helm-charts/freesailarr/values.yaml

# freesailarr runs gluetun plus the whole media automation stack in a single
# StatefulSet pod: every app container shares gluetun's network namespace, the
# containers talk to each other over localhost and all traffic leaves through
# the Wireguard tunnel.
#
# Image pinning (documented deviation from the Chart.AppVersion standard):
# NO image tag comes from appVersion. All nine images, gluetun included, are
# pinned here via <app>.image.repository / <app>.image.tag, because the stack
# combines nine independently versioned upstream projects and none of them is
# "the" one app version.
#
# That is also what puts every image under Renovate: the built-in helm-values
# manager reads image.repository/image.tag pairs out of this file and proposes
# one update per image, and ci/renovate-bump-chart.sh bumps the chart version
# along with it. A chart whose main image came from appVersion would instead
# need a hard-coded block in renovate.json5 - freesailarr deliberately has none.
#
# Chart.yaml's appVersion is therefore the chart's own version marker, freely
# chosen and tied to no upstream - not the source of any tag here. Nothing
# rewrites it automatically; raise it by hand when you want to mark a new
# edition of the chart as a whole.

# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

# Replica count for the whole stack (one pod contains all containers); 0 is
# allowed and scales it down. The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
# More than 1 replica is not meaningful: every replica would run its own
# isolated stack on its own config volumes.
replicas: 1

secrets:
  # op:// item path for the gluetun VPN credentials. The 1Password item must
  # contain the fields "wireguard-private-key" (the Wireguard private key) and
  # "wireguard-addresses" (the Wireguard interface address, e.g. 10.x.y.z/32).
  gluetunSecretRef: null

# User/group the linuxserver.io containers drop to after init (their PUID/PGID
# mechanism) and the runAsUser/runAsGroup for the seerr and recyclarr
# containers. Media and config volumes must be writable for this user.
puid: 1000
pgid: 1000
# Timezone for all containers.
timezone: Europe/Zurich

securityContext:
  # Pod-level security context. No pod-level runAsNonRoot/runAsUser: the pod
  # mixes root containers (gluetun, linuxserver.io images) with non-root ones
  # (seerr, recyclarr, flaresolverr); users are set per container instead.
  # fsGroup (keep in sync with pgid) makes freshly provisioned config volumes
  # group-writable for the non-root containers; fsGroupChangePolicy
  # OnRootMismatch avoids recursively re-chowning the (large, shared) media
  # claims on every pod start.
  # How far that reaches is the CSI driver's decision, not this chart's, and the
  # media claims are the case where it stops short: a driver whose fsGroupPolicy
  # is ReadWriteOnceWithFSType - Longhorn's setting - applies fsGroup to RWO
  # volumes only, so on an RWX media claim fsGroup is ignored outright and
  # OnRootMismatch never even gets a say. The config claims are RWO and are
  # covered normally. Consequence for the media claims: their root directory has
  # to be writable for PUID/PGID by itself, see the media block below (#164).
  # seccompProfile RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default
  # syscall filter to every container in the pod, init containers included, and
  # is set at pod level so a container added later inherits it without the
  # value being repeated. It is worth naming what it has to survive here:
  # gluetun runs as root with NET_ADMIN, creates a tun device and programs
  # iptables, and the s6-overlay init of the five linuxserver.io images starts
  # as root and drops to PUID/PGID via CHOWN/SETUID/SETGID. Both were verified
  # against a real tunnel under this filter - see the chart's PR.
  # A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still override it
  # under <app>.securityContext, which wins over the pod value.
  pod:
    fsGroup: 1000
    fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault

storage:
  # StorageClass for all config volumeClaimTemplates (null = cluster default).
  storageClass: null

