# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

secrets:
  # op:// item path for the 1Password operator; the item must carry a
  # "secret-key" field. REQUIRED - the chart has no default and fails to
  # render without it.
  #
  # Why it is required rather than optional: server.secret_key signs the
  # settings cookie and the image-proxy URLs. SearXNG refuses to start when it
  # is still the upstream placeholder - searx/webapp.py init():
  #
  #   if not app.debug and get_setting("server.secret_key") == 'ultrasecretkey':
  #       logger.error("server.secret_key is not changed. ...")
  #       sys.exit(1)
  #
  # The image's entrypoint has a self-generating fallback, but it only fires
  # when /etc/searxng/settings.yml is MISSING, and this chart always mounts one
  # from its ConfigMap - so the fallback can never run here. Without this value
  # the instance would inherit "ultrasecretkey" from the upstream defaults and
  # exit 1 in a crash loop.
  #
  # And it is a Secret, not a ConfigMap key, because a ConfigMap is the place
  # people look into without thinking twice: anyone with read access in the
  # namespace would see the key that signs every user's cookies.
  searxngSecretRef: null
  # op:// item path for an EXTERNAL Valkey/Redis, carrying a "valkey-url"
  # field (e.g. redis://valkey.example.svc:6379/0). Optional: leave it null
  # unless the bot detection below is switched on.
  #
  # Setting it renders a second OnePasswordItem and passes the URL to the
  # container as SEARXNG_VALKEY_URL. The chart ships NO Valkey of its own.
  # Chart dependencies are admissible since #214 (README, guideline 14), but
  # this chart declares none, so an external connection through a secret is the
  # same shape outline and paperless-ngx use for their databases.
  valkeySecretRef: null
  #
  # Documented limitation (README, guideline 9): the CONTENT of these items is
  # invisible to Helm - the 1Password operator fills the Kubernetes Secret in
  # the cluster after rendering, so there is nothing to hash and no checksum
  # can cover it. Repointing either *SecretRef at a different item DOES roll
  # the pods (the Deployment hashes the rendered OnePasswordItem into
  # checksum/secret-ref), but rotating the value inside the same item does
  # not: both are consumed as environment variables, which Kubernetes never
  # refreshes in a running container. After such a rotation, restart by hand:
  #
  #   kubectl -n <namespace> rollout restart deployment/<release>-searxng-deployment

# The contents of /etc/searxng/settings.yml, rendered into the ConfigMap.
#
# The file is deliberately minimal and starts with use_default_settings: true,
# so it inherits the ~3500-line settings.yml the image ships and only names the
# deviations. That is what keeps every upstream engine change flowing in
# without a chart release, and it is why this chart does NOT map SearXNG's
# hundreds of engine options onto first-class values: such a mapping would be
# out of date with the first upstream change and would then lie about what the
# instance actually runs.
#
# Everything else goes through "extra" below, which is merged over the block
# the four keys build. Changing anything here rolls the pods - the Deployment
# carries a checksum over the rendered ConfigMap. Without it the change would
# never reach the running container: settings.yml is a subPath mount, which
# the kubelet never refreshes, and SearXNG reads its configuration once at
# start.
settings:
  # general.instance_name - the name shown in the UI and in the OpenSearch
  # description. Upstream default: "SearXNG".
  instanceName: "SearXNG"
  # search.safe_search - 0 = off, 1 = moderate, 2 = strict.
  safeSearch: 0
  # search.autocomplete - the suggestion backend, e.g. "duckduckgo", "google",
  # "startpage", "wikipedia". The empty string disables suggestions.
  # Upstream default: "duckduckgo".
  autocomplete: "duckduckgo"
