# Scale the whole chart down without uninstalling it: scaleDown: true renders # every Deployment/StatefulSet with replicas: 0 (and suspends CronJobs) and # takes precedence over any per-workload replicas value. PVCs, Secrets and # Services stay in place; scaleDown: false brings the workloads back up. scaleDown: false cyberchef: # Replica count for this workload; 0 is allowed and scales it down. # The chart-global scaleDown flag takes precedence. replicas: 1 # Since 11.0.0 the upstream image is nginxinc/nginx-unprivileged: nginx runs # as its nginx user (uid 101) and listens on the unprivileged port 8080, so # no sysctl tweaks are needed to run fully non-root. securityContext: pod: runAsNonRoot: true runAsUser: 101 runAsGroup: 101 # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter, # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value. seccompProfile: type: RuntimeDefault container: allowPrivilegeEscalation: false readOnlyRootFilesystem: true runAsNonRoot: true capabilities: drop: - ALL livenessProbe: httpGet: path: / port: http periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 3 readinessProbe: httpGet: path: / port: http periodSeconds: 10 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 3 # The startup probe gates liveness/readiness. Startup budget = 5s * 30 = 150s. startupProbe: httpGet: path: / port: http periodSeconds: 5 timeoutSeconds: 5 failureThreshold: 30 # Extra environment variables. Values are rendered through tpl; value, # secretKeyRef and configMapKeyRef forms are supported. env: [] resources: # Limits are optional: memory and ephemeral-storage limits default to # limitFactor x the request, an explicitly set limit always wins, and a # CPU limit is only set when configured explicitly under "limits". limitFactor: 3 requests: cpu: 0.1 memory: 512Mi ephemeralStorage: 10Mi ingress: # Set to false to omit the Ingress entirely (the required clusterIssuer value # is then not needed either, because it is only read inside the Ingress # template). Mutually exclusive with httpRoute.enabled below: with both true # the render aborts, naming both values. enabled: true clusterIssuer: null # The public hostname of this release. Read by the Ingress AND - when # httpRoute.hostnames is empty - by the HTTPRoute, so it stays the single # source of truth for the hostname in both modes. domain: null className: nginx # Extra annotations for the Ingress; merged with the cert-manager # cluster-issuer annotation the chart always sets. # # THESE HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN GATEWAY MODE. The Gateway API has no # annotation channel for controller behaviour, so everything configured here # - external auth in front of an app that has no login of its own, for # instance - is simply gone when httpRoute.enabled is used instead. It is # then the Gateway's business, or that of an implementation-specific policy # object this chart deliberately does not render. annotations: {} # Gateway-API alternative to the Ingress above (Gitea #114). Off by default, so # an existing release is unaffected; exactly one of ingress.enabled and # httpRoute.enabled may be true. # # The chart renders ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no # gatewayClassName, no Certificate and no implementation-specific policy # object. Class and certificate belong to the Gateway and therefore to the # platform, which is what keeps this chart independent of whether the cluster # runs nginx-gateway-fabric, Cilium, Envoy Gateway or Istio. # # The Gateway-API CRDs must be installed in the cluster: the chart does not and # cannot detect them (.Capabilities.APIVersions is unreliable at template # time), so with httpRoute.enabled: true and no CRDs the INSTALL fails. httpRoute: enabled: false # The Gateway(s) this route attaches to - a platform object, usually in # another namespace, which must allow this namespace in its listener's # allowedRoutes. One entry per parent, the fields are the Gateway API's # ParentReference (name, and optionally namespace, sectionName, port, group, # kind), passed through unchanged: # # parentRefs: # - name: public # namespace: gateway # sectionName: https # # REQUIRED while httpRoute.enabled is true - the render aborts on an empty # list, because a route without a parent is created, is valid and routes # nothing, with no event to say so. parentRefs: [] # Empty means [ingress.domain], so the hostname has one source of truth. Set # explicitly only to publish under a different or an additional name - which # is how a migration from the Ingress runs: the HTTPRoute takes a second # hostname while the Ingress keeps ingress.domain. hostnames: []