# Media libraries as pre-existing PVCs (shared with the separately deployed
# Jellyfin) - the chart mounts but never creates them. Each claim is required
# as soon as an app that mounts it is enabled:
#   downloads: qbittorrent, radarr, sonarr
#   movies:    radarr, bazarr
#   tv:        sonarr, bazarr
#
# subPath mounts a sub-directory of the claim instead of its root (null = the
# claim root, i.e. one claim per category). The same existingClaim may back two
# or all three categories, which is what makes the one-library-volume layout
# possible - one claim, one sub-directory per category:
#
#   media:
#     downloads: { existingClaim: media-library, subPath: downloads }
#     movies:    { existingClaim: media-library, subPath: movies }
#     tv:        { existingClaim: media-library, subPath: tv-shows }
#
# Categories sharing a claim get exactly ONE pod volume entry and differ only in
# the subPath of their mounts (#164). That is not cosmetic: a pod that lists the
# same claim twice never starts - it stays in Init:0/1 forever without a single
# kubelet event (measured on RKE2/Longhorn, with RWO as well as RWX). The entry
# is named after the first ENABLED category in the fixed order downloads,
# movies, tv that carries the claim, so the name does not wander when an
# unrelated app flag changes (see the mediaVolumeName helper).
#
# The subPath directories do NOT have to exist beforehand - the kubelet creates
# a missing one. What it does not do is give it usable permissions: the created
# directory belongs to root and inherits the mode of the CLAIM ROOT. So the one
# thing that has to hold is:
#
#   the root directory of the claim must be writable for PUID/PGID.
#
# Do not count on fsGroup for that. Whether the kubelet applies fsGroup to a
# volume at all is the CSI driver's decision (its fsGroupPolicy), not the pod's:
# Longhorn ships ReadWriteOnceWithFSType, so fsGroup applies to its RWO volumes
# and is silently ignored on an RWX claim - measured by the reporter of #164 on
# the target cluster (kubectl get csidriver driver.longhorn.io -o
# jsonpath='{.spec.fsGroupPolicy}').
#
# In practice this works out on Longhorn because Longhorn hands out its volume
# root as mode 777, and a subPath directory created under it inherits those 777
# - root-owned, but writable for everyone. That is a property of the driver, not
# of Kubernetes. Measured in k3d against a claim whose root is 0755 and with no
# fsGroup in effect: the kubelet creates /movies as root:root 0755 and the
# container's `touch` fails with EPERM. On such a driver, prepare the claim root
# once (chown 1000:1000 or chmod g+w with the right group) before the first
# start - the chart deliberately does not chown anything: a multi-TB library
# must not be walked on every pod start.
#
# What this buys and what it does NOT buy - measured in a k3d cluster against
# this chart, because the usual argument for a shared volume is hardlinking:
#   - It buys the layout: one claim to provision, back up and share with
#     Jellyfin, with the categories as sibling directories instead of three
#     separate volumes.
#   - It does NOT buy hardlinked imports. Radarr and Sonarr import by moving,
#     and a move within one filesystem can be a hardlink or a rename instead of
#     a copy - but Kubernetes turns every volumeMount into its own bind mount,
#     and link()/rename() across two mount points fails with EXDEV even when
#     both sides are the same claim on the same device. Measured: /downloads and
#     /movies in the radarr container both report device 65025 and resolve to
#     the same PV directory, yet `ln /downloads/f /movies/f` fails with
#     "Cross-device link", while the identical link succeeds when the claim root
#     is mounted once and both categories are sub-directories under it.
#     This is not a property of subPath: two plain mounts of the same claim
#     without any subPath fail exactly the same way, so the chart has never
#     supported cross-category hardlinks.
#   - Consequence today: an import still copies, so download and library each
#     hold a full copy until the torrent is removed.
#
# HARDLINKS NEED ONE MOUNT, NOT ONE CLAIM. This is the conclusion people draw
# from the paragraph above and get wrong, so it is spelled out: adding downloads
# as a third subPath on the shared claim changes NOTHING about hardlinks. The
# kernel compares the VFSMOUNT in do_linkat, not the superblock, and two bind
# mounts of the same filesystem are two vfsmounts - hence EXDEV. Measured again
# on Longhorn/NFS: both mount points report st_dev 0:56, the mount table shows
# two mount IDs on that one device, a cross-mount link() fails, and a link()
# inside a single mount succeeds with link count 2.
# The device number is the trap. "stat" reports the same device on both sides
# and thereby suggests the exact opposite of what happens - which is why this
# reads like an application bug instead of a property of the mount namespace.
# The layout that WOULD hardlink is one claim with exactly ONE mount and the
# categories as sub-directories inside it (the "one /data mount" layout the *arr
# guides recommend). The chart cannot express that today - it mounts each
# category separately. Named as a possibility, not as instructions: there are no
# values for it, and providing them would be a change to the mount layout.
media:
  downloads:
    existingClaim: null
    subPath: null
  movies:
    existingClaim: null
    subPath: null
  tv:
    existingClaim: null
    subPath: null

