# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

secrets:
  voucherVaultSecretRef: null
  oidcSecretRef: null
  databaseSecretRef: null

voucherVault:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  replicas: 1
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 256Mi
      # The static-files emptyDir (~90Mi of static assets, see the
      # securityContext comment) counts toward the pod's ephemeral-storage
      # usage, so the request must cover it.
      ephemeral-storage: 128Mi
  # "/" answers with a redirect for anonymous users, which httpGet treats as
  # success. The Host header must be set to 127.0.0.1 because Django's
  # ALLOWED_HOSTS only accepts 127.0.0.1 and the configured DOMAIN — probing
  # with the default Host (the pod IP) would always return 400.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
      httpHeaders:
        - name: Host
          value: 127.0.0.1
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
      httpHeaders:
        - name: Host
          value: 127.0.0.1
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /
      port: http
      httpHeaders:
        - name: Host
          value: 127.0.0.1
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  # The upstream image (l4rm4nd/vouchervault) runs as www-data (uid/gid 33).
  # With readOnlyRootFilesystem the chart mounts emptyDirs over the paths the
  # image writes at runtime: /tmp (upload/PDF scratch files), /opt/app/logs
  # and STATIC_ROOT /opt/app/myapp/static (the entrypoint runs collectstatic
  # at every start; an init container seeds the volume with the static files
  # shipped in the image, because the directory doubles as the app's static
  # source). Uploads and the database live on the PVC at /opt/app/database.
  securityContext:
    pod:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 33
      runAsGroup: 33
      fsGroup: 33
      fsGroupChangePolicy: Always
      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  ports:
    - containerPort: 8000
      protocol: TCP
      name: http
  env:
    # ingress.domain is not a pure Ingress value: Django's ALLOWED_HOSTS only
    # accepts 127.0.0.1 and this DOMAIN, so an empty value makes the app answer
    # 400 to every real request. It therefore stays required even when the
    # Ingress is switched off via ingress.enabled.
    - name: DOMAIN
      value: '{{ required "A Domain/Host must be provided (ingress.domain)" .Values.ingress.domain }}'
    - name: SECURE_COOKIES
      value: "True"
    - name: SESSION_COOKIE_AGE
      value: "30"
    - name: SESSION_EXPIRE_AT_BROWSER_CLOSE
      value: "True"
    - name: EXPIRY_THRESHOLD_DAYS
      value: "90"
    - name: EXPIRY_LAST_NOTIFICATION_DAYS
      value: "7"
    - name: TZ
      value: "UTC"
    - name: PORT
      value: "8000"
    - name: SECRET_KEY
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-secret"
          key: "secretKey"
    - name: REDIS_URL
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-secret"
          key: "redis-url"
    - name: CELERY_WORKER_CONCURRENCY
      value: "1"
    - name: CELERY_WORKER_PREFETCH_MULTIPLIER
      value: "1"
    - name: OIDC_ENABLED
      value: "True"
    - name: OIDC_AUTOLOGIN
      value: "True"
    - name: OIDC_CREATE_USER
      value: "True"
    - name: OIDC_RP_SIGN_ALGO
      value: "RS256"
    - name: OIDC_OP_JWKS_ENDPOINT
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oidc-secret"
          key: "oidc-jwks-endpoint"
    - name: OIDC_RP_CLIENT_ID
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oidc-secret"
          key: "client-id"
    - name: OIDC_RP_CLIENT_SECRET
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oidc-secret"
          key: "client-secret"
    - name: OIDC_OP_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oidc-secret"
          key: "authorization-endpoint"
    - name: OIDC_OP_TOKEN_ENDPOINT
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oidc-secret"
          key: "token-endpoint"
    - name: OIDC_OP_USER_ENDPOINT
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oidc-secret"
          key: "user-endpoint"
    - name: DB_ENGINE
      value: "postgres"
    - name: POSTGRES_HOST
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-db-secret"
          key: "host"
    - name: POSTGRES_PORT
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-db-secret"
          key: "port"
    - name: POSTGRES_USER
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-db-secret"
          key: "user"
    - name: POSTGRES_PASSWORD
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-db-secret"
          key: "password"
    - name: POSTGRES_DB
      valueFrom:
        secretKeyRef:
          name: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-db-secret"
          key: "database"
  storage:
    volumes:
      - name: voucher-vault-data
        persistentVolumeClaim:
          claimName: "{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-pvc"
    volumeMounts:
      - name: voucher-vault-data
        mountPath: /opt/app/database
        subPath: voucher-vault-data

storage:
  amount: 10Gi
  storageClass: null

ingress:
  # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely. Note that ingress.domain stays
  # required even then: it is also Django's ALLOWED_HOSTS entry (the DOMAIN env
  # above), not just the Ingress host. Only clusterIssuer becomes unnecessary.
  #
  # Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below (Gitea #114): with both
  # true the render aborts, naming both values.
  enabled: true
  clusterIssuer: null
  # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress, by Django's
  # DOMAIN (and through it ALLOWED_HOSTS and CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS), and - when
  # httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by the HTTPRoute. Required in every mode.
  domain: null
  className: nginx
  # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager
  # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets.
  #
  # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no
  # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so anything configured here is
  # simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead - it is then the
  # Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy object
  # this chart deliberately does not render. Nothing this chart needs lives
  # here by default.
  annotations: {}

# Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so
# an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and
# httpRoute.enabled may be true.
#
# The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no
# gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy
# object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the
# platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster
# runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio.
#
# The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and
# cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template
# time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails.
httpRoute:
  enabled: false
  # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in
  # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's
  # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's
  # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group,
  # kind), passed through unchanged:
  #
  #   parentRefs:
  #     - name: public
  #       namespace: gateway
  #       sectionName: https
  #
  # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty
  # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes
  # nothing, with no event to say so.
  parentRefs: []
  # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set
  # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which
  # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second
  # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain.
  #
  # FOR THIS CHART THAT IS A SHARP EDGE. A hostname the route publishes but
  # DOMAIN does not name is answered with 400 by Django (ALLOWED_HOSTS), and
  # all three probes stay green while it happens - they carry a Host header of
  # 127.0.0.1 on purpose. So a second hostname needs ingress.domain changed in
  # the same step.
  hostnames: []

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
networkPolicy:
  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 8000 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 5432
  # (Postgres), 6379 (Redis) and 443 (the OIDC provider).
  #
  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO: those are the STANDARD ports, not the configured ones -
  # all three dependencies arrive as connection details inside 1Password items
  # this chart never parses. A dependency on another port is BLOCKED and belongs
  # in egress.extraPorts.
  #
  # Inbound 8000 is not restricted by source in the default (probe port), and a
  # policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
  enabled: true
  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
  #
  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
  allowedNamespaces: []
  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 8000, which is the port all three probes address.
  #
  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
  #
  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
  #
  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
  probeSources: []
  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled is true, and only in
  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
  # to every pod in kube-system.
  #
  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
  # traffic comes from.
  ingressController:
    namespace: kube-system
    podLabels:
      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
  egress:
    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
    #
    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
    #
    # Add the real port whenever Postgres, Redis or the OIDC issuer is not on
    # 5432 / 6379 / 443.
    extraPorts: []