes keep pointing at a Service with no endpoints, and the
+  Gateway answers with an error of its own rather than with nothing.{{ else }} stay in place, so no state is lost.{{ end }}
 
   Bringing this release back up is not a no-op: the pod re-reads the config
   item from the vault as it starts, and it starts on whatever app version the
@@ -155,23 +234,27 @@ THE CONFIGURATION IS A 1PASSWORD ITEM, AND IT IS READ-ONLY IN THE CONTAINER
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} rollout restart statefulset/{{ $sfs }}
 
-BEHIND AN INGRESS, THE http BLOCK DECIDES BETWEEN 400 AND WRONG CLIENT IPs
-  Every request reaching Home Assistant through ingress-nginx arrives from the
-  controller's pod IP, not from the browser. The http-config field is where
-  that is dealt with, and both ways of getting it wrong are quiet in their own
-  way:
+BEHIND A PROXY, THE http BLOCK DECIDES BETWEEN 400 AND WRONG CLIENT IPs
+  Every request reaching Home Assistant through {{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}the Gateway{{ else }}ingress-nginx{{ end }} arrives from
+  {{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}its data-plane pod IP{{ else }}the controller's pod IP{{ end }}, not from the browser. The http-config field is
+  where that is dealt with, and both ways of getting it wrong are quiet in
+  their own way:
 
     use_x_forwarded_for: true without the proxy's address in trusted_proxies
     makes Home Assistant reject the request outright — the browser gets
     400 Bad Request and the log names the untrusted address it saw.
 
-    Neither setting at all means every client looks like the ingress
-    controller. Nothing fails; you simply get one address in the logbook for
+    Neither setting at all means every client looks like {{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}the Gateway{{ else }}the ingress
+    controller{{ end }}. Nothing fails; you simply get one address in the logbook for
     everyone, and Home Assistant's login-attempt ban then locks out all users
     at once because they share that address.
 
-  The value belongs to the ingress controller's POD network, not to the nodes
-  and not to the clients:
+  The value belongs to the {{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}GATEWAY's{{ else }}ingress controller's{{ end }} POD network, not to the nodes
+  and not to the clients{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }} — and switching from an Ingress to a Gateway CHANGES
+  that network, because a Gateway's data plane normally runs in a namespace of
+  its own. A trusted_proxies list carried over unchanged from Ingress mode
+  turns every request into a 400 if the pod CIDR differs, or silently keeps
+  attributing all clients to one address if it does not{{ end }}:
 
     use_x_forwarded_for: true
     trusted_proxies:
@@ -289,3 +372,55 @@ env IS APPENDED, AND HOME ASSISTANT WILL NOT READ IT ON ITS OWN
   value: a value is stored in the pod spec and readable by anyone who can read
   pods in {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
 {{- end }}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 8123 only — anything else this image or an add-on binds is not
+  reachable. THERE IS NO EGRESS RESTRICTION AT ALL, deliberately: outbound
+  traffic here is the union of every integration you enable (mDNS and SSDP
+  discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge, ESPHome, printers, speakers,
+  inverters, cloud APIs, NTP), a chart cannot know that set, and a cap would
+  break integrations one at a time — months apart, each looking like a flaky
+  device rather than like a policy. An installation that wants one should write
+  it at release level, against its own integration list.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app="{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}"
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

homeassistant/templates/homeassistant.httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+{{/*
+HTTPRoute - the Gateway-API alternative to homeassistant.ingress.yaml
+(Gitea #114), AND THE ONE CHART IN THE SWEEP WHERE THE CONVENTION HAD TO BEND
+RATHER THAN THE CHART.
+
+This chart is the DOCUMENTED INGRESS EXCEPTION (README): it keeps upstream's
+flexible ingress values - a LIST of hosts, each with its own LIST of paths,
+plus a separate tls list - instead of the repository's required
+domain/clusterIssuer pair. The exception stays. Nothing here unifies it, and
+the Gateway support is built on top of it rather than next to it.
+
+THIS CHART HAS NO ingress.domain, SO httpRoute HAS NO hostnames KEY
+
+That is the freesailarr precedent from group 2, and the reason is the same: a
+chart-global hostname list could not say which host entry - and therefore which
+set of paths - it belonged to. So the hostnames come from the values that
+already hold them, ingress.hosts[].host, and httpRoute carries only `enabled`
+and `parentRefs`. One HTTPRoute PER HOST ENTRY, with one rule per path of that
+entry, because an HTTPRoute's rules apply to every hostname of the object and
+this chart's whole point is that the paths may differ per host.
+
+ingress.hosts IS READ IN BOTH MODES, then, and it is not an "Ingress" value any
+more than ingress.domain is in the other charts - it is where this release's
+public names live. ingress.tls and ingress.className are NOT read here: the
+certificate and the class sit on the Gateway and its listeners and belong to
+the platform (decision 1 of #114). ingress.annotations is inert - the Gateway
+API has no annotation channel.
+
+Nothing was measured on the live cluster for this chart, because there is
+nothing to measure: homeassistant is NOT DEPLOYED in jk-cluster (checked
+2026-10-12 - 23 Ingress objects cluster-wide, none of them this chart's, and no
+workload of it in any namespace). So unlike its five siblings in this group it
+carries no operator-supplied annotation that this mode would drop. That is an
+absence of evidence about THIS installation, not a demonstration that the chart
+needs none: its ingress.annotations default is {} and the chart sets nothing
+itself, so whatever a future installation puts there would be dropped in this
+mode exactly as elsewhere.
+
+pathType HAS NO CLEAN COUNTERPART, AND THE CHART'S DEFAULT IS THE AWKWARD ONE
+
+Ingress pathType has three values; the Gateway API's path match types are
+Exact, PathPrefix and RegularExpression. The mapping:
+
+    Exact                  -> Exact
+    Prefix                 -> PathPrefix
+    ImplementationSpecific -> NOTHING. It means "ask the controller", so there
+                              is no value that preserves it.
+
+And ImplementationSpecific is this chart's DEFAULT (values.yaml,
+ingress.hosts[0].paths[0].pathType). Two rules therefore, and the split is not
+tidiness:
+
+  - On the path "/", ImplementationSpecific is rendered as PathPrefix. Every
+    controller treats a root ImplementationSpecific path as a prefix match, so
+    the two coincide and the chart's default works in this mode out of the box.
+  - On ANY OTHER path, ImplementationSpecific ABORTS THE RENDER. In
+    ingress-nginx - the class this chart defaults to - an
+    ImplementationSpecific non-root path is a REGEX, and PathPrefix is not a
+    regex. Mapping it silently would change matching behaviour while the render
+    stayed green, which is precisely the class of defect #118 was: a chart that
+    looks translated and routes differently. So the operator is asked to say
+    which of Exact or Prefix was meant.
+
+RegularExpression is deliberately NOT offered as an escape hatch: its support
+level is Implementation-specific, which would bind this chart to one Gateway
+implementation and is what decision 1 of #114 forbids.
+*/}}
+{{- /*
+Null-safe like every other block a template here dereferences (#99): an
+override written without children - "httpRoute:" with its keys deleted - is
+YAML null, and .Values.httpRoute.enabled would abort with a nil pointer.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- if and $httpRoute.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
+{{- fail "ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true - set exactly one of them. The Ingress and the HTTPRoutes would publish the same Service under the same hostnames over two different data paths, which is already a conflict at DNS level: one name, two addresses, and which one a client reaches is luck. For Home Assistant there is a second edge: it refuses requests whose Host header is not in its own trusted/allowed list and builds absolute URLs from it, so a client arriving over the other path can be rejected by the application rather than by the proxy. A migration runs over a DIFFERENT hostname - add a second entry to ingress.hosts and switch the modes once it answers - never over parallel operation of both." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $parentRefs := $httpRoute.parentRefs | default list -}}
+{{- if not $parentRefs -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but httpRoute.parentRefs is empty - an HTTPRoute without a parent attaches to no Gateway. It is created, it is schema-valid, and it routes NOTHING, with no event and no condition that says so; the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer. Name the cluster's Gateway, e.g. httpRoute.parentRefs: [{name: public, namespace: gateway}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $hosts := .Values.ingress.hosts | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hosts -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but ingress.hosts is empty - there is no hostname to publish and the release would render no route at all, silently. This chart has no ingress.domain (it is the documented ingress exception and keeps upstream's flexible host list), so ingress.hosts is where its public names live and it is read in BOTH modes. Set at least one entry, e.g. ingress.hosts: [{host: ha.example.com, paths: [{path: /, pathType: Prefix}]}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $first := true -}}
+{{- range $i, $entry := $hosts }}
+{{- $host := required "Every entry of ingress.hosts needs a host - an HTTPRoute with an empty hostname matches every request that reaches its listener, which on a shared Gateway means this release answers for hostnames belonging to other releases" $entry.host -}}
+{{- $paths := $entry.paths | default list -}}
+{{- if not $paths -}}
+{{- fail (printf "ingress.hosts[%d] (%s) has no paths - the HTTPRoute would carry no rules, and a route with no rules matches nothing while being perfectly valid and Accepted. Give it at least one, e.g. paths: [{path: /, pathType: Prefix}]" $i $host) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if not $first }}
+---
+{{- end }}
+{{- $first = false -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  {{- /*
+  ONE ROUTE PER HOST ENTRY, so the name has to carry the entry's identity. The
+  index and not the hostname: a hostname is not a legal object-name fragment
+  (dots are legal in a name but a 63-character label limit and the leading
+  "<release>-<chart>-" prefix are not something a hostname can be trusted to
+  fit), and a sanitised hostname would collide for two hosts differing only in
+  a character that sanitising removes. The index is stable for a given values
+  file, and REORDERING ingress.hosts THEREFORE RENAMES ROUTES - which deletes
+  and recreates them on the next upgrade rather than editing them. Harmless
+  here (a route carries no state and no certificate), and named so it is not a
+  surprise.
+  */}}
+  name: "{{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-httproute{{ if $i }}-{{ $i }}{{ end }}"
+  labels:
+    app: "{{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}"
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    - {{ $host | quote }}
+  rules:
+  {{- range $paths }}
+    {{- /*
+    pathType mapping, with the rule from the header: ImplementationSpecific -
+    this chart's default - becomes PathPrefix on "/" only, and aborts the
+    render on any other path rather than silently changing how it matches. An
+    absent pathType is treated the same way; note that pathType is a REQUIRED
+    field of networking.k8s.io/v1 Ingress, so an entry without it renders an
+    Ingress the API server rejects - a pre-existing gap of the Ingress
+    template, not something this one introduces.
+    */}}
+    {{- $given := .pathType | default "ImplementationSpecific" -}}
+    {{- $path := required "Every entry of ingress.hosts[].paths needs a path" .path -}}
+    {{- $type := "" -}}
+    {{- if eq $given "Exact" -}}
+    {{- $type = "Exact" -}}
+    {{- else if eq $given "Prefix" -}}
+    {{- $type = "PathPrefix" -}}
+    {{- else if eq $given "ImplementationSpecific" -}}
+    {{- if eq $path "/" -}}
+    {{- $type = "PathPrefix" -}}
+    {{- else -}}
+    {{- fail (printf "ingress.hosts[%d] (%s) has a path %q with pathType ImplementationSpecific, which has NO counterpart in the Gateway API - it means \"ask the controller\", and the Gateway API offers only Exact, PathPrefix and RegularExpression. On \"/\" the chart maps it to PathPrefix because every controller agrees there, but on a sub-path ImplementationSpecific is a REGEX in ingress-nginx (this chart's default class) and PathPrefix is not one, so mapping it would change how the path matches while the render stayed green. Say which you mean: pathType: Prefix or pathType: Exact. RegularExpression is deliberately not offered - its support level is Implementation-specific and would bind this chart to one Gateway implementation (decision 1 of Gitea #114)" $i $host $path) -}}
+    {{- end -}}
+    {{- else -}}
+    {{- fail (printf "ingress.hosts[%d] (%s) has a path %q with an unknown pathType %q - Ingress knows Exact, Prefix and ImplementationSpecific" $i $host $path $given) -}}
+    {{- end }}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: {{ $type }}
+            value: {{ $path | quote }}
+      backendRefs:
+          {{- /*
+          The port is the Service's port NUMBER and not its name "http":
+          backendRefs takes a PortNumber, so unlike the Ingress this reference
+          cannot be made by name. It comes from service.port, the same value
+          the Service renders, so the two cannot drift;
+          ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh holds the pair for the case where they
+          do.
+          */}}
+        - name: "{{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-service"
+          port: {{ $.Values.service.port | int64 }}
+  {{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}

homeassistant/templates/homeassistant.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for homeassistant (Gitea #5).
+
+INGRESS ONLY, AND THE MISSING EGRESS SECTION IS THE DECISION IN THIS FILE.
+
+Home Assistant's outbound traffic is the union of every integration an operator
+enables, and that set is unknowable to a chart: mDNS and SSDP discovery on
+5353/UDP and 1900/UDP, MQTT on 1883 or 8883, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on
+whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome on 6053, printers, speakers, TVs,
+inverters, cloud APIs on 443, an NTP client on 123/UDP. A port cap here would
+not protect anything meaningful - the devices are on the same LAN as the node -
+and it would break integrations ONE AT A TIME, months apart, each failure
+looking like a flaky device rather than like this object. There is no version
+of this list that stays correct.
+
+So the rule from valkey applies, in the other direction: policyTypes names only
+what there is something to restrict, because an egress rule that has to be
+widened until it permits everything makes the object look stricter than it is
+while costing real outages to get there. If a deployment wants an egress cap,
+it belongs in a release-level policy written against that installation's actual
+integrations - not in a chart that cannot see them.
+
+What the Ingress half still buys is real and worth having on its own: only 8123
+is reachable, so anything else this image or an add-on binds is not.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects this chart's workload. Note the label: the bare release-and-chart name,
+  QUOTED, with no -sfs suffix - unlike most charts here. Copying a selector from
+  a neighbouring chart would match nothing and leave this policy filtering
+  nothing, which is what ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh holds it against.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}"
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    8123 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service forwards 80 to, and
+    the port all three probes address. The probe path.
+
+    No ingress-controller entry: this chart keeps its flexible upstream ingress
+    style and renders no Ingress of its own (a documented exception in README),
+    so the sources to name are namespaces, through allowedNamespaces.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8123
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

homeassistant/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,30 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },
@@ -31,7 +55,7 @@
       }
     },
     "ingress": {
-      "description": "Documented exception (README): this chart keeps the upstream-style flexible ingress values - host and tls lists instead of the repo's required domain/clusterIssuer pair. The list entries go verbatim into the Ingress spec, so they stay open.",
+      "description": "Documented exception (README): this chart keeps the upstream-style flexible ingress values - host and tls lists instead of the repo's required domain/clusterIssuer pair. The list entries go verbatim into the Ingress spec, so they stay open. Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled (Gitea #114) - the render aborts when both are true.",
       "type": "object",
       "additionalProperties": false,
       "properties": {
@@ -39,20 +63,36 @@
           "type": "boolean"
         },
         "className": {
-          "description": "Set to \"\" to omit ingressClassName from the rendered Ingress.",
+          "description": "Set to \"\" to omit ingressClassName from the rendered Ingress. Not read in Gateway mode: the class is a property of the Gateway there, and the Gateway belongs to the platform.",
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "annotations": {
+          "description": "Not read in Gateway mode: the Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything set here is gone in that mode. The chart sets nothing itself.",
           "type": "object"
         },
         "hosts": {
+          "description": "The public names of this release, READ IN BOTH MODES - this chart has no ingress.domain, so there is no httpRoute.hostnames either and the hostnames live here. In Gateway mode the chart renders one HTTPRoute per entry, with one rule per path of that entry. pathType maps Exact to Exact and Prefix to PathPrefix; ImplementationSpecific (the default below) has no Gateway-API counterpart and is rendered as PathPrefix on \"/\" only - on any other path the render aborts rather than silently changing how the path matches, because in ingress-nginx an ImplementationSpecific sub-path is a regex. RegularExpression is not offered: its support level is Implementation-specific.",
           "type": ["array", "null"]
         },
         "tls": {
+          "description": "Not read in Gateway mode: the certificate sits on the Gateway's listener and belongs to the platform.",
           "type": ["array", "null"]
         }
       }
     },
+    "httpRoute": {
+      "description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true, naming both value paths. The chart renders only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. TWO KEYS ONLY, and the missing hostnames key is deliberate: this chart is the documented ingress exception and has no ingress.domain, so the hostnames and paths come from ingress.hosts and the chart renders ONE route per entry there (the freesailarr shape from group 2 of the sweep). Reordering ingress.hosts renames routes, which recreates rather than edits them - harmless, since a route holds no state. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them.",
+      "type": ["object", "null"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "parentRefs": {
+          "description": "The Gateway(s) every route of this release attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced by required()-equivalent in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged. The same list is used for every route; the hosts differ, the Gateway does not.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "securityContext": {
       "$ref": "#/definitions/securityContext"
     },
@@ -125,6 +165,11 @@
     }
   },
   "definitions": {
+    "parentRef": {
+      "description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["name"]
+    },
     "resources": {
       "description": "May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to its default requests and computed limits (issue #99) instead of rendering a container without resource accounting.",
       "type": ["object", "null"],

homeassistant/values.yaml

@@ -17,22 +17,106 @@ service:
 