# Ingress defaults. There are two shapes, and they mix freely:
#
#   1. One host per app (the default). Every app carries its own
#      <app>.ingress.host, so the hosts are independent of each other and may
#      live in completely different domains. Each app gets its own Ingress
#      object and its own certificate.
#   2. One shared domain with sub-paths: set ingress.host and leave the per-app
#      hosts empty. Every app then moves into ONE Ingress object as a sub-path
#      (<app>.ingress.path, default /<app>), which means one DNS name and one
#      certificate for the whole stack instead of six.
#
# A per-app host always wins: an app that has one keeps its own object even
# while ingress.host is set, so a mixed setup needs no extra values.
#
# clusterIssuer, className and annotations are the defaults for all apps and
# can be overridden per app in the <app>.ingress block (an explicitly set
# per-app value always wins). The shared object uses the global values only -
# it belongs to no single app.
#
# What the sub-path mode costs, per app, measured against the upstream
# documentation and not assumed:
#
#   - radarr, sonarr, prowlarr: nothing. The chart sets their UrlBase itself
#     (RADARR__SERVER__URLBASE and friends) as soon as they render under a
#     path other than "/" - unless that app's own env block already contains
#     the variable, in which case yours wins and the chart stays out.
#     One measured detail, in case a probe ever looks odd: with a UrlBase set,
#     these apps answer the bare /ping with "307 Temporary Redirect,
#     Location: /<urlbase>/ping" instead of 200. The probes keep passing -
#     the kubelet counts every status from 200 to 399 as success, and the
#     containers come up Ready with 0 restarts (verified in k3d) - so the
#     probe paths are deliberately left at /ping and stay valid in both
#     ingress shapes. Worth knowing before reading anything into that 307.
#   - bazarr: ONE manual step. Bazarr reads its base path only from its own
#     configuration, it has no environment variable for it, so after the first
#     start set Settings -> General -> Base URL to the same value as
#     bazarr.ingress.path and restart the pod. Until then the sub-path yields
#     a broken UI - and it does NOT announce itself with a 404: bazarr answers
#     every unknown path with its index page, so /bazarr/ AND /bazarr/<asset>
#     both return "200 text/html" of identical length (measured in k3d). The
#     page loads, its assets silently come back as HTML, and nothing looks
#     like an error. Check the content type, not the status code. Deliberately not
#     automated: seeding it would mean an init container writing into bazarr's
#     config database, which is a much bigger promise than this chart wants to
#     make. Note that bazarr's probes address "/" - if it does not answer
#     there once a base URL is set, adjust bazarr.livenessProbe/readinessProbe/
#     startupProbe accordingly (they are values, precisely for cases like this).
#   - qbittorrent: it has no base path at all, so the chart gives it its own
#     Ingress object on the same host with an nginx rewrite that strips the
#     prefix. Two traps from the upstream recipe, both of which look like a
#     login failure and therefore point in the wrong direction:
#       * qBittorrent marks its session cookie "Secure". Reaching the UI over
#         plain HTTP means the browser never sends the cookie back and every
#         click bounces to the login form. Use https.
#       * qBittorrent bans the client IP for a while after a few failed login
#         attempts. Once that has triggered, even correct credentials fail -
#         the ban has to expire (or the pod be restarted) first.
#     If it does not work behind the stripped prefix, the fallback costs no
#     chart change: set qbittorrent.ingress.host and qBittorrent is back on a
#     host of its own while everything else stays on the shared domain.
#   - seerr: it has no base-path support either and, unlike qBittorrent,
#     cannot be fixed by a rewrite (the upstream request has been open since
#     May 2022, https://github.com/Fallenbagel/jellyseerr/issues/97). It
#     therefore sits at "/" and the chart refuses to render it anywhere else.
#     If seerr is switched off, nothing serves the root and the shared domain
#     answers 404 there. That is correct and left alone on purpose.
ingress:
  # Master switch: false suppresses every app ingress regardless of the
  # per-app toggles.
  enabled: true
  # The shared domain for the sub-path mode, e.g. "media.example.com". Empty
  # means the default: each app on a host of its own.
  host: ""
  clusterIssuer: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress objects; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
  annotations: {}

