Install-test / Install-test apache-tika (pull_request) Successful in 1m21s
Install-test / Install-test bentopdf (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
Install-test / Install-test cyberchef (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s
Install-test / Install-test gotenberg (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
Install-test / Install-test outline (pull_request) Failing after 1m16s
Install-test / Install-test rss-bridge (pull_request) Successful in 1m1s
Install-test / Install-test searxng (pull_request) Successful in 1m13s
Validate Helm Charts / Install-test (pull_request) Failing after 9m57s
Install-test / Install-test ytdlp-web-player (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
Validate Helm Charts / Detect changed charts (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Validate Helm Charts / Resource quantities (pull_request) Failing after 18s
Validate Helm Charts / HTTPRoute match (pull_request) Failing after 13s
Validate Helm Charts / Selector match (pull_request) Failing after 17s
Validate Helm Charts / Bump level (pull_request) Successful in 8s
Validate Helm Charts / YAML scalars (pull_request) Failing after 16s
Validate Helm Charts / NetworkPolicy (pull_request) Failing after 9s
Validate Helm Charts / Build apache-tika (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config apache-tika (pull_request) Successful in 13s
Validate Helm Charts / Build bentopdf (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Build cyberchef (pull_request) Successful in 6s
Validate Helm Charts / Build outline (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Build template-chart (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config outline (pull_request) Failing after 12s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config searxng (pull_request) Successful in 15s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config template-chart (pull_request) Successful in 14s
Validate Helm Charts / Build gotenberg (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Build rss-bridge (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Build searxng (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Build ytdlp-web-player (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config bentopdf (pull_request) Successful in 14s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config cyberchef (pull_request) Successful in 13s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config gotenberg (pull_request) Successful in 13s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config rss-bridge (pull_request) Successful in 14s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config ytdlp-web-player (pull_request) Successful in 15s
bentopdf, apache-tika, gotenberg, rss-bridge, searxng, ytdlp-web-player. One major each, networkPolicy.enabled defaults to true. Three of them differ from the simple case in ways worth naming: GOTENBERG gets DNS-only egress as a deliberate, documented trade. It drives a headless Chromium, and 3000 is its probe port - so it is reachable from the whole cluster by default, and an egress rule for 80/443 would turn a service anyone can POST to into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs. The price is the remote-asset half of HTML conversion: inline content converts, images the page would have fetched silently do not. That degrades a PDF instead of failing a pod, so nothing alerts on it, which is why it is in the template header, in values.yaml and in NOTES.txt, with extraPorts: [80, 443] named as the knowing opt-in. RSS-BRIDGE, SEARXNG and YTDLP-WEB-PLAYER get the open internet on their web ports, because reaching other people's servers IS the application and this object cannot name a host. Said plainly in each, so none of them reads stricter than it is. What the cap still buys is real: no other outbound port, so a compromised pod reaches no database, no mail server and no SSH anywhere. APACHE-TIKA and GOTENBERG render no Ingress - their consumers are other pods, in other namespaces here - so neither gets an ingressController value and both say in NOTES.txt that narrowing probeSources means listing the consumers' namespaces in allowedNamespaces in the same change, or extraction and conversion stop. YTDLP-WEB-PLAYER names the gap this convention has: its oauth2-proxy subchart renders its own Deployment with its own labels and ships no policy, so with the proxy enabled the pod that actually faces the Ingress is unrestricted in both directions. Nothing in this chart can change that - an upstream chart is consumed as it comes - so it is written down instead. ci/outline/test-values.yaml gains egress.extraPorts: [5556]. The CI dex runs there rather than on 443, and Outline fetches the discovery document at boot - so this is the chart's documented escape hatch used for exactly the case it was written for, and the one place in the repo where the cap's upgrade risk is actually exercised. Part of #5
169 lines
8.6 KiB
Plaintext
169 lines
8.6 KiB
Plaintext
{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict -}}
|
|
{{- $hostnames := $httpRoute.hostnames | default list -}}
|
|
RSS-Bridge {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} was installed as release "{{ .Release.Name }}".
