# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

secrets:
  ralllySecretRef: null
  oidcSecretRef: null
  databaseSecretRef: null
  smtpSecretRef: null

rallly:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  replicas: 1
  smtp:
    enabled: false
    # Verify the mail server's TLS certificate (passed to the app as
    # SMTP_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED). Leave this at true.
    #
    # Set it to false ONLY for a mail server with a self-signed certificate.
    # Without that hint the symptom is misleading: the send fails with a
    # certificate error naming the mail server, so the search starts at the
    # mail server or its CA chain rather than at this value.
    #
    # false disables the certificate check entirely and exposes the SMTP
    # session to a man-in-the-middle; prefer trusting the CA over setting it.
    rejectUnauthorized: true
  allowedEmails: '*'
  supportEmail: null
  oidc:
    name: 'OIDC'
    pictureClaimPath: 'picture'
    emailClaimPath: 'email'
    nameClaimPath: 'name'
  # Next.js writes its cache below the app directory (prerendered/ISR pages and
  # the optimized images of /_next/image). The container runs as uid 20000
  # while /app belongs to the image's own "nextjs" user, so that path is not
  # writable for the app even without readOnlyRootFilesystem — the chart mounts
  # a writable volume over it. The pod's fsGroup (1000) is what makes the
  # mounted volume group-writable for the container.
  #
  # Deliberately an emptyDir, not a PVC: the cache is volatile. After every pod
  # restart it starts out empty and Next.js rebuilds it on demand, which costs
  # a little time on the first request after a restart. That is correct for a
  # cache — its entries are derived data tied to the build id of the image, so
  # a persistent volume would only carry stale entries across app updates.
  cache:
    # Mount path of the cache volume. Matches the Next.js cache directory of
    # the upstream image; only needs changing if the image layout changes.
    path: /app/apps/web/.next/cache
    # Optional upper bound for the emptyDir, e.g. 512Mi. Unset means the volume
    # is only bounded by the container's ephemeral-storage limit (computed as
    # limitFactor x request, see resources below) — note that emptyDir usage
    # counts against that limit, and exceeding either bound evicts the pod.
    sizeLimit: null
  securityContext:
    pod:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 20000
      runAsGroup: 1000
      fsGroup: 1000
      fsGroupChangePolicy: Always
      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      # No capabilities are added: the app is a plain Node process listening on
      # the unprivileged port 3000, verified to run with all capabilities
      # dropped. Do not reintroduce an "add:" key here — an empty list item
      # under it renders as a null entry, which is what Trivy reported as
      # AVD-KSV-0022 for the older chart version deployed in the cluster (#84).
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  # Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets.
  # Values are rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef
  # forms are supported.
  env: []
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 512Mi
      ephemeral-storage: 100Mi
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness, so those need no initialDelaySeconds.
  # Startup budget = periodSeconds * failureThreshold = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30

ingress:
  # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. Note that ingress.domain stays
  # required even then: it is also the app's public base URL
  # (NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_URL), not just the Ingress host. Only clusterIssuer
  # becomes unnecessary.
  #
  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
  # true the render aborts, naming both values.
  enabled: true
  clusterIssuer: null
  # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress, by
  # NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, and - when httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by the
  # HTTPRoute. Required in every mode (see above).
  domain: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
  #
  # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no
  # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything configured here is
  # simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - it is then the
  # Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy object
  # this chart deliberately does not render. Nothing this chart needs lives
  # here by default.
  annotations: {}

# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
# httpRoute.enabled may be true.
#
# The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
#
# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
httpRoute:
  enabled: false
  # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
  # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's
  # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's
  # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group,
  # kind), passed through unchanged:
  #
  #   parentRefs:
  #     - name: public
  #       namespace: gateway
  #       sectionName: https
  #
  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
  # nothing, with no event to say so.
  parentRefs: []
  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
  #
  # For THIS chart, mind that a second hostname does not move
  # NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_URL with it, and that the OIDC redirect URI registered at
  # the provider is built from ingress.domain - a new name needs both sides
  # updated or logins fail on a redirect-uri mismatch while the pod stays green.
  hostnames: []

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
networkPolicy:
  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 5432
  # (Postgres), 443 (the OIDC provider) and - only while rallly.smtp.enabled is
  # true - 587 and 465 for mail submission.
  #
  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: all of those are STANDARD ports, not configured ones.
  # The database, the issuer and the mail server all arrive as connection
  # details inside 1Password items this chart never parses, so a dependency
  # anywhere else is BLOCKED - a mail server on 25 or 2525 above all. Put it in
  # egress.extraPorts.
  #
  # Inbound 3000 is not restricted by source in the default (probe port), and a
  # policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
  enabled: true
  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
  #
  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
  allowedNamespaces: []
  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
  #
  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
  #
  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
  #
  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
  probeSources: []
  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled is true, and only in
  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
  # to every pod in kube-system.
  #
  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
  # traffic comes from.
  ingressController:
    namespace: kube-system
    podLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
  egress:
    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
    #
    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
    #
    # The usual entries here are a mail server on 25 or 2525, or an OIDC issuer
    # that is not on 443.
    extraPorts: []