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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jklein	bc580ee291	feat(teamspeak-server): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render. Port half only: this chart offers no networkPolicy.probeSources - its probes put no packet on the network - so there is no redirected probe to allow and an ipBlock for one would match nothing while making the rule look like it did something. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh ties that exemption to the absence of probeSources, not to a chart name.	2026-10-19 17:56:57 +00:00
jklein	445ca36d7d	feat(samba): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render. Port half only: this chart offers no networkPolicy.probeSources - its probes put no packet on the network - so there is no redirected probe to allow and an ipBlock for one would match nothing while making the rule look like it did something. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh ties that exemption to the absence of probeSources, not to a chart name.	2026-10-19 17:56:57 +00:00
jklein	fe573cc762	feat(stalwart): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:57 +00:00
jklein	f911a5cddd	feat(minecraft-router): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:49 +00:00
jklein	ab09378e0a	feat(keycloak): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:49 +00:00
jklein	219dcc705d	feat(garage): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:49 +00:00
jklein	19a2c5e4a5	test(networkpolicy): tie the ambient probe-source half to probeSources, not to a chart name ... Gitea #143. Five charts offer no networkPolicy.probeSources - their probes are exec probes and put no packet on the network - so for them 169.254.7.127/32 would be an ipBlock that matches nothing, which is exactly the strict-looking empty rule this script exists to catch. Assertion 7 now exempts them on the absence of that value, the same conditionality assertion 4 and the overlay guard already use, and records the exemption as a held assertion rather than as silence. Also names two limits of assertion 7 in its header: assertions 1, 3, 4 and 5 are not re-run on the switched-on render, and assertion 3's omission is the interesting one - with probeSources empty, 15008 sits in a rule with no "from" that neither of assertion 3's two justifications covers. Teaching it a third would mean writing a rule against a guess, because where ztunnel dials from cannot be settled until a namespace joins the mesh.	2026-10-19 17:56:49 +00:00
jklein	5b3400581f	feat(homeassistant): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	a04e47ac87	feat(zipline): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	91e2e5093e	feat(ytdlp-web-player): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	fb222b3d37	feat(voucher-vault): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	6fd61beec7	feat(urlaubsverwaltung): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	0d2a385673	feat(sure): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	6fc8332ffd	feat(searxng): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:48 +00:00
jklein	589021aed1	feat(rss-bridge): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:47 +00:00
jklein	38ea124c94	feat(rallly): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:47 +00:00
jklein	609bbaeab2	feat(patchmon): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:47 +00:00
jklein	1a7d5817c2	feat(paperless-ngx): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:47 +00:00
jklein	e09b3bb9f8	feat(outline): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:21 +00:00
jklein	b0572834e0	feat(matrix-synapse): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:21 +00:00
jklein	aedc6ff136	feat(gotenberg): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:21 +00:00
jklein	9950e935ab	feat(freesailarr): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:20 +00:00
jklein	5b53d62b5f	feat(calibre-web-automated): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:19 +00:00
jklein	fef9034862	feat(bulwark): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:19 +00:00
jklein	d7d6f8a907	feat(bentopdf): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:19 +00:00
jklein	7a3f15efc7	feat(apache-tika): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders against origin/main rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. Ambient does not bypass NetworkPolicy enforcement, so without the port a pod whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed, and a pod that never becomes Ready reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:19 +00:00
jklein	009c93e3cd	feat(cyberchef): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh ... Gitea #143. Additive, default false, so the render is byte-identical to the previous release - proven by diffing both renders rather than asserted. Switched on it adds 15008/TCP, ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, to the rule carrying the probe port, and - inside that rule's source-restricted branch - 169.254.7.127/32, the address the kubelet's probes arrive from once the pod is in the mesh. The two halves are one value because the second is the one nobody thinks of: 15008 added by hand leaves a policy that passes review and drops every probe the first time probeSources is narrowed. Minor, not major: additive value, unchanged default, unchanged render.	2026-10-19 17:56:19 +00:00
