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bulwark, calibre-web-automated, patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault, zipline, sure, homeassistant. One major each. These are the charts with real outbound dependencies, and they all share one limitation that is now written into every one of them: THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Databases, caches and OIDC issuers arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items that the charts never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is blocked, and networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is the escape hatch. That is the upgrade risk of this rollout, stated per chart instead of discovered per release. Four of them differ in ways that mattered: HOMEASSISTANT gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and NO egress section at all, and that is the decision in the file rather than an omission. Its outbound traffic is the union of every integration an operator enables - mDNS and SSDP discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP - which no chart can know. A cap would protect little, since the devices sit on the node's own LAN, and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a flaky device rather than like a policy. So valkey's rule applies in the other direction: policyTypes names only what there is something to restrict. URLAUBSVERWALTUNG allows BOTH 5432 and 3306, deliberately. It is handed a full JDBC URL inside a 1Password item and never parses it, so it cannot tell PostgreSQL from MariaDB - and this cluster runs both. Allowing one would break half the possible deployments on upgrade, with the symptom buried in a Java stack trace. A small widening against a large and silent failure. RALLLY derives its SMTP rule from rallly.smtp.enabled rather than always rendering it: with mail switched off there is nothing to permit, and a rule that permits nothing makes the object look stricter than it is. BULWARK is the chart where the cap can fail most quietly. Its probes test its own port and say nothing about the JMAP server, so a jmapServerUrl on a port the policy does not allow yields a Ready pod serving an empty webmail. 443 is allowed, Stalwart's in-cluster 8080 is not, and both halves of that are in values.yaml and NOTES.txt. PATCHMON and HOMEASSISTANT select their pods by the BARE release-and-chart label, with no -deployment or -sfs suffix. Copying a selector from a neighbouring chart would have matched nothing and left a policy that filters nothing - which is precisely the first assertion of the render test. Five CI fixtures gain networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and they are the only place in the repository where the cap's cost is actually exercised: the CI dex runs on 5556 rather than 443 (patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault) and the CI JMAP server on plain 8080 (bulwark). Part of #5
268 lines
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268 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
{{- $replicas := include "calibre-web-automated.replicas" (dict "scaleDown" .Values.scaleDown "replicas" .Values.cwa.replicas) -}}
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{{- $startup := fromYaml (include "calibre-web-automated.startupProbe" .Values.cwa.startupProbe) -}}
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{{- $sfs := printf "%s-%s-sfs" .Release.Name .Chart.Name -}}
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{{- $pod := printf "%s-0" $sfs -}}
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{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
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{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
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{{- if not $hostnames -}}
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{{- $hostnames = list .Values.ingress.domain -}}
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{{- end -}}
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Calibre-Web Automated {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} — release {{ .Release.Name }} in namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
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{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
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ACCESS — INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false)
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https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}
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The certificate is requested by cert-manager through the "{{ .Values.ingress.clusterIssuer }}"
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cluster issuer. Until it has been issued the browser shows a warning; follow it with
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get certificate tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress
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Uploads are capped at {{ .Values.cwa.maxUploadFileSize }} by the Ingress, not by the application: the
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chart renders that value into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size and
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nginx.org/client-max-body-size. A bigger book is rejected with 413 by the
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controller before CWA ever sees it, so nothing about it reaches the app log.
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Both annotations are understood by the nginx-family controllers only, and this
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release uses ingressClassName "{{ .Values.ingress.className }}".
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{{- else if $httpRoute.enabled }}
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ACCESS — GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false)
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{{- range $hostnames }}
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https://{{ . }}
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{{- end }}
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This release renders an HTTPRoute ({{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute) and NOTHING
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else of the routing path — no Gateway, no class, no Certificate. Three things
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therefore belong to the cluster and not to this chart, and if any is missing
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the address above does not answer:
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1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed.
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2. The Gateway named in httpRoute.parentRefs
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{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
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{{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}
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{{- end }}
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must exist AND its listener must allow routes from this namespace
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({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment shows
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up only in the route's status:
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
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Read status.parents[].conditions — "Accepted: True" and
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"ResolvedRefs: True" is a working attachment. An empty status means no
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controller has looked at the route at all.
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3. The TLS certificate for the hostname, on the Gateway's listener.
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ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required: the
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chart renders no Certificate, so there is no
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tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress secret and nothing for cert-manager to do.
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YOUR UPLOAD LIMIT IS NOT cwa.maxUploadFileSize ANY MORE — IT IS THE GATEWAY'S.