gluetun:
  # Pinned here like every other image in this chart, so Renovate's helm-values
  # manager proposes gluetun updates too. Docker Hub tags carry a v prefix.
  image:
    repository: docker.io/qmcgaw/gluetun
    tag: v3.41.3
  vpn:
    serviceProvider: mullvad
    type: wireguard
    serverCities: Zurich
    serverCountries: Switzerland
    dnsUpstreamResolvers: quad9
    # Comma-separated CIDRs the gluetun firewall allows outbound traffic to
    # outside the VPN tunnel. Set this to the cluster pod and service CIDRs
    # (e.g. "10.42.0.0/16,10.43.0.0/16" on k3s) - without it the firewall
    # blocks cluster-internal egress such as DNS lookups against cluster DNS
    # and seerr talking to the in-cluster Jellyfin.
    firewallOutboundSubnets: null
  storage:
    # Size of the gluetun config volume (server list cache under /gluetun).
    size: 1Gi
  # Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets.
  # Values are rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef
  # forms are supported. (Same for every <app>.env block below.)
  env: []
  # gluetun's built-in HTTP health server; the chart binds it to :9999 (env
  # HEALTH_SERVER_ADDRESS) so the kubelet probes, which connect to the pod IP,
  # can reach it. It returns 200 only while the VPN tunnel is up and working.
  # Liveness is more tolerant (60s) than readiness (30s): during a short
  # tunnel re-negotiation gluetun recovers on its own and a kubelet restart
  # would only prolong the outage; the kill switch keeps all egress blocked
  # the whole time, so nothing runs unprotected.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 9999
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 6
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 9999
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Budget for image start plus
  # Wireguard handshake: 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 9999
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    # (Same for every <app>.resources block below.)
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 128Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 50Mi
  # Deviations from the hardening baseline, forced by gluetun's role as VPN
  # gateway:
  # - runs as root (no runAsNonRoot): required to create the tun device and
  #   program the firewall.
  # - NET_ADMIN capability: creates the Wireguard tunnel and the iptables
  #   rules (firewall, kill switch).
  # - readOnlyRootFilesystem: false: gluetun rewrites /etc/resolv.conf and
  #   other files on its root filesystem at runtime.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL
      add:
        - NET_ADMIN