jklein	badfaa32cb	feat(template-chart): networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh, plus its checked CI exception ... Gitea #143. A pod cannot be reached inside Istio's ambient mesh unless its NetworkPolicy lets ztunnel's HBONE tunnel in - ambient explicitly does not bypass policy enforcement - and 15008 is deliberately no containerPort of the application, so assertion 2 of ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh rejected it. The switch is a named intention rather than a free port list, and it renders two things that cannot be had separately: 15008/TCP inbound, and - where probeSources is non-empty - 169.254.7.127/32 as an additional peer, because inside the mesh the kubelet's probes are redirected away from the worker node's address. Whoever opens 15008 by hand has not added the probe address, and the first narrowed probeSources then drops every probe: the pod never becomes Ready and the symptom reads as a broken application. That is assertion 4 of the same script, one value further along. Assertion 2 keeps its edge. It gets ONE named exception for ONE port number, gated on one value, and it is not granted in the main loop at all - which renders every chart with the value at its default, so 15008 stays an ordinary failure there. The free-port variant was design A of #143 and would have opened the assertion for all 30 charts. Assertion 7 holds the exception to five things on two renders per chart: the port and the ipBlock are absent while the switch is off, 15008 is present while it is on, 15008 is still the ONLY ingress port that is not a containerPort, and wherever the rule carrying it restricts sources it also carries the ipBlock. The last one is reachable because these renders apply ci/networkpolicy/<chart>.yaml, where probeSources is non-empty. Built into the existing script, as for #136: the exception weakens assertion 2 and belongs beside it - a separate script could go green while the exception it is paired with is wrong, with nothing connecting the two. The job already runs over every chart on every pull request. Found by running it: the policy's name comes from Chart.yaml's name, not from the directory - template-chart is called "xxx". Not proven, and said so in values.yaml, the template header and the script's header: that 15008 alone suffices comes from Istio's documentation, and the probe-source half reaches no release, because probeSources is empty in every chart here. No namespace of this cluster carries istio.io/dataplane-mode, so there is no path on which either could be measured. What is proven is the render and the assertions.	2026-10-19 17:56:19 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	725d046dd9	Update Helm release valkey to v2	2026-10-19 13:12:44 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	79aa97475e	Update gotenberg/gotenberg Docker tag to v8.38.1	2026-10-19 13:01:59 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	da46744bb8	Update lukevella/rallly Docker tag to v4.15.5	2026-10-19 08:04:32 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	fd44644f14	Update itzg/mc-router Docker tag to v1.48.0	2026-10-17 15:09:07 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	0ae17ba94f	Update dependency aquasecurity/trivy to v0.76.0	2026-10-17 12:40:12 +00:00
jklein	95f3e8c1a1	docs(paperless-ngx): the policy header said TWO and listed three ... Pre-existing, and corrected here rather than left because the third item is the mail rule this PR rewrites. values.yaml already said THREE. Part of #136	2026-10-15 17:54:15 +00:00
jklein	1894e7d465	test(ci): assert a chart's egress ports against the POD ports of the chart it dials ... The four assertions from Gitea #5 hold ports against the pod spec the policy SELECTS. That is right for ingress and meaningless for egress: an egress port belongs to the destination, and for a database, a cache or the web that destination is in no render this repository has. So the mistake behind #136 - an egress rule naming a ClusterIP Service's port, which kube-proxy has already translated away by the time the policy is evaluated at the pod's interface - was not catchable within one chart. It is catchable across two, and paperless-ngx -> apache-tika, gotenberg is the only place in the repository where a chart dials another chart's Service (the three other policies naming port 80 aim at the internet, where there is no DNAT and 80 is the real port). The pairs are an explicit table rather than a discovery, because no render can know which Service another chart dials - the address is a value or a 1Password field - and a row naming a chart that no longer exists fails instead of being skipped. Each row is checked on two renders of the consumer: with the feature gate ON the egress ports must CONTAIN every pod port behind the peers' Services, resolved Service port -> targetPort -> containerPort, which is exactly the translation the policy is evaluated after; with the gate OFF the requirement must not apply and those ports must be absent, so a gated rule cannot quietly become one that permits what the release cannot use. The evidence line prints the chain ("port 80 -> targetPort 'tika-port' -> pod port 9998"), so a reader sees the DNAT rather than two numbers. Built into run-networkpolicy-test.sh rather than added as a new script with its own job: that job already runs over every chart on every PR, Helm is already the YAML parser through ci/yaml2json, and the verdict and summary plumbing is shared. python3 standard library only, no yq, no pyyaml, no Docker. Six fail paths executed, not assumed: a required port removed, a wrong number in its place, the peer chart renamed away, the policy name no longer following the <release>-<chart>-<kind> convention, the peers rendering no Service at all (an empty requirement reads like a satisfied one, so it fails), and the rule made unconditional, which is the fail path of the gate-off half. Measured: 30 charts, 210 assertions held (208 before), 0 failed, ~15s, no cluster. README's stated figure was 206 and is corrected here. Part of #136	2026-10-15 17:46:45 +00:00
jklein	530227405c	fix(paperless-ngx): egress names the Tika/Gotenberg POD ports, not the Service port ... The rule allowed outbound 80, the port the apache-tika and gotenberg Services listen on, and justified it in a comment: an egress rule names the port on the destination as the client dials it, and the client dials the Service. That is wrong. kube-proxy does a ClusterIP Service's destination NAT BEFORE the egress policy is evaluated at the pod's network interface, so the policy sees podIP:targetPort and never clusterIP:port - and those two charts forward 80 to 9998 and 3000. Deployed as 14.0.0+up3.3.1 it cut Paperless off from both services on 2026-10-15: mail import, EML, HTML and Office documents stopped, plain PDFs and images kept working, and the error was httpx.ConnectTimeout with no mention of a NetworkPolicy. The rule now names 9998, 3000 and 80. The 80 stays because it costs nothing and covers a foreign Tika that really does listen on 80. The refuted sentence is quoted rather than deleted: it reads perfectly, which is how it survived review, and the timeout-not-refused symptom is written down with it. No policy switch of its own: the rule stays gated on paperless.files.tikaGotenberg.enabled, because a second value that can drift from the feature re-arms this very outage. New networkPolicy.egress.mailImport opens IMAPS 993, off by default - paperless' mail accounts are rows in its database, so the chart cannot derive the rule. Plain IMAP (143) and POP3 stay in extraPorts, and 993 is noted as a real destination port, because a mail server outside the cluster has no DNAT in the path. Minor: one additive value, and a fix that widens a rule. Nothing breaks, no value becomes required, appVersion unchanged. Part of #136	2026-10-15 17:39:24 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	1ef23e9ce9	Update outlinewiki/outline Docker tag to v1.11.0	2026-10-15 15:05:15 +00:00
jklein	ec9e64187b	Merge pull request 'feat!: a NetworkPolicy in every chart, on by default' (#133) from feat/network-policies-all-charts into main	2026-10-14 23:07:39 +00:00
jklein	b617068b16	Merge origin/main: Renovate's stalwart v0.16.26 into this branch ... Renovate automerged the stalwart app patch onto main while this PR was open (1fd6c56: 1.3.0+upv0.16.25 -> 1.3.1+upv0.16.26), which collided with the major this PR gives the same chart. The PR went mergeable: false, with an approval and green checks - the conflict was the only thing in the way. Resolution: version: 2.0.0+upv0.16.26 with appVersion: "v0.16.26". My major absorbs their patch rather than being added to it, and the +up suffix follows appVersion as the scheme requires - verified, suffix == appVersion with dashes normalised. Also corrects the justification comment above that line, which had gone stale in a misleading direction: it argued MINOR, from a diff, for the two previous rounds (#96's spread constraint and PDB, both gated on a computed replica count the chart never reaches; #123's MTA-STS routes, whose list ships empty) - both of which rendered byte-for-byte identically against the previous version. It then sat directly above a 2.0.0. The comment now says why #5 fails that same test on every count: a new value, a changed rendered form, and an object that reaches a RUNNING release on upgrade and changes what can reach the pod. The old evidence is kept as history rather than deleted, because the contrast is the useful part. A merge rather than a rebase, deliberately: the branch is already pushed and force-pushing a reviewed branch is destructive, so main comes in instead. Part of #5	2026-10-14 22:59:37 +00:00
jklein	b31a18918c	docs(gotenberg): point the values comments at the switch, not at extraPorts ... Two leftovers from before the switch existed. The summary still told the reader to set egress.extraPorts: [80, 443] for remote assets, and the extraPorts hint still offered the same pair as its headline case - both now say to use egress.remoteAssets instead, and the extraPorts hint says why: a bare 80/443 in that list records no reason, which is the whole argument for the named value. Also sharpens the sentence that matters: HTML conversion keeps the EMBEDDED content and loses the images it would have FETCHED. The two words were doing the work and the old wording blurred them. Part of #5	2026-10-14 21:21:35 +00:00
