# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

# The bridges RSS-Bridge offers, rendered into the ConfigMap as whitelist.txt
# and mounted at /app/whitelist.txt.
#
# A list rather than a blob of file content: the file format is one bridge name
# per line, and the application trims and filters every line before use
# (lib/Configuration.php), so nothing is lost by modelling it as YAML - while a
# hardcoded file body in the template could not be changed without editing the
# chart.
#
# The single entry "*" is RSS-Bridge's own wildcard and enables every bridge.
# It is the default here because it is exactly what the image does when no
# whitelist.txt exists at all, so a default install behaves like stock
# RSS-Bridge instead of silently serving nothing. Installations that want a
# narrower set list the bridge names explicitly:
#
#   whitelist:
#     - Youtube
#     - Heise
#
# Changing this value rolls the pod - the deployment carries a checksum over
# the rendered ConfigMap (see rss-bridge.deployment.yaml). Without that the
# change would not reach the running container at all: the whitelist is a
# subPath mount, which the kubelet never refreshes.
whitelist:
  - "*"

rssBridge:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  replicas: 1
  # Verified against the image, not assumed (issue #128).
  #
  # The image ships no USER and runs everything as root by default. It does,
  # however, run fully hardened once its writable paths are provided: nginx and
  # php-fpm both start, the front page renders and real bridges fetch feeds.
  #
  # uid/gid 33 is www-data, and it is not interchangeable: /app and every file
  # in it is owned by www-data in the image, nginx.conf declares "user
  # www-data" and the php-fpm pool declares "user = www-data". Both emit a
  # harmless notice that those directives are ignored when the master process
  # is not root, and then serve normally as uid 33.
  securityContext:
    pod:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 33
      runAsGroup: 33
      fsGroup: 33
      fsGroupChangePolicy: Always
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
      # Why this chart listens on the privileged port 80, and why that is safe.
      #
      # nginx is configured for port 80 inside the image. The only lever the
      # entrypoint offers is HTTP_PORT, which runs a sed against
      # /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default - impossible with a read-only root
      # filesystem. So the choice is port 80 or readOnlyRootFilesystem, and
      # port 80 is the cheaper of the two. (The Service selects the port by
      # NAME, so the number is invisible to it either way.)
      #
      # Kubernetes sets net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start=0 in the pod
      # network namespace, so binding 80 needs no capability at all. But that
      # is a runtime default, not a guarantee, and relying on it silently is
      # exactly the trap the template-chart warns about - so the chart pins the
      # value instead of inheriting it.
      #
      # Measured in k3d (k3s v1.35.5), same pod spec, only this value changed:
      #   sysctl 1024, capabilities.drop [ALL]        -> nginx: bind() to
      #       0.0.0.0:80 failed (13: Permission denied)
      #   sysctl 1024, plus NET_BIND_SERVICE added    -> identical failure.
      #       Adding the capability does NOT help: for a non-root process it
      #       lands in the permitted set but not the effective/ambient one, so
      #       it buys nothing here. That is why this chart does not add it.
      #   sysctl 0 (this default)                     -> binds, HTTP 200.
      #
      # Note how that failure looks without probes: the entrypoint starts nginx
      # in the background and then execs php-fpm, so a failed bind leaves a
      # container that reports Running with no web server at all. The probes on
      # /?action=health turn that silent failure into a pod that never becomes
      # Ready.
      sysctls:
        - name: net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start
          value: "0"
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  # All three probes hit RSS-Bridge's own health action, which renders a fixed
  # 49-byte JSON document without touching the file cache or any remote site.
  # That keeps liveness free of external dependencies (guideline 3): a scraped
  # website going down, or a cache directory that is not writable, must not
  # restart the pod.
  #
  # Deliberately not "/": the front page enumerates every enabled bridge and
  # answers with roughly 1.5 MB, which is a wasteful thing to fetch every ten
  # seconds forever.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /?action=health
      port: rss-bridge-port
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /?action=health
      port: rss-bridge-port
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness, so those need no
  # initialDelaySeconds. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s, which is generous:
  # the container is ready in about two seconds (nginx plus php-fpm, no
  # migrations, no warm-up).
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /?action=health
      port: rss-bridge-port
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  # Extra environment variables. Values are rendered through tpl; the value,
  # secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef forms are supported.
  #
  # RSS-Bridge maps RSSBRIDGE_<section>_<key> onto its config, so for example
  # "RSSBRIDGE_system_timezone: Europe/Berlin" works here.
  env: []
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      # Measured with the shipped image: about 21 MiB resident at startup and
      # roughly 64 MiB after serving feeds, so the 20Mi the original manifest
      # requested was a third of what the workload occupies around the clock.
      # (Re-measured on the 2025-08-05 image; the 2025-06-03 image came out
      # marginally higher at 24 MiB / 71 MiB under the identical procedure.)
      memory: 128Mi
      # The previous manifest requested 2Gi of ephemeral storage - identical to
      # its limit - and thereby reserved two gigabytes of node scheduling
      # capacity for a workload that does not come close to using it.
      #
      # Everything RSS-Bridge writes was enumerated by running the image with a
      # writable root filesystem, exercising every whitelisted bridge and then
      # reading the container's diff layer. The only path that grows is the
      # feed cache under /app/cache: 17 entries and 2.2 MB after fetching all
      # five bridges, largest single entry 196 KB, and the application purges
      # it on its own (FileCache enable_purge). /run and /var/lib/nginx add
      # under 100 KB together.
      #
      # 64Mi is therefore roughly thirty times the measured footprint while
      # freeing 97% of the old reservation. The limit below stays large, so
      # the decoupling costs no safety margin (same shape as gotenberg, #106).
      ephemeralStorage: 64Mi
    limits:
      # Set explicitly rather than left to limitFactor x request.
      #
      # memory: the manifest this chart replaces capped the container at
      # 100Mi, but a warm container serving five concurrent feed fetches was
      # measured peaking at 119 MiB - the old limit was already below the real
      # peak. php-fpm is configured for up to five workers with a 128M PHP
      # memory_limit each, so the theoretical ceiling is far higher still.
      # 512Mi covers the measured peak with room to spare and still bounds a
      # runaway bridge.
      memory: 512Mi
      # Unchanged from the previous manifest on purpose: a large cap costs
      # nothing (it reserves no capacity) and guarantees this change cannot
      # make eviction more likely than it is today.
      ephemeralStorage: 2Gi
    # No CPU limit by default (repo standard): CPU is compressible, so a limit
    # only throttles. The previous manifest capped CPU at 0.5.