qbittorrent:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: docker.io/linuxserver/qbittorrent
    tag: 5.2.3
  # Every app gets its own Ingress object (named <release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress)
  # with its own TLS secret tls-<release>-<chart>-<app>-ingress, so the apps can
  # be exposed independently and under unrelated hosts.
  # host is required while enabled is true and has no default - an app whose
  # ingress is switched off never demands one, and neither does an app served
  # under the shared ingress.host. clusterIssuer, className and annotations may
  # be set here to override the global ingress block.
  # path is only read in the shared-domain mode (see the ingress block above);
  # it defaults to /<app> and is ignored while this app has a host of its own.
  # (Same block for prowlarr, radarr, sonarr, seerr and bazarr below.)
  ingress:
    enabled: true
    host: null
    path: /qbittorrent
    # clusterIssuer: null
    # className: null
    # annotations: {}
  storage:
    # The CONFIG volume, and it is meant to stay small: it holds
    # qBittorrent.conf, the BT_backup state and nothing else. Downloads must
    # never land here - see savePath below for what happens when they do.
    size: 1Gi
  # Default save path for new torrents, seeded into the persisted config by the
  # init container below. Without it qBittorrent falls back to its built-in
  # default /config/Downloads, which is this 1Gi config volume: it fills within
  # minutes, every torrent goes to "errored", and qBittorrent can no longer
  # even write its own metadata to BT_backup - so a restart in that state costs
  # the torrent list. The failure looks like a network, tracker or VPN problem
  # and needs a "df" to recognise. Measured on a real cluster, not assumed.
  # /downloads is the media claim (media.downloads), mounted into this
  # container.
  # Unlike networkInterface below this value is seeded ONLY when the key is
  # absent from the config, never replaced: the save path is a legitimate
  # operator decision, and someone who changes it in the WebUI must not be
  # overwritten on every pod restart. Set it to null or "" to opt out entirely
  # and leave the path to qBittorrent's built-in default (not recommended, see
  # above).
  savePath: /downloads
  # Network interface qBittorrent binds its BitTorrent session to - gluetun's
  # Wireguard device. Without this binding libtorrent listens and announces on
  # every interface in the shared pod network namespace, including eth0 (the
  # pod IP) and loopback. Those announces bypass the tunnel, so gluetun's kill
  # switch (OUTPUT DROP except tun0 and the allowed cluster subnets) drops
  # them: trackers report "skipping tracker announce (unreachable)", no peers
  # are found and torrents stall at 0 bytes in stalledDL. Binding to tun0 is
  # therefore both the functional fix and a leak fix - it stops qBittorrent
  # from listening on the pod IP past the tunnel. The value is written into
  # /config/qBittorrent/qBittorrent.conf by the config-seed init container
  # below, and it is ENFORCED on every start (unlike savePath), because a
  # deviating value would be a leak; setting it to null or "" drops the binding
  # and leaves it to the user (not recommended).
  networkInterface: tun0
  # The init container that seeds qbittorrent.networkInterface and
  # qbittorrent.savePath into the persisted qBittorrent config before the app
  # starts. Runs as puid/pgid so the config file keeps the ownership the app
  # expects. Setting both networkInterface and savePath to null removes the
  # init container entirely.
  configInit:
    # Auxiliary busybox image for the init container, pinned here like every
    # other image in this chart and proposed by Renovate the same way.
    image:
      repository: docker.io/busybox
      tag: "1.38.0"
    resources:
      limitFactor: 3
      requests:
        cpu: 10m
        memory: 16Mi
        ephemeralStorage: 1Mi
    securityContext:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  env: []
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 8080
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 8080
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 8080
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.2
      memory: 512Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # Deviations from the hardening baseline, forced by the linuxserver.io
  # images (s6-overlay init that starts as root and drops to PUID/PGID):
  # - no runAsNonRoot: s6-overlay must start as root to apply PUID/PGID and
  #   chown /config.
  # - readOnlyRootFilesystem: false: the s6 init applies PUID/PGID by
  #   rewriting /etc/passwd and /etc/group and stages runtime state on the
  #   root filesystem. With a read-only root filesystem the containers still
  #   start, but silently keep the image's built-in uid/gid (911) instead of
  #   PUID/PGID (verified at runtime) - unacceptable for the shared media
  #   volumes.
  # - capabilities: ALL dropped except what the s6-overlay init needs:
  #   CHOWN/FOWNER/DAC_OVERRIDE (taking ownership of /config and /run) and
  #   SETUID/SETGID (dropping from root to the PUID/PGID user).
  # (Same block for all linuxserver.io containers: qbittorrent, prowlarr,
  # radarr, sonarr, bazarr.)
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL
      add:
        - CHOWN
        - DAC_OVERRIDE
        - FOWNER
        - SETGID
        - SETUID

prowlarr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: docker.io/linuxserver/prowlarr
    tag: 2.3.5
  # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
  ingress:
    enabled: true
    host: null
    path: /prowlarr
    # clusterIssuer: null
    # className: null
    # annotations: {}
  storage:
    size: 1Gi
  env: []
  # The *arr apps expose /ping as an unauthenticated health endpoint.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 9696
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 9696
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 9696
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 256Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL
      add:
        - CHOWN
        - DAC_OVERRIDE
        - FOWNER
        - SETGID
        - SETUID

