{{- /*
The Ingress for the WebUI and JMAP only. SMTP, IMAP and ManageSieve are not
HTTP and cannot pass through it - those reach the pods through the per-port
NodePort Services.

It targets exactly ONE node group (ingress.nodeGroup) through that group's own
http Service, never a port-label selector: the management surface is not safe
to spread across a group that may not run the management tasks.

TWO TRAPS THAT BELONG TO THIS OBJECT AND ARE NOT SOLVED BY IT:

1. The auto-ban sees the INGRESS CONTROLLER's pod IP for every JMAP and WebUI
   request, not the client's. Sooner or later it bans that address and the
   WebUI and JMAP go dark for everyone at once. The PROXY protocol is not the
   remedy for HTTP: the remedy is Stalwart's "forwarded" handling with
   X-Forwarded-For evaluation, plus discarding whatever forwarding headers the
   client brought along. That is a configuration step in the database, and it
   is mandatory rather than optional - the failure arrives weeks later and
   looks like a server problem.

2. AFTER BOOTSTRAP, PORT 8080 IS NOT THE ADMIN PORT ANY MORE. Upstream:
   "After the restart, the WebUI is reached at https://<hostname>/admin on the
   configured server hostname, and HTTP access on port 8080 is no longer
   available for administration." So this Ingress only works once an HTTP
   NetworkListener on 8080 exists in the database. Between finishing the setup
   and creating that listener, the Ingress resolves to a port that answers
   nothing.
*/ -}}
{{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
{{- $group := include "stalwart.ingressNodeGroup" . -}}
{{- $nodes := fromYaml (include "stalwart.nodes" .) -}}
{{- $spec := index $nodes $group -}}
{{- if not (has "http" $spec.exposedPorts) -}}
{{- fail (printf "ingress.nodeGroup is %q, but nodes.%s.exposedPorts does not include \"http\" - there would be no Service for the Ingress to point at" $group $group) -}}
{{- end -}}
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: {{ include "stalwart.fullname" . }}-ingress
  labels:
    app: {{ include "stalwart.fullname" . }}
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: {{ required "A Cluster-Issuer must be provided (ingress.clusterIssuer)" .Values.ingress.clusterIssuer }}
    {{- with .Values.ingress.annotations }}
    {{- toYaml . | nindent 4 }}
    {{- end }}
spec:
  ingressClassName: {{ .Values.ingress.className }}
  rules:
    - host: {{ required "A Domain/Host must be provided (ingress.domain)" .Values.ingress.domain }}
      http:
        paths:
          - backend:
              service:
                # The http Service of the "{{ $group }}" group only.
                name: {{ include "stalwart.fullname" . }}-{{ $group }}-http-service
                port:
                  name: http
            path: /
            pathType: Prefix
  tls:
    - hosts:
        - {{ required "A Domain/Host must be provided (ingress.domain)" .Values.ingress.domain }}
      secretName: tls-{{ include "stalwart.fullname" . }}-ingress
{{- end }}
{{- /*
MTA-STS (Gitea #123) - the policy route, in Ingress mode.

ONE OBJECT PER clusterIssuer, one rule per host, tls grouped by secret. The
whole reasoning for that shape, including the cert-manager measurement it rests
on, is in stalwart.mtaSts.ingressGroups in _helpers.tpl; the short version is
that the issuer is an object-level ANNOTATION while the secret is a per-tls-entry
field, so an object cannot both ask cert-manager for one certificate and leave
another alone.

GATED ON ingress.enabled, not on a switch of its own. mtaSts.hosts is the
switch for the feature (empty list = nothing rendered, in either mode) and
ingress.enabled is the switch for the MODE - so these objects appear exactly
when this chart is publishing over an Ingress AND the list is non-empty. The
mutual exclusion of the two modes is enforced once, in stalwart.httproute.yaml,
and it is unconditional on mtaSts: a fail anywhere aborts the whole render.