 # This block is for setting up the ingress for more information can be found here: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/ingress/
 ingress:
+  # MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE WITH httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are
+  # true, and the message names both value paths.
   enabled: false
   # Ingress class; set to "" to omit ingressClassName from the rendered Ingress.
+  # NOT READ IN GATEWAY MODE: the class is a property of the Gateway there, and
+  # the Gateway belongs to the platform.
   className: nginx
+  # NOT READ IN GATEWAY MODE either, and this is the one to be aware of: the
+  # Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour, so
+  # everything put here is simply gone in that mode. This chart sets nothing
+  # itself, and the installation this repository serves does not deploy
+  # homeassistant at all (checked 2026-10-12), so there is no operator-supplied
+  # annotation here today that the switch would drop - unlike its siblings in
+  # the same sweep. That is an absence of evidence about this installation, not
+  # a guarantee about yours: whatever you put here disappears in Gateway mode.
   annotations: {}
     # kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx
     # kubernetes.io/tls-acme: "true"
+  # THE PUBLIC NAMES OF THIS RELEASE, AND READ IN BOTH MODES.
+  #
+  # This chart is the documented ingress exception (README): it keeps upstream's
+  # flexible host list rather than the repository's required
+  # domain/clusterIssuer pair, and that exception stays. The consequence for
+  # Gitea #114 is that httpRoute has NO hostnames key - a chart-global hostname
+  # list could not say which host entry, and therefore which set of paths, it
+  # belonged to. So this list is where the hostnames live in BOTH modes, and in
+  # Gateway mode the chart renders ONE HTTPRoute PER ENTRY, with one rule per
+  # path of that entry.
+  #
+  # pathType IN GATEWAY MODE, because the default below is the awkward value.
+  # Ingress has Exact, Prefix and ImplementationSpecific; the Gateway API has
+  # Exact, PathPrefix and RegularExpression. Exact and Prefix map cleanly.
+  # ImplementationSpecific means "ask the controller" and has NO counterpart,
+  # so:
+  #   - on the path "/" it is rendered as PathPrefix (every controller treats a
+  #     root ImplementationSpecific path as a prefix match, so the default
+  #     below works in Gateway mode unchanged);
+  #   - on ANY OTHER path the render ABORTS and asks you to say which you mean.
+  #     In ingress-nginx an ImplementationSpecific sub-path is a REGEX and
+  #     PathPrefix is not one, so mapping it silently would change how the path
+  #     matches while the render stayed green.
+  # RegularExpression is deliberately not offered: its support level is
+  # Implementation-specific and would bind this chart to one Gateway
+  # implementation.
   hosts:
     - host: chart-example.local
       paths:
         - path: /
           pathType: ImplementationSpecific
+  # NOT READ IN GATEWAY MODE: the certificate sits on the Gateway's listener.
   tls: []
   #  - secretName: chart-example-tls
   #    hosts:
   #      - chart-example.local
 
+# THE GATEWAY-API ALTERNATIVE TO THE INGRESS (Gitea #114).
+#
+# Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are
+# true. The chart renders ONLY HTTPRoutes with parentRefs: no Gateway, no
+# class, no Certificate, and no implementation-specific policy object. Class
+# and certificate sit on the Gateway and its listeners and belong to the
+# platform (cluster-config), which is what keeps the Gateway implementation
+# replaceable without touching this chart again.
+#
+# TWO KEYS ONLY, and the missing third one is deliberate: there is no
+# httpRoute.hostnames here, because this chart has no ingress.domain either.
+# The hostnames and the paths come from ingress.hosts above - see the comment
+# there, including the pathType mapping. This is the freesailarr shape from
+# group 2 of the sweep, for the same reason.
+#
+# ONE HTTPRoute PER ENTRY of ingress.hosts, named
+# <release>-homeassistant-httproute for the first and ...-httproute-<index> for
+# the rest. REORDERING ingress.hosts RENAMES ROUTES and so deletes and
+# recreates them on the next upgrade instead of editing them - harmless,
+# because a route holds no state and no certificate, but worth knowing before
+# it looks like a bug.
+#
+# THE GATEWAY-API CRDs MUST BE PRESENT. The chart cannot detect them
+# (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template time) and an HTTPRoute
+# without them fails at install, so this is a value and not a guess.
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: false
+
+  # The Gateway(s) EVERY route of this release attaches to - a platform object,
+  # usually in another namespace, whose listener must allow this namespace in
+  # allowedRoutes. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference (name, and
+  # optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group, kind), passed through
+  # unchanged:
+  #
+  #   parentRefs:
+  #     - name: public
+  #       namespace: gateway
+  #       sectionName: https
+  #
+  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
+  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
+  # nothing, with no event to say so. The same list is used for every route
+  # this chart renders; the hosts differ, the Gateway does not.
+  parentRefs: []
+
 # Documented deviation from the repo-wide hardening standard: the official
 # Home Assistant container must start as root — it boots via the s6-overlay
 # init system, which performs its setup as uid 0 (the image supports no
@@ -151,3 +235,56 @@ core:
 #   kubectl rollout restart statefulset <release>-homeassistant-sfs
 secrets:
   configSecretRef: null
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8123 only. THERE IS NO EGRESS SECTION, and
+  # that is the decision in this chart rather than an omission.
+  #
+  # Home Assistant's outbound traffic is the union of every integration enabled
+  # in a release: mDNS/SSDP discovery (5353/UDP, 1900/UDP), MQTT (1883/8883), a
+  # Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome (6053),
+  # printers, speakers, TVs, inverters, cloud APIs on 443, NTP on 123/UDP. A
+  # chart cannot know that set, a cap would protect little - the devices sit on
+  # the node's own LAN - and it would break integrations one at a time, months
+  # apart, each looking like a flaky device rather than like a policy. So
+  # policyTypes names Ingress only, for the same reason valkey names Ingress
+  # only: a rule that has to be widened until it permits everything makes the
+  # object look stricter than it is.
+  #
+  # An installation that wants an egress cap should write one against its own
+  # integrations, at release level, where they are visible.
+  #
+  # Inbound 8123 is not restricted by source in the default (probe port), and a
+  # policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8123, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []

keycloak/Chart.yaml

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ type: application
 # procedure lives in NOTES.txt and on the wiki page instead of in a
 # packageRules entry. Read the "MINOR UPGRADES" section of NOTES.txt before
 # merging an app-version PR that changes the minor.
-version: 1.1.0+up26.8.0
+version: 2.0.0+up26.8.0
 appVersion: "26.8.0"
 
 maintainers:

keycloak/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
+{{- /*
+NOTHING IN CI READS THIS FILE. `helm template` does not emit notes and no
+workflow or script under ci/ reads it, so every claim below carries
+review-only assurance - it is checked by being read, not by a stage. A
+rendering ERROR here does fail `helm template`, which is all the pipeline can
+see of it.
+*/ -}}
 {{- $settings := fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" .) -}}
 {{- $replicas := int (include "keycloak.replicas" (dict "scaleDown" .Values.scaleDown "replicas" .Values.keycloak.replicas)) -}}
 {{- $adminHostname := eq (include "keycloak.adminHostnameEnabled" .) "true" -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $httpRouteAdmin := $httpRoute.admin | default dict -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list .Values.ingress.domain -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $adminHostnames := $httpRouteAdmin.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $adminHostnames -}}
+{{- $adminHostnames = list (.Values.ingress.admin | default dict).domain -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $realmHosts := (fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" .)).realmHosts | default list -}}
 {{- $deploy := printf "%s-%s-deployment" .Release.Name .Chart.Name -}}
 {{- $svc := printf "%s-%s-service" .Release.Name .Chart.Name -}}
 Keycloak {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} installed as release {{ .Release.Name }} in namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
@@ -8,19 +26,154 @@ Keycloak {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} installed as release {{ .Release.Name }} in nam
 {{ $replicas }} replica(s), cache=ispn with jdbc-ping discovery over the database,
 external PostgreSQL at {{ $settings.db.host | default "<keycloak.db.host NOT SET>" }}:{{ $settings.db.port | int64 }}/{{ $settings.db.database }}.
 
-ENDPOINTS
+ENDPOINTS - {{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false){{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }}GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false){{ else }}NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE{{ end }}
 {{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }}  Public:  {{ include "keycloak.frontendUrl" . }}
-{{ else }}  Public:  no Ingress (ingress.enabled: false) - in-cluster only
-{{ end }}{{ if $adminHostname }}  Admin:   {{ include "keycloak.adminUrl" . }}/admin
-{{ else }}  Admin:   no admin hostname (ingress.admin.enabled: false) - the console is
+{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }}{{ range $hostnames }}  Public:  https://{{ . }}
+{{ end }}{{ else }}  Public:  no Ingress and no HTTPRoute (ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are
+           both false) - in-cluster only
+{{ end }}{{ if not $adminHostname }}  Admin:   no admin hostname (ingress.admin.enabled: false) - the console is
            served on the public host and Keycloak generates its URLs for it
+{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }}{{ range $adminHostnames }}  Admin:   https://{{ . }}/admin
+{{ end }}{{ else if .Values.ingress.enabled }}  Admin:   {{ include "keycloak.adminUrl" . }}/admin
+{{ else }}  Admin:   {{ include "keycloak.adminUrl" . }}/admin is what KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN says, and
+           NOTHING PUBLISHES IT. ingress.admin.enabled is true, so the console
+           still generates its URLs for that host, but with both modes off
+           there is no Ingress and no HTTPRoute to carry it. Use the
+           port-forward below, or switch a mode on.
 {{ end }}  In-cluster: http://{{ $svc }}.{{ .Release.Namespace }}.svc.cluster.local:{{ $settings.ports.http | int64 }}
 
   Management port {{ $settings.ports.management | int64 }} is NOT published and must never be: it serves
   /health, /health/live, /health/ready, /health/started{{ if $settings.metrics.enabled }} and /metrics{{ end }}
   WITHOUT authentication. It has a ClusterIP Service
   ({{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-management-service) for in-cluster scraping only.
+{{ if $realmHosts }}
+REALM HOSTNAMES - {{ len $realmHosts }} further name(s), each landing in ONE realm
 
+  The object names carry the LIST INDEX and not the realm, so this is the only
+  place that says which is which. Reordering keycloak.realmHosts therefore
+  renames these objects and recreates them.
+{{ range $i, $entry := $realmHosts }}
+    https://{{ $entry.host }}
+      realm      {{ $entry.realm }}  (bare / -> /realms/{{ $entry.realm }}/account/)
+      object     {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-realm-{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}httproute{{ else }}ingress{{ end }}{{ if $i }}-{{ $i }}{{ end }}
+{{- if not $httpRoute.enabled }}
+      cert       {{ $entry.tlsSecretName }}{{ if $entry.clusterIssuer }}, requested by THIS object ({{ $entry.clusterIssuer }}){{ else }}, NOT requested by this object - it must already exist or be issued elsewhere{{ end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{ end }}
+{{- /*
+No "and nothing publishes them" branch here, deliberately: a filled
+keycloak.realmHosts with both modes off ABORTS the render in
+keycloak.ingress.yaml, so this block can only ever be reached with a mode on.
+A branch for an impossible state reads like a state somebody has seen.
+*/ -}}
+{{- end }}
+{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}
+GATEWAY MODE - WHAT THIS CHART DOES NOT RENDER, AND WHAT YOU MUST SET YOURSELF
+
+  This release renders {{ add (ternary 2 1 $adminHostname) (len $realmHosts) }} HTTPRoute(s) and NOTHING else of the routing path -
+  no Gateway, no class, no Certificate, no policy object.
+
+    {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute         {{ join ", " $hostnames }}
+{{- if $adminHostname }}
+    {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-admin-httproute   {{ join ", " $adminHostnames }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- range $i, $entry := $realmHosts }}
+    {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-realm-httproute{{ if $i }}-{{ $i }}{{ end }}   {{ $entry.host }}   (realm {{ $entry.realm }})
+{{- end }}
+
+  Three things therefore belong to the cluster, and if any is missing the
+  hostnames above simply do not answer:
+
+    1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed, so
+       they are present - nothing to check.
+    2. The Gateway(s) named in parentRefs
+{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}   (public)
+{{- end }}
+{{- if $adminHostname }}
+{{- range ($httpRouteAdmin.parentRefs | default $httpRoute.parentRefs) }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}   (admin)
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- range $i, $entry := $realmHosts }}
+{{- range ($entry.parentRefs | default $httpRoute.parentRefs) }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}   (realm {{ $entry.realm }})
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+       must exist AND their listeners must allow routes from this namespace
+       ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment is visible only
+       in the route's status:
+
+         kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
+
+       Read status.parents[].conditions - "Accepted: True" and
+       "ResolvedRefs: True" is what a working attachment looks like. An empty
+       status means no controller has looked at the route at all.
+    3. The TLS certificates for those hostnames, on the Gateway's listeners.
+       ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required: the
+       chart renders no Certificate here, so there is no
+       tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress secret and nothing for cert-manager to do
+       for this release.
+{{- if $realmHosts }}
+       The realm hostnames above are part of that: their tlsSecretName values
+       are not read in this mode either. Where several of them share a DNS zone,
+       ONE wildcard listener for that zone replaces one certificate per name -
+       which is the one thing this mode makes cheaper here rather than dearer.
+{{- end }}
+
+  AND THE ONE YOU WILL NOT NOTICE UNTIL A LOGIN FAILS: THE PROXY BUFFERS.
+
+  Keycloak's responses carry large headers - JWTs, SAML assertions, long
+  Set-Cookie chains during the login flow. In Ingress mode that is handled by
+
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size:    16k
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffers-number: 4
+
+  which this chart has never set: they come from ingress.annotations and
+  ingress.admin.annotations, i.e. from whoever installs it. IN THIS MODE THEY
+  ARE GONE and there is NO counterpart in the Gateway API - buffer sizing is
+  implementation policy, not routing, and this chart renders no policy object
+  on purpose (it would bind the chart to one Gateway implementation).
+
+  The failure mode, so you recognise it: the PROXY answers 502 while Keycloak
+  logs the request as successful. Nothing says a chart value was ignored,
+  because no chart value was involved. Set the equivalent next to the Gateway,
+  in your implementation's own object, BEFORE you point DNS at it - and raise
+  it, do not just match 16k, if you use long-lived tokens or SAML.
+
+  ingress.annotations and ingress.admin.annotations are inert here in general:
+  the Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour. An IP
+  allow-list for the admin host is the other thing that has to move - and read
+  the first trap below before relying on it in either mode.
+{{ if $realmHosts }}
+  AND THE SAME LOSS ONCE MORE, ON THE REALM HOSTNAMES - where it is likelier to
+  be met rather than merely possible.
+
+  Each entry of keycloak.realmHosts carries its own annotations block in Ingress
+  mode, and in this mode every one of them is gone: {{ len $realmHosts }} hostname(s) here, none
+  of which can configure a proxy buffer through this chart any more. What the
+  entries CAN still express is the routing - the redirect into the realm is a
+  rule of the route and survives the mode change intact.
+
+  Why these hostnames are the awkward ones: they exist to put somebody in an
+  ACCOUNT CONSOLE. That is a logged-in session from the first request after the
+  redirect, so the large Authorization and Set-Cookie headers are the normal
+  traffic on these names rather than an edge case the way they are on a login
+  host that mostly serves anonymous requests. A buffer sized for the default
+  therefore fails here FIRST, and it fails as a 502 from the Gateway on a
+  hostname whose Ingress never had a chart value to point at - so there is
+  nothing to grep for and nothing to un-set.
+
+  Set the buffer equivalent for these hostnames too, in the Gateway
+  implementation's own object, and set it before the names resolve there.
+{{- end }}
+
+  THE ADMIN HOSTNAME'S "INTERNAL CLASS" MOVES TO THE PARENT. What
+  ingress.admin.className does in the other mode, httpRoute.admin.parentRefs
+  does here: point the admin route at an internal Gateway. It falls back to
+  httpRoute.parentRefs, so leaving it empty puts both hostnames on the same
+  Gateway.
+{{ end }}
 THE 1PASSWORD ITEMS, AND WHICH FIELDS THEY MUST CARRY
 The operator materializes one Secret key per item FIELD, so a missing or
 misnamed field leaves the pod in CreateContainerConfigError - with no message
@@ -61,7 +214,7 @@ FIRST INSTALL - AND STEP 4 IS MANDATORY, NOT ADVICE
      jdbc-ping did not find the peer - check that both pods can reach each
      other on port {{ $settings.ports.jgroups | int64 }} and that they really share one database.
 
