helm-charts/gotenberg/templates/gotenberg.networkpolicy.yaml

{{- /*
NetworkPolicy for gotenberg (Gitea #5).

Gotenberg here is a cluster-internal service: no Ingress, and its consumers are
other pods (paperless-ngx converts mail HTML to PDF through it).

EGRESS IS DNS ONLY BY DEFAULT, AND THAT IS A DELIBERATE, VISIBLE TRADE rather
than an oversight. Gotenberg drives a headless Chromium, so an egress rule for
80 and 443 would let anything that can POST to this service fetch arbitrary
URLs through it - a textbook SSRF pivot, and the pod is reachable from the
whole cluster by default because 3000 is the probe port. Blocking it costs the
remote-asset half of HTML conversion: a converted page keeps its EMBEDDED
content and loses the images it would have FETCHED, which degrades a PDF rather
than failing a pod. The degradation is silent, which is why it is named here, in
values.yaml and in NOTES.txt.

A deployment that needs those images sets networkPolicy.egress.remoteAssets:
true - a named switch rather than a line in extraPorts, so the trade is a
decision someone made and not a port number nobody can place. Its default is
off, because restrictive-by-default is the convention and the deployment is
where reality is accommodated. The long form of what it buys, and of the one
thing about it that was NOT verified, is on the rule itself.

WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
notice it exists.

WHAT IT IS NOT:
  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
    PORT to any destination.
  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
    configured while nothing is filtered.
  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".

THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
selects.
*/ -}}
{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
{{- /* networkPolicy.ingress - the policy's INBOUND side, and not the same thing
       as networkPolicy.ingressController (the SOURCE SELECTOR for the ingress
       controller's pods, a SIBLING of it and no part of it) nor as the
       top-level .Values.ingress (the Ingress object). All three match a search
       for "ingress"; one round of this work already mistook the second for an
       inbound escape hatch on the strength of the substring. */}}
{{- $npIngress := $np.ingress | default dict }}
{{- $ambientMesh := $npIngress.ambientMesh }}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
  labels:
    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
spec:
  {{- /*
  Selects the Deployment's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
  */}}
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    {{- /*
    Egress is listed because this is the chart where the cap matters most: a
    headless Chromium that can reach the internet turns a service anyone in the
    cluster can POST to into an SSRF pivot. DNS is the only rule.
    */}}
    - Egress
  ingress:
    {{- /*
    3000 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service forwards 80 to, and
    the one all three probes address. The probe path.
    */}}
    - ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 3000
        {{- if $ambientMesh }}
        {{- /* FIRST HALF OF networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh (Gitea #143). 15008/TCP
               is ztunnel's HBONE tunnel, the port every inbound connection arrives on
               once the namespace carries istio.io/dataplane-mode - ambient "does not
               and will never bypass Kubernetes NetworkPolicy enforcement", so without
               it a pod in the mesh is simply unreachable.

               It is the one port here that is NOT a containerPort of the selected pod
               spec: ztunnel terminates it, not the application. ci/run-networkpolicy-
               test.sh therefore holds a NAMED exception for exactly this number, gated
               on exactly this value - and assertion 7 of that script proves, on a
               second render, that 15008 stays the ONLY such port and that it is absent
               while the value is false.

               NOT MEASURED: that 15008 alone suffices comes from Istio's
               documentation. Measured on this cluster is only which listeners ztunnel
               opens. Provable at the first namespace to join the mesh; none has. */}}
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 15008
        {{- end }}
      {{- if $probeSources }}
      {{- /*
      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.

      NO ingress controller is added here, because this chart renders no Ingress: its
      consumers are other pods, and they have to be named in allowedNamespaces.
      */}}
      from:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              {{- /*
              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
              */}}
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
        {{- range $allowedNs }}
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
        {{- end }}
        {{- range $probeSources }}
        - ipBlock:
            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
        {{- end }}
        {{- if $ambientMesh }}
        {{- /* SECOND HALF OF networkPolicy.ingress.ambientMesh, and the reason it is
               one value and not two. Inside the mesh the kubelet's probes are
               redirected and no longer arrive from the worker node's address: they
               arrive from 169.254.7.127.

               An operator who only opens 15008 by hand writes a policy that passes
               review - and the moment probeSources is non-empty every probe is
               dropped, the pod never becomes Ready, and the symptom reads as a broken
               application rather than as a policy. That is assertion 4 of
               ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh one value further along. A switch whose
               halves can only be had together cannot be set halfway.

               Only in this branch, because this is the only branch with a "from" list:
               with no sources restricted the rule is open and needs no peer. The IPv6
               counterpart is deliberately absent - this cluster is SingleStack IPv4,
               and an ipBlock of the wrong family is accepted and matches nothing.

               UNPROVEN IN OPERATION: probeSources is empty in every chart here, so no
               release reaches this branch. CI proves its render, through the overlays
               in ci/networkpolicy. */}}
        - ipBlock:
            cidr: 169.254.7.127/32
        {{- end }}
      {{- else }}
      {{- /*
      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
      networkPolicy.probeSources.
      */}}
      {{- end }}
  egress:
    {{- /*
    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
    */}}
    - ports:
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53
    {{- with $np.egress }}
    {{- if .remoteAssets }}
    {{- /*
    REMOTE ASSETS: the web, on both ports, to any destination. Off by default,
    and the switch exists because the cost of leaving it off is invisible while
    the cost of removing it is not.

    WHAT IT BUYS, measured on the live cluster rather than assumed. paperless-ngx
    splits a mail into two steps with two separate endpoints, both
    cluster-internal: the .eml goes to TIKA for parsing
    (PAPERLESS_TIKA_ENDPOINT) and the resulting HTML comes here for rendering
    (PAPERLESS_TIKA_GOTENBERG_ENDPOINT). Of the images in that HTML:

      - EMBEDDED images are MIME parts INSIDE the file. Neither Tika nor
        Gotenberg needs the network for them, which is why apache-tika stays
        DNS-only and why this switch is not needed for a mail that carries its
        pictures with it.
      - REMOTE images (<img src="https://..."> in the mail body) are fetched by
        CHROMIUM, here, at render time. With this switch off they are silently
        dropped: the PDF is produced, it is just missing them. Nothing fails,
        nothing is logged by this chart, and no probe notices.

    NOT CHECKED, and not claimed: whether paperless-ngx re-embeds the images
    Tika extracted before handing the HTML over. If it does not, embedded
    images would be lost as well - but that would be pre-existing paperless
    behaviour and not this policy, so do not read the switch as a fix for it.

    WHY IT IS A SWITCH AND NOT THE DEFAULT. Gotenberg drives a headless
    Chromium and 3000 is its probe port, so the service is reachable from the
    whole cluster by default. Allowing 80/443 outbound therefore turns anything
    that can POST here into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs - an SSRF pivot
    with the cluster's whole internal address space behind it. That argument is
    unchanged by the switch; the switch only makes the trade a NAMED decision
    with a default of "no" instead of a line in extraPorts that reads like
    nothing in particular.
    */}}
    - ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 80
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 443
    {{- end }}
    {{- end }}
    {{- with $np.egress }}
    {{- with .extraPorts }}
    {{- /*
    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
    the whole policy off.
    */}}
    - ports:
        {{- range . }}
        - protocol: TCP
          port: {{ int . }}
        {{- end }}
    {{- end }}
    {{- end }}
{{- end }}