AND "not httpRoute.enabled" IS PART OF THAT GATE RATHER THAN REDUNDANT WITH
IT. Without it this block's per-entry required() can fire while BOTH modes are
on, and then the render reports "mtaSts.hosts[0] has no tlsSecretName, and in
Ingress mode every entry needs one" - true, and the wrong diagnosis: the
values file's defect is that both modes are on, and "in Ingress mode" is a
claim about a configuration that is not coherent at all. Whoever met it would
add a tlsSecretName, re-run, and reach the real message one round later, or
conclude this feature was the problem. MEASURED on this chart before the gate
was added, not reasoned about.

Ordering is not the fix and could not be: Helm renders templates in an order a
chart cannot pin, so this template may not assume the httproute template's
structural abort runs first. SCOPE is the fix - with both modes on this block
validates nothing, so the only fail left is the one that names the real
problem. The generalisation (a specific validation must not be reachable in a
state a structural validation already rejects) is the Lessons-Learned entry
that the parallel keycloak round of Gitea #122 bought on its own realm list.

WHAT THIS DELIBERATELY DOES NOT CARRY: ingress.annotations. Those belong to the
WebUI/JMAP host - on the live installation they are its CORS configuration for
the bulwark webmail - and a policy file served to sending MTAs has no use for
them. Copying them here would put a CORS allow-origin on an endpoint no browser
ever calls, and would do it silently.

AND THE LIMIT THAT NO OBJECT HERE CAN FIX: this chart registers a ROUTE, it
does not create a DOMAIN. Whether Stalwart answers for mta-sts.<domain> depends
on <domain> existing in its data store, which is not in any chart value (see
values.yaml, line 1 onwards, and the mtaSts block).
*/ -}}
{{- $httpRoute := .Values.httpRoute | default dict }}
{{- if and .Values.ingress.enabled (not $httpRoute.enabled) }}
{{- $mtaSts := fromYaml (include "stalwart.mtaSts.ingressGroups" .) }}
{{- if $mtaSts.order }}
{{- $group := include "stalwart.ingressNodeGroup" . }}
{{- $nodes := fromYaml (include "stalwart.nodes" .) }}
{{- $spec := index $nodes $group }}
{{- if not (has "http" $spec.exposedPorts) }}
{{- fail (printf "ingress.nodeGroup is %q, but nodes.%s.exposedPorts does not include \"http\" - there would be no Service for the MTA-STS Ingress to point at" $group $group) }}
{{- end }}
{{- $service := printf "%s-%s-http-service" (include "stalwart.fullname" .) $group }}
{{- $path := include "stalwart.mtaSts.path" . }}
{{- range $issuer := $mtaSts.order }}
{{- $entry := index $mtaSts.groups $issuer }}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: {{ include "stalwart.mtaSts.ingressName" (dict "root" $ "issuer" $issuer) }}
  labels:
    app: {{ include "stalwart.fullname" $ }}
  {{- if $issuer }}
  annotations:
    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: {{ $issuer }}
  {{- end }}
spec:
  ingressClassName: {{ $.Values.ingress.className }}
  rules:
    {{- range $host := $entry.hosts }}
    - host: {{ $host }}
      http:
        paths:
            {{- /*
            Exact, not Prefix, and the same per-group http Service the WebUI
            rule above names - by PORT NAME, which an Ingress backend can do
            and a Gateway backendRef cannot. RFC 8461 serves exactly one file
            at exactly one path; a Prefix here would hand this host's whole
            URL space to the mail server's management surface.
            */}}
          - backend:
              service:
                name: {{ $service }}
                port:
                  name: http
            path: {{ $path }}
            pathType: Exact
    {{- end }}
  tls:
    {{- range $secret := $entry.tlsOrder }}
    - hosts:
        {{- range $host := index $entry.tls $secret }}
        - {{ $host }}
        {{- end }}
      secretName: {{ $secret }}
    {{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}