jklein	e3f6256244	feat(gotenberg): a named switch for remote assets, off by default ... The maintainer's decision, and it keeps restrictive-by-default intact: not an opening but networkPolicy.egress.remoteAssets, whose purpose is in its name instead of being an unplaceable [80, 443] in extraPorts. Additive inside the major this chart already carries in this PR, so no second version step. WHAT IT BUYS, measured rather than assumed. paperless-ngx splits a mail into two steps with two separate cluster-internal endpoints: the .eml goes to TIKA for parsing (PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT) and the resulting HTML comes here for rendering (PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT). Of the images in that HTML, EMBEDDED ones are MIME parts inside the file and need no network from either service - which is why apache-tika stays DNS-only and is unchanged - while REMOTE ones (<img src="https://...">) are fetched by Chromium here, at render time. With the switch off they are silently dropped: the PDF is produced and is simply missing them, nothing fails, nothing is logged, no probe notices. That invisibility is the reason the switch exists. NOT CHECKED, and written down as not checked rather than implied: whether paperless-ngx re-embeds the images Tika extracted before handing the HTML over. If it does not, embedded images would be lost too - but that would be pre-existing paperless behaviour and not this policy, so the switch is not a fix for it. The SSRF argument is unchanged and is why the default is off: Gotenberg drives a headless Chromium and 3000 is its probe port, so the service is reachable from the whole cluster, and outbound web access turns anything that can POST here into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs. Two things the implementation needed, and one of them was a real defect. The NOTES.txt branch read .Values.networkPolicy.egress.remoteAssets directly, which fails the whole render with "nil pointer evaluating interface {}.remoteAssets" when an operator erases the egress block - the schema permits null there, and issue #99's rule is that an erased block means "the default applies", not a broken render. It is null-safe now, and an erased block falls back to DNS-only, which is the restrictive direction. And ci/networkpolicy/ gotenberg.yaml makes the switch's ON state permanent in CI rather than checked once by hand: it renders both the switch's egress rule and the source-restricted probe branch, so all five assertions run over the toggle in both positions on every pull request. Worth having precisely because assertions 2 and 3 look at INGRESS rules - an egress mistake has no other mechanical check. Also, three things that were load-bearing and written nowhere: - NO CHART SHIPS allowedNamespaces PRE-FILLED. A chart naming mc-router or stalwart in its defaults would bake in an assumption about this cluster's namespace layout, which a chart cannot keep true. Restrictive is the default and filling it is the DEPLOYMENT adaptation - so the release-side one-liners this sweep produces are the expected procedure, not a defect list, and the major on each chart is what announces them. ingressController is the one exception, because it names a cluster component rather than a tenant. - A POLICY APPLIES TO TRAFFIC THAT CAME THROUGH A SERVICE, and that is why the ingressController rule works at all. A Service is only destination NAT and the policy acts at the pod's interface. What the Service changes is the SOURCE ADDRESS: pod -> ClusterIP -> pod preserves it, so a podSelector can still match Traefik; NodePort traffic with the default externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster is masqueraded to a node, which is why those rules are left open. stalwart's template already carried the second half; the first half is the one everything rests on. - AND THE ONE CLUSTER SETTING THIS CONVENTION DEPENDS ON AND CANNOT CHECK: Traefik must not run with hostNetwork. Measured 2026-10-14 - the DaemonSet has none and its pods carry real pod IPs (10.42.3.120, 10.42.4.94, 10.42.0.187 in the pod CIDR 10.42.0.0/16, nodes on entirely different addresses), and only because of that does a podSelector match it. On host networking those pods share the node's namespace, stop being selectable, and EVERY WEB CHART GOES DARK AT ONCE while every pod stays Ready, because the probe path does not run through the controller. Same class as --enable-certificate-owner-ref in #126: undetectable from here. It is in README and in the header of template-chart's policy, so whoever changes the controller's networking meets the consequence on the thing they are changing. Part of #5	2026-10-14 21:19:34 +00:00
jlab-renovate-bot	1fd6c56c2e	Update docker.io/stalwartlabs/stalwart Docker tag to v0.16.26	2026-10-14 18:05:16 +00:00
