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helm-charts/sure/values.schema.json
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feat!: NetworkPolicy in nine more charts, on by default
bulwark, calibre-web-automated, patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung,
voucher-vault, zipline, sure, homeassistant. One major each.

These are the charts with real outbound dependencies, and they all share one
limitation that is now written into every one of them: THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE
STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Databases, caches and OIDC issuers
arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items that the charts
never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot
validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is blocked, and
networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is the escape hatch. That is the upgrade risk
of this rollout, stated per chart instead of discovered per release.

Four of them differ in ways that mattered:

HOMEASSISTANT gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and NO egress section at all, and
that is the decision in the file rather than an omission. Its outbound traffic
is the union of every integration an operator enables - mDNS and SSDP
discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose,
ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP - which no chart can
know. A cap would protect little, since the devices sit on the node's own LAN,
and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a
flaky device rather than like a policy. So valkey's rule applies in the other
direction: policyTypes names only what there is something to restrict.

URLAUBSVERWALTUNG allows BOTH 5432 and 3306, deliberately. It is handed a full
JDBC URL inside a 1Password item and never parses it, so it cannot tell
PostgreSQL from MariaDB - and this cluster runs both. Allowing one would break
half the possible deployments on upgrade, with the symptom buried in a Java
stack trace. A small widening against a large and silent failure.

RALLLY derives its SMTP rule from rallly.smtp.enabled rather than always
rendering it: with mail switched off there is nothing to permit, and a rule
that permits nothing makes the object look stricter than it is.

BULWARK is the chart where the cap can fail most quietly. Its probes test its
own port and say nothing about the JMAP server, so a jmapServerUrl on a port
the policy does not allow yields a Ready pod serving an empty webmail. 443 is
allowed, Stalwart's in-cluster 8080 is not, and both halves of that are in
values.yaml and NOTES.txt.

PATCHMON and HOMEASSISTANT select their pods by the BARE release-and-chart
label, with no -deployment or -sfs suffix. Copying a selector from a
neighbouring chart would have matched nothing and left a policy that filters
nothing - which is precisely the first assertion of the render test.

Five CI fixtures gain networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and they are the only
place in the repository where the cap's cost is actually exercised: the CI dex
runs on 5556 rather than 443 (patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung,
voucher-vault) and the CI JMAP server on plain 8080 (bulwark).

Part of #5
2026-10-14 14:26:25 +00:00

315 lines
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JSON

{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"title": "sure values",
"description": "Strict values schema (issue #68): additionalProperties is false on every chart-owned object level, so a key the chart does not read is rejected at render time instead of being silently ignored. The objects that go verbatim into the Kubernetes pod spec (probes, security contexts, global, free-form annotations) stay open, because the chart does not interpret their contents. The hardening, probe and resources blocks additionally accept null - the chart's null-safe helpers then fall back to ITS defaults (issue #99). The schema adds to required(), it does not replace it.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"global": {
"description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
"type": "object"
},
"networkPolicy": {
"description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"allowedNamespaces": {
"description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
"type": ["array", "null"],
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"probeSources": {
"description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
"type": ["array", "null"],
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"ingressController": {
"description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"namespace": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"podLabels": {
"description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
},
"egress": {
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"extraPorts": {
"description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
"type": ["array", "null"],
"items": {
"type": "integer"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"scaleDown": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"secrets": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"appSecretRef": {
"description": "op:// item path of the app secret. Field: secret-key-base (SECRET_KEY_BASE).",
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"dbSecretRef": {
"description": "op:// item path of the PostgreSQL credentials. Fields: host, port, database, username, password.",
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"redisSecretRef": {
"description": "op:// item path of the Redis connection. Field: connection-url (REDIS_URL).",
"type": ["string", "null"]
}
}
},
"sure": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"replicas": {
"description": "Replicas of the StatefulSet; both containers scale with it, because they share one ReadWriteOnce PVC.",
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0
},
"securityContext": {
"description": "Pod-level hardening, shared by both containers. May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to ITS defaults (uid/gid 1000, matching the image's USER 1000:1000) instead of rendering an unhardened pod.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"pod": {
"description": "Merged onto the chart's pod hardening defaults and rendered as the pod's securityContext; kept open because the chart does not interpret the individual fields.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
},
"web": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"securityContext": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/containerSecurityContext"
},
"resources": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resources"
},
"livenessProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"readinessProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"startupProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"env": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/env"
}
}
},
"worker": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"securityContext": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/containerSecurityContext"
},
"resources": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resources"
},
"livenessProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"readinessProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"startupProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"env": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/env"
}
}
}
}
},
"storage": {
"description": "The Active Storage PVC, mounted at /rails/storage in both containers. Deliberately NOT null-safe: an erased block yields an invalid PVC, which fails loudly.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"amount": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"storageClass": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
}
}
},
"ingress": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"description": "Gates the Ingress template (issue #93). Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. It does NOT free ingress.domain: that value is also read for APP_DOMAIN, WEBAUTHN_RP_ID and WEBAUTHN_ALLOWED_ORIGINS and keeps its own required() there (guideline 12.1). Since Gitea #114 it no longer decides the TLS flags on its own either: RAILS_ASSUME_SSL/RAILS_FORCE_SSL follow ingress.enabled OR httpRoute.enabled, because in Gateway mode TLS is terminated at the Gateway while this value is false by construction.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"clusterIssuer": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"domain": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"className": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"annotations": {
"description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager annotation the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature, so this object stays open. No counterpart in Gateway mode: the Gateway API has no annotation channel, so these are gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead.",
"type": "object"
}
}
},
"httpRoute": {
"description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. The chart renders only an HTTPRoute with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them. This value also feeds RAILS_ASSUME_SSL/RAILS_FORCE_SSL - see ingress.enabled.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"parentRefs": {
"description": "The Gateway(s) the route attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced by required()-equivalent in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef"
}
},
"hostnames": {
"description": "Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has a single source of truth. A hostname set here does not move WEBAUTHN_RP_ID, APP_DOMAIN or WEBAUTHN_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, which keep following ingress.domain - and changing the relying party id invalidates every registered passkey.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
}
},
"definitions": {
"parentRef": {
"description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
"type": "object",
"required": ["name"]
},
"resources": {
"description": "May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to its default requests and computed limits (issue #99) instead of rendering a container without resource accounting.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"limitFactor": {
"type": "number",
"exclusiveMinimum": 0
},
"requests": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resourceList"
},
"limits": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resourceList"
}
}
},
"resourceList": {
"description": "Both spellings of the ephemeral-storage key are accepted because the resources helper normalizes camelCase to the Kubernetes key.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"cpu": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"memory": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"ephemeral-storage": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"ephemeralStorage": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
}
}
},
"env": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["name"],
"properties": {
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"valueFrom": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"secretKeyRef": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/keyRef"
},
"configMapKeyRef": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/keyRef"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"keyRef": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["name", "key"],
"properties": {
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"key": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"containerSecurityContext": {
"description": "May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to its container hardening defaults (issue #99) instead of rendering an unhardened container. The pod-level context lives one level up, under sure.securityContext.pod, because it is shared by both containers.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"container": {
"description": "Merged onto the chart's container hardening defaults and rendered as the container's securityContext; kept open because the chart does not interpret the individual fields.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
},
"probe": {
"description": "Merged onto the chart's probe defaults and rendered as a container probe; kept open because the chart does not interpret the individual fields. May be null / empty, which means the defaults apply (issue #99) rather than the probe disappearing. The chart's defaults carry the probe's context - the path for the web container, the exec command for the worker - not just its timings (guideline 12.5).",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
}