# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders
# every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and
# takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and
# Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up.
scaleDown: false

gotenberg:
  # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down.
  # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence.
  replicas: 1
  # The official image runs as the dedicated gotenberg user (uid 1001). /tmp
  # and /home/gotenberg are writable emptyDirs so Chromium/LibreOffice keep
  # working with a read-only root filesystem.
  securityContext:
    pod:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 1001
      runAsGroup: 1001
      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
      #
      # Verified against both conversion engines, because a browser sandbox is
      # the classic case where a syscall filter bites: Chromium HTML->PDF and
      # LibreOffice document->PDF both still return real PDFs under the filter,
      # and /health reports chromium and libreoffice as "up".
      seccompProfile:
        type: RuntimeDefault
    container:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
  # Gotenberg exposes a documented health endpoint at /health.
  livenessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /health
      port: gotenberg-port
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  readinessProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /health
      port: gotenberg-port
    periodSeconds: 10
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 3
  # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s.
  startupProbe:
    httpGet:
      path: /health
      port: gotenberg-port
    periodSeconds: 5
    timeoutSeconds: 5
    failureThreshold: 30
  # Extra environment variables. Values are rendered through tpl; value,
  # secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef forms are supported.
  env: []
  resources:
    # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to
    # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a
    # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits".
    limitFactor: 3
    # The requests stay small on purpose: gotenberg idles at a few dozen MB,
    # so reserving conversion-sized capacity on the node would waste it
    # around the clock. Conversions are short bursts, and the limits below
    # cover the burst instead (issue #106).
    requests:
      cpu: 0.1
      memory: 512Mi
      ephemeralStorage: 10Mi
    # Set explicitly rather than left to limitFactor x request, because the
    # computed limits (1536Mi / 30Mi) were too small for real documents.
    # Measured with the official image, HTML converted via Chromium:
    #   - 18 MB HTML: OOMKilled at 2Gi and 2560Mi, converts at 3Gi in ~22s
    #     (21 MB PDF). 12 MB HTML already OOM-kills at the old 1536Mi.
    #   - Raising memory alone only moves the failure: with 3Gi memory and
    #     the old 30Mi ephemeral limit, /tmp peaked at 40 MB on a single
    #     conversion and at ~125 MB over a short series, and the pod was
    #     evicted ("ephemeral local storage usage exceeds the total limit of
    #     containers 30Mi") instead of OOM-killed.
    # Memory beyond 3Gi buys nothing: gotenberg's own request timeout is 30s
    # and the chart passes no flags to change it, so a document that needs
    # more memory than this has already run out of time.
    limits:
      memory: 3Gi
      ephemeralStorage: 256Mi

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
networkPolicy:
  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only and outbound nothing but DNS.
  #
  # THE EGRESS CAP IS THE POINT OF THIS ONE. Gotenberg drives a headless
  # Chromium, so allowing 80/443 outbound would let anything that can POST to
  # this service fetch arbitrary URLs through it - and 3000 is the probe port,
  # so the whole cluster can POST to it by default. The cost is the
  # remote-asset half of HTML conversion: a converted page keeps its inline
  # content and silently loses images it would have fetched. That is a degraded
  # PDF, not a dead pod, which is exactly why it is written down here. A
  # deployment that needs remote assets sets egress.extraPorts: [80, 443]
  # knowingly.
  #
  # And like every chart here: 3000 is not restricted by source in the default
  # (probe port), and a policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
  enabled: true
  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
  #
  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
  allowedNamespaces: []
  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
  #
  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
  #
  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
  #
  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
  # namespace and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
  probeSources: []
  egress:
    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
    #
    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
    #
    # [80, 443] is the entry to add if this release must fetch remote assets or
    # convert URLs - and see the SSRF note above before adding it. A
    # paperless-ngx that only converts mail bodies does not need it.
    extraPorts: []