# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

secrets:
  configSecretRef: null
  redisSecretRef: null
  dbSecretRef: null
outline:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  replicas: 1
  maxUploadSize: '262144000'
  forceHttps: 'false'
  oidc:
    displayName: OIDC
  storage:
    size: 10Gi
    storageClass: null
  # The upstream image (outlinewiki/outline) runs as its nodejs user
  # (uid/gid 1001). Outline only writes to the upload storage (PVC) and to
  # /tmp (import/export scratch files), which the chart mounts as an
  # emptyDir, so the root filesystem stays read-only.
  securityContext:
    pod:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 1001
      runAsGroup: 1001
      fsGroup: 1001
      fsGroupChangePolicy: Always
      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  # Outline exposes a dedicated health endpoint at /_health (also used
  # by the upstream Docker HEALTHCHECK). It checks Postgres and Redis;
  # there is no dependency-free HTTP endpoint ("/" returns 500 too when
  # the database is down), so all three probes use /_health.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /_health
      port: 3000
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /_health
      port: 3000
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Outline runs database
  # migrations on startup: budget 10s * 30 = 300s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /_health
      port: 3000
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  # Extra environment variables, appended to the ones the chart always sets.
  # Values are rendered through tpl; value, secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef
  # forms are supported.
  env: []
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 512Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 10Mi

ingress:
  # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. clusterIssuer is then not needed
  # either, because it is only read inside the Ingress template. ingress.domain
  # is a different case: it is also Outline's URL variable (see below) and
  # stays mandatory in every mode.
  #
  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
  # true the render aborts, naming both values.
  enabled: true
  # The request-body cap, and it lives entirely in the INGRESS: the chart
  # renders it into nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size and
  # nginx.org/client-max-body-size, so it is enforced by the nginx-family
  # controllers and by nothing inside Outline.
  #
  # TWO CEILINGS APPLY TO AN UPLOAD AND THE SMALLER ONE WINS: this value and
  # outline.maxUploadSize above, which default to 25m and ~250 MB - a factor of
  # ten apart, with the ingress limit the tighter one (Gitea #12, open). In
  # GATEWAY MODE this half disappears: the Gateway API has no body-size field,
  # the value is NOT ENFORCED, and the ceiling becomes whatever the Gateway
  # enforces - which is neither of the two numbers this chart documents. That
  # moves #12 rather than resolving it; NOTES.txt says so in that mode.
  maxUploadFileSize: 25m
  clusterIssuer: null
  # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress, by Outline's URL
  # variable in the StatefulSet (with its own required()), and - when
  # httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by the HTTPRoute. Required in every mode.
  domain: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer and proxy-body-size annotations the chart always sets.
  #
  # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no
  # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything configured here is
  # simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - it is then the
  # Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy object
  # this chart deliberately does not render. For THIS chart that includes the
  # upload cap above.
  annotations: {}

# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
# httpRoute.enabled may be true.
#
# The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
#
# WHAT THIS MODE COSTS HERE: ingress.maxUploadFileSize is not enforced, so the
# upload ceiling is the Gateway's. Check it before switching - this chart is
# the one with the open upload defect (#12), and in this mode neither of the
# two numbers the chart knows is necessarily the one that bites.
#
# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
httpRoute:
  enabled: false
  # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
  # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's
  # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's
  # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group,
  # kind), passed through unchanged:
  #
  #   parentRefs:
  #     - name: public
  #       namespace: gateway
  #       sectionName: https
  #
  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
  # nothing, with no event to say so.
  parentRefs: []
  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
  #
  # For THIS chart, mind that a second hostname does not move Outline's URL
  # variable with it: it keeps following ingress.domain, so every generated
  # link, every share URL and the OIDC redirect URI still name the old host
  # until ingress.domain is changed too.
  hostnames: []

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
networkPolicy:
  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only - the single port this pod
  # declares - and outbound DNS plus TCP 5432 (Postgres), 6379 (Redis) and 443
  # (the OIDC provider's discovery document, fetched at boot).
  #
  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO, and this is the one to read before upgrading: THOSE
  # THREE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Outline's
  # database, Redis and OIDC provider all arrive as connection URLs inside
  # 1Password items, which this chart never parses - so it cannot know your
  # ports and cannot validate them. A dependency on a non-standard port is
  # BLOCKED, and because all three probes hit /_health (which checks Postgres
  # and Redis), that shows up as a pod which never becomes Ready. Put the real
  # port in egress.extraPorts below.
  #
  # The 3000 rule is NOT restricted by source in the default - 3000 is the
  # probe port, see probeSources. And a policy is only a boundary where the CNI
  # enforces one; unenforced, it is accepted and filters nothing.
  enabled: true
  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
  #
  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
  allowedNamespaces: []
  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
  #
  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
  #
  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
  #
  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
  probeSources: []
  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
  # to every pod in kube-system.
  #
  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
  # traffic comes from.
  ingressController:
    namespace: kube-system
    podLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
  egress:
    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
    #
    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
    #
    # Outline needs one entry here more often than most charts: a Postgres or
    # Redis on a non-standard port, an OIDC provider that is not on 443 (a CI
    # dex on 5556), an S3 endpoint on a custom port, or SMTP - the chart sets
    # no SMTP_* variable itself, but a deployment that adds them through
    # outline.env needs 587 or 465 here too.
    extraPorts: []