jklein	be3e2cdd47	test(ci): exercise minecraft-server's NodePort branch, which nothing rendered ... Found by reviewing my own diff rather than by a failure, which is the only reason it is worth a commit of its own. minecraft-server's game-port rule has two branches read from the same value the Service reads: OPEN when server.service.type is NodePort, RESTRICTED to the namespace otherwise. All four releases in this cluster use ClusterIP and so does the install-test fixture - so the OPEN branch was rendered nowhere at all. Not by the chart defaults, not by the fixture, not by lint. It is also the branch where naming server.service.outwardPort instead of server.port would be the classic NodePort mistake, and assertion 2 can only see a rule it has been given. The overlay switches the Service to NodePort and RCON on, so both unreachable branches are now rendered on every pull request. RCON is in there for a reason too: its rule is gated on server.rcon.enabled exactly as the containerPort is, that pairing was wrong once while this chart was being written, and switching the feature on keeps the PAIR under test rather than just the gate. The overlay guard had to be made conditional for this to be possible, and the refinement is sound rather than a workaround. It demanded that any chart with an overlay render a source-restricted PROBE rule - but minecraft-server has no probe rule at all, because all three of its probes are exec probes, and it therefore offers no probeSources. The guard now applies only to charts that offer that value, so it still catches an overlay that stopped reaching the restricted probe branch (template-chart, the case it was written for) without rejecting an overlay that exists for a different unreachable branch. All twelve failure paths re-run against the change; the suite is 30 charts, 208 assertions, 0 failed. Part of #5	2026-10-14 15:29:16 +00:00
jklein	8233617f57	docs: the NetworkPolicy convention and its render test ... README gains two sections and CLAUDE.md the binding compact summary. "NetworkPolicies (#5)" under Chart style guidelines carries the part that is actually hard to get right: the FOUR PORT CLASSES, and that the class decides the rule. A port a network probe addresses stays open until probeSources is set, because the kubelet probes from the worker node's IP and no chart can know it. A NodePort-published port stays open because the source is already masqueraded. Everything else can be - and is - restricted by source, which is why the charts with a real inbound restriction are exactly the ones whose probes use a different port: keycloak's 8080, garage's s3 and web, minecraft-server's RCON, teamspeak-server's query interface. And a cluster bus between a release's own replicas gets a bare podSelector, with the reminder that policyTypes Egress means the outbound side needs its own rule or the cluster never forms while every node looks healthy. The exec-probe distinction is written down as load-bearing rather than pedantic, because it is the whole reason valkey and minecraft-server are the tightest policies here and every HTTP-probed web app is looser. What the policies do NOT do has its own list, including the two that will surprise someone: most dependency ports are the STANDARD ones rather than the configured ones, because connection details live in 1Password items the charts never parse - with keycloak, stalwart and minecraft-router named as the exceptions that derive theirs from values; and a subchart's pods are not covered, with ytdlp-web-player's oauth2-proxy as the sharp case and paperless-ngx' valkey as the opposite. The three Ingress-only charts are listed with their individual arguments rather than a blanket excuse, and gotenberg is contrasted against them: it keeps a DNS-only cap on purpose, because it drives a headless Chromium on a port the whole cluster can reach. "NetworkPolicy render test" under CI/CD documents the gate, and ends with what the pipeline cannot prove - including the measurement from this PR that k3s exempts kubelet probe traffic from policy, so the install-test's net is an EGRESS net. That is stated there rather than implied, because it is the reason assertion 2 matters: a wrong ingress port is caught mechanically or not at all. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:48:21 +00:00
jklein	73c2ec704f	feat!: NetworkPolicy in the last five charts - the sweep is complete ... matrix-synapse, paperless-ngx, freesailarr, valkey, stalwart. One major each. All 29 installable charts plus template-chart now render a policy, and ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh passes over all 30 with 206 assertions held. MATRIX-SYNAPSE renders TWO policies, one per workload, and the split is the decision in that file. Synapse federates - it must be able to reach any homeserver on the internet, so 443 and 8448 go to any destination - while the delegation nginx serves two static JSON documents and calls nobody, so its egress is DNS and nothing else. A single policy over both pods would have to permit the union, handing full federation reach and the database port to an nginx whose job is to return a constant, and it would read as one decision rather than as a widening. networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts deliberately does not reach the delegation policy for the same reason. PAPERLESS-NGX names the two pods of its own release that this object does NOT cover: the valkey subchart's pod, which carries its own labels and needs no cover because the valkey chart ships a tighter policy of its own; and the consume CronJob's pods, whose pod template carries NO LABELS AT ALL, so no podSelector can match them. That second one is a real gap in the convention. It is tolerable only