-  3. Log in at {{ if $adminHostname }}{{ include "keycloak.adminUrl" . }}/admin{{ else if .Values.ingress.enabled }}{{ include "keycloak.frontendUrl" . }}/admin{{ else }}the in-cluster address, port-forwarded{{ end }}
+  3. Log in at {{ if and $adminHostname (not $httpRoute.enabled) }}{{ include "keycloak.adminUrl" . }}/admin{{ else if $adminHostname }}https://{{ first $adminHostnames }}/admin{{ else if .Values.ingress.enabled }}{{ include "keycloak.frontendUrl" . }}/admin{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }}https://{{ first $hostnames }}/admin{{ else }}the in-cluster address, port-forwarded{{ end }}
      with the bootstrap credentials from the vault item above.
 
   4. CREATE A PERMANENT ADMINISTRATOR, then remove the temporary one.
@@ -132,7 +285,10 @@ TRAPS WORTH KNOWING BEFORE YOU NEED THEM
     on the reverse proxy level." So /admin/realms/... is reachable through the
     public host whatever you put on the admin host, and an IP allow-list on the
     admin Ingress restricts nothing on its own. This chart renders no deny rule
-    for /admin - see values.yaml for why not.
+    for /admin - see values.yaml for why not.{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }} In GATEWAY MODE there is not
+    even a place in this chart to put one: no annotation channel, and no
+    implementation-specific policy object by design. The restriction belongs
+    next to the Gateway, which is where it can also be tested.{{ end }}
 
   - A SHARED DATABASE MERGES TWO CLUSTERS. Node discovery runs through the
     database, so - upstream - "clusters that share the same database but should
@@ -200,5 +356,87 @@ WHAT THIS CHART DOES NOT RENDER
   - No NetworkPolicy. jdbc-ping opens direct pod-to-pod connections on port
     {{ $settings.ports.jgroups | int64 }}, so any policy added later has to allow that between the
     replicas, or the cluster silently becomes two islands.
-  - No deny rule for /admin on the public Ingress, and no restriction of the
-    administration REST API. That is reverse-proxy work - see the first trap.
+  - No deny rule for /admin on the public Ingress{{ if $httpRoute.enabled }} or route{{ end }}, and no restriction of
+    the administration REST API. That is reverse-proxy work - see the first
+    trap.
+  - No Gateway, no GatewayClass and no listener, in either mode. Those are
+    platform objects and live in cluster-config; this chart renders an
+    HTTPRoute at most, which is the part that looks the same on every Gateway
+    implementation.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound, and all three ports differ:
+    - http ({{ $settings.ports.http | int64 }}): RESTRICTED BY SOURCE — this namespace, anything in
+      networkPolicy.allowedNamespaces, and the ingress controller. No probe uses
+      this port, which is what makes the restriction possible.
+    - management ({{ $settings.ports.management | int64 }}): open inside the cluster, because all three probes
+      address it. Its health and metrics surface is UNAUTHENTICATED, and before
+      this object the only thing protecting it was that no Ingress pointed at
+      it. Narrow it with networkPolicy.probeSources.
+    - jgroups ({{ $settings.ports.jgroups | int64 }}): this release's own pods only.
+  Outbound: DNS, TCP {{ $settings.db.port | int64 }} (the CONFIGURED database port — this chart derives it
+  rather than guessing), {{ $settings.ports.jgroups | int64 }} (the cluster bus, outbound as well as in) and 443{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }},
+  plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+
+  TWO THINGS TO CHECK AFTER THE FIRST UPGRADE, because nothing else will.
+
+  1. LOG IN. This release is the cluster's identity provider, and the http rule
+     is the only source-restricted inbound rule in the repository. If the
+     ingress-controller source is wrong for this cluster, every login
+     everywhere stops — and no part of CI can see it, because no ingress
+     controller runs there and the probes use the management port, so the pod
+     becomes Ready either way. The default was measured against the live
+     cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which serves the Gateway
+     API here too), but measured labels are not proven traffic.
+  2. CHECK YOUR CONSUMERS' ISSUER URLS. An application that reaches Keycloak on
+     its in-cluster Service address rather than its public URL is a pod in
+     another namespace, and the http rule blocks it. Those namespaces go into
+     networkPolicy.allowedNamespaces. Consumers using the public issuer URL
+     arrive through Traefik and are already covered.
+
+  AND MAIL IS NOT ALLOWED. Keycloak's SMTP server is configured per realm,
+  which this chart never sees, so verification and password-reset mail needs its
+  port (587 or 465) in networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts. The symptom otherwise is
+  mail that is never delivered, with a healthy pod behind it.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

keycloak/templates/_helpers.tpl

@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ Usage: {{ $settings := fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" .) }}
       "features" (list)
       "cache" (dict "clusterName" nil)
       "ports" (dict "http" 8080 "management" 9000 "jgroups" 7800)
-      "podDisruptionBudget" (dict "enabled" true "minAvailable" 1) -}}
+      "podDisruptionBudget" (dict "enabled" true "minAvailable" 1)
+      "realmHosts" (list) -}}
 {{- include "keycloak.defaultedDict" (dict "defaults" $defaults "given" $given "path" "keycloak") -}}
 {{- end -}}
 
@@ -342,6 +343,104 @@ true
 {{- end -}}
 {{- end -}}
 
+{{/*
+THE REALM HOSTNAMES (Gitea #122) - validated here once, rendered twice.
+
+WHAT THEY ARE. Keycloak serves every realm from one deployment, and a realm's
+account console lives at /realms/<realm>/account/. A realm therefore gets a
+hostname of its own by publishing THIS release's Service under that name and
+sending the bare / to that path. The list is keycloak.realmHosts, it defaults
+to empty, and an empty list renders nothing in either mode - the feature is
+additive and the default render is byte-identical without it.
+
+WHY THE VALIDATION IS SHARED AND NOT PER TEMPLATE. The same list feeds the
+Ingress and the HTTPRoute template, so a check written in one of them is a check
+that does not exist in the other mode - and the failure these checks are about
+is a hostname that resolves, answers, and serves the wrong thing or nothing at
+all. None of it is loud: an entry without a realm would render an Ingress whose
+app-root annotation reads "/realms//account/", an entry without a host would
+render an object with an empty host that ingress-nginx treats as a CATCH-ALL for
+the whole controller, and an entry without a tlsSecretName would render a TLS
+block with no secret, which serves the controller's default certificate and
+fails in the browser only.
+
+THE MODE DECIDES WHICH FIELDS ARE LOAD-BEARING, which is why it is a parameter
+rather than read from the values here: tlsSecretName and annotations are Ingress
+fields with no counterpart in the Gateway API (see keycloak.httproute.yaml), and
+parentRefs is the other way round. A field demanded in a mode that ignores it is
+the defect guideline 12 exists to remove, so each is required only where it is
+read.
+
+Input:  dict "root" <the root context> "mode" "ingress"|"gateway"
+Output: YAML of dict "entries" <the entries, as given, after validation>
+*/}}
+{{- define "keycloak.realmHosts" -}}
+{{- $root := .root -}}
+{{- $mode := .mode -}}
+{{- $entries := (fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" $root)).realmHosts | default list -}}
+{{- if not (kindIs "slice" $entries) -}}
+{{- fail (printf "keycloak.realmHosts must be a list or null, got %s (%v). One entry per realm hostname, each a mapping of host and realm plus the fields its routing mode reads - see values.yaml." (kindOf $entries) $entries) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $ingress := $root.Values.ingress | default dict -}}
+{{- $ingressAdmin := $ingress.admin | default dict -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := $root.Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- /*
+THE HOSTNAMES THIS RELEASE ALREADY CLAIMS, collected so that a realm entry
+cannot claim one of them a second time. Both modes punish it, differently and
+neither of them clearly: under ingress-nginx the admission webhook rejects the
+SECOND Ingress on the same host and path - which under Fleet leaves the bundle
+in ErrApplied until forceSyncGeneration is raised - while two HTTPRoutes on one
+listener and one hostname are MERGED by the implementation, so the duplicate is
+accepted and which of the two identical rules serves a request is decided by
+object age. The first is a deployment that stops, the second is a coin toss that
+looks healthy.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $claimed := dict -}}
+{{- if $ingress.domain -}}
+{{- $_ := set $claimed (toString $ingress.domain) "ingress.domain, this release's public hostname" -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if and (eq (include "keycloak.adminHostnameEnabled" $root) "true") $ingressAdmin.domain -}}
+{{- $_ := set $claimed (toString $ingressAdmin.domain) "ingress.admin.domain, the administration console's hostname" -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if eq $mode "gateway" -}}
+{{- range ($httpRoute.hostnames | default list) -}}
+{{- $_ := set $claimed (toString .) "httpRoute.hostnames, the public route's explicit hostname list" -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- range (($httpRoute.admin | default dict).hostnames | default list) -}}
+{{- $_ := set $claimed (toString .) "httpRoute.admin.hostnames, the admin route's explicit hostname list" -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $seen := dict -}}
+{{- range $i, $entry := $entries -}}
+{{- $at := printf "keycloak.realmHosts[%d]" $i -}}
+{{- if not (kindIs "map" $entry) -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s must be a mapping with at least host and realm, got %s (%v). The list is a list of entries, not of hostnames - the realm cannot be derived from the hostname, and this installation is the proof: id.klein.pub serves the realm klein-family." $at (kindOf $entry) $entry) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $host := toString ($entry.host | default "") -}}
+{{- $realm := toString ($entry.realm | default "") -}}
+{{- if not $host -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s has no host (its realm is %q). An Ingress rule or an HTTPRoute without a hostname is not an error in either API: ingress-nginx treats the empty host as a CATCH-ALL and the object then answers every name the controller serves that nothing else claims, while an HTTPRoute with an empty hostnames list attaches to every hostname of its listener. Both publish this realm's account console across hostnames nobody chose. Set %s.host." $at $realm $at) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if not $realm -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s (host %s) has no realm. The realm is the whole point of the entry - it is what the bare / redirects to - and without it the redirect target would read /realms//account/, which Keycloak answers 404 while the hostname, the certificate and the route are all healthy. Set %s.realm, and read it off the realm in Keycloak rather than off the hostname: the two need not match, and in this installation they do not." $at $host $at) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if contains "/" $realm -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s has realm %q, which contains a slash. The value is interpolated into the URL path /realms/<realm>/account/, so a slash does not escape it - it silently retargets the redirect at a different path. Use the realm's name as Keycloak shows it." $at $realm) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if hasKey $seen $host -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s repeats the host %s, already used by keycloak.realmHosts[%v]. Two entries on one hostname render two objects with the same hostname and the same path: in Ingress mode the admission webhook rejects the second, in Gateway mode both are accepted and merged and the redirect a client gets - so the realm it lands in - depends on which object is older. Give each realm its own hostname, or drop the duplicate entry." $at $host (index $seen $host)) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $_ := set $seen $host $i -}}
+{{- if hasKey $claimed $host -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s claims the host %s, which this release already publishes through %s. One hostname cannot carry both: a realm entry sends the bare / to /realms/%s/account/, and the hostname it collides with serves the login endpoints or the administration console at / instead. Pick a hostname of its own for the realm - that is what the feature is for - or publish the realm through the existing host without this entry." $at $host (index $claimed $host) $realm) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if and (eq $mode "ingress") (not (toString ($entry.tlsSecretName | default ""))) -}}
+{{- fail (printf "%s (host %s) has no tlsSecretName, and in Ingress mode it is required. Unlike this chart's own two Ingresses the realm objects do NOT get the conventional tls-<release>-keycloak-ingress name: these hostnames live on certificates that already exist - a wildcard covering several of them, or one per name - and letting the chart invent a secret name per entry would ask cert-manager for a SECOND certificate for a name that is already covered, which costs an ACME order per host and buys nothing. So the name is operator data and has to be given. If the certificate is to be issued for this entry, name a secret of its own here and set %s.clusterIssuer as well." $at $host $at) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- toYaml (dict "entries" $entries) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+
 {{/*
 The effective security contexts, probes and resources (issue #99).
 