|
|
|
|
{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled -}}
|
|
ACCESS - INGRESS MODE (ingress.enabled: true, httpRoute.enabled: false)
|
|
|
|
Reachable at:
|
|
{{ range $entry := .Values.ingress.hosts }} https://{{ $entry.host }}
|
|
{{ end }}
|
|
Each host serves the same instance. Certificates are issued by the
|
|
cert-manager cluster issuer "{{ .Values.ingress.clusterIssuer }}" into these secrets:
|
|
{{ range $secret := (fromYaml (include "rss-bridge.tlsGroups" (dict "hosts" .Values.ingress.hosts "root" $))).order }} {{ $secret }}
|
|
{{ end }}
|
|
Hosts sharing a secret name share one certificate with several SANs; hosts with
|
|
distinct names get one certificate each. That grouping is what keeps the three
|
|
grown certificates of this installation on their existing secret names.
|
|
{{- else if $httpRoute.enabled -}}
|
|
ACCESS - GATEWAY MODE (httpRoute.enabled: true, ingress.enabled: false)
|
|
|
|
Reachable at:
|
|
{{ range $hostnames }} https://{{ . }}
|
|
{{ end }}
|
|
All of these names are served by ONE HTTPRoute ({{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute), because
|
|
nothing differs between them: one rule, PathPrefix "/", one backend. Adding or
|
|
removing a name is an edit to httpRoute.hostnames and nothing else.
|
|
|
|
This release renders that route and NOTHING else of the routing path - no
|
|
Gateway, no class, no Certificate. Three things therefore belong to the cluster
|
|
and not to this chart, and if any of them is missing the hostnames above simply
|
|
do not answer:
|
|
|
|
1. The Gateway-API CRDs. Without them this install would have failed, so
|
|
they are present - nothing to check.
|
|
2. The Gateway named in httpRoute.parentRefs
|
|
{{- range $httpRoute.parentRefs }}
|
|
{{ .name }}{{ if .namespace }} in namespace {{ .namespace }}{{ end }}{{ if .sectionName }}, listener {{ .sectionName }}{{ end }}
|
|
{{- end }}
|
|
must exist AND its listener must allow routes from this namespace
|
|
({{ .Release.Namespace }}) in allowedRoutes. A rejected attachment is
|
|
visible only in the route's status:
|
|
|
|
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get httproute {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-httproute -o yaml
|
|
|
|
Read status.parents[].conditions - "Accepted: True" and
|
|
"ResolvedRefs: True" is what a working attachment looks like. An empty
|
|
status means no controller has looked at the route at all.
|
|
3. A TLS certificate for every hostname above, on the Gateway's listener.
|
|
ingress.clusterIssuer is NOT used in this mode and is not required - the
|
|
chart renders no Certificate here, so none of the tls-* secrets listed by
|
|
the Ingress mode exists and there is nothing for cert-manager to do on
|
|
behalf of this release.
|
|
|
|
NOTHING THIS CHART DID IN INGRESS MODE IS LOST HERE
|
|
|
|
Worth stating plainly, because it is not the usual case in this repository:
|
|
most charts switched to the Gateway API give something up, since
|
|
ingress.annotations has no counterpart in this API and an operator's
|
|
annotation often carried real behaviour. This chart's live Ingress was measured
|
|
before the switch and carries no nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io annotation at all -
|
|
no body-size limit, no buffer sizes, no CORS, no rewrite, no auth. So there is
|
|
no compensation to re-create at the Gateway and no behaviour to miss.
|
|
|
|
Two things do become inert, and neither is a loss:
|
|
|
|
* ingress.annotations - gone in this mode, as everywhere. Empty here.
|
|
* The TLS secret grouping (rss-bridge.tlsGroups, and the per-host
|
|
ingress.hosts[].tlsSecretName it reads) - with the certificate on the
|
|
listener there is nothing left to group. This is the chart's most
|
|
intricate Ingress-mode machinery and it simply has no job here.
