helm-charts/ytdlp-web-player/templates/ytdlp-web-player.networkpolicy.yaml

{{- /*
NetworkPolicy for ytdlp-web-player (Gitea #5).

Downloading media is this application's purpose, so egress 80 and 443 to any
destination is the rule and cannot be narrowed - a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs
and selectors, never hostnames.

AND ONE THING THIS POLICY DOES NOT COVER AT ALL, which matters more here than
in any other chart of the sweep: THE OAUTH2-PROXY SUBCHART'S PODS. This policy
selects this chart's own workload by its app label; the subchart renders its own
Deployment with its own labels and brings no policy of its own. So with
oauth2-proxy enabled, the proxy pod - the component that actually faces the
Ingress - is unrestricted in both directions. That is a gap in the convention
and not a decision of this chart: an upstream chart is consumed as it comes
(README, "Chart dependencies"), and patching a subchart's templates is not done
here. Said out loud so nobody reads "the chart has a NetworkPolicy" as "the
release is covered".

WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
notice it exists.

WHAT IT IS NOT:
  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
    PORT to any destination.
  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
    configured while nothing is filtered.
  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".

THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
selects.
*/ -}}
{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
{{- /* networkPolicy.ingress - the policy's INBOUND side, and not the same thing
       as networkPolicy.ingressController (the SOURCE SELECTOR for the ingress
       controller's pods, a SIBLING of it and no part of it) nor as the
       top-level .Values.ingress (the Ingress object). All three match a search
       for "ingress"; one round of this work already mistook the second for an
       inbound escape hatch on the strength of the substring. */}}
{{- $npIngress := $np.ingress | default dict }}
{{- /* NULL-SAFE ON PURPOSE (#99): ambientMesh is an OBJECT, so every read goes
       through a fallback reproducing THIS chart's declared defaults. An
       operator who deletes the object, or writes only "enabled: true", must
       land on the defaults and not in a nil dereference - #136 shipped exactly
       that defect one value away, where the NOTES.txt branch dereferenced
       .networkPolicy.egress directly. Clearing the probe-source list restores
       the constant rather than removing the ipBlock, deliberately: the two
       halves are not separable, and enabled: false is how you open nothing. */}}
{{- $ambient := $npIngress.ambientMesh | default dict }}
{{- $ambientEnabled := $ambient.enabled }}
{{- $ambientPort := $ambient.port | default 15008 }}
{{- $ambientProbeSources := $ambient.redirectedProbeSources | default (list "169.254.7.127/32") }}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
  labels:
    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
spec:
  {{- /*
  Selects the Deployment's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
  */}}
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    {{- /*
    Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict: this workload
    needs DNS and the ports named below, and nothing else. A chart whose
    workload opens no outbound connection of its own must NOT list Egress -
    valkey is the example - because a rule that constrains nothing makes the
    object look stricter than it is.
    */}}
    - Egress
  ingress:
    {{- /*
    5000 - the port from ytdlpWebPlayer.ports named "http", which is the single
    place it is configured: the chart derives PORT from it, the Service targets it
    by that name, and all three probes address it by name. The probe path.
    */}}
    - ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 5000
        {{- if $ambientEnabled }}
        {{- /* FIRST HALF OF networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh (Gitea #143). 15008/TCP
               is ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, the port every inbound connection arrives on
               once the namespace carries istio.io/dataplane-mode - ambient "does not
               and will never bypass Kubernetes NetworkPolicy enforcement", so without
               it a pod in the mesh is simply unreachable.

               It is the one port here that is NOT a containerPort of the selected pod
               spec: ztunnel terminates it, not the application. ci/run-networkpolicy-
               test.sh therefore holds a NAMED exception for exactly this number, gated
               on exactly this value - and assertion 7 of that script proves, on a
               second render, that 15008 stays the ONLY such port and that it is absent
               while the value is false.