keycloak/templates/keycloak.httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+{{/*
+HTTPRoute - the Gateway-API alternative to keycloak.ingress.yaml (Gitea #114).
+TWO ROUTES, because this chart has TWO Ingress objects: the public hostname and
+the admin hostname. Read keycloak.ingress.yaml first - everything it says about
+what the admin hostname is NOT (it is not an access control) holds here
+unchanged, and the Gateway API gives no new way to make it one.
+
+WHAT THIS RENDERS, AND WHAT IT MUST NOT
+
+Only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs. No Gateway, no gatewayClassName, no
+Certificate, no implementation-specific policy object. That subset is identical
+on nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway and Istio, which is the whole
+point (decision 1 of #114). Class and certificate therefore belong to the
+PLATFORM, on the Gateway and its listeners, in cluster-config.
+
+WHAT ingress.admin.className BECOMES, AND WHY THERE IS AN admin BLOCK HERE
+
+The admin Ingress exists so the console can sit on an INTERNAL ingress class or
+in a different DNS zone (ingress.admin.className, falling back to
+ingress.className). "Which data path" is a property of the Gateway in this API,
+not of the route, so its counterpart is the PARENT: httpRoute.admin.parentRefs,
+falling back to httpRoute.parentRefs exactly as the class does. Without that
+fallback the admin route could only ever hang off the same Gateway as the public
+one, and the one useful half of the second hostname would be gone in this mode.
+
+THE ANNOTATIONS THIS MODE DROPS ARE NOT HYPOTHETICAL FOR THIS CHART
+
+Measured on the live cluster on 2026-10-12, on BOTH of this chart's Ingress
+objects (jk-cluster/keycloak):
+
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size:    16k
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffers-number: 4
+
+The CHART sets neither - they are operator-supplied, through
+ingress.annotations and ingress.admin.annotations, which is why a reader of
+this repository alone would never find them. They are also not cosmetic:
+Keycloak's responses carry large headers (JWTs, SAML assertions, long Set-Cookie
+chains on the login flow), and a proxy whose buffer is too small answers 502
+ITSELF. The failure then looks like Keycloak being broken while Keycloak logged
+a perfectly successful request.
+
+ingress.annotations and ingress.admin.annotations are INERT in this mode - the
+Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour, and buffer
+sizing has no counterpart in the specification at all; it is implementation
+policy. So the Gateway branch of NOTES.txt NAMES it instead of rebuilding it
+(decision 2 of #114). Whoever migrates this host sets the equivalent next to
+the Gateway, in that implementation's own object.
+
+THE REALM ROUTES, AND WHY THERE IS ONE OBJECT PER ENTRY (Gitea #122)
+
+keycloak.realmHosts publishes further hostnames onto the SAME Service, each
+sending the bare / to one realm's account console. Empty by default, so this
+block renders nothing unless an installation fills it.
+
+ONE OBJECT PER ENTRY, never one object with several hostnames. spec.hostnames
+applies to the WHOLE object and a rule's matches are path-based, so the realm
+could not be told apart inside a shared route: all entries would match
+`Exact: /` and whichever rule the implementation picked would send every
+hostname to the same realm. The count is therefore data-driven, which is also
+why the object names are INDEX-based (style guide §4, as homeassistant does it)
+- a realm name is not a dependable object-name fragment and a sanitised one can
+collide. The consequence, written down rather than discovered: REORDERING THE
+LIST RENAMES ROUTES, so they are recreated rather than edited. A route holds no
+state and no certificate, which is what makes that acceptable; the TLS secret
+the Ingress mode references is not the chart's and survives untouched either
+way.
+
+TWO RULES PER OBJECT, AND THE REDIRECT IS AN EXACT MATCH. The Ingress
+counterpart is nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/app-root, which ingress-nginx renders
+as `if ($uri = /) { return 302 $scheme://$http_host<app-root>; }`
+(rootfs/etc/nginx/template/nginx.tmpl:1000, controller-v1.14.5) - a 302 on
+exactly /, and everything else proxied unchanged. So: an Exact match on / with a
+RequestRedirect to /realms/<realm>/account/, plus the ordinary PathPrefix rule
+on the Service. The Exact rule wins on / by the specification's precedence
+("Exact" path match ahead of prefix matches) INDEPENDENTLY of its position in
+the list, so the order below is a rendering convention and not a promise anyone
+has to rely on.
+
+statusCode IS WRITTEN OUT, at the value the field already defaults to. 301 and
+302 are both Support: Core here, so the portability trap of #119 - an
+implementation declining an Extended status code sets Accepted: False on the
+WHOLE route, taking its other hostnames down with it - does not apply. The
+reason to write it anyway: ingress-nginx emits 302 and a value that is merely
+accidentally right documents nothing.
+
+WHAT THE REALM ENTRIES LOSE IN THIS MODE is the per-entry annotations block,
+and for three of the four hostnames this installation runs today that means the
+proxy buffers - see the paragraph above, which is about the same loss on this
+chart's own two objects. It is worse here than there in one respect only: these
+hostnames serve ACCOUNT CONSOLE sessions, so the large-header case is the
+normal case rather than the edge, and the 502 arrives from the proxy on a
+hostname whose Ingress never had a chart value to point at.
+
+ingress.clusterIssuer and the entries' tlsSecretName are not read in this mode:
+the certificates for these hostnames sit on the Gateway's listeners, where a
+wildcard listener covers whole zones at once.
+*/}}
+{{- /*
+Null-safe like every other block a template here dereferences (#99): an
+override written without children - "httpRoute:" with its keys deleted - is
+YAML null, and .Values.httpRoute.enabled would abort with a nil pointer.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $settings := fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" .) -}}
+{{- $adminEnabled := eq (include "keycloak.adminHostnameEnabled" .) "true" -}}
+{{- if and $httpRoute.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
+{{- fail "ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true - set exactly one of them. The Ingress and the HTTPRoute would publish the same Service under the same hostname over two different data paths, which is already a conflict at DNS level: one name, two addresses, and which one a client reaches is luck. For Keycloak it is worse than for a stateless app, because the server derives KC_HOSTNAME from ingress.domain and generates absolute redirect and asset URLs for it - a login that starts on one path and finishes on the other fails on the state cookie, not with an error that names the cause. A migration runs over a SECOND hostname (set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain), never over parallel operation of both." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $admin := $httpRoute.admin | default dict -}}
+{{- $parentRefs := $httpRoute.parentRefs | default list -}}
+{{- if not $parentRefs -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but httpRoute.parentRefs is empty - an HTTPRoute without a parent attaches to no Gateway. It is created, it is schema-valid, and it routes NOTHING, with no event and no condition that says so; the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer. Name the cluster's Gateway, e.g. httpRoute.parentRefs: [{name: public, namespace: gateway}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $realmHosts := (fromYaml (include "keycloak.realmHosts" (dict "root" . "mode" "gateway"))).entries -}}
+{{- /*
+One source of truth for the hostname: an empty httpRoute.hostnames means
+[ingress.domain]. Two values that have to agree drift apart. ingress.domain is
+required in EVERY mode in this chart and its required() lives in the
+keycloak.frontendUrl helper, because the Deployment reads it as KC_HOSTNAME -
+guideline 12.1, and the reason this chart's value cannot be gated away. The
+required() below is therefore a second, redundant guard rather than the only
+one; it stays so the message names the route when the route is what is missing
+a hostname.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list (required "A Domain/Host must be provided: set ingress.domain (used as the public HTTPRoute's single hostname when httpRoute.hostnames is empty) or set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly" .Values.ingress.domain) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    {{- toYaml $hostnames | nindent 4 }}
+  rules:
+      {{- /*
+      The Ingress counterpart is `path: / , pathType: Prefix` on the serving
+      Service. The port is the Service's port NUMBER and not its name "http":
+      backendRefs takes a PortNumber, so unlike the Ingress this reference
+      cannot be made by name. It is read from the same settings helper the
+      Service renders its port from, so the two cannot drift;
+      ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh holds the pair for the case where they do.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.http | int64 }}
+{{- if $adminEnabled }}
+---
+{{- /*
+The admin route. Gated on ingress.admin.enabled, the same switch the admin
+Ingress uses, because that value is not an Ingress switch: it also decides
+whether KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN is set on the Deployment, i.e. whether the admin
+hostname is in play AT ALL. So it stays mode-independent and the ROUTING
+OBJECT follows the mode - which is also why switching to Gateway mode must not
+require setting it to false.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $adminHostnames := $admin.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $adminHostnames -}}
+{{- $adminHostnames = list (required "An admin Domain/Host must be provided while ingress.admin.enabled is true: set ingress.admin.domain (used as the admin HTTPRoute's single hostname when httpRoute.admin.hostnames is empty) or set httpRoute.admin.hostnames explicitly" ((.Values.ingress.admin | default dict).domain)) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-admin-httproute
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Its own parent, falling back to the public one - the counterpart of
+  ingress.admin.className falling back to ingress.className. An internal
+  Gateway here is the useful half of the admin hostname, and still not the
+  access control keycloak.ingress.yaml is about.
+  */}}
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml ($admin.parentRefs | default $parentRefs) | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    {{- toYaml $adminHostnames | nindent 4 }}
+  rules:
+      {{- /*
+      The SAME backend and the same path as the public route. The
+      administration console is not a separate application and not a separate
+      path - only the hostname differs, and Keycloak generates its admin URLs
+      for that hostname because of KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.http | int64 }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- range $i, $entry := $realmHosts }}
+---
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  {{- /*
+  INDEX-BASED, like homeassistant's per-host routes and for the same reason
+  (style guide §4): the count is data-driven and a realm name is not a
+  dependable object-name fragment - the 63-character label limit plus the
+  release prefix, and a sanitised name can collide with another entry's. The
+  price is that reordering keycloak.realmHosts RENAMES these routes, so they are
+  recreated rather than edited. Which hostname and which realm each index
+  carries is printed by NOTES.txt, because the name does not say.
+  */}}
+  name: "{{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-realm-httproute{{ if $i }}-{{ $i }}{{ end }}"
+  labels:
+    app: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-deployment
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Its own parent, falling back to the chart-global one - the same shape as
+  httpRoute.admin.parentRefs. It is not decoration here: these hostnames sit in
+  several DNS zones, so a Gateway that terminates them needs either a wildcard
+  listener per zone or a named listener per host, and a chart-global parentRef
+  pinning one sectionName would attach every realm route to one certificate's
+  listener. A route whose listener does not match its hostname is not an error
+  either - it is simply not accepted, and the hostname does not answer.
+  */}}
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml ($entry.parentRefs | default $parentRefs) | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    - {{ $entry.host | quote }}
+  rules:
+      {{- /*
+      RULE ONE, the counterpart of nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/app-root. Exact
+      on / so that only the bare entry point is redirected and every other path
+      - the realm's own endpoints, its assets, the token endpoints - continues
+      to be proxied by rule two. Exact outranks every prefix match in the
+      specification's precedence, so this rule wins on / wherever it is emitted.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: Exact
+            value: /
+      filters:
+        - type: RequestRedirect
+          requestRedirect:
+            path:
+              type: ReplaceFullPath
+              replaceFullPath: {{ printf "/realms/%s/account/" $entry.realm | quote }}
+            {{- /*
+            Written out at the field's own default. 301 and 302 are both
+            Support: Core, so the trap of #119 - an implementation declining an
+            Extended code sets Accepted: False on the WHOLE route - is not in
+            play; ingress-nginx emits 302 for app-root, and a value that is only
+            accidentally right documents nothing.
+            */}}
+            statusCode: 302
+      {{- /*
+      RULE TWO: the same Service, the same port and the same prefix as the
+      public route. These hostnames are not a second application - they are the
+      same Keycloak under a name that lands in one realm.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-service
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.http | int64 }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}