|
|
|
|
What is NOT demonstrated: that traffic actually flows. No Gateway controller
|
|
runs in CI, so no HTTPRoute of this chart has ever reached "Accepted: True"
|
|
there, and the install-test installs the Ingress mode rather than this one.
|
|
Check the route status above after the first install rather than assuming it
|
|
attached.
|
|
{{- else -}}
|
|
ACCESS - NEITHER INGRESS NOR HTTPROUTE
|
|
|
|
ingress.enabled and httpRoute.enabled are both false, so this release has no
|
|
Ingress, no HTTPRoute and no certificate; ingress.hosts, ingress.clusterIssuer
|
|
and httpRoute.hostnames are not needed. Reach the instance with:
|
|
|
|
kubectl --namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service 8080:80
|
|
|
|
and open http://localhost:8080
|
|
|
|
To publish it instead, set either ingress.enabled=true with ingress.hosts and
|
|
ingress.clusterIssuer, or httpRoute.enabled=true with httpRoute.hostnames and
|
|
httpRoute.parentRefs.
|
|
{{- end }}
|
|
|
|
Enabled bridges ({{ len .Values.whitelist }} entr{{ if eq (len .Values.whitelist) 1 }}y{{ else }}ies{{ end }} in whitelist.txt):
|
|
{{ range $entry := .Values.whitelist }} {{ $entry }}
|
|
{{ end }}
|
|
{{- if has "*" .Values.whitelist }}
|
|
"*" enables every bridge the image ships. Narrow it down by listing bridge
|
|
names in the "whitelist" value.
|
|
{{- end }}
|
|
|
|
Useful to know:
|
|
|
|
* Health endpoint: /?action=health - a fixed JSON document that touches
|
|
neither the cache nor any remote site. All three probes use it.
|
|
* Changing the "whitelist" value rolls the pod: the deployment carries a
|
|
checksum over the ConfigMap, because a subPath mount would otherwise never
|
|
reach the running container.
|
|
* The feed cache lives in an emptyDir at /app/cache and is therefore
|
|
deliberately lost on every restart. RSS-Bridge refills it on demand; it
|
|
holds only fetched feeds, no configuration and no user data.
|
|
* The container runs read-only and non-root as uid 33 (www-data).
|
|
{{- if .Values.scaleDown }}
|
|
|
|
WARNING: scaleDown is true, so this release is running with 0 replicas.
|
|
Set scaleDown=false to bring it back up.
|
|
{{- end }}
|
|
{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
|
|
|
|
NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
|
|
{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
|
|
Inbound: TCP 80 only. Outbound: DNS plus TCP 80 and 443 to ANY destination{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }},
|
|
plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
|
|
|
|
THE EGRESS RULE IS THE OPEN INTERNET ON TWO PORTS, and it has to be: fetching
|
|
other people's websites is what RSS-Bridge does, and a NetworkPolicy matches
|
|
CIDRs and selectors but never hostnames, so "only the configured bridges"
|
|
cannot be written. What the cap buys is that this pod can open NO other
|
|
outbound port — not a database, not SMTP, not SSH.
|
|
|
|
Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
|
|
the object itself:
|
|
|
|
- EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
|
|
selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
|
|
port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
|
|
cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
|
|
outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
|
|
networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
|
|
application-level connection error rather than through this object.
|
|
{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
|
|
- THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
|
|
networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
|
|
{{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
|
|
Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
|
|
CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
|
|
and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
|
|
looks like a broken application. Compare
|
|
|
|
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
|
|
|
|
against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
|
|
{{- else }}
|
|
- THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
|
|
empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
|
|
routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
|
|
isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
|
|
networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
|
|
address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
|
|
permanently un-Ready.
|
|
{{- end }}
|
|
- IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
|
|
this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
|
|
configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
|
|
shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
|
|
namespace shows that it bites.
|
|
|
|
Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
|
|
{{- end }}
|