               AN ISTIO CONSTANT, NOT A STANDARD: 15008 is not registered with
               IANA for this, no protocol prescribes it, and Kubernetes knows
               nothing about it - Istio picked it for HBONE and Istio can change
               it. Hence a VALUE with a documented default rather than a literal
               here, so an operator can correct it without a chart release. Read
               for ztunnel 1.30.6. The exception ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh
               grants is pinned to the number THAT TEST names, plus a check that
               this chart declares the same default - never to whatever the value
               says, because that would let a mistyped port ride in through a
               configurable field (design A of #143).

               NOT MEASURED: that 15008 alone suffices comes from Istio's
               documentation. Measured on this cluster is only which listeners ztunnel
               opens. Provable at the first namespace to join the mesh; none has. */}}
        - protocol: TCP
          port: {{ int $ambientPort }}
        {{- end }}
      {{- if $probeSources }}
      {{- /*
      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.

      The ingress controller is added to the same rule. With oauth2-proxy enabled the
      traffic arrives from the PROXY POD instead, which allowedNamespaces cannot
      express at pod granularity - another reason the subchart gap above matters.
      */}}
      from:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              {{- /*
              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
              */}}
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
        {{- /*
        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
        */}}
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
          podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
          {{- end }}
        {{- end }}
        {{- range $allowedNs }}
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
        {{- end }}
        {{- range $probeSources }}
        - ipBlock:
            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
        {{- end }}
        {{- if $ambientEnabled }}
        {{- /* SECOND HALF OF networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh, and the reason it is
               one value and not two. Inside the mesh the kubelet's probes are
               redirected and no longer arrive from the worker node's address: they
               arrive from 169.254.7.127.

               An operator who only opens 15008 by hand writes a policy that passes
               review - and the moment probeSources is non-empty every probe is
               dropped, the pod never becomes Ready, and the symptom reads as a broken
               application rather than as a policy. That is assertion 4 of
               ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh one value further along. A switch whose
               halves can only be had together cannot be set halfway.

               Only in this branch, because this is the only branch with a "from" list:
               with no sources restricted the rule is open and needs no peer. The IPv6
               counterpart is deliberately absent - this cluster is SingleStack IPv4,
               and an ipBlock of the wrong family is accepted and matches nothing.

               WHERE 169.254.7.127 COMES FROM - vendor magic, not protocol:
               it is LINK-LOCAL (169.254.0.0/16, RFC 3927), a range reserved for
               node-local use and never routed; Istio's IPv6 counterpart
               fd16:9254:7127:1337:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff carries the SAME DIGITS
               plus 1337; and KUBERNETES DOES NOT KNOW THE ADDRESS - neither the
               NetworkPolicy API nor the kubelet - only Istio's data plane
               rewrites the probe source onto it. Read for ztunnel 1.30.6, and if
               Istio changes it THE FAILURE IS SILENT: probes dropped, and only
               where probeSources is non-empty, which is nowhere today.

               A LIST, not a string, and the one case where that does not
               contradict "a constant, not a configuration": a DUAL-STACK cluster
               needs BOTH entries at once. This cluster is SingleStack IPv4, so
               the IPv6 counterpart is left out - an ipBlock of the wrong family
               is accepted and matches nothing. Add it ALONGSIDE, never instead.

               UNPROVEN IN OPERATION: probeSources is empty in every chart here, so no
               release reaches this branch. CI proves its render, through the overlays
               in ci/networkpolicy. */}}
        {{- range $ambientProbeSources }}
        - ipBlock:
            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
        {{- end }}
        {{- end }}
      {{- else }}
      {{- /*
      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
      networkPolicy.probeSources.
      */}}
      {{- end }}
  egress:
    {{- /*
    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
    */}}
    - ports:
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
    {{- /*
    The web on both ports, to any destination: fetching media is the application.
    Not narrowable to the sites in use, because this object cannot name a host.
    */}}
    - ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 80
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 443
    {{- with $np.egress }}
    {{- with .extraPorts }}
    {{- /*
    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
    the whole policy off.
    */}}
    - ports:
        {{- range . }}
        - protocol: TCP
          port: {{ int . }}
        {{- end }}
    {{- end }}
    {{- end }}
{{- end }}