keycloak/templates/keycloak.ingress.yaml

@@ -29,8 +29,58 @@ time outside this template - as KC_HOSTNAME on the Deployment - so it stays
 required even with ingress.enabled: false, and its required() lives in the
 keycloak.frontendUrl helper rather than here. clusterIssuer is read only in
 this file, so switching both Ingresses off frees it.
+
+BOTH OBJECTS HANG OFF ingress.enabled, AND THE ADMIN ONE DID NOT USED TO
+(fixed with the Gateway-API support, Gitea #114). ingress.admin.enabled is NOT
+an Ingress switch: it decides whether KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN is set on the
+Deployment, i.e. whether the admin hostname is in play at all - so the admin
+Ingress used to render with ingress.enabled: false, which meant
+"ingress.enabled: false" did not mean "no Ingress" and clusterIssuer was still
+required for an object nobody asked for. Measured before the fix:
+`helm template -f ci/keycloak/test-values.yaml --set ingress.enabled=false`
+emitted kc-keycloak-admin-ingress and nothing else of the routing path. It also
+made Gateway mode impossible: switching httpRoute on leaves ingress.enabled
+false, and the admin Ingress would have gone on claiming the admin host next to
+the admin HTTPRoute - one host, two data paths, the exact conflict the mutual
+exclusion exists to prevent. The default render is unchanged (ingress.enabled
+defaults to true); what changed is a combination that could not be coherent.
 */ -}}
 {{- $adminEnabled := eq (include "keycloak.adminHostnameEnabled" .) "true" }}
+{{- /*
+THE REALM HOSTNAMES WITH NO MODE TO CARRY THEM (Gitea #122), checked here
+because this is the template that owns ingress.enabled and because the check
+has to run when NEITHER routing template emits anything. Both modes off is a
+legitimate configuration - the chart then publishes nothing and NOTES.txt says
+so - but a filled keycloak.realmHosts next to it is not: the list would be
+accepted, validated, and rendered into no object at all, which is the one
+outcome nobody can tell from a working install by looking at the release.
+Emitting nothing is only correct when nothing was asked for.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if and (not .Values.ingress.enabled) (not (.Values.httpRoute | default dict).enabled) }}
+{{- if (fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" .)).realmHosts }}
+{{- fail "keycloak.realmHosts is set while BOTH routing modes are off (ingress.enabled: false and httpRoute.enabled: false). The entries name hostnames and realms and there is no object to put them in: no Ingress, no HTTPRoute, no DNS answer, and nothing in the rendered release that reveals the list was ignored. Switch on the mode these hostnames are meant to be served by, or remove the entries - both are coherent, this combination is not." }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- /*
+Validated and bound OUTSIDE the ingress.enabled block, because a variable
+declared inside an if-block does not exist after it and the realm objects below
+need the same list. The helper is only CALLED in Ingress mode: it demands a
+tlsSecretName per entry, which the Gateway mode neither reads nor should ask
+for.
+
+AND NOT WHEN httpRoute.enabled IS ALSO TRUE, which looks redundant next to
+ingress.enabled and is not. That combination is the one keycloak.httproute.yaml
+aborts over, with a message about the two data paths; template execution order
+is not something a chart can rely on, so a realm check that fired here would
+sometimes answer "this entry needs a tlsSecretName" to a values file whose
+actual defect is that both modes are on. The specific message must not be able
+to hide the structural one. Measured while writing this: without the second
+condition, exactly that happened.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $realmHosts := list }}
+{{- if and .Values.ingress.enabled (not (.Values.httpRoute | default dict).enabled) }}
+{{- $realmHosts = (fromYaml (include "keycloak.realmHosts" (dict "root" . "mode" "ingress"))).entries }}
+{{- end }}
 {{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
@@ -61,10 +111,8 @@ spec:
         - {{ required "A Domain/Host must be provided (ingress.domain)" .Values.ingress.domain }}
       secretName: tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress
 {{- end }}
-{{- if $adminEnabled }}
-{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+{{- if and .Values.ingress.enabled $adminEnabled }}
 ---
-{{- end }}
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:
@@ -106,3 +154,103 @@ spec:
         - {{ required "An admin Domain/Host must be provided (ingress.admin.domain) while ingress.admin.enabled is true" ((.Values.ingress.admin | default dict).domain) }}
       secretName: tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-admin-ingress
 {{- end }}
+{{- range $i, $entry := $realmHosts }}
+---
+{{/*
+A REALM HOSTNAME (Gitea #122), one Ingress object per keycloak.realmHosts entry.
+
+Keycloak serves every realm from this one deployment, and a realm's account
+console lives at /realms/<realm>/account/. An entry here gives a realm a
+hostname of its own: the same Service as the two objects above, under a further
+name, with the bare / sent to that realm's console by app-root. Gateway mode's
+counterpart is an Exact match plus a RequestRedirect filter - see
+keycloak.httproute.yaml.
+
+THIS IS WHERE THE CHART DEVIATES FROM THE REPO'S INGRESS CONVENTION, and the
+deviation is the expensive half of the feature rather than an oversight. The
+convention (style guide §4) is one TLS secret per object named
+tls-<release>-<chart>-ingress, with the cert-manager annotation ALWAYS set.
+Neither holds here:
+
+  - THE SECRET NAME IS OPERATOR DATA, required per entry and never derived.
+    These hostnames live in zones whose certificates already exist, and several
+    of them typically share one: a wildcard for a zone covers every realm host
+    under it. A chart-derived name per entry would ask cert-manager for a fresh
+    certificate for a name a wildcard already covers - one ACME order per
+    hostname, for nothing.
+  - THE ISSUER IS OPTIONAL, and omitting it is the normal case rather than the
+    exception. cert-manager keys a Certificate by the secret it writes, so two
+    objects naming one secret and both carrying the annotation request the same
+    certificate twice. Exactly one object per secret may carry it - which is the
+    same deliberate omission the qBittorrent object in freesailarr makes, for
+    the same reason. Where an entry's certificate is to be issued FOR it, it
+    names a secret of its own and sets clusterIssuer; where the certificate
+    comes from elsewhere (a wildcard, a Certificate in cluster-config, another
+    release), clusterIssuer stays empty and this object only consumes the
+    secret.
+
+The entry's annotations are merged last and per entry, not chart-globally,
+because this is not a uniform set: of the four hostnames this installation runs
+today, three carry the proxy-buffer pair and one does not. A chart-global
+annotation block could not express that difference.
+*/}}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  {{- /*
+  INDEX-BASED, like homeassistant's per-host routes and for the same reason
+  (style guide §4): the count is data-driven, and a realm name is not a
+  dependable object-name fragment - the 63-character label limit plus the
+  release prefix, and a sanitised name can collide with another entry's. The
+  price, written down rather than discovered: reordering keycloak.realmHosts
+  RENAMES these objects, so they are recreated rather than edited, and the
+  hostname is briefly unserved while that happens. The TLS secret is not the
+  chart's and survives it. NOTES.txt prints which index carries which hostname
+  and realm, because the name does not say.
+  */}}
+  name: "{{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-realm-ingress{{ if $i }}-{{ $i }}{{ end }}"
+  labels:
+    app: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  annotations:
+    {{- /*
+    The counterpart of the Gateway mode's Exact-match RequestRedirect.
+    ingress-nginx renders this annotation as
+        if ($uri = /) { return 302 $scheme://$http_host<app-root>; }
+    (rootfs/etc/nginx/template/nginx.tmpl:1000, controller-v1.14.5) - a 302 on
+    exactly /, with every other path proxied unchanged.
+    */}}
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/app-root: {{ printf "/realms/%s/account/" $entry.realm | quote }}
+    {{- with $entry.clusterIssuer }}
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: {{ . | quote }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- with $entry.annotations }}
+    {{- toYaml . | nindent 4 }}
+    {{- end }}
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  The entry's own class, falling back to ingress.className - the same shape as
+  ingress.admin.className. A realm hostname can perfectly well belong to a zone
+  served by a different controller than the login host.
+  */}}
+  ingressClassName: {{ $entry.className | default $.Values.ingress.className }}
+  rules:
+    - host: {{ $entry.host | quote }}
+      http:
+        paths:
+          {{- /*
+          The SAME backend as the two objects above, by port NAME as they do.
+          Everything but the bare / is proxied straight through; app-root
+          handles /.
+          */}}
+          - backend:
+              service:
+                name: {{ $.Release.Name }}-{{ $.Chart.Name }}-service
+                port:
+                  name: http
+            path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - {{ $entry.host | quote }}
+      secretName: {{ $entry.tlsSecretName | quote }}
+{{- end }}

keycloak/templates/keycloak.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for keycloak (Gitea #5).
+
+THE RICHEST POLICY OF THIS ROLLOUT, AND THE ONE WITH THE LARGEST BLAST RADIUS.
+Read both halves of that before changing anything here.
+
+Keycloak is the only chart in the repository whose three ports fall into three
+DIFFERENT classes, so it is the one place the convention is visible in full:
+
+  http (8080)        NOT addressed by any probe, so it CAN be restricted by
+                     source - and it is. Own namespace, allowedNamespaces, and
+                     the ingress controller. This is the only real inbound
+                     restriction in the sweep, and it is possible only because
+                     the probes use a different port.
+  management (9000)  the port all three probes address, so it stays open by
+                     default. That is unfortunate here specifically: 9000
+                     carries the health and metrics surface UNAUTHENTICATED,
+                     and "no Ingress" was its only protection before this
+                     object existed. The policy improves it from "anything that
+                     can route to the pod" to "anything inside the cluster",
+                     and networkPolicy.probeSources is what closes the rest -
+                     at the price of needing the worker node IPs.
+  jgroups (7800)     the cluster bus between this release's own replicas.
+                     Restricted to the pods this policy itself selects, which
+                     is the narrowest rule this object can express.
+
+All three port numbers and the database port are DERIVED from the chart's own
+values through keycloak.settings, not written down twice: an operator who moves
+keycloak.ports.http moves the policy with it. The database port is
+keycloak.db.port, so unlike most charts in this sweep the egress rule here is
+the CONFIGURED port and not a guess.
+
+THE BLAST RADIUS, stated plainly because it is the largest in this issue: this
+release is the cluster's identity provider. If the ingress-controller source
+below is wrong, every login everywhere breaks, and NOTHING IN CI CAN CATCH IT -
+no ingress controller runs in the install-test, and the probes use 9000, so the
+pod becomes Ready either way. The source was measured on the live cluster
+(DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API
+here), but measured labels are not proven traffic. After the first upgrade,
+verify with an actual login rather than with kubectl.
+
+AND THE SECOND TRAP, which is the same shape: a consumer that reaches Keycloak
+on its IN-CLUSTER Service address rather than through its public URL is a pod
+in another namespace, and the http rule blocks it. Those namespaces belong in
+allowedNamespaces. Consumers that use the public issuer URL arrive through
+Traefik and are already covered.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $settings := fromYaml (include "keycloak.settings" .) }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the Deployment's pods, and the same label the PodDisruptionBudget and
+  the two Services use. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if it matches no pod
+  spec of the same render.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because there is a great deal to restrict and almost all of it
+    is known: the database on its configured port, the cluster bus, and HTTPS. What
+    is NOT permitted and is the likely first surprise: SMTP. Keycloak sends mail
+    (verification, password reset) through a server configured per realm, which
+    this chart cannot see - so it needs networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    THE HTTP PORT, AND THE ONE GENUINELY RESTRICTED INBOUND RULE IN THIS SWEEP.
+
+    It can be restricted because no probe addresses it - the probes use the
+    management port - so there is no kubelet traffic to accommodate and no need for
+    probeSources here. Allowed: this release's own namespace, whatever
+    allowedNamespaces adds, and the ingress controller.
+
+    Both selectors of the controller entry sit in ONE list item, which makes them
+    an AND: those pods in that namespace. Split into two items they would be an OR
+    and would open Keycloak's login endpoint to every pod in kube-system.
+
+    If this rule is wrong, every login in the cluster breaks and no part of CI will
+    say so. See the header.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.http | int64 }}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- /*
+    THE MANAGEMENT PORT - health, readiness and metrics, and all three probes
+    address it. So it is the probe path and stays open by default.
+
+    That is worth naming rather than glossing: this surface is UNAUTHENTICATED, and
+    before this object existed its only protection was that no Ingress pointed at
+    it. What this policy adds is a smaller ceiling, not a closed door - the port is
+    reachable from inside the cluster. Closing it means listing the worker node IPs
+    in networkPolicy.probeSources, with the usual cost of getting them wrong.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.management | int64 }}
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      No ingress-controller entry on this rule: nothing routes to the management port
+      from outside, and it should stay that way.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+    {{- /*
+    THE CLUSTER BUS between this release's own replicas, and the narrowest rule
+    this object can express: a podSelector with no namespaceSelector, which means
+    "pods with these labels IN THIS NAMESPACE" - i.e. exactly the pods this policy
+    already selects.
+
+    Infinispan discovery here is jdbc-ping (see values.yaml), so no multicast and
+    no extra port is involved; the peers find each other through the database and
+    then connect on this port. The matching egress rule below is what lets them
+    dial OUT - without it the cluster would form in one direction only.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.jgroups | int64 }}
+      from:
+        - podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    The external PostgreSQL, on THE CONFIGURED PORT - keycloak.db.port, derived
+    through keycloak.settings. This chart is the exception in the sweep: its
+    database port is a value rather than a field inside an opaque secret, so this
+    rule follows the configuration instead of guessing at 5432.
+
+    It also carries Infinispan's jdbc-ping discovery, which is why a blocked
+    database here costs the cluster as well as the data.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.db.port | int64 }}
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound cluster bus. Needed as well as the ingress rule above: policyTypes
+    lists Egress, so a replica dialling its peer is subject to this policy too, and
+    without this rule the bus would be permitted inbound and blocked outbound - a
+    cluster that never forms, with two nodes that each look healthy.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ $settings.ports.jgroups | int64 }}
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound HTTPS. Keycloak needs it for identity brokering and for external
+    identity-provider metadata, both configured inside REALMS this chart never
+    sees - so the port has to be permitted here or a federated login fails with no
+    hint pointing at this object. Also covers an outbound webhook or a remote JWKS.
+    Ports only: these are hostnames.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

keycloak/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "description": "true renders the Deployment with replicas: 0 and takes precedence over keycloak.replicas. Also the first half of the minor-upgrade procedure, because Keycloak supports a rolling update only inside a minor line.",
       "type": "boolean"
@@ -151,6 +202,48 @@
         "extraVolumeMounts": {
           "description": "Additional volume mounts, rendered verbatim and TWICE - on the build init container as well as on the serving container (Gitea #88). That is deliberate: a login theme is read at runtime, but an SPI provider JAR must be present while `kc.sh build` writes the provider registry, or it is never registered and nothing reports it. Items loosely typed for the same reason as extraVolumes. Never mount on /opt/keycloak/themes itself - it would hide the image's base, keycloak and keycloak.v2 themes; use a subpath /opt/keycloak/themes/<name>.",
           "type": ["array", "null"]
+        },
+        "realmHosts": {
+          "description": "One hostname per realm (Gitea #122), rendered in BOTH routing modes: one Ingress per entry with nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/app-root, or one HTTPRoute per entry whose Exact match on / carries a RequestRedirect filter to /realms/<realm>/account/. Empty by default and then renders nothing at all. One object per entry, named by list INDEX - so reordering the list renames and recreates them. host and realm are required and the realm is NOT derived from the hostname; the render also aborts on a repeated host and on a host this release already publishes, because one hostname cannot serve two different things at /. tlsSecretName is required in Ingress mode and never derived, and clusterIssuer is optional there - the documented deviation from the one-secret/always-annotate convention, so that a certificate already covering these zones is consumed rather than requested a second time. See values.yaml for the full reasoning and for the order a takeover of existing hostnames has to run in.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": ["host", "realm"],
+            "properties": {
+              "host": {
+                "description": "The hostname serving this realm. Must differ from every other entry's and from the hostnames this release already publishes.",
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1
+              },
+              "realm": {
+                "description": "The realm as Keycloak names it, interpolated into the redirect target /realms/<realm>/account/. Not derivable from the hostname - the two need not correspond and in the installation this was written for they do not. A slash in it aborts the render, because it would retarget the redirect instead of being escaped.",
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1
+              },
+              "tlsSecretName": {
+                "description": "The TLS secret this hostname's certificate lives in. REQUIRED IN INGRESS MODE and deliberately not derived from release and chart name: these zones already have certificates, often one wildcard for several entries, and a derived name would mean one further ACME order per hostname for a name that is already covered. Not read in Gateway mode - there the certificate sits on the Gateway's listener.",
+                "type": ["string", "null"]
+              },
+              "clusterIssuer": {
+                "description": "Optional cert-manager issuer for THIS object. Empty or absent renders no cert-manager annotation, which is the normal case: cert-manager keys a Certificate by the secret it writes, so of several objects naming one secret exactly one may carry the annotation. Same deliberate omission as the qBittorrent object in freesailarr. Not read in Gateway mode.",
+                "type": ["string", "null"]
+              },
+              "className": {
+                "description": "Optional ingress class for this object, falling back to ingress.className - the same shape as ingress.admin.className, because a realm hostname may belong to a zone served by another controller. Not read in Gateway mode, where the class is a property of the Gateway.",
+                "type": ["string", "null"]
+              },
+              "annotations": {
+                "description": "Extra annotations for THIS entry's Ingress, merged after the app-root and cert-manager annotations. Per entry rather than chart-global on purpose: the set is not uniform across hostnames - of the four this was written for, three carry the proxy-buffer pair and one does not. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open. INERT in Gateway mode, and for an account console that loses the proxy buffers in the case where large headers are the norm rather than the edge.",
+                "type": "object"
+              },
+              "parentRefs": {
+                "description": "Optional Gateway(s) for this entry's HTTPRoute, falling back to httpRoute.parentRefs - the counterpart of className above, because \"which data path\" is a property of the Gateway in this API. Not decoration here: realm hostnames sit in several DNS zones, so a chart-global parentRef pinning one sectionName would attach every realm route to one certificate's listener, and a route whose listener does not match its hostname is not accepted and simply does not answer. Not read in Ingress mode.",
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+              }
+            }
+          }
         }
       }
     },
@@ -187,15 +280,55 @@
               "type": ["string", "null"]
             },
             "annotations": {
-              "description": "Extra annotations for the admin Ingress, merged with the cert-manager annotation. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open.",
+              "description": "Extra annotations for the admin Ingress, merged with the cert-manager annotation. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open. Inert in Gateway mode.",
               "type": "object"
             }
           }
         }
       }
+    },
+    "httpRoute": {
+      "description": "Gateway-API alternative to the TWO Ingresses (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true, naming both value paths. The chart renders only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. TWO routes, the public hostname and the admin one; the second is gated on ingress.admin.enabled, because that value also sets KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN on the Deployment and is therefore not an Ingress switch. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them. NOT COVERED IN THIS MODE: the proxy-buffer-size and proxy-buffers-number annotations this installation relies on - the Gateway API has no counterpart for proxy buffer sizing, and Keycloak's large headers make a too-small buffer answer 502 at the proxy while the application logs success. See values.yaml, httpRoute block.",
+      "type": ["object", "null"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "parentRefs": {
+          "description": "The Gateway(s) the public route attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced by required()-equivalent in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+        },
+        "hostnames": {
+          "description": "Empty means [ingress.domain], so the public hostname has a single source of truth.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "type": "string" }
+        },
+        "admin": {
+          "description": "The admin route. Rendered while ingress.admin.enabled is true - the same switch the admin Ingress uses, so the admin hostname is available in both modes.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "parentRefs": {
+              "description": "Empty falls back to httpRoute.parentRefs - the counterpart of ingress.admin.className falling back to ingress.className, because \"which data path\" is a property of the Gateway in this API and not of the route. An internal Gateway here is what an internal ingress class is in the other mode, and still not an access control.",
+              "type": "array",
+              "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+            },
+            "hostnames": {
+              "description": "Empty means [ingress.admin.domain].",
+              "type": "array",
+              "items": { "type": "string" }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
     }
   },
   "definitions": {
+    "parentRef": {
+      "description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["name"]
+    },
     "port": {
       "type": ["integer", "null"],
       "minimum": 1,

keycloak/values.yaml

@@ -614,6 +614,120 @@ keycloak:
   extraVolumes: []
   extraVolumeMounts: []
 