  # server.image_proxy - route image thumbnails through the instance instead
  # of letting the browser fetch them from the origin. true is the value the
  # upstream container template sets (the library default is false).
  imageProxy: true
  # server.limiter - SearXNG's bot detection.
  #
  # Off by default, and that is a decision rather than an omission: the limiter
  # needs a Valkey/Redis to keep its counters, and this chart deploys none. The
  # instance is meant to sit behind authentication at the Ingress (see
  # ingress.annotations below), so nothing that the bot detection would look at
  # ever reaches the application - switching it on would only add a second
  # place to debug.
  #
  # If you do switch it on, set secrets.valkeySecretRef as well. What happens
  # WITHOUT it was measured rather than guessed, and the answer is the
  # uncomfortable middle one - a quiet fall-back, not a loud failure:
  #
  #   * one ERROR at worker start, "searx.limiter: The limiter requires
  #     Valkey, please consult the documentation: ...", and nothing after that
  #   * the pod becomes Ready and stays Ready
  #   * every request is served normally - /, /search and /healthz all
  #     answered 200, with no rate limiting in effect at all
  #
  # So a limiter switched on without a Valkey is not protecting anything, and
  # the only sign of it is a single log line at start. With a reachable Valkey
  # the same setup does limit: measured against a throwaway Valkey, "/" then
  # answers 429 while /healthz still answers 200 - which is the whole reason
  # the probes use /healthz.
  limiter: false
  # server.public_instance - extra protections for instances listed publicly.
  # Off for the same reason as the limiter: it depends on the limiter's
  # infrastructure and this instance is not public.
  publicInstance: false
  # Free-form passthrough, merged OVER the block the keys above build and
  # rendered verbatim into settings.yml. This is where everything the chart
  # does not model first-class goes, in SearXNG's own key names:
  #
  #   extra:
  #     search:
  #       default_lang: "de"
  #       formats: ["html", "json"]
  #     ui:
  #       default_theme: simple
  #     engines:
  #       - name: wikipedia
  #         disabled: false
  #
  # Merge semantics come from the same null-safe helper the security contexts
  # use: nested maps are merged key by key, an explicit false or 0 wins, and a
  # null keeps the value from the block above (nulls never delete). A scalar
  # written where the base has a map is rejected by name instead of failing
  # later with a template error.
  #
  # This object stays open in values.schema.json on purpose: its schema is
  # SearXNG's, not this chart's, and restricting it would only reject keys the
  # upstream has not invented yet.
  extra: {}

searxng:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  #
  # Note before raising this above 1: SearXNG keeps its settings in a signed
  # cookie rather than server-side, so several replicas do not need a shared
  # session store - but they DO need the same server.secret_key, which they
  # have here (one Secret for the whole release). The per-pod SQLite caches
  # under /tmp are independent and merely warm up separately.
  replicas: 1
  # uid/gid 977 is the "searxng" user of the image, and the number is not
  # interchangeable: /etc/searxng and /var/cache/searxng are created 0755 and
  # owned 977:977 in the image (searxng/base Dockerfile), and the entrypoint
  # compares the ownership of both against searxng:searxng by name.
  #
  # EXPECTED LOG LINE, not a fault: the emptyDir mounted at
  # /var/cache/searxng below is owned root:977 (fsGroup only sets the group),
  # so the entrypoint prints a multi-line
  #
  #   !!! WARNING
  #   !!! "/var/cache/searxng" directory is not owned by "searxng:searxng"
  #
  # and then continues. It cannot fix the ownership because the process is not
  # root - which is the point - and it does not need to: the directory is
  # group-writable through fsGroup. The warning is written down here because
  # otherwise the next person who finds it in the log spends an hour on it.
  securityContext:
    pod:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 977
      runAsGroup: 977
      fsGroup: 977
      fsGroupChangePolicy: Always
      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  # All three probes hit /healthz, and that is a deliberate choice in both
