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helm-charts/outline/templates/outline.networkpolicy.yaml
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Revert the enforcement experiment, and record what it measured
Both experiments are in, and together they answer the question the scope of
#5 rests on - with an answer that is not the one the plan assumed.

MEASURED, run 888 on this branch:

  Install-test cyberchef   SUCCESS, 1m9s   probe port 8080 restricted to
                                           192.0.2.11/32, which cannot be the
                                           k3d node's address
  Install-test outline     FAILURE, 5m59s  DNS egress rule removed, so
                                           "postgres" and "redis" do not
                                           resolve and /_health cannot pass

So: POLICIES ARE ENFORCED in the install-test - outline's pod never became
Ready and rollout status timed out after six minutes, which is the net this
rollout needs. But THE KUBELET'S PROBE TRAFFIC IS EXEMPT from policy in k3s:
cyberchef became Ready in 69 seconds with its probe port restricted to an
address no probe can come from.

What that changes, and what it does not:

  - The plan's claim was "a policy that blocks the probe path makes the
    install-test red". That is NOT true here, and it is now measured rather
    than assumed. The install-test's net is for EGRESS and for anything the
    application itself needs, not for the probe path.
  - It does not undermine the rollout, because this convention never restricts
    a probe port by default - the rule is rendered without a "from" until an
    operator sets probeSources. The trap CI cannot see is therefore not
    triggered by this PR; it is triggered by a deliberate narrowing, which is
    what the NOTES.txt sentence and ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh's fourth
    assertion exist for.
  - It raises the stakes for the render assertions. A wrong ingress port - the
    NodePort mistake above all - would leave the pod Ready in CI (probes exempt)
    and no ingress controller runs there either, so nothing in the pipeline
    would notice. That failure is caught mechanically by assertion 2 or not at
    all.
  - And it says nothing about the production cluster, whose CNI is Calico, not
    k3s'. There, probe traffic is subject to policy, which is exactly why the
    default stays open.

Part of #5
2026-10-14 14:17:49 +00:00

193 lines
8.0 KiB
YAML

{{- /*
NetworkPolicy for outline (Gitea #5).
Outline is the first chart of this rollout whose policy has real work to do in
BOTH directions, and it is also the one that proves the egress cap bites: all
three of its probes hit /_health, which checks Postgres AND Redis, so a pod
that cannot reach its data stores never becomes Ready.
THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE CHART'S ONLY KNOWLEDGE OF ITS DEPENDENCIES, AND THEY
ARE A GUESS AT THE STANDARD ONES. Outline's database, Redis and OIDC provider
are configured through connection URLs inside 1Password items - the chart never
sees a host or a port, cannot derive one, and cannot validate one. So the rules
below name the standard ports (5432, 6379, 443) and nothing else. A deployment
whose Postgres listens anywhere else is BLOCKED, and it finds out through an
application-level connection error, not through this object. That is the
upgrade risk of this chart's policy, stated plainly; the escape hatch is
networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
notice it exists.
WHAT IT IS NOT:
- EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
PORT to any destination.
- NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
configured while nothing is filtered.
- THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
selects.
*/ -}}
{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
labels:
app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
spec:
{{- /*
Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
*/}}
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
policyTypes:
- Ingress
{{- /*
Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict: this workload
needs DNS and the ports named below, and nothing else. A chart whose
workload opens no outbound connection of its own must NOT list Egress -
valkey is the example - because a rule that constrains nothing makes the
object look stricter than it is.
*/}}
- Egress
ingress:
{{- /*
3000 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service targets, and the
one all three probes address (/_health). It is therefore the probe path.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 3000
{{- if $probeSources }}
{{- /*
RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress goes dark the
moment this list is filled.
*/}}
from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
{{- /*
Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
*/}}
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
{{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
{{- /*
ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
open the port to every pod in kube-system.
*/}}
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
{{- with $ic.podLabels }}
podSelector:
matchLabels:
{{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- range $allowedNs }}
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- range $probeSources }}
- ipBlock:
cidr: {{ . | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- else }}
{{- /*
NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
networkPolicy.probeSources.
*/}}
{{- end }}
egress:
{{- /*
DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
the pod is a trap and not a feature.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
{{- /*
Postgres. The port, not the host - outline.secrets.dbSecretRef carries a
connection URL the chart never parses, so this is the STANDARD port and not
the configured one. A Postgres on any other port is blocked and must be added
to networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5432
{{- /*
Redis/Valkey, same reasoning as Postgres above: the standard port, because
outline.secrets.redisSecretRef holds a URL this chart does not read.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 6379
{{- /*
Outbound HTTPS. Needed for the OIDC provider: Outline fetches the issuer's
discovery document at boot, and the discovery URL also lives inside a secret.
443 to any destination is as narrow as this object gets for that - a hostname
cannot appear in a NetworkPolicy. An OIDC provider on a non-standard port (a
CI dex on 5556, for instance) needs extraPorts.
*/}}
- ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 443
{{- with $np.egress }}
{{- with .extraPorts }}
{{- /*
Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
the whole policy off.
*/}}
- ports:
{{- range . }}
- protocol: TCP
port: {{ int . }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}