+  # ONE HOSTNAME PER REALM (Gitea #122). Empty by default, and an empty list
+  # renders NOTHING in either mode - the default render is byte-identical to a
+  # release without this feature.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT IS FOR. Keycloak serves every realm from this one deployment, and a
+  # realm's account console lives at /realms/<realm>/account/. An entry here
+  # gives one realm a hostname of its own: this release's Service published
+  # under a further name, with the bare / sent to that realm's console and
+  # everything else proxied through unchanged. It renders in BOTH routing modes
+  # - one Ingress per entry with nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/app-root, or one
+  # HTTPRoute per entry whose Exact match on / carries a RequestRedirect filter.
+  #
+  # ONE OBJECT PER ENTRY, never one object with several hostnames: an
+  # HTTPRoute's hostnames apply to the whole object and a rule's matches are
+  # path-based, so inside a shared route every entry would match `Exact: /` and
+  # the realm could not be told apart. The objects are named by LIST INDEX
+  # (<release>-keycloak-realm-ingress, -realm-ingress-1, ... and the same for
+  # -realm-httproute), which means REORDERING THIS LIST RENAMES THEM and they
+  # are recreated rather than edited. NOTES.txt prints the index-to-hostname
+  # mapping, because the object name does not carry it.
+  #
+  # THE REALM IS NOT DERIVABLE FROM THE HOSTNAME and the chart does not try:
+  # both are given per entry. In the installation this feature was written for,
+  # one of the four hostnames serves a realm whose name shares nothing with it.
+  #
+  # Fields, with the mode that reads each one:
+  #
+  #   host            (both)      REQUIRED. The hostname. Must not repeat
+  #                               another entry's, and must not be a hostname
+  #                               this release already publishes
+  #                               (ingress.domain, ingress.admin.domain, an
+  #                               httpRoute hostname) - the render aborts on
+  #                               either, because one hostname cannot serve two
+  #                               different things at /.
+  #   realm           (both)      REQUIRED. The realm as Keycloak names it. It
+  #                               is interpolated into /realms/<realm>/account/.
+  #   tlsSecretName   (Ingress)   REQUIRED in Ingress mode, see below.
+  #   clusterIssuer   (Ingress)   OPTIONAL, see below. Empty or absent = no
+  #                               cert-manager annotation on this object.
+  #   annotations     (Ingress)   OPTIONAL, per entry. Merged last.
+  #   className       (Ingress)   OPTIONAL. Falls back to ingress.className.
+  #   parentRefs      (Gateway)   OPTIONAL. Falls back to httpRoute.parentRefs.
+  #
+  #   realmHosts:
+  #     - host: realm-one.id.example.com
+  #       realm: realm-one
+  #       tlsSecretName: tls-id-wildcard-ingress   # a certificate that exists
+  #       clusterIssuer: ""                        # issued elsewhere, see below
+  #       annotations:
+  #         nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size: 16k
+  #         nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffers-number: "4"
+  #     - host: id.other.example.com
+  #       realm: realm-two
+  #       tlsSecretName: tls-id-other-ingress
+  #       clusterIssuer: letsencrypt-issuer        # issued for THIS object
+  #
+  # (Neutral examples on purpose. Realm names, hostnames and secret names are
+  # operator data and are not in this chart - they belong in the values file of
+  # the installation.)
+  #
+  # WHY THIS DEVIATES FROM THE REPO'S INGRESS CONVENTION, which is one TLS
+  # secret named tls-<release>-<chart>-ingress and the cert-manager annotation
+  # ALWAYS set (style guide §4). Neither holds for these objects, and both
+  # deviations are deliberate:
+  #
+  #   - tlsSecretName is REQUIRED AND NEVER DERIVED. These hostnames live in
+  #     zones whose certificates already exist, and several entries typically
+  #     share one - a wildcard for a zone covers every realm host under it. A
+  #     chart-derived name per entry would ask cert-manager for a fresh
+  #     certificate for a name a wildcard already covers: one ACME order per
+  #     hostname, for nothing. So the name is operator data, and an entry
+  #     without one aborts the render in Ingress mode rather than rendering a
+  #     TLS block that silently serves the controller's default certificate.
+  #   - clusterIssuer is OPTIONAL, and leaving it empty is the normal case.
+  #     cert-manager keys a Certificate by the secret it writes, so two objects
+  #     naming one secret and both carrying the annotation request the same
+  #     certificate twice. Exactly one object per secret may carry it - the same
+  #     deliberate omission the qBittorrent object in freesailarr makes, for the
+  #     same reason. Set it only where the certificate is to be issued FOR this
+  #     entry's own secret.
+  #
+  # ANNOTATIONS ARE PER ENTRY and not chart-global, because the set is not
+  # uniform: of the four hostnames the installation this was written for runs
+  # today, three carry the proxy-buffer pair and one does not. One global block
+  # could not express that difference. In GATEWAY MODE this field is inert, like
+  # ingress.annotations - and for these hostnames that loss bites harder than
+  # for the chart's own two, because an account console session is exactly the
+  # large-header case: see the httpRoute block below and NOTES.txt.
+  #
+  # TAKING OVER HOSTNAMES THAT ANOTHER RELEASE SERVES TODAY - THE ORDER MATTERS,
+  # AND IT IS NOT REVERSIBLE WITHIN A DEPLOY. These objects may already exist in
+  # the cluster, created by a different repository and owned by a different Helm
+  # release. Filling this list then does not edit them, it adds a SECOND object
+  # for the same hostname and path, and the two orders are not equally bad:
+  #
+  #   1. Remove the objects in the owning repository FIRST and let that removal
+  #      reach the cluster.
+  #   2. THEN install this chart with the list filled.
+  #
+  # The window between the two is a short unreachability of those hostnames.
+  # The other order, or both at once, is worse: ingress-nginx's admission
+  # webhook rejects the second claim on a host-and-path pair, and under Fleet
+  # that leaves the bundle in ErrApplied until forceSyncGeneration is raised -
+  # measured, and written down in ytdlp-web-player's collision fail. In Gateway
+  # mode the webhook never fires (it compares Ingresses with Ingresses), and the
+  # duplicate is accepted instead: two merged routes on one hostname, with
+  # object age deciding which redirect a client gets.
+  #
+  # AND ONE QUESTION THIS CHART CANNOT ANSWER, UNCHECKED AS OF THIS WRITING:
+  # whether anything in the owning repository depends on those objects BY NAME -
+  # a Fleet bundle, a monitor, an objectset reference. Clear that before step 1,
+  # not after.
+  realmHosts: []
+
 ingress:
   # The PUBLIC ingress - the login endpoint, the token endpoints, the account
   # console. On by default, because an identity provider nothing can reach is
@@ -642,6 +756,11 @@ ingress:
 
   # Extra annotations for the public Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
   # annotation the chart always sets.
+  #
+  # INERT IN GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled) - the Gateway API has no
+  # annotation channel for controller behaviour. That matters for THIS chart in
+  # particular: see the httpRoute block below for the proxy-buffer annotations
+  # this installation actually relies on and what their loss looks like.
   annotations: {}
 
   admin:
@@ -684,4 +803,182 @@ ingress:
     # annotation. This is where an IP allow-list would go
     # (nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/whitelist-source-range) - with the caveat
     # above firmly in mind.
+    #
+    # INERT IN GATEWAY MODE, like ingress.annotations - see the httpRoute block
+    # below for what this installation actually has in here today and what
+    # losing it costs.
     annotations: {}
+
+# THE GATEWAY-API ALTERNATIVE TO THE TWO INGRESSES (Gitea #114).
+#
+# Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are
+# true, and the message names both value paths. The chart renders ONLY
+# HTTPRoutes with parentRefs: no Gateway, no class, no Certificate, and no
+# implementation-specific policy object. Class and certificate sit on the
+# Gateway and its listeners and belong to the platform (cluster-config), which
+# is what makes the Gateway implementation replaceable without touching this
+# chart again.
+#
+# TWO ROUTES, mirroring the two Ingresses: the public hostname and the admin
+# hostname. ingress.admin.enabled keeps gating BOTH forms, because it is not an
+# Ingress switch - it decides whether KC_HOSTNAME_ADMIN is set on the
+# Deployment, i.e. whether the admin hostname exists at all.
+#
+# WHAT THIS MODE COSTS THIS CHART, MEASURED AND NOT HYPOTHETICAL. On
+# 2026-10-12 both of this chart's live Ingress objects carried
+#
+#     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size:    16k
+#     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffers-number: 4
+#
+# set by the OPERATOR through the two annotations blocks above - this chart
+# sets neither, which is why reading the chart alone does not reveal them. The
+# Gateway API has no annotation channel and no counterpart for proxy buffer
+# sizing: it is implementation policy, not routing, so there is nothing here to
+# render and nothing this chart could promise. The consequence is specific:
+# Keycloak's responses carry large headers (JWTs, SAML assertions, long
+# Set-Cookie chains during the login flow), and a proxy whose buffer is too
+# small answers 502 ITSELF, while Keycloak logs a successful request. The
+# symptom therefore points at the application and the cause is at the proxy.
+# Set the equivalent next to the Gateway, in that implementation's own object,
+# BEFORE moving the host. NOTES.txt prints this in Gateway mode.
+#
+# THE GATEWAY-API CRDs MUST BE PRESENT. The chart cannot detect them
+# (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template time) and an HTTPRoute
+# without them fails at install, so this is a value and not a guess.
+httpRoute:
+  enabled: false
+
+  # The Gateway(s) the PUBLIC route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
+  # another namespace, whose listener must allow this namespace in
+  # allowedRoutes. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference (name, and
+  # optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group, kind), passed through
+  # unchanged:
+  #
+  #   parentRefs:
+  #     - name: public
+  #       namespace: gateway
+  #       sectionName: https
+  #
+  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
+  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
+  # nothing, with no event to say so.
+  parentRefs: []
+
+  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the public hostname has one source of
+  # truth. ingress.domain is required in every mode in this chart anyway (the
+  # Deployment reads it as KC_HOSTNAME), so setting this list is only for
+  # publishing under a different or an ADDITIONAL name - which is how a
+  # migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second hostname
+  # while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
+  hostnames: []
+
+  admin:
+    # The admin route's own parent. null/empty falls back to
+    # httpRoute.parentRefs - the exact counterpart of ingress.admin.className
+    # falling back to ingress.className. "Which data path" is a property of the
+    # Gateway in this API rather than of the route, so an INTERNAL Gateway here
+    # is what an internal ingress class is in the other mode. Still not the
+    # access control the ingress.admin paragraph above is about.
+    parentRefs: []
+
+    # Empty means [ingress.admin.domain]. Required (via that value) while
+    # ingress.admin.enabled is true and httpRoute.enabled is true.
+    hostnames: []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # THE RICHEST POLICY IN THIS REPOSITORY, AND THE ONE WITH THE LARGEST BLAST
+  # RADIUS. Both halves matter.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT ALLOWS, inbound, and the three ports are three different cases:
+  #   - http (8080): RESTRICTED BY SOURCE to this namespace, allowedNamespaces
+  #     and the ingress controller. The only real inbound restriction in the
+  #     whole sweep, and possible only because no probe uses this port.
+  #   - management (9000): open inside the cluster, because all three probes
+  #     address it. This is the port whose health and metrics surface is
+  #     UNAUTHENTICATED; before this object its only protection was that no
+  #     Ingress pointed at it. probeSources closes the rest.
+  #   - jgroups (7800): this release's own pods only.
+  # Outbound: DNS, the CONFIGURED database port (keycloak.db.port - this chart
+  # does not have to guess), the cluster bus, and 443 for identity brokering.
+  #
+  # THE BLAST RADIUS: this release is the cluster's identity provider. If
+  # ingressController below is wrong, EVERY LOGIN EVERYWHERE BREAKS, and no
+  # part of CI can catch it - no ingress controller runs in the install-test,
+  # and the probes use 9000 so the pod goes Ready either way. The source was
+  # measured on the live cluster, but measured labels are not proven traffic:
+  # after the first upgrade, verify with a real login.
+  #
+  # AND THE SECOND TRAP: a consumer that reaches Keycloak on its IN-CLUSTER
+  # Service address instead of its public URL is a pod in another namespace,
+  # and the http rule blocks it. Put those namespaces in allowedNamespaces.
+  # Consumers using the public issuer URL come through Traefik and are covered.
+  #
+  # NOT allowed, and the likely first surprise: SMTP. Mail is configured per
+  # REALM, which this chart never sees - see egress.extraPorts.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach the management port (keycloak.ports.management, 9000 by default), which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # SMTP is the entry this chart needs most: 587 or 465, for the mail server
+    # configured inside a realm. Also an LDAP user federation (389 or 636), or
+    # a database that is somehow not on keycloak.db.port.
+    extraPorts: []

matrix-synapse/Chart.yaml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: matrix-synapse
 description: A Helm chart to deploy a Matrix Synapse server on Kubernetes
 icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/element-hq/synapse/develop/docs/favicon.png
 type: application
-version: 7.1.1+upv1.159.0
+version: 8.0.0+upv1.159.0
 appVersion: "v1.159.0"
 maintainers:
   - name: jklein

matrix-synapse/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
+{{- /*
+NOTHING IN CI READS THIS FILE. `helm template` does not emit notes and no
+workflow or script under ci/ reads it, so every claim below carries
+review-only assurance - it is checked by being read, not by a stage. A
+rendering ERROR here does fail `helm template`, which is all the pipeline can
+see of it.
+*/ -}}
 {{- $replicas := include "matrix-synapse.replicas" (dict "scaleDown" .Values.scaleDown "replicas" .Values.matrix.replicas) -}}
 {{- $delegation := .Values.matrix.delegation | default dict -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- $httpRouteDelegation := $httpRoute.delegation | default dict -}}
+{{- /*
+"Published" rather than "has an Ingress": the two modes are alternatives, and
+every paragraph below that used to ask ingress.enabled was really asking
+whether anything publishes this release. Gitea #114, and the sure.publishedOverTls
+/ freesailarr.published shape.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $published := or .Values.ingress.enabled $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list .Values.ingress.domain -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- $delegationHostnames := $httpRouteDelegation.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $delegationHostnames -}}
+{{- $delegationHostnames = list $delegation.serverUrl -}}
+{{- end -}}
 {{- $delegationReplicas := include "matrix-synapse.replicas" (dict "scaleDown" .Values.scaleDown "replicas" $delegation.replicas) -}}
 {{- $res := fromYaml (include "matrix-synapse.effectiveResources" .Values.matrix.resources) -}}
 {{- $eph := index ($res.limits | default dict) "ephemeral-storage" | default "the computed ephemeral-storage limit" -}}
@@ -14,7 +38,7 @@ Matrix Synapse {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} — release {{ .Release.Name }} in namesp
 