  # directions.
  #
  # For it: /healthz is the ONLY path SearXNG's bot detection lets through
  # unconditionally - searx/limiter.py filter_request() returns early on
  # exactly this path before any of its checks run. This is not a theoretical
  # margin. Measured in k3d against a reachable Valkey with settings.limiter
  # true: "/" answered 429 while /healthz answered 200. A probe on "/" would
  # therefore not merely risk a 429, it would collect one the moment the
  # limiter is switched on - the pod would go NotReady and the symptom would
  # point at the application instead of at the bot detection. It also costs
  # nothing: the handler is
  # `return Response('OK', mimetype='text/plain')`, no engines, no cache, no
  # network - so liveness carries no external dependency (README, "Values that
  # must not lie", point 3).
  #
  # Against it, stated plainly: a fixed string proves that the WSGI worker
  # answers. It does not prove that a search works, that any engine is
  # reachable, or that this chart's settings.yml was the file that got loaded.
  # A green pod here is a running process, nothing more.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /healthz
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /healthz
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness, so those need no
  # initialDelaySeconds. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s. Measured in k3d
  # (k3s v1.35.5) with the image already on the node: 6 s from container start
  # to Ready. The budget is therefore about 25x a healthy start - the margin is
  # for a cold node under load, not for a slow application.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /healthz
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  # Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets
  # (SEARXNG_SECRET, SEARXNG_BASE_URL and - when secrets.valkeySecretRef is
  # set - SEARXNG_VALKEY_URL). Values are rendered through tpl; the value,
  # secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef forms are supported.
  #
  # NOTE that the list below is a DEFAULT, not an addition to one: an
  # installation that sets searxng.env replaces it wholesale and has to repeat
  # the GRANIAN_HOST entry.
  #
  # Also note the precedence: SearXNG's own SEARXNG_* variables
  # (settings_defaults.py) override the ConfigMap, so an env entry named e.g.
  # SEARXNG_LIMITER wins over settings.limiter above. That is a way out if you
  # need it, and a trap if you forget it.
  env:
    # The bind address of granian, the WSGI server the image runs since it
    # dropped uwsgi. It is a value rather than a template constant because it
    # is the one setting that could plausibly need correcting per cluster, and
    # the correction should be a values change, not a chart release.
    #
    # "::" is the image's own default and it was MEASURED here, not assumed.
    # In k3d (k3s v1.35.5) the pod is single-stack IPv4 - one podIP, and eth0
    # carries nothing but a link-local fe80:: address - and granian still logs
    #
    #   [INFO] Listening at: http://:::8080
    #
    # while the kubelet's IPv4 probes are answered and the pod goes Ready. The
    # v4-mapped socket therefore works without a routable IPv6 address. On a
    # cluster where it does not (an IPv6-disabled kernel: granian would fail to
    # bind and the container would never answer), set this to "0.0.0.0".
    #
    # Note that there is no SEARXNG_* alias for the bind address: the
    # entrypoint maps only SEARXNG_PORT onto GRANIAN_PORT, and the
    # SEARXNG_BIND_ADDRESS setting is a leftover from the uwsgi era that
    # granian never reads.
    - name: GRANIAN_HOST
      value: "::"
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      # Measured on the shipped image in k3d, cgroup memory.current of the
      # container: 152 MiB once the worker is up and answering, peaking at
      # 157 MiB across a real search. 256Mi covers that with headroom; the
      # computed limit (3x = 768Mi) leaves room for the per-request engine
      # work, which fans out to many upstreams at once.
      memory: 256Mi
      # SearXNG writes its SQLite caches into /tmp - searx/cache.py falls back
      # to tempfile.gettempdir() when no db_url is configured. Measured after a
      # real search: 356 KiB total (DATA_CACHE and ENGINES_CACHE, each a small
      # db plus its -shm/-wal files), and the application expires entries
      # itself. 64Mi is roughly 180x the measured footprint while still
      # bounding a runaway; the computed limit is 192Mi.
      ephemeralStorage: 64Mi
    # No CPU limit by default (repo standard): CPU is compressible, so a limit
    # only throttles.

ingress:
  # Gates the whole Ingress template.
  #
  # Checked in both directions per guideline 1, and the answer here is NOT the
  # comfortable one: ingress.domain is read a SECOND time, outside this
  # template, to build SEARXNG_BASE_URL in the Deployment. It therefore keeps
  # its own required() there and stays mandatory even with the Ingress turned
  # off; only clusterIssuer becomes unnecessary.
  #
  # Why that read cannot be dropped: server.base_url is what SearXNG puts into
  # the OpenSearch description, into the image-proxy URLs it signs and into
  # every absolute link it generates. Left empty, the instance renders and the
  # pod goes green while browsers get sent to a broken address - exactly the
  # silent failure the guideline exists for.
  #
  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
  # true the render aborts, naming both values.
  enabled: true
  clusterIssuer: null
  # The hostname this instance is served under. Required (see above), with no
  # default - hostnames are installation data and have no business in a chart.
  # Read by the Ingress, by SEARXNG_BASE_URL, and - when httpRoute.hostnames is
  # empty - by the HTTPRoute.
  domain: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
  #
  # This is where authentication in front of SearXNG belongs, and it needs no
  # chart change: forward-auth is entirely an ingress-nginx matter. With
  # Authentik, for example:
  #
  #   annotations:
  #     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-url: |-
  #       http://ak-outpost-authentik-embedded-outpost.authentik.svc.cluster.local:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/nginx
  #     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-signin: |-
  #       https://searxng.example.com/outpost.goauthentik.io/start?rd=$escaped_request_uri
  #     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-response-headers: |-
  #       Set-Cookie,X-authentik-username,X-authentik-groups,X-authentik-email,X-authentik-name,X-authentik-uid
  #     nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-snippet: |
  #       proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_host;
  #
  # (example.com is a placeholder - substitute your own hostname.)
  #
  # Two things to know before relying on it:
  #
  #   * The kubelet's probes go straight to the pod and never pass the
  #     Ingress, so an authentication outpost that is down cannot turn this
  #     release red. Good for availability - and it also means a green pod
  #     says nothing about whether the login in front of it works.
  #   * Anyone who adds this instance as a browser search engine sends their
  #     queries through the same login. That is not a chart concern, but it is
  #     the reason such a setup "suddenly stops working" after a session
  #     expires.
  #
  # AND THE THIRD THING TO KNOW: NONE OF THIS EXISTS IN GATEWAY MODE. The
  # Gateway API has no annotation channel for controller behaviour, so the
  # forward-auth block above - the documented way to put a login in front of
  # this instance - has no counterpart at all when httpRoute.enabled is used
  # instead. The chart does not rebuild it: a policy object would bind it to
  # one Gateway implementation and to a CRD whose presence it cannot check.
  # Protection then has to come from the Gateway itself - a listener that is
  # not publicly reachable, or that implementation's own auth filter,
  # configured next to the Gateway. NOTES.txt says so in that mode.
  #
  # The rate limiter is unaffected either way: it runs inside SearXNG against a
  # Valkey (settings.limiter), not at the proxy.
  annotations: {}

# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
# httpRoute.enabled may be true.
#
# The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
#
# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
#
# WHAT THIS MODE COSTS HERE: the forward-auth escape hatch documented under
# ingress.annotations above. A SearXNG instance has no login of its own, so in
# Gateway mode "who may use this" is entirely the Gateway's question.
httpRoute:
  enabled: false
  # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
  # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's
  # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's
  # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group,
  # kind), passed through unchanged:
  #
  #   parentRefs:
  #     - name: public
  #       namespace: gateway
  #       sectionName: https
  #
  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
  # nothing, with no event to say so.
  parentRefs: []
  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
  #
  # For THIS chart, mind that a second hostname does not move SEARXNG_BASE_URL
  # with it: signed image-proxy URLs and the OpenSearch description keep naming
  # ingress.domain.
  hostnames: []

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
networkPolicy:
  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8080 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 443
  # (the search engines - this IS the application) and 6379 (the external
  # Valkey the limiter uses).
  #
  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: 443 goes to ANY destination, because the engine list
  # is hostnames and this object matches CIDRs and selectors only. And 6379 is
  # the STANDARD Valkey port, not the configured one - the URL lives in a
  # 1Password item this chart never parses, so a Valkey elsewhere is blocked
  # and belongs in egress.extraPorts.
  #
  # Inbound 8080 is not restricted by source in the default (probe port), and a
  # policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
  enabled: true
  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
  #
  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
  allowedNamespaces: []
  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8080, which is the port all three probes address.
  #
  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
  #
  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
  #
  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
  probeSources: []
  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
  # to every pod in kube-system.
  #
  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
  # traffic comes from.
  ingressController:
    namespace: kube-system
    podLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
  egress:
    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
    #
    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
    #
    # Add 80 if an engine or a proxy in use is plain HTTP, or the real Valkey
    # port if it is not 6379.
    extraPorts: []