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cwa.maxUploadFileSize ({{ .Values.cwa.maxUploadFileSize }}) is NOT ENFORCED in this mode. The chart
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renders it into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size, and the Gateway
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API has NO counterpart — it knows no body size at all, that is
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implementation-specific policy — so this chart deliberately renders no policy
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object, which would bind it to one implementation. Whatever limit the Gateway
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enforces is the limit your uploads get, and this is an e-book library: a book
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above the Gateway's default is rejected before CWA sees a byte, the user gets
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the proxy's error instead of a message from the application, and nothing says
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a chart value was ignored. Set the limit at the Gateway, or through its
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implementation's own policy object next to the Gateway — not here.
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ingress.annotations is inert in this mode as well, for the same reason: the
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Gateway API has no annotation channel.
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{{- else }}
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ACCESS — NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE
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ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both false, so this release is not
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published: no Ingress, no HTTPRoute and no certificate. Neither
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ingress.domain nor ingress.clusterIssuer is needed — this chart reads
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ingress.domain in the two routing templates and nowhere else, and with both
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of them off nothing reads it. The app is reachable
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inside the cluster as {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service:80. To open it locally:
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service 8083:80
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Then browse to http://localhost:8083. cwa.maxUploadFileSize ({{ .Values.cwa.maxUploadFileSize }}) does
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nothing in this mode — it exists only as an Ingress annotation, so an upload
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through the port-forward is limited by the volume and by nothing else.
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{{- end }}
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{{ if eq $replicas "0" }}
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SCALED TO ZERO
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{{ if .Values.scaleDown }}scaleDown: true{{ else }}cwa.replicas: 0{{ end }} — the StatefulSet runs with replicas: 0, so nothing
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answers until you set it back and upgrade again. Both PVCs, the Secret and the
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Service{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and Ingress stay in place, so no data is lost and the certificate
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is not re-issued.{{ else if $httpRoute.enabled }} and HTTPRoute stay in place, so no data is lost — the route then
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resolves to a Service with no endpoints and the Gateway answers its own
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error.{{ else }} stay in place, so no data is lost.{{ end }}
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{{ end }}
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FIRST LOGIN — THE DEFAULT PASSWORD IS PUBLIC
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Username "admin", password "admin123". Those are the upstream defaults, they
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stand in CWA's README, and this chart does not change them — the 1Password item
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below carries no admin credentials. Until you change it under Admin -> Users,
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everyone who reaches the address above is one guess away from being
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administrator.
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THE FIRST START BUILDS A LIBRARY, AND THE STARTUP PROBE IS TIMING IT
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Against an empty volume CWA notices that there is no Calibre library under
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/calibre-library and creates one itself, while the s6 init fixes ownership of
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/config. That first boot takes minutes where every later one takes seconds.
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The startup probe grants it {{ $startup.periodSeconds }}s x {{ $startup.failureThreshold }} failures = {{ mul $startup.periodSeconds $startup.failureThreshold }}s. On a slow volume
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the container is killed and restarted before it is finished, which presents as
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CrashLoopBackOff and is really a budget that is too small: raise
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cwa.startupProbe.failureThreshold, and watch the boot instead of guessing.
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} logs {{ $pod }} -f
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SECRETS — THE FIELDS THE 1PASSWORD ITEM MUST CARRY
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{{ .Values.secrets.cwaSecretRef }}
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→ Secret {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-secret
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hardcover-api-token becomes the HARDCOVER_TOKEN environment variable
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calibre-plugins mounted as /config/.config/calibre/customize.py.json,
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Calibre's plugin registry; "{}" is a valid empty value
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These field names are decided by this chart and appear nowhere in 1Password, so
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they are exactly what you would otherwise go and read in the templates. Both
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are required even if you never use Hardcover: the OnePasswordItem is created
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unconditionally, and so are the environment reference and the volume. A missing
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hardcover-api-token parks the pod in CreateContainerConfigError; a missing
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calibre-plugins fails the mount instead ("couldn't find key calibre-plugins"),
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and the container is never created at all.
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secrets.cwaSecretRef itself is required: the template guards it with
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required(), so a release without it does not render at all rather than
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creating a OnePasswordItem with an empty itemPath.
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CHANGING THE ITEM'S CONTENT RESTARTS NOTHING
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Helm never sees what is inside a OnePasswordItem, so it cannot hash it into the
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pod template: after you edit the item, "helm upgrade" finds no change and the
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running pod keeps the old values. Pointing secrets.cwaSecretRef at a DIFFERENT
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item does not help either — the Secret's name is built from the release and
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chart name, so the pod spec stays byte-identical. Roll it by hand:
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} rollout restart statefulset/{{ $sfs }}
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For the plugin file that is the only way: it is mounted with subPath, and a
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subPath mount is never refreshed by the kubelet, not even when the Secret
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itself has been updated. HARDCOVER_TOKEN is an environment variable and is
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likewise read once, at start.
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THE INGEST FOLDER DELETES WHAT YOU PUT INTO IT
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Books copied into /cwa-book-ingest are imported, converted, and then removed.
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Upstream is blunt about it: "All files within this folder will be DELETED after
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being processed." It is a drop box, never a second copy of the library — put
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nothing there that does not exist somewhere else.