because the job moves files between mounted volumes and reaches the SMB share through a CSI volume the node mounts - the pod opens no connection of its own - and if that ever changes the CronJob needs labels before it can need a policy. FREESAILARR is ten containers in one pod behind a VPN, and simpler than that sounds: they share a network namespace, so all inter-container traffic is localhost and no policy sees any of it. Because the namespace belongs to gluetun, everything the *arr containers send is encapsulated before it leaves, so three rules describe the whole outbound surface - DNS, UDP 51820 for the tunnel, and 443 for gluetun's server-list API, which cannot go through the tunnel because it runs before the tunnel exists. The tunnel rule is the one that can break this chart and also the best covered: gluetun's health server answers 200 only while the tunnel is up and all three of its probes address it, so a blocked 51820 is a pod that never goes Ready - in the install-test, which brings up a real tunnel. VALKEY AND STALWART, the two charts that had a policy before this issue, are pulled onto the convention without a single rule changing. What changed: - the reasoning moved out of "#" comments, which are part of the rendered object and travel into the cluster, into template comments. Both files failed the new check; that is what it is for. - stalwart gains networkPolicy.ingressController, which fixes a hole its own comment described without being able to solve: it advised putting the controller's namespace into allowedNamespaces, which is namespace-granular and would have opened the http port to every pod in kube-system. - stalwart's example was WRONG and is corrected. It suggested ["ingress-nginx"]; measured on 2026-10-14, ingress-nginx is gone from this cluster entirely and the controller is rke2-traefik in kube-system. A policy written against the old one would have been accepted, looked strict, and silently blocked all web traffic. Their justified specifics are untouched: valkey stays Ingress-only, because it opens no outbound connection and an egress rule would constrain nothing while making the object look stricter; and it keeps 6379 restricted by source with no probeSources at all, which is safe only because all three of its probes are exec probes and put no packet on the network. The convention was written to accommodate both, and homeassistant and satisfactory now invoke valkey's rule in the other direction. ONE CHANGE TO THE TEST, forced by a structural fact rather than by convenience: the rendered-comment assertion now skips documents from a SUBCHART. A dependency is fetched from the Helm registry, not from the copy in this repository, so the policy paperless-ngx and stalwart bundle is whatever valkey version is PUBLISHED - and nothing in the parent chart can change its rendered comments. Holding the parent responsible would have made the test unfixable until valkey's next release and would fail a chart for a file its own diff does not contain. The subchart's own pull request is where it is caught, because this test runs over every chart including valkey itself. All twelve failure paths were re-run against the change. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:46:11 +00:00
jklein	28a0230ef0	feat!: NetworkPolicy in the NodePort and game-server charts, on by default ... garage, minecraft-router, minecraft-server, samba, teamspeak-server, satisfactory. One major each. These are the charts the plan said to leave for last, and they earned it - three of them changed the convention rather than just consuming it. GARAGE is the clearest illustration after keycloak. Its four ports split three ways: s3 and web are RESTRICTED by source (no probe touches them), admin is the probe path and stays open inside the cluster - which is uncomfortable, because admin is also the admin API, and that is said out loud instead of glossed - and rpc gets the narrowest rule the object can express, a podSelector with no namespaceSelector. All four numbers come from garage.settings. MINECRAFT-SERVER is the tightest policy in the repository, and the reason is worth knowing: all three of its probes are EXEC probes, which put no packet on the network, so no port has to stay open for the kubelet and no probeSources value is needed at all. RCON and metrics are restricted outright. The game port has two branches rendered from the same value the Service reads - server.service.type NodePort means players arrive from the internet and the rule must be open; anything else means the only path is in-cluster, so the rule is restricted and the router's namespace has to be in allowedNamespaces. MINECRAFT-ROUTER derives its egress from the routing table instead of guessing: server.backendPort plus the "port" override of every mapping that sets one. Add a backend on a non-standard port and the policy follows. What it cannot express is the destination - mappings name hosts, and this object matches no hostname - so the rule is wider than the routing table, and that is written down. SATISFACTORY gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and no egress section, and the second half of the reason is the deciding one. Steam's content delivery is not a pinnable port set (SteamCMD over TCP 80/443/27015-27050, master