helm-charts/calibre-web-automated/values.yaml

# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

secrets:
  # REQUIRED - op:// item path for the 1Password operator, carrying the fields
  # "hardcover-api-token" and "calibre-plugins". Both are needed even if you
  # never use Hardcover: the OnePasswordItem is created unconditionally, and so
  # are the environment reference and the volume. Without this value the render
  # aborts - required() in calibre-web-automated.secret.yaml is the whole
  # enforcement, and values.schema.json cannot help here (README, guideline 12).
  # Before the guard existed it produced an OnePasswordItem with an empty
  # itemPath, the operator had nothing to resolve, the Secret never appeared and
  # the pod could not start.
  cwaSecretRef: null

cwa:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  replicas: 1
  storage: 10Gi
  storageClass: longhorn
  timezone: "UTC"
  # The upload cap, and it lives entirely in the INGRESS: the chart renders it
  # into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size and
  # nginx.org/client-max-body-size, so it is enforced by the nginx-family
  # controllers and by nothing inside CWA. Consequences worth knowing before
  # trusting it: with ingress.enabled: false it does nothing at all, and in
  # Gateway mode (httpRoute.enabled) it is NOT ENFORCED either - the Gateway
  # API has no body-size field, the limit is the Gateway's own, and this chart
  # deliberately renders no implementation-specific policy object to set it
  # (Gitea #114). NOTES.txt says so in both modes.
  maxUploadFileSize: "10m"
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 10s * 30 = 300s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 512Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # Documented deviation from the repo-wide hardening standard: the CWA image
  # (linuxserver.io-style) must start as root — it boots via the s6-overlay
  # init system, whose stage-1/2 setup runs as uid 0 and then drops the app
  # to the PUID/PGID user (1000), so runAsNonRoot/runAsUser are deliberately
  # not set (s6 supervisors stay root, the application runs as uid 1000).
  # readOnlyRootFilesystem is deliberately false: in read-only mode the image
  # disables the PUID/PGID remapping (the runtime uid would silently change
  # from 1000 to the built-in 911 and break existing volume data) and its
  # init fails to write the ImageMagick policy under /etc. Everything else
  # is hardened: no privilege escalation and all capabilities dropped except
  # the minimal set the s6 init/supervision needs (verified against v4.0.6):
  # CHOWN/DAC_OVERRIDE/FOWNER/SETGID/SETUID for the ownership fix-up of
  # /config etc. and the root->PUID drop, KILL so the root supervisor can
  # signal the uid-1000 services (without it the pod cannot shut down
  # cleanly and gets SIGKILLed).
  securityContext:
    pod:
      fsGroup: 1000
      fsGroupChangePolicy: Always
      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
      #
      # It is orthogonal to the readOnlyRootFilesystem: false deviation above:
      # the filter restricts syscalls, not mount flags, so the s6 init keeps
      # its writable root filesystem and the PUID/PGID remapping to uid 1000
      # stays active. Verified against v4.0.6 under the filter.
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
        add:
          - CHOWN
          - DAC_OVERRIDE
          - FOWNER
          - KILL
          - SETGID
          - SETUID
  # Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets.
  # Rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef forms are
  # supported (see template-chart).
  env: []

ingress:
  # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. Nothing inside the pod reads
  # ingress.domain - no environment variable, no probe Host header, no URL the
  # app builds itself - so with the Ingress off, clusterIssuer and domain are
  # both unnecessary. That is still true, but no longer the whole sentence:
  # the HTTPRoute below is a SECOND reader of ingress.domain (while
  # httpRoute.hostnames is empty), so "domain is not needed" holds only while
  # BOTH routing modes are off.
  #
  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
  # true the render aborts, naming both values.
  enabled: true
  clusterIssuer: null
  # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress and - when
  # httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by the HTTPRoute, and by nothing else.
  domain: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer and proxy-body-size annotations the chart always sets.
  #
  # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no
  # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything configured here is
  # simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - it is then the
  # Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy object
  # this chart deliberately does not render. For THIS chart that includes the
  # upload cap: see cwa.maxUploadFileSize above.
  annotations: {}

# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
# httpRoute.enabled may be true.
#
# The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
#
# WHAT THIS MODE COSTS HERE: cwa.maxUploadFileSize is not enforced. It exists
# only as an ingress-nginx annotation and the Gateway API has no body-size
# field, so the limit becomes whatever the Gateway enforces. For an e-book
# library that is the one value worth checking before switching - a book above
# the Gateway's default is rejected by the proxy, and nothing in CWA's log says
# a chart value was ignored. NOTES.txt prints this in Gateway mode.
#
# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
httpRoute:
  enabled: false
  # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
  # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's
  # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's
  # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group,
  # kind), passed through unchanged:
  #
  #   parentRefs:
  #     - name: public
  #       namespace: gateway
  #       sectionName: https
  #
  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
  # nothing, with no event to say so.
  parentRefs: []
  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
  #
  # Cheap in this chart, because nothing inside the pod follows the hostname:
  # CWA is told its address by nothing, so a second name needs no second value
  # changed with it.
  hostnames: []

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
networkPolicy:
  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8083 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 443
  # for metadata lookups (covers and book details from public providers).
  #
  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: 443 goes to any destination - the providers are
  # hostnames, which this object cannot match. Inbound 8083 is not restricted
  # by source in the default, because it is the probe port. And a policy is
  # only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
  enabled: true
  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
  #
  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
  allowedNamespaces: []
  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8083, which is the port all three probes address.
  #
  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
  #
  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
  #
  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
  probeSources: []
  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled is true, and only in
  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
  # to every pod in kube-system.
  #
  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
  # traffic comes from.
  ingressController:
    namespace: kube-system
    podLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik

  # The policy's INBOUND side. Mind the three names that overlap as substrings,
  # because a search for "ingress" matches all of them and they are different
  # things:
  #
  #   ingress                          (top level) the Ingress OBJECT this chart
  #                                    renders - host, TLS, className
  #   networkPolicy.ingress            this block: what the policy lets IN
  #   networkPolicy.ingressController  the SOURCE SELECTOR for the ingress
  #                                    controller's pods. A SIBLING of this block
  #                                    and NO PART OF IT, despite the name.
  ingress:
    # Opens the pod for Istio's ambient mesh (Gitea #143). OFF by default and
    # additive: while it is false this chart renders byte for byte as it did
    # before the value existed.
    #
    # IT RENDERS TWO THINGS, and that they come together is the point:
    #
    #   1. 15008/TCP inbound - ztunnel's HBONE tunnel. Every inbound mesh
    #      connection arrives on it, and ambient "does not and will never bypass
    #      Kubernetes NetworkPolicy enforcement", so without this port a pod
    #      whose namespace has joined the mesh is unreachable.
    #   2. 169.254.7.127/32 as an additional peer - but ONLY where the rule
    #      restricts sources at all, which here means probeSources is non-empty.
    #      Inside the mesh the kubelet's probes are redirected and no longer come
    #      from the worker node's address.
    #
    # WHY ONE SWITCH AND NOT TWO: point 2 is the one nobody thinks of. Whoever
    # adds "15008" to a port list by hand writes a policy that passes review, and
    # the first time probeSources is narrowed every probe is dropped - the pod
    # never becomes Ready and the symptom reads as a broken application rather
    # than as a policy. A switch whose halves can only be had together cannot be
    # set halfway, which is why this is a named intention and not a port list.
    #
    # TWO THINGS IT DOES NOT PROVE:
    #   - That 15008 alone is enough. That comes from Istio's documentation;
    #     measured on this cluster is only which listeners ztunnel opens.
    #     Provable at the first namespace to join the mesh - none carries
    #     istio.io/dataplane-mode yet.
    #   - That the probe-source half works. probeSources is empty in every chart
    #     here, so no release reaches that branch. CI proves its render, not its
    #     effect.
    #
    # Note where the port lands: it joins the rule that carries the probe port,
    # so once probeSources restricts that rule, 15008 is restricted with it.
    # Whether ztunnel needs a peer of its own is open - it runs with its own pod
    # IPs in istio-system (measured: no hostNetwork on the DaemonSet, Istio
    # 1.30.6), so if one proves necessary it is expressible as a
    # namespaceSelector plus podSelector and needs no unknowable node CIDR.
    # BOTH NUMBERS BELOW ARE ISTIO CONSTANTS, NOT STANDARDS, and they are values
    # rather than template literals for exactly that reason: a vendor constant
    # can change, and an operator should be able to correct it without waiting
    # for a chart release. Their provenance is written on each one.
    #
    # DELETING THIS OBJECT IS SAFE. Every read falls back to the defaults
    # declared here (#99), so "ambientMesh: null", or an object carrying only
    # "enabled: true", renders the documented defaults instead of failing.
    ambientMesh:
      # The switch. Everything else here is inert while it is false, and the
      # chart renders exactly as it did before the object existed.
      enabled: false