 {{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
 
-ACCESS
+ACCESS — INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false)
   https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}
 
   That host carries the whole client and federation API: the Ingress sends "/"
@@ -24,11 +48,96 @@ ACCESS
   shows a warning and federation fails. Follow it with
 
     kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get certificate tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress
+{{- else if $httpRoute.enabled }}
+
+ACCESS — GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false)
+{{- range $hostnames }}
+  https://{{ . }}
+{{- end }}
+
+  That host carries the whole client and federation API: the HTTPRoute sends
+  "/" on it to the Synapse Service, which forwards port 80 to the container's
+  8008.
+
+  THIS RELEASE RENDERS {{ if $delegation.enabled }}TWO HTTPRoutes{{ else }}ONE HTTPRoute{{ end }} AND NOTHING ELSE of the routing
+  path — no Gateway, no class, no Certificate, no policy object.
+
+    {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute              {{ join ", " $hostnames }}
+{{- if $delegation.enabled }}
+    {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-httproute   {{ join ", " $delegationHostnames }}
+{{- end }}
+
+  Three things therefore belong to the cluster, and if any is missing the
+  hostname does not answer — which for Matrix means federation is down, not
+  just the web client:
+
+    1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed, so
+       they are present — nothing to check.
+    2. The Gateway(s) named in parentRefs
+{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}   (homeserver)
+{{- end }}
+{{- if $delegation.enabled }}
+{{- range ($httpRouteDelegation.parentRefs | default $httpRoute.parentRefs) }}
+         {{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}   (delegation)
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}
+       must exist AND their listeners must allow routes from this namespace
+       ({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment is visible only
+       in the route's status:
+
+         kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
+
+       Read status.parents[].conditions — "Accepted: True" and
+       "ResolvedRefs: True" is what a working attachment looks like. An empty
+       status means no controller has looked at the route at all.
+    3. {{ if $delegation.enabled }}The TLS certificates — one per hostname, on the Gateway's listeners,
+       or one wildcard listener covering both{{ else }}The TLS certificate for the hostname, on the Gateway's listener{{ end }}.
+       ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required: the
+       chart renders no Certificate here, so there is no
+       tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress secret{{ if $delegation.enabled }} and no
+       tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation secret{{ end }} and nothing for
+       cert-manager to do for this release. MATRIX FEDERATION IS HTTPS-ONLY,
+       so a listener without a valid certificate for these names is a
+       federation outage that no probe in this release can see.
+
+  THE UPLOAD LIMIT IS NOT ENFORCED BY ANYTHING THIS CHART RENDERS.
+
+  In Ingress mode an operator sets
+  nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size through ingress.annotations —
+  this installation runs with 50m — because Synapse's media repository takes
+  uploads and nginx's default of 1m rejects nearly all of them. IN THIS MODE
+  THAT IS GONE: the Gateway API has no body-size field, it is implementation
+  policy rather than routing, and this chart renders no policy object on
+  purpose (it would bind the chart to one Gateway implementation).
+
+  The ceiling in force is the smaller of max_upload_size in your
+  homeserver.yaml — which this chart cannot see, it comes from 1Password —
+  and whatever the GATEWAY enforces. Neither number anyone can point at is
+  necessarily the one that decides. Set the Gateway's half, in your
+  implementation's own object, to match max_upload_size, BEFORE you point DNS
+  at it.
+
+  AND ONE THING NOT TO RE-CREATE. The live Ingress also carries a
+  configuration-snippet of three more_set_headers directives
+  (X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr, X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme, Host). It LOOKS
+  like what Synapse's x_forwarded setting depends on. It is not:
+  more_set_headers is the headers-more module's OUTPUT-header directive, so
+  those three headers go on the RESPONSE TO THE CLIENT and Synapse never sees
+  them. What Synapse reads with x_forwarded: true is the REQUEST's
+  X-Forwarded-For, which the proxy supplies by itself. Do not spend effort
+  rebuilding this at the Gateway, and do not read its absence as the cause of
+  a rate-limiting or federation problem. (This is a reading of the directive's
+  documented semantics; nothing here A/B-tested a Synapse instance.)
+
+  ingress.annotations is inert in this mode in general: the Gateway API has no
+  annotation channel for controller behaviour.
 {{- else }}
 
-ACCESS — NO INGRESS
-  ingress.enabled is false, so this release has no Ingress and no certificate;
-  ingress.clusterIssuer is not needed.
+ACCESS — NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE
+  ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both false, so this release has no
+  Ingress, no HTTPRoute and no certificate; ingress.clusterIssuer is not
+  needed.
 {{- if $delegation.enabled }}
   ingress.domain still is: the delegation nginx renders it into the
   /.well-known/matrix/* documents, so it stays the host every other Matrix
@@ -56,10 +165,10 @@ DELEGATION — TWO HOSTNAMES THAT ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE
       → {"m.server": "{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}:443"}
     /.well-known/matrix/client
       → {"m.homeserver": {"base_url": "https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}"}}
-{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+{{- if $published }}
 
-  The Ingress publishes them on a SECOND host. Read that split carefully,
-  because the chart cannot check it for you:
+  {{ if $httpRoute.enabled }}A SECOND HTTPRoute publishes{{ else }}The Ingress publishes{{ end }} them on a SECOND host. Read that split
+  carefully, because the chart cannot check it for you:
 
     matrix.delegation.serverUrl ({{ $delegation.serverUrl }})
       is the DELEGATING host — the domain in every user ID (@user:{{ $delegation.serverUrl }}).
@@ -69,18 +178,36 @@ DELEGATION — TWO HOSTNAMES THAT ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE
       is where Synapse actually answers. It appears inside the documents
       above and needs no relation to the server name.
 
-  Only the path /.well-known/matrix is routed to nginx on {{ $delegation.serverUrl }};
-  everything else on that host is not served by this release. Both hosts need
+  Only the path /.well-known/matrix is routed to nginx on {{ join ", " $delegationHostnames }};
+  everything else on that host is not served by this release.
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled }}
+
+  AND THAT CO-EXISTENCE IS EASIER HERE THAN IT WAS. The server name is usually
+  an apex domain that already serves a website, and under ingress-nginx two
+  Ingress objects cannot both claim one hostname — the admission webhook
+  rejects the second — which is why the delegation rule had to sit inside this
+  chart's single Ingress object. HTTPRoutes attached to the same listener for
+  the same hostname are MERGED by the implementation, longest match winning,
+  so this route may sit beside whatever owns that apex without either side
+  knowing about the other.
+
+  Both hosts need a certificate ON THE GATEWAY'S LISTENERS — this chart renders
+  none in this mode — and a listener without a valid certificate for the server
+  name is a federation outage, not a cosmetic problem.
+{{- else }}
+  Both hosts need
   a certificate — the second one is tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation — and
   cert-manager only issues it once {{ $delegation.serverUrl }} resolves to this cluster.
   A pending certificate there is a federation outage, not a cosmetic problem.
+{{- end }}
 
   Check what is actually being served, from outside the cluster:
 
-    curl -s https://{{ $delegation.serverUrl }}/.well-known/matrix/server
+    curl -s https://{{ first $delegationHostnames }}/.well-known/matrix/server
 {{- else }}
 
-  Nothing publishes them, though: ingress.enabled is false, so the documents
+  Nothing publishes them, though: ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are
+  both false, so the documents
   exist only on the in-cluster Service {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-service, and
   matrix.delegation.serverUrl ({{ $delegation.serverUrl }}) is rendered into no object of this
   release. Whatever terminates TLS in front of the cluster has to route
@@ -101,7 +228,7 @@ NO DELEGATION IN THIS RELEASE — FEDERATION LIKELY DOES NOT WORK
   8448 anywhere: the container publishes 8008 only, and the Service maps port
   80 onto it. Unless the delegation is served by something else (a static
   .well-known on the server-name host, or an SRV record), federation stays
-  broken{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} while clients on {{ .Values.ingress.domain }} work fine{{ end }}.
+  broken{{ if $published }} while clients on {{ first $hostnames }} work fine{{ end }}.
   Setting matrix.delegation.enabled to true and matrix.delegation.serverUrl
   to the server name lets this chart serve it.
 {{- end }}
@@ -120,7 +247,11 @@ SCALED TO ZERO
 {{- end }}
 {{- end }}
   The PVC, the Secret and the Services stay in place, so no data is lost{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and
-  the certificates are not re-issued{{ end }}. Set it back and upgrade again to
+  the certificates are not re-issued{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }} and the
+  HTTPRoutes stay in place, so the hostnames keep pointing at Services with no
+  endpoints — the Gateway answers with an error of its own rather than with
+  nothing, and remote homeservers see a failing .well-known instead of an
+  unresolvable name{{ end }}. Set it back and upgrade again to
   return.
 {{- end }}
 
@@ -190,7 +321,7 @@ THE SERVER NAME IS DECIDED ONCE, AND NOT BY matrix.serverName
   a different name is a new server with a new database, not an upgrade. Decide
   it before the first start — together with matrix.delegation.serverUrl, which
   has to match it.
-{{- if and .Values.ingress.enabled $delegation.enabled .Values.matrix.serverName $delegation.serverUrl }}
+{{- if and $published $delegation.enabled .Values.matrix.serverName $delegation.serverUrl }}
 {{- if ne (printf "%v" .Values.matrix.serverName) (printf "%v" $delegation.serverUrl) }}
 
   MISMATCH IN THIS RELEASE: matrix.serverName is "{{ .Values.matrix.serverName }}" but the
@@ -265,3 +396,62 @@ matrix.env IS APPENDED, NOT MERGED
   {{ .Release.Namespace }}. Note that Synapse takes its real configuration from
   homeserver.yaml, not from the environment.
 {{- end }}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — TWO OBJECTS, ONE PER WORKLOAD
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects the Synapse pods and
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-networkpolicy the delegation nginx. They are
+  separate because their needs are opposite: Synapse federates and must be able
+  to reach any homeserver on the internet, while the delegation server returns
+  two static JSON documents and calls nobody. One policy over both pods would
+  have to permit the union — handing full federation reach and the database port
+  to an nginx that serves a constant.
+
+  Synapse: inbound TCP 8008 only; outbound DNS, TCP 5432 (Postgres), 443 and
+  8448 (federation, remote media, push gateways, identity servers){{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }}, plus TCP
+  {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+  Delegation nginx: inbound TCP 8080 only; outbound DNS and nothing else —
+  networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts deliberately does not widen it.
+
+  Three limits, none of them visible in the objects themselves:
+
+  - FEDERATION CANNOT BE NARROWED. 443 and 8448 go to ANY destination, because
+    a federating homeserver may contact any other homeserver there is, and a
+    NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors but never hostnames — with this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) there is no FQDN rule either.
+    What the cap still buys is real: Synapse can open NO other outbound port,
+    so a compromised instance reaches no other database, no SSH and no mail
+    server in the cluster.
+  - 5432 IS THE STANDARD PORT, NOT YOUR CONFIGURED ONE. Synapse's Postgres
+    connection lives inside secrets.configSecretRef, which this chart never
+    parses. A database elsewhere is blocked — put its port in
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts. The same applies to a TURN server for
+    voice, or to SMTP if this release sends mail.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATHS ARE RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node a pod lands on, its probes are dropped and THE POD
+    NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout times out and the symptom looks like a
+    broken application.
+
+    AND CHECK FEDERATION AFTER THIS CHANGE, not just the web UI. Inbound
+    federation reaches Synapse through the Ingress, and every remote homeserver
+    that wants to federate fetches /.well-known/matrix from the delegation
+    server — so a wrong ingressController here stops federation and stops it
+    being discoverable, and that failure appears on OTHER people's servers
+    before it appears on yours.
+{{- else }}
+  - BOTH PROBE PORTS ARE OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so neither rule carries a source selector and any pod the CNI routes
+    to can reach them. Not from the internet — neither port has a NodePort —
+    but this is NOT pod-level isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker
+    node IPs, because the kubelet probes from the node's own address and the
+    chart cannot know it; a wrong guess leaves the pod permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+
+  Switch both off with networkPolicy.enabled: false. And remember that a policy
+  is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one — unenforced, both objects are
+  accepted and filter nothing, so everything reads as configured.
+{{- end }}