flaresolverr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: ghcr.io/flaresolverr/flaresolverr
    tag: v3.5.0
  # No ingress and no config volume: flaresolverr is stateless and only
  # consumed by prowlarr over localhost.
  env: []
  # /health is flaresolverr's dedicated lightweight health endpoint.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /health
      port: 8191
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /health
      port: 8191
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /health
      port: 8191
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.2
      memory: 512Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 200Mi
  # Deviations from the hardening baseline, forced by the flaresolverr image:
  # - readOnlyRootFilesystem: false: on startup flaresolverr copies and
  #   patches the chromedriver binary to the hardcoded path /app/chromedriver
  #   and writes chromedriver caches under /app (its home directory).
  # - runAsUser/runAsGroup pin the image's "flaresolverr" user numerically
  #   (uid/gid 1000; the image declares it by name only, which the kubelet's
  #   runAsNonRoot check cannot verify).
  # Chromium's scratch paths (/tmp, /dev/shm) are emptyDirs.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
    runAsGroup: 1000
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL

radarr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: docker.io/linuxserver/radarr
    tag: 6.1.1
  # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
  ingress:
    enabled: true
    host: null
    path: /radarr
    # clusterIssuer: null
    # className: null
    # annotations: {}
  storage:
    size: 1Gi
  env: []
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 7878
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 7878
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 7878
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 256Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL
      add:
        - CHOWN
        - DAC_OVERRIDE
        - FOWNER
        - SETGID
        - SETUID

recyclarr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: ghcr.io/recyclarr/recyclarr
    tag: 8.7.1
  # No ingress: recyclarr has no web UI, it syncs TRaSH guides to radarr and
  # sonarr on a schedule (daemon mode).
  storage:
    size: 1Gi
  env: []
  # recyclarr serves no HTTP port in daemon mode, so all probes exec the CLI.
  livenessProbe:
    exec:
      command:
        - recyclarr
        - --version
    periodSeconds: 30
    timeoutSeconds: 10
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    exec:
      command:
        - recyclarr
        - --version
    periodSeconds: 30
    timeoutSeconds: 10
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    exec:
      command:
        - recyclarr
        - --version
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 10
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.05
      memory: 128Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 50Mi
  # The image supports running as an arbitrary non-root user; runAsUser and
  # runAsGroup are set from the global puid/pgid values in the template - do
  # not set them here.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
    runAsNonRoot: true
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL

sonarr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: docker.io/linuxserver/sonarr
    tag: 4.0.17
  # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
  ingress:
    enabled: true
    host: null
    path: /sonarr
    # clusterIssuer: null
    # className: null
    # annotations: {}
  storage:
    size: 1Gi
  env: []
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 8989
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 8989
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /ping
      port: 8989
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 256Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL
      add:
        - CHOWN
        - DAC_OVERRIDE
        - FOWNER
        - SETGID
        - SETUID

seerr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: ghcr.io/seerr-team/seerr
    tag: v3.4.1
  # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
  ingress:
    enabled: true
    host: null
    path: /
    # clusterIssuer: null
    # className: null
    # annotations: {}
  storage:
    size: 1Gi
  env: []
  # /api/v1/settings/public answers unauthenticated once the app is up.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /api/v1/settings/public
      port: 5055
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /api/v1/settings/public
      port: 5055
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. First boot runs database
  # migrations: budget 10s * 30 = 300s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /api/v1/settings/public
      port: 5055
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 256Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # The image runs fine as an arbitrary non-root user; runAsUser and
  # runAsGroup are set from the global puid/pgid values in the template - do
  # not set them here.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
    runAsNonRoot: true
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL

bazarr:
  enabled: true
  image:
    repository: docker.io/linuxserver/bazarr
    tag: 1.5.6
  # See the qbittorrent ingress comment.
  ingress:
    enabled: true
    host: null
    path: /bazarr
    # clusterIssuer: null
    # className: null
    # annotations: {}
  storage:
    size: 1Gi
  env: []
  # bazarr has no unauthenticated health endpoint; / serves the UI with 200.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 6767
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 6767
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: 6767
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  resources:
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 256Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 100Mi
  # linuxserver.io image - see the qbittorrent securityContext comment.
  securityContext:
    allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
    readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
    capabilities:
      drop:
        - ALL
      add:
        - CHOWN
        - DAC_OVERRIDE
        - FOWNER
        - SETGID
        - SETUID