      # ISTIO'S HBONE PORT. A constant Istio chose, not a standard: not
      # registered with IANA for this, prescribed by no protocol, and unknown to
      # Kubernetes. Read for ztunnel 1.30.6 (measured on this cluster: ztunnel
      # opens [::]:15008 as its inbound listener).
      #
      # If Istio changes it, a pod in the mesh cannot be reached. Change it here
      # in all 30 charts AND in the pinned expectation inside
      # ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh - the test is deliberately what forces
      # someone to look, because the exception it grants this port is pinned to
      # the number IT knows and not to whatever this value says. A value-driven
      # exception would let a mistyped port through, which is the hole design A
      # of #143 was rejected for.
      #
      # NOT MEASURED: that this port ALONE suffices comes from Istio's
      # documentation. Measured here is only which listeners ztunnel opens, and
      # no namespace carries istio.io/dataplane-mode yet.
      port: 15008

      # SOURCES THE KUBELET'S PROBES ARRIVE FROM ONCE ISTIO HAS REDIRECTED THEM.
      #
      # NOT THE SAME VALUE AS networkPolicy.probeSources one level up, and the
      # two are easy to confuse, so:
      #
      #   networkPolicy.probeSources
      #       YOUR worker node CIDRs. Empty by default, and empty means the
      #       probe rule is OPEN. The chart cannot know these addresses.
      #   networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh.redirectedProbeSources
      #       ISTIO's rewrite address. Shipped filled, because unlike the node
      #       IPs it is a constant the chart CAN know. Only rendered where the
      #       rule above is restricted, i.e. where probeSources is non-empty.
      #
      # WHERE 169.254.7.127 COMES FROM - vendor magic, not protocol:
      #
      #   - LINK-LOCAL, 169.254.0.0/16 (RFC 3927): a range reserved for
      #     node-local use that is never routed - exactly the range one picks a
      #     vendor's magic address out of.
      #   - Istio's IPv6 counterpart gives it away:
      #     fd16:9254:7127:1337:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff carries the SAME DIGITS
      #     (9254:7127 is 169.254.7.127) plus 1337. Numbers built that way are
      #     vendor constants, not protocols.
      #   - KUBERNETES DOES NOT KNOW THIS ADDRESS. Neither the NetworkPolicy API
      #     nor the kubelet has any notion of it; only Istio's own data plane
      #     rewrites the probe source onto it.
      #
      # Read for ztunnel 1.30.6. IF ISTIO CHANGES IT, THE FAILURE IS SILENT:
      # probes would be dropped, and only where probeSources is non-empty - which
      # is nowhere in this repository today - so nothing here and nothing in
      # Kubernetes would report it. What to re-check then: the address Istio's
      # release notes name for probe redirection, this list in all 30 charts, and
      # the pinned expectation in ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh.
      #
      # A LIST, not a string, and the one case where that does not contradict "a
      # constant, not a configuration": on a DUAL-STACK cluster BOTH entries are
      # needed at the same time, not one of two. This cluster is SingleStack
      # IPv4, so the IPv6 counterpart is left out - an ipBlock of the wrong
      # family is accepted by the API server and matches nothing. Add it
      # ALONGSIDE, never instead, if the cluster gains IPv6.
      #
      # Clearing this list restores the default rather than removing the ipBlock,
      # deliberately: the two halves of this switch are not separable. To not
      # open the port at all, set enabled: false.
      #
      # UNPROVEN IN OPERATION: probeSources is empty in every chart here, so no
      # release reaches this branch. CI proves the render, not the effect.
      redirectedProbeSources:
        - 169.254.7.127/32

  egress:
    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
    #
    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
    #
    # Add a port only for a metadata provider or an e-mail/send-to-Kindle setup
    # that does not use 443 - SMTP submission would be 587 or 465.
    extraPorts: []