servers over UDP 27000-27100 and 4380, changed by Valve, re-downloaded on every update) - and this is the ONE chart with no install-test at all, because the image is multiple GB and the first start pulls over 10GB. An egress cap here would be the only one in the sweep with no empirical check behind it, on the chart whose correct port set is least knowable. SAMBA and TEAMSPEAK-SERVER carry the NodePort lesson explicitly: the rules name 445/139 and the pod's voice and file-transfer ports, never the NodePorts, and teamspeak's file is explicit that its pod port and NodePort happening to share a number is a coincidence of its values rather than a pattern to copy. Teamspeak's voice rule is UDP, and the file says why that matters: a TCP rule on the same number is accepted, looks complete, and drops every voice packet. THREE THINGS THE CHECKS CAUGHT WHILE THIS BATCH WAS WRITTEN, all of them real: - minecraft-server's RCON rule named a port the pod does not declare. The containerPort is gated on server.rcon.enabled and the rule was not, so assertion 2 rejected it. The rule now carries the same gate. - samba and satisfactory would have shipped allowedNamespaces and probeSources values that reach NO rule - every one of their inbound rules is open to any source. A value that silently does nothing is worse than one that is absent, because it reads as a control, so both are gone from those two charts and from their schemas, with the reason in values.yaml. teamspeak-server loses probeSources for the same reason and keeps allowedNamespaces, which its web-query rule uses. - the policy templates no longer declare template variables they do not use. samba keeps one, satisfactory none. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:37:51 +00:00
jklein	96c23b7912	feat(keycloak)!: NetworkPolicy, on by default - the full convention in one chart ... Major. This is the richest policy of the sweep and the one with the largest blast radius, and it is the only chart whose three ports fall into three different classes - so it is where the convention is visible in full: http (8080) NOT addressed by any probe, so it CAN be restricted by source, and it is: own namespace, allowedNamespaces, and the ingress controller. The only real inbound restriction in this whole rollout, possible only because the probes use a different port. management (9000) the port all three probes address, so it stays open inside the cluster. That matters here specifically: this surface carries health and metrics UNAUTHENTICATED, and "no Ingress" was its only protection before this object. The policy turns "anything that can route to the pod" into "anything inside the cluster"; probeSources closes the rest. jgroups (7800) the cluster bus, restricted to the pods this policy itself selects - a podSelector with no namespaceSelector, the narrowest rule the object can express. All four port numbers come from keycloak.settings rather than being written down twice, so moving keycloak.ports.http moves the policy with it. And the egress rule for the database is the CONFIGURED port, keycloak.db.port - this is the one chart in the sweep that does not have to guess, because its database port is a value instead of a field inside an opaque secret. The outbound cluster-bus rule is not a duplicate of the inbound one: policyTypes lists Egress, so a replica dialling its peer is subject to this policy too, and without it the bus would be open inbound and blocked outbound - a cluster that never forms, with two nodes that each look healthy. THE BLAST RADIUS IS WRITTEN INTO THE CHART, because nothing in CI can catch it: this release is the cluster's identity provider, no ingress controller runs in the install-test, and the probes use 9000 - so the pod becomes Ready whether or not the http rule is right. NOTES.txt therefore asks for two checks after the first upgrade: log in, and look at whether any consumer uses the in-cluster Service address instead of the public issuer URL (those namespaces need allowedNamespaces). Not allowed at all, and named as the likely first surprise: SMTP, because the mail server is configured per realm where the chart cannot see it. The test's overlay guard is tightened in the same commit, and keycloak is why. It counted any source-restricted rule, and this chart restricts two of them in its own defaults - so the guard would have been satisfied while the probe branch, the only branch an overlay exists to reach, was never rendered. It now counts restricted PROBE rules. All twelve failure paths were re-run against the change. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:30:30 +00:00
