Files
helm-charts/outline/values.schema.json
jklein 77b978d669 feat(outline)!: NetworkPolicy, on by default
Major, as every chart in this rollout is.

Inbound 3000 only; outbound DNS plus 5432, 6379 and 443. Those three egress
ports are the STANDARD ones and not the configured ones, which is this chart's
real limitation and is written into values.yaml, the template header and
NOTES.txt rather than left to be discovered: Outline's database, Redis and OIDC
provider all arrive as connection URLs inside 1Password items that the chart
never parses, so it cannot know where they listen and cannot validate a guess.
A dependency on another port is blocked, and because all three probes hit
/_health - which checks Postgres and Redis - the symptom is a pod that never
becomes Ready rather than an error anyone reads. networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts
is the escape hatch.

That same property is what makes this chart the right place for the enforcement
experiment in the next commit.

Also reverts the cyberchef fixture from the first experiment: with the probe
port restricted to an address that is not the node's, the install-test went
GREEN, so the claim that it catches a blocked probe path does not hold as
written. The next commit establishes whether policies are enforced in CI at
all.

Part of #5
2026-10-14 14:07:06 +00:00

294 lines
14 KiB
JSON

{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"title": "outline values",
"description": "Strict values schema (issue #68). additionalProperties is false on every chart-owned object level, so a key that the chart does not read is rejected at render time instead of being silently ignored. The only objects that stay open are the ones passed verbatim into the Kubernetes pod spec (probes, security contexts, global) - the chart does not interpret their contents, so it cannot judge which keys are meaningful. The hardening, probe and resources blocks additionally accept null, because an erased block falls back to the chart defaults (issue #99).",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"global": {
"description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
"type": "object"
},
"networkPolicy": {
"description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"allowedNamespaces": {
"description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
"type": ["array", "null"],
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"probeSources": {
"description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
"type": ["array", "null"],
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"ingressController": {
"description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"namespace": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"podLabels": {
"description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
},
"egress": {
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"extraPorts": {
"description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
"type": ["array", "null"],
"items": {
"type": "integer"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"scaleDown": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"secrets": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"configSecretRef": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"redisSecretRef": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"dbSecretRef": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
}
}
},
"outline": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"replicas": {
"type": "integer",
"minimum": 0
},
"maxUploadSize": {
"description": "Passed to the app as a byte count; the chart's values keep it a string on purpose.",
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"forceHttps": {
"description": "Passed through as a string ('true' / 'false'), matching the app's env parsing.",
"type": ["string", "boolean", "null"]
},
"oidc": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"displayName": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
}
}
},
"storage": {
"description": "The uploads PVC. Not null-safe on purpose: an erased block yields an invalid PVC rather than a silently degraded workload.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"size": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"storageClass": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
}
}
},
"securityContext": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/securityContext"
},
"livenessProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"readinessProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"startupProbe": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/probe"
},
"env": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/env"
},
"resources": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resources"
}
}
},
"ingress": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"description": "Gates the whole Ingress template. Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. false omits the Ingress and makes clusterIssuer unnecessary - but NOT domain, which is also Outline's public URL and carries its own required() in the StatefulSet.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"maxUploadFileSize": {
"description": "Rendered into the ingress-nginx proxy-body-size and nginx.org/client-max-body-size annotations, so it takes effect only while the Ingress is enabled. NOT ENFORCED in Gateway mode (Gitea #114): the Gateway API has no body-size field, the effective ceiling is the Gateway's, and this chart deliberately renders no implementation-specific policy object to set it. Together with outline.maxUploadSize this is the pair of Gitea #12 - the smaller of the two wins, and in Gateway mode the smaller one may be neither.",
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"clusterIssuer": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"domain": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"className": {
"type": ["string", "null"]
},
"annotations": {
"description": "Extra Ingress annotations, merged with the cert-manager and proxy-body-size annotations the chart always sets. Free-form keys by nature. No counterpart in Gateway mode: the Gateway API has no annotation channel, so these are gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - including the upload cap the chart itself sets from ingress.maxUploadFileSize.",
"type": "object"
}
}
},
"httpRoute": {
"description": "Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress (Gitea #114). Mutually exclusive with ingress.enabled - the render aborts when both are true. The chart renders only an HTTPRoute with parentRefs; class and certificate sit on the Gateway and belong to the platform. The Gateway-API CRDs must be present in the cluster, because the chart cannot detect them. ingress.maxUploadFileSize is not enforced in this mode.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"parentRefs": {
"description": "The Gateway(s) the route attaches to. Required while httpRoute.enabled is true, enforced in the template (an empty list aborts the render) - a JSON Schema \"required\" cannot do it, because the key ships as an empty list and is therefore present. Entries are the Gateway API's ParentReference and are passed through unchanged.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/parentRef"
}
},
"hostnames": {
"description": "Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has a single source of truth. A hostname set here does not move Outline's URL variable, which keeps following ingress.domain - set both together or the app hands out links under the old name.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
}
}
}
},
"definitions": {
"parentRef": {
"description": "A Gateway API ParentReference, passed verbatim into HTTPRoute.spec.parentRefs. Deliberately left OPEN (no additionalProperties: false), for the same reason probes and security contexts are: Kubernetes owns this schema, the Gateway API adds fields to it across releases, and a closed list here would reject a field only upstream knows about. What the chart can assert is that \"name\" is there - it is required by the API and a reference without it attaches to nothing, which is the silent failure this chart aborts the render over.",
"type": "object",
"required": ["name"]
},
"resources": {
"description": "May be null / empty: the chart then falls back to its default requests and computed limits (issue #99) instead of rendering a container without resource accounting.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"limitFactor": {
"type": "number",
"exclusiveMinimum": 0
},
"requests": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resourceList"
},
"limits": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/resourceList"
}
}
},
"resourceList": {
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"cpu": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"memory": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"ephemeral-storage": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
},
"ephemeralStorage": {
"type": ["string", "number", "null"]
}
}
},
"env": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["name"],
"properties": {
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"type": "string"
},
"valueFrom": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"secretKeyRef": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/keyRef"
},
"configMapKeyRef": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/keyRef"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"keyRef": {
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": ["name", "key"],
"properties": {
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"key": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"securityContext": {
"description": "May be null / empty at any level: the chart then falls back to its hardening defaults (issue #99) instead of rendering an unhardened workload.",
"type": ["object", "null"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"pod": {
"description": "Merged onto the chart's pod hardening defaults and rendered as the pod's securityContext; kept open because the chart does not interpret the individual fields.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
},
"container": {
"description": "Merged onto the chart's container hardening defaults and rendered as the container's securityContext; kept open because the chart does not interpret the individual fields.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
},
"probe": {
"description": "Merged onto the chart's probe defaults and rendered as a container probe; kept open because the chart does not interpret the individual fields. May be null / empty, which means the defaults apply (issue #99) rather than the probe disappearing.",
"type": ["object", "null"]
}
}
}