matrix-synapse/templates/matrix-synapse.httproute.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+{{/*
+HTTPRoute - the Gateway-API alternative to matrix-synapse.ingress.yaml
+(Gitea #114).
+
+TWO ROUTES, AND THE SHAPE IS NOT WHAT #114 EXPECTED. The issue describes this
+chart as rendering "its Ingresses in a loop over several apps". It does not -
+that is freesailarr. This chart renders ONE Ingress object with TWO host rules:
+
+    ingress.domain                 /                        synapse service
+    matrix.delegation.serverUrl    /.well-known/matrix      delegation service
+
+In the Gateway API that has to become TWO HTTPRoute objects, and not because of
+style: spec.hostnames applies to the WHOLE object, so one route can carry
+several hostnames only when they want the SAME rules. These two want different
+paths and different backends, so one object per hostname is the only faithful
+translation.
+
+WHAT THIS MODE IMPROVES, WHICH IS WORTH KNOWING BEFORE THE MIGRATION
+
+The delegation hostname is the Matrix SERVER NAME - the apex domain, not the
+homeserver's own host - and it is almost always already serving something else
+(a website at /). Under ingress-nginx two Ingress objects on one hostname are a
+fight: the admission webhook rejects the second claim on the same host and
+path, which is why the delegation rule has to live INSIDE this chart's single
+Ingress object rather than beside it. HTTPRoutes do not work that way: several
+routes may attach to the same listener for the same hostname and the
+implementation merges them by match specificity (a longer path wins). So in
+this mode the /.well-known/matrix route can sit next to whatever else owns that
+apex, without either side knowing about the other.
+
+WHAT THIS RENDERS, AND WHAT IT MUST NOT
+
+Only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs. No Gateway, no gatewayClassName, no
+Certificate, no implementation-specific policy object - the subset that looks
+identical on nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway and Istio (decision 1
+of #114). Class and certificate belong to the PLATFORM, on the Gateway and its
+listeners, in cluster-config. Note that the two hostnames need certificates on
+TWO listeners (or one wildcard listener covering both), which in Ingress mode
+were two entries in the one object's tls block.
+
+WHAT THIS MODE DROPS, MEASURED ON THE LIVE OBJECT - AND ONE OF THE TWO IS NOT
+WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE
+
+On 2026-10-12 the live Ingress (jk-cluster, namespace matrix-synapse) carried,
+all of it OPERATOR-supplied through ingress.annotations - this chart sets none
+of it:
+
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size:    50m
+    nginx.org/client-max-body-size:                 50m
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/configuration-snippet: |
+      more_set_headers "X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr";
+      more_set_headers "X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme";
+      more_set_headers "Host $host:$server_port";
+
+1. THE BODY SIZE IS THE REAL LOSS. Synapse's media repository takes uploads,
+   its own ceiling is max_upload_size in homeserver.yaml - which this chart
+   cannot see, because the whole config arrives from 1Password through
+   secrets.configSecretRef - and the effective limit is the smaller of the two.
+   In this mode the proxy half becomes THE GATEWAY'S default, so neither number
+   anyone can point at is necessarily the one that decides. There is no
+   counterpart in the Gateway API: body size is implementation policy, not
+   routing, and decision 2 of #114 says it is documented rather than rebuilt.
+   (nginx.org/client-max-body-size is the same limit spelled for the OTHER
+   nginx ingress controller, NGINX Inc's; it is a hedge across both
+   implementations and it disappears for the same reason.)
+
+2. THE SNIPPET IS NOT LOAD-BEARING, AND THAT TOOK CHECKING RATHER THAN
+   ASSUMING. It looks like the thing Synapse's x_forwarded setting depends on -
+   client IP for rate limiting, and federation. It is not, because
+   more_set_headers is the module's OUTPUT-header directive:
+   headers-more-nginx-module, verbatim - more_set_headers "Replaces (if any) or
+   adds (if not any) the specified OUTPUT headers", while the request-side
+   directive is a different one, more_set_input_headers ("it operates on input
+   headers (or request headers)"). So these three headers are added to the
+   RESPONSE TO THE CLIENT. Synapse never sees them; what Synapse reads with
+   x_forwarded: true is the REQUEST's X-Forwarded-For, which ingress-nginx
+   populates itself.
+
+   The honest statement for the migration is therefore: not translatable, and
+   not needed. The Gateway API's ResponseHeaderModifier could set static
+   response headers but knows no nginx variables ($remote_addr, $scheme,
+   $host), so a rebuild is impossible anyway - and pointless, since dropping
+   them changes nothing Synapse depends on. What does change is that a client
+   stops receiving three headers echoing the proxy's view of its own request,
+   which is at best noise.
+
+   This is a claim about a directive's documented semantics, not an experiment:
+   nothing here observed a Synapse instance with and without the snippet.
+
+Both are named in the Gateway branch of NOTES.txt, the first as a limit to
+re-establish at the Gateway and the second as a thing NOT to re-establish.
+*/}}
+{{- /*
+Null-safe like every other block a template here dereferences (#99): an
+override written without children - "httpRoute:" with its keys deleted - is
+YAML null, and .Values.httpRoute.enabled would abort with a nil pointer.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
+{{- if and $httpRoute.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
+{{- fail "ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both true - set exactly one of them. The Ingress and the HTTPRoute would publish the same Services under the same hostnames over two different data paths, which is already a conflict at DNS level: one name, two addresses, and which one a client reaches is luck. For Matrix it is worse than for a stateless app: the /.well-known/matrix delegation tells every OTHER homeserver in the federation where to find this one, and a server name that resolves to two data paths makes federation succeed or fail per remote server and per retry. A migration runs over a SECOND hostname (set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain), never over parallel operation of both - and the delegation host moves last, after the homeserver host answers." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
+{{- $parentRefs := $httpRoute.parentRefs | default list -}}
+{{- if not $parentRefs -}}
+{{- fail "httpRoute.enabled is true but httpRoute.parentRefs is empty - an HTTPRoute without a parent attaches to no Gateway. It is created, it is schema-valid, and it routes NOTHING, with no event and no condition that says so; the only symptom is a hostname that does not answer. Name the cluster's Gateway, e.g. httpRoute.parentRefs: [{name: public, namespace: gateway}]." -}}
+{{- end -}}
+{{- /*
+One source of truth for the hostname: an empty httpRoute.hostnames means
+[ingress.domain]. Two values that have to agree drift apart. ingress.domain is
+read outside the routing templates in this chart - the delegation nginx serves
+it inside /.well-known/matrix/client - so it already carries a required() of
+its own there and stays mandatory with the Ingress off (README, guideline 12,
+point 1). This required() is the route's own, so the message names the route.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $hostnames -}}
+{{- $hostnames = list (required "A Domain/Host must be provided: set ingress.domain (used as the homeserver HTTPRoute's single hostname when httpRoute.hostnames is empty) or set httpRoute.hostnames explicitly" .Values.ingress.domain) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute
+spec:
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml $parentRefs | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    {{- toYaml $hostnames | nindent 4 }}
+  rules:
+      {{- /*
+      The Ingress counterpart is `path: / , pathType: Prefix` on the Synapse
+      Service. The port is the Service's port NUMBER and not its name "http":
+      backendRefs takes a PortNumber, so unlike the Ingress this reference
+      cannot be made by name. ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh is what holds the
+      pair - it fails when a backendRef names a Service, or a port, that the
+      same render does not create.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service
+          port: 80
+{{- if .Values.matrix.delegation.enabled }}
+---
+{{- /*
+The delegation route, on the SERVER NAME rather than on the homeserver's host.
+Gated on matrix.delegation.enabled exactly as the second host rule of the
+Ingress is, and for the same reason: without the delegation workload there is
+nothing to route to.
+
+Its hostname deliberately does NOT fall back to httpRoute.hostnames. The
+delegation host is matrix.delegation.serverUrl - the Matrix server name, which
+is a different thing from the homeserver's hostname and is what remote servers
+resolve. Letting a chart-global hostname list cover it would make the two
+indistinguishable, and the migration order (homeserver host first, server name
+last) depends on telling them apart. httpRoute.delegation.hostnames exists for
+the one case where the server name itself has to move.
+*/ -}}
+{{- $delegation := $httpRoute.delegation | default dict -}}
+{{- $delegationHostnames := $delegation.hostnames | default list -}}
+{{- if not $delegationHostnames -}}
+{{- $delegationHostnames = list (required "If delegation is enabled you must provide a serverUrl: set matrix.delegation.serverUrl (used as the delegation HTTPRoute's single hostname when httpRoute.delegation.hostnames is empty) or set httpRoute.delegation.hostnames explicitly" .Values.matrix.delegation.serverUrl) -}}
+{{- end -}}
+apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: HTTPRoute
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-httproute
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Its own parent, falling back to the homeserver route's. The server name may
+  well be published by a different Gateway than the homeserver host - it is a
+  domain somebody else's website usually owns - and in that case this is where
+  it is said.
+  */}}
+  parentRefs:
+    {{- toYaml ($delegation.parentRefs | default $parentRefs) | nindent 4 }}
+  hostnames:
+    {{- toYaml $delegationHostnames | nindent 4 }}
+  rules:
+      {{- /*
+      PathPrefix and not Exact, and the same path the Ingress uses: the
+      delegation nginx serves two documents below it
+      (/.well-known/matrix/server and /.well-known/matrix/client), so the
+      prefix has to carry both. NO URLRewrite filter - the delegation nginx's
+      own config answers on the full path, so nothing is stripped, which is
+      also why the #118 prefix/redirect assurance has no precondition to meet
+      here.
+      */}}
+    - matches:
+        - path:
+            type: PathPrefix
+            value: /.well-known/matrix
+      backendRefs:
+        - name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-service
+          port: 80
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}

matrix-synapse/templates/matrix-synapse.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+{{- /*
+Two NetworkPolicies, one per workload (Gitea #5).
+
+THIS CHART RENDERS TWO POD TEMPLATES AND THEY NEED DIFFERENT RULES, which is
+why this file is written out rather than generated from one shape like most of
+the sweep. A single policy selecting both would have to be the UNION of what
+each needs - Synapse's federation egress granted to the delegation server, and
+the delegation server's ports granted to Synapse - and a policy that is the
+union of two workloads' needs is strictly weaker than two policies, while
+looking like one decision.
+
+  <release>-<chart>-networkpolicy             the Synapse StatefulSet
+  <release>-<chart>-delegation-networkpolicy  the delegation nginx Deployment
+
+The split matters most on egress. Synapse federates: it opens connections to
+other people's homeservers, to push gateways and to identity servers, so its
+egress rule is necessarily wide. The delegation server serves two static JSON
+documents under /.well-known/matrix and calls NOTHING - so its egress is DNS
+and nothing else, which is as tight as this object gets. Merging them would
+have handed Synapse's reach to an nginx whose entire job is to return a
+constant.
+
+BOTH WORKLOADS SIT BEHIND THE SAME INGRESS, on different paths (/ to Synapse,
+/.well-known/matrix to the delegation server), so both carry the ingress
+controller in their restricted branch - and both would go dark together if it
+were wrong.
+
+AND BOTH PROBE PORTS STAY OPEN BY DEFAULT, because all three probes of each
+workload address its own HTTP port. The kubelet probes from the IP of the
+worker node running the pod, which no chart can know; narrowing is
+networkPolicy.probeSources, and it applies to both policies at once.
+
+WHAT THESE POLICIES DO NOT DO:
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and never hostnames, so "only the homeservers we federate with"
+    cannot be expressed - and with Canal (Flannel plus Calico) there is no FQDN
+    rule to reach for. Federation therefore means 443 and 8448 to any address,
+    which is the honest description: Synapse may contact any homeserver on the
+    internet, because that is what federation is.
+  - THE DATABASE PORT IS A GUESS. Synapse's Postgres connection lives inside
+    secrets.configSecretRef, a 1Password item this chart never parses, so 5432
+    is the standard port and not the configured one.
+  - A POLICY IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES ONE.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the Synapse StatefulSet's pods - NOT the delegation Deployment's,
+  which has its own policy below. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh reports which pod
+  templates each selector matches, so a label renamed in one of the two
+  workloads shows up as a finding rather than as a policy that filters nothing.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    8008 - Synapse's client and federation API, the port the Service forwards 80
+    to, and the port all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8008
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's
+      probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, so that
+      address has to be in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod
+      that is never Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      MIND THE FEDERATION SIDE OF THIS RULE. Inbound federation traffic arrives
+      through the Ingress, so the controller entry below is what keeps other
+      homeservers able to reach this one. Restricting this rule without it does
+      not merely hide a web UI: it stops federation inbound, which looks like
+      other servers being unreachable rather than like a local policy.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this
+              needs no labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these
+        labels IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR,
+        and would open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to
+      guess the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe:
+      the pod stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like
+      the application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it
+      allows everything too, but while reading as a restriction.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in the
+    pod is a trap and not a feature. Synapse needs it more than most - every
+    federated server is resolved by name, including its SRV and .well-known
+    delegation lookups.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    PostgreSQL on the STANDARD port. The connection lives inside
+    secrets.configSecretRef, a 1Password item this chart never parses, so this
+    is the conventional port and not the configured one - a Postgres elsewhere
+    is blocked and belongs in networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 5432
+    {{- /*
+    FEDERATION, and this is the rule that cannot be narrowed. 443 and 8448 to
+    ANY destination: 8448 is the Matrix federation port, 443 is where a
+    delegating homeserver puts its federation API instead, and both are also
+    what Synapse uses to fetch remote media, to reach a push gateway and to
+    reach an identity server.
+
+    "Any destination" is not laziness here, it is the specification: a
+    federating homeserver may contact any other homeserver on the internet, and
+    this object cannot match a hostname in any case. What the cap still buys is
+    real - Synapse cannot open a connection on any OTHER port, so a compromised
+    instance reaches no database, no SSH and no mail server elsewhere in the
+    cluster.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8448
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. The operator's escape hatch
+    from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching the whole policy
+    off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /* Selects the delegation nginx Deployment's pods only. */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-delegation-nginx-deployment
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    8080 - the only port this pod declares, the port the delegation Service
+    forwards 80 to, and the port all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 8080
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources - the same value
+      governs both policies in this chart. The kubelet probes from the node's
+      own IP, so it has to be in the list or this pod never becomes Ready.
+
+      AND THE CONSUMERS OF THIS ONE ARE OTHER PEOPLE'S HOMESERVERS. The
+      delegation documents under /.well-known/matrix are fetched by every remote
+      server that wants to federate with this one, through the Ingress. Restrict
+      this rule without the controller entry and federation stops being
+      discoverable - a failure that shows up on OTHER servers, not here.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /* Open inside the cluster, as above - the probe path. */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS AND NOTHING ELSE, and this is the tightest egress rule in the chart on
+    purpose. This nginx serves two static JSON documents and calls nobody; it
+    does not touch the database, it does not federate, it has no upstream. Even
+    DNS is only here because the container resolves at start.
+
+    This is exactly what the two-policy split buys. Folded into Synapse's
+    policy, this pod would have been permitted 443, 8448 and 5432 - full
+    federation reach and the database - for a workload whose entire job is to
+    return a constant. networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts deliberately does NOT
+    apply here: an entry meant for Synapse's database has no business widening
+    this.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+{{- end }}

matrix-synapse/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "type": "boolean"
     },
@@ -119,10 +170,11 @@
       "additionalProperties": false,
       "properties": {
         "enabled": {
-          "description": "Gates the whole Ingress template (issue #93). false omits the Ingress and makes clusterIssuer unnecessary - but NOT domain, which the delegation nginx also serves in its /.well-known/matrix/* endpoints.",
+          "description": "Gates the whole Ingress template (issue #93). Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. false omits the Ingress and makes clusterIssuer unnecessary - but NOT domain, which the delegation nginx also serves in its /.well-known/matrix/* endpoints and which the HTTPRoute reads as its hostname.",
           "type": "boolean"
         },
         "domain": {
+          "description": "The homeserver hostname. Read by the Ingress, by the HTTPRoute (when httpRoute.hostnames is empty) and by the delegation nginx, which serves it inside /.well-known/matrix/client - so it is required in every mode while delegation is on.",
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "clusterIssuer": {
@@ -132,13 +184,53 @@
           "type": ["string", "null"]
         },
         "annotations": {
-          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature.",
+          "description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature. INERT IN GATEWAY MODE: the Gateway API has no annotation channel. This installation's live Ingress carries proxy-body-size 50m (which has no counterpart and must be re-established at the Gateway) and a configuration-snippet of more_set_headers directives (which must NOT be re-established - see values.yaml, httpRoute block).",
           "type": "object"
         }
       }
+    },
+    "httpRoute": {
+      "description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true, naming both value paths. The chart renders only HTTPRoutes with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. TWO routes, not one: the Ingress is a single object with two host rules (homeserver at /, delegation at /.well-known/matrix), and an HTTPRoute's hostnames apply to the whole object, so two hostnames wanting different paths and backends must be two objects. NOT COVERED IN THIS MODE: proxy-body-size, which this installation carries at 50m and which Synapse's own max_upload_size has to agree with - see values.yaml, httpRoute block, including why the configuration-snippet on the live object is NOT a loss. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them.",
+      "type": ["object", "null"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "parentRefs": {
+          "description": "The Gateway(s) the homeserver route attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced by required()-equivalent in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+        },
+        "hostnames": {
+          "description": "Empty means [ingress.domain], so the homeserver hostname has a single source of truth. Does NOT cover the delegation host - see httpRoute.delegation.hostnames.",
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": { "type": "string" }
+        },
+        "delegation": {
+          "description": "The delegation route, rendered while matrix.delegation.enabled is true - the same switch the Ingress's second host rule uses.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "parentRefs": {
+              "description": "Empty falls back to httpRoute.parentRefs. Worth setting when the server name is published by a different Gateway than the homeserver host, which is the normal case - the server name is an apex domain somebody else's website usually owns.",
+              "type": "array",
+              "items": { "$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef" }
+            },
+            "hostnames": {
+              "description": "Empty means [matrix.delegation.serverUrl]. Deliberately does NOT fall back to httpRoute.hostnames: the server name is what remote homeservers resolve and is a different thing from the homeserver's hostname, and the migration order depends on telling them apart.",
+              "type": "array",
+              "items": { "type": "string" }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
     }
   },
   "definitions": {
+    "parentRef": {
+      "description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["name"]
+    },
     "resources": {
       "description": "May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to its default requests and computed limits (issue #99) instead of rendering a container without resource accounting.",
       "type": ["object", "null"],