jklein	e1adcef71f	feat!: NetworkPolicy in nine more charts, on by default ... bulwark, calibre-web-automated, patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault, zipline, sure, homeassistant. One major each. These are the charts with real outbound dependencies, and they all share one limitation that is now written into every one of them: THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Databases, caches and OIDC issuers arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items that the charts never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is blocked, and networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is the escape hatch. That is the upgrade risk of this rollout, stated per chart instead of discovered per release. Four of them differ in ways that mattered: HOMEASSISTANT gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and NO egress section at all, and that is the decision in the file rather than an omission. Its outbound traffic is the union of every integration an operator enables - mDNS and SSDP discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP - which no chart can know. A cap would protect little, since the devices sit on the node's own LAN, and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a flaky device rather than like a policy. So valkey's rule applies in the other direction: policyTypes names only what there is something to restrict. URLAUBSVERWALTUNG allows BOTH 5432 and 3306, deliberately. It is handed a full JDBC URL inside a 1Password item and never parses it, so it cannot tell PostgreSQL from MariaDB - and this cluster runs both. Allowing one would break half the possible deployments on upgrade, with the symptom buried in a Java stack trace. A small widening against a large and silent failure. RALLLY derives its SMTP rule from rallly.smtp.enabled rather than always rendering it: with mail switched off there is nothing to permit, and a rule that permits nothing makes the object look stricter than it is. BULWARK is the chart where the cap can fail most quietly. Its probes test its own port and say nothing about the JMAP server, so a jmapServerUrl on a port the policy does not allow yields a Ready pod serving an empty webmail. 443 is allowed, Stalwart's in-cluster 8080 is not, and both halves of that are in values.yaml and NOTES.txt. PATCHMON and HOMEASSISTANT select their pods by the BARE release-and-chart label, with no -deployment or -sfs suffix. Copying a selector from a neighbouring chart would have matched nothing and left a policy that filters nothing - which is precisely the first assertion of the render test. Five CI fixtures gain networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and they are the only place in the repository where the cap's cost is actually exercised: the CI dex runs on 5556 rather than 443 (patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault) and the CI JMAP server on plain 8080 (bulwark). Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:26:25 +00:00
jklein	6bde72192f	fix(ci): put outline's extraPorts entry where it belongs in the fixture ... The previous commit appended the networkPolicy block in the middle of the secrets: mapping, so dbSecretRef was absorbed into it. The chart's own values.schema.json caught it immediately - "at '/networkPolicy': additional properties 'dbSecretRef' not allowed" - which is exactly what issue #68 built that schema for: a key the chart does not read is a named error at render time instead of a silently missing secret. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:21:45 +00:00
jklein	ee9ae8a724	feat!: NetworkPolicy in six more charts, on by default ... bentopdf, apache-tika, gotenberg, rss-bridge, searxng, ytdlp-web-player. One major each, networkPolicy.enabled defaults to true. Three of them differ from the simple case in ways worth naming: GOTENBERG gets DNS-only egress as a deliberate, documented trade. It drives a headless Chromium, and 3000 is its probe port - so it is reachable from the whole cluster by default, and an egress rule for 80/443 would turn a service anyone can POST to into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs. The price is the remote-asset half of HTML conversion: inline content converts, images the page would have fetched silently do not. That degrades a PDF instead of failing a pod, so nothing alerts on it, which is why it is in the template header, in values.yaml and in NOTES.txt, with extraPorts: [80, 443] named as the knowing opt-in. RSS-BRIDGE, SEARXNG and YTDLP-WEB-PLAYER get the open internet on their web ports, because reaching other people's servers IS the application and this object cannot name a host. Said plainly in each, so none of them reads stricter than it is. What the cap still buys is real: no other outbound port, so a compromised pod reaches no database, no mail server and no SSH anywhere. APACHE-TIKA and GOTENBERG render no Ingress - their consumers are other pods, in other namespaces here - so neither gets an ingressController value and both say in NOTES.txt that narrowing probeSources means listing the consumers' namespaces in allowedNamespaces in the same change, or extraction and conversion stop. YTDLP-WEB-PLAYER names the gap this convention has: its oauth2-proxy subchart renders its own Deployment with its own labels and ships no policy, so with the proxy enabled the pod that actually faces the Ingress is unrestricted in both directions. Nothing in this chart can change that - an upstream chart is consumed as it comes - so it is written down instead. ci/outline/test-values.yaml gains egress.extraPorts: [5556]. The CI dex runs there rather than on 443, and Outline fetches the discovery document at boot - so this is the chart's documented escape hatch used for exactly the case it was written for, and the one place in the repo where the cap's upgrade risk is actually exercised. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:20:39 +00:00