# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders # every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and # takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and # Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up. scaleDown: false patchmon: server: # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down. # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence. # Note: the server registers itself in the agent presence registry under a # stable identity (the pod hostname, pinned by the chart). Running more # than one replica requires a distinct identity per replica and is not # supported by this chart. replicas: 1 # The 2.x server image is a hardened Alpine image running as uid 65532 # (nonroot). It is stateless: frontend, agent binaries and SCAP content # are baked into the image, so the root filesystem stays read-only; /tmp # is provided as an emptyDir. securityContext: pod: runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 65532 runAsGroup: 65532 # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp # filter, which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It # sits in the pod context on purpose: from here it covers every # container in the pod - the server and the optional guacd sidecar # alike - including init containers, while a container-level # seccompProfile would have to be repeated for each one (and silently # missed on the next one added). A container that genuinely needs a # different filter can still override it under # securityContext.container, which wins over this value. seccompProfile: type: RuntimeDefault container: allowPrivilegeEscalation: false readOnlyRootFilesystem: true runAsNonRoot: true capabilities: drop: - ALL resources: # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits". limitFactor: 3 requests: cpu: 0.1 memory: 256Mi ephemeral-storage: 10Mi # Probes hit GET /health ({"status": "ok"}). The 2.x server rejects # requests whose Host header is neither loopback nor a CORS_ORIGIN host # with 403 — kubelet probes target the pod IP, so they must send the # public hostname as Host header. Probe values are rendered through tpl, # so the default Host header follows ingress.domain. livenessProbe: httpGet: path: /health port: 3000 httpHeaders: - name: Host value: "{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}" periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 3 readinessProbe: httpGet: path: /health port: 3000 httpHeaders: - name: Host value: "{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}" periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 3 # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. The server waits for the # database and runs migrations on startup; upstream warns that the first # 2.x boot rebuilds database indexes, which can take minutes on slow # storage: budget 10s * 60 = 600s. startupProbe: httpGet: path: /health port: 3000 httpHeaders: - name: Host value: "{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}" periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 60 # Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets. # Values are rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef # forms are supported. env: [] guacd: # In-browser RDP for Windows hosts (beta) via the Apache Guacamole daemon, # run as a sidecar container in the server pod. Disabled by default; when # enabled, the server is pointed at it via GUACD_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1:4822. enabled: false # guacd is an independent upstream application, so its image is not tied # to the chart's appVersion. Pinned to the version upstream ships with. image: docker.io/guacamole/guacd:1.6.0 # The image runs as its own unprivileged user (uid 1000); it only needs a # writable /tmp, which the chart provides as an emptyDir. securityContext: container: allowPrivilegeEscalation: false readOnlyRootFilesystem: true runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 1000 runAsGroup: 1000 capabilities: drop: - ALL resources: # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits". limitFactor: 3 requests: cpu: 0.05 memory: 64Mi ephemeral-storage: 10Mi # Probe values are rendered through tpl. livenessProbe: tcpSocket: port: 4822 periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 3 readinessProbe: tcpSocket: port: 4822 periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 3 # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s. startupProbe: tcpSocket: port: 4822 periodSeconds: 5 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 30 # Extra environment variables for the guacd sidecar (e.g. GUACD_LOG_LEVEL). # Values are rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef # forms are supported. env: [] ingress: # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. clusterIssuer is then not needed # either, because it is only read inside the Ingress template. # # ingress.domain is a different case and the comment here used to lump the # two together, which was wrong: it is read twice MORE outside the Ingress - # CORS_ORIGIN in the Deployment (with its own required()) and the explicit # Host header the probes send - so it stays mandatory with the Ingress off. # The 2.x server rejects requests whose Host is neither loopback nor a # CORS_ORIGIN host, so an empty value keeps the pod out of Ready forever. # # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both # true the render aborts, naming both values. enabled: true clusterIssuer: null # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress, by CORS_ORIGIN, # by the probes' Host header, and - when httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by # the HTTPRoute. Required in every mode (see above). domain: null className: nginx # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets. # # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything configured here is # simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - it is then the # Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy object # this chart deliberately does not render. Nothing this chart NEEDS lives # here: the server's WebSocket upgrade works on a plain route, and TRUST_PROXY # is an environment variable, not an annotation. annotations: {} # Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so # an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and # httpRoute.enabled may be true. # # The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no # gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy # object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the # platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster # runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio. # # The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and # cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template # time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails. httpRoute: enabled: false # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group, # kind), passed through unchanged: # # parentRefs: # - name: public # namespace: gateway # sectionName: https # # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes # nothing, with no event to say so. parentRefs: [] # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain. # # For THIS chart, mind that a second hostname does not move CORS_ORIGIN or # the probes' Host header with it: both keep following ingress.domain, and # the server answers the new name with a rejection until ingress.domain names # it too. hostnames: [] secrets: redisSecretRef: null postgresSecretRef: null oidcSecretRef: null patchmonSecretRef: null