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Downloading straight into it is unsupported for the same reason it sounds
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convenient: a half-written file gets picked up, which upstream warns "can cause
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duplicate imports and potentially a corrupt database". Copy finished files in.
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The folder is the ReadWriteMany claim {{ .Chart.Name }}-{{ .Release.Name }}-cwa-consume-pvc,
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and its size is fixed at 1Gi inside the chart — there is no value for it. An
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import batch larger than that fills the volume, and raising it means changing
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the chart, not the values file.
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EVERYTHING ELSE SHARES ONE CLAIM
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{{ .Chart.Name }}-{{ .Release.Name }}-cwa-pvc ({{ .Values.cwa.storage }} on {{ if .Values.cwa.storageClass }}storage class "{{ .Values.cwa.storageClass }}"{{ else }}the cluster's default storage class{{ end }})
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is mounted three times by subPath: config/ holds the application state,
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calibre-library/ the books and metadata.db, calibre-plugins/ the Calibre
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plugins. A growing library and the application's own database therefore draw on
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one quota, and a full volume does not merely stop imports — it takes the app
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down. That claim is also the entire backup: metadata.db without the book files
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is an index of nothing.
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THIS RELEASE IS SINGLE-INSTANCE BY CONSTRUCTION
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The StatefulSet mounts both claims by fixed name instead of using
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volumeClaimTemplates, so every replica would mount the same volumes — and the
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library claim is ReadWriteOnce. A second pod stays Pending unless it happens to
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land on the node holding the volume, and where it does start, two CWA processes
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write one SQLite metadata.db. Raising cwa.replicas above 1 buys nothing.
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THE HARDENING HERE IS DELIBERATELY NOT THE REPO STANDARD
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The image boots through the s6 init as root and only then drops the application
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to PUID/PGID 1000. Hence no runAsNonRoot/runAsUser, a writable root filesystem,
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and a capabilities.add that is not empty. Two of those look like oversights:
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readOnlyRootFilesystem: true switches the image's PUID/PGID remapping off.
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The application then runs as the built-in uid 911 and no longer has access to
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what uid 1000 wrote, so an existing library goes quietly unreadable.
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Without KILL the root supervisor cannot signal its own uid-1000 services. The
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pod stops shutting down cleanly and is SIGKILLed when the grace period ends.
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PUID and PGID are pinned to 1000 in the template, not in the values, and the
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pod's fsGroup default of 1000 is what matches them. Changing
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securityContext.pod.fsGroup on its own takes write access away from the app.
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WHAT A READY POD DOES NOT PROVE
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All three probes GET "/", and CWA answers that with its login page no matter
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what else is wrong. Ready therefore says the web server is up — not that the
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library was found, not that one import has ever succeeded, and not that the
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Hardcover token is accepted. Those show in the log, and only there.
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TIME, AND THE ENVIRONMENT THE CHART ALREADY OCCUPIES
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TZ is "{{ .Values.cwa.timezone }}", which decides the log timestamps and when CWA's scheduled
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tasks run. Besides TZ the chart sets PUID, PGID, HARDCOVER_TOKEN,
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CALIBRE_CONFIG_DIR and NETWORK_SHARE_MODE itself, and anything in cwa.env is
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appended after those.
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{{- if .Values.cwa.env }}
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There {{ if eq (len .Values.cwa.env) 1 }}is 1 such entry{{ else }}are {{ len .Values.cwa.env }} such entries{{ end }} in this release, and the chart does not check
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whether one of them repeats a name it has already used — nor does Kubernetes
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reject the repetition.
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{{- end }}
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NETWORK_SHARE_MODE is pinned to "false", which leaves SQLite write-ahead
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logging switched on. Upstream's instruction for the other case is explicit —
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"If you are deploying on a network share, set the following environment
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variable to disable WAL: NETWORK_SHARE_MODE=true" — so a library claim backed
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by NFS or SMB, which is what cwa.storageClass decides, runs into exactly the
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locking problems that setting exists to avoid.
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{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
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NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
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{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
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Inbound: TCP 8083 only. Outbound: DNS and TCP 443 (metadata providers){{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }},
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plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}. A send-to-Kindle or e-mail setup needs its SMTP port
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(587 or 465) in networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts — without it the send fails
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silently from this side.
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Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
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the object itself:
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- EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
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selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
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port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
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cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
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outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
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networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
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application-level connection error rather than through this object.
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{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
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- THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
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networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
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{{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
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Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
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CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
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and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
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looks like a broken application. Compare
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
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against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
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{{- else }}
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- THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
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empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
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routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
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isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
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networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
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address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
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permanently un-Ready.
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{{- end }}
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- IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
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this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
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configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
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shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
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namespace shows that it bites.
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Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
|
|
{{- end }}
|