ingress:
  # Gates the whole Ingress template. Checked in both directions per guideline
  # 1: nothing outside this template reads an ingress value - the container
  # takes no domain in its environment and nginx serves as default_server
  # without a server_name - so switching the Ingress off frees every value
  # below, and none of them needs a separate required().
  enabled: true
  clusterIssuer: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
  annotations: {}
  # The hosts this Ingress serves. Required - the chart ships no default,
  # because hostnames are installation data and have no business in a chart.
  #
  # Each entry is a host plus an OPTIONAL tlsSecretName:
  #
  #   hosts:
  #     - host: rss-bridge.example.com
  #     - host: feeds.example.com
  #       tlsSecretName: tls-legacy-feeds-ingress
  #
  # Entries sharing a tlsSecretName are grouped into one tls entry, so they
  # share a single certificate with several SANs. Entries with distinct names
  # get one certificate each. Omitting tlsSecretName falls back to the repo
  # convention, tls-<release>-<chart>-ingress.
  #
  # DOCUMENTED DEVIATION - why the secret name is configurable at all:
  #
  # The repo convention (guideline 4) is exactly one TLS secret per Ingress,
  # named tls-<release>-<chart>-ingress. The installation this chart takes over
  # has grown three separate secrets, one per host, from three years of
  # kubectl apply. Renaming them would not be a cosmetic cleanup: cert-manager
  # keys certificates by secret name, so three new names mean three fresh
  # issuances, and the service is unreachable on each host until its
  # certificate is issued. That is a self-inflicted outage plus three
  # avoidable Let's Encrypt issuances, for a deployment that has been running
  # untouched for over a year.
  #
  # Making host and secret name per-entry values keeps the existing names in
  # place today and turns the eventual consolidation onto one certificate - or
  # the retirement of the legacy hostnames - into a values change instead of a
  # template change (the explicit ask from cluster-config#33).
  hosts: null