feat!: a NetworkPolicy in every chart, on by default #133
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@@ -28,30 +28,6 @@ ingress:
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# Ingress switch.
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domain: cyberchef.ci.local
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enabled: false
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# TEMPORARY - THIS COMMIT IS AN EXPERIMENT AND IS REVERTED IN THE NEXT ONE.
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#
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# The whole scope of Gitea #5 rests on one claim: that the install-test
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# ENFORCES NetworkPolicies, so a policy which blocks the probe path goes red in
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# CI instead of silently in production. k3d is created without
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# --disable-network-policy, so k3s should bring its policy controller - but
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# "should" read off a flag is not evidence, and 29 charts are about to be
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# switched over on the strength of it.
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#
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# So: 192.0.2.11/32 is a documentation address (RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1). It is
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# NOT the k3d node's IP and cannot be. Setting it restricts cyberchef's probe
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# port 8080 to that one source, which means the kubelet's probes - which come
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# from the node's own address - are dropped.
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#
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# EXPECTED: the pod never becomes Ready and `kubectl rollout status` times out,
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# i.e. the install-test for cyberchef goes RED.
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#
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# If it goes GREEN instead, policies are not enforced in CI, the net under this
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# rollout does not exist, and the scope has to be renegotiated rather than
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# pushed through.
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networkPolicy:
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probeSources:
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- 192.0.2.11/32
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httpRoute:
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enabled: true
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# The Gateway does not exist in the CI cluster, and it does not need to: a
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+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/outline/outline/main/public/images/icon-
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type: application
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version: 7.2.0+up1.10.1
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version: 8.0.0+up1.10.1
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appVersion: 1.10.1
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maintainers:
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@@ -235,3 +235,57 @@ FORCE_HTTPS IS ON
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header. Turned on, Outline redirects to https itself — which loops
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endlessly if that header does not reach the pod.
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{{- end }}
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{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
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NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
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{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
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Inbound: TCP 3000 only. Outbound: DNS, TCP 5432 (Postgres), 6379 (Redis),
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443 (OIDC discovery){{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }}, plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
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THOSE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT YOUR CONFIGURED ONES. The
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database, Redis and OIDC URLs all live inside 1Password items that this chart
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never parses, so it cannot know where your dependencies listen. A dependency
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on another port is blocked — and since all three probes hit /_health, which
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checks Postgres and Redis, the symptom is a pod that never becomes Ready
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rather than a connection error anyone sees. Add the real port to
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networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
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Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
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the object itself:
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- EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
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selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
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port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
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cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
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outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
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networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
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application-level connection error rather than through this object.
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{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
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- THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
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networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
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{{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
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Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
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CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
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and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
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looks like a broken application. Compare
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kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
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against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
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{{- else }}
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- THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
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empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
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routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
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isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
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networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
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address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
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permanently un-Ready.
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{{- end }}
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- IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
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this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
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configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
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shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
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namespace shows that it bites.
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Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
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{{- end }}
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@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
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{{- /*
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NetworkPolicy for outline (Gitea #5).
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Outline is the first chart of this rollout whose policy has real work to do in
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BOTH directions, and it is also the one that proves the egress cap bites: all
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three of its probes hit /_health, which checks Postgres AND Redis, so a pod
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that cannot reach its data stores never becomes Ready.
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THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE CHART'S ONLY KNOWLEDGE OF ITS DEPENDENCIES, AND THEY
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ARE A GUESS AT THE STANDARD ONES. Outline's database, Redis and OIDC provider
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are configured through connection URLs inside 1Password items - the chart never
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sees a host or a port, cannot derive one, and cannot validate one. So the rules
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below name the standard ports (5432, 6379, 443) and nothing else. A deployment
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whose Postgres listens anywhere else is BLOCKED, and it finds out through an
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application-level connection error, not through this object. That is the
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upgrade risk of this chart's policy, stated plainly; the escape hatch is
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networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
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WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
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Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
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binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
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notice it exists.
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WHAT IT IS NOT:
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- EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
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hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
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cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
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rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
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to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
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of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
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PORT to any destination.
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- NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
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accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
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configured while nothing is filtered.
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- THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
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of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
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diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
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THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
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evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
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translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
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nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
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block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
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every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
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selects.
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*/ -}}
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{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
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{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
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{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
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{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
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{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
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{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
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{{- $routed := or .Values.ingress.enabled .Values.httpRoute.enabled }}
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
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labels:
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app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
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spec:
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{{- /*
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Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
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this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
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would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
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its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
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*/}}
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
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policyTypes:
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- Ingress
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{{- /*
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Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict: this workload
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needs DNS and the ports named below, and nothing else. A chart whose
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workload opens no outbound connection of its own must NOT list Egress -
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valkey is the example - because a rule that constrains nothing makes the
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object look stricter than it is.
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*/}}
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- Egress
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ingress:
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{{- /*
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3000 - the only port this pod declares, the one the Service targets, and the
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one all three probes address (/_health). It is therefore the probe path.
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*/}}
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- ports:
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 3000
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{{- if $probeSources }}
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{{- /*
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RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
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come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
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in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
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reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
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The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress goes dark the
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moment this list is filled.
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*/}}
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from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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{{- /*
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Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
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labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
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*/}}
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
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{{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
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{{- /*
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ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
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IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
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open the port to every pod in kube-system.
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*/}}
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
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{{- with $ic.podLabels }}
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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{{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- range $allowedNs }}
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- range $probeSources }}
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- ipBlock:
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cidr: {{ . | quote }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- else }}
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{{- /*
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NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
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cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
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the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
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stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
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application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
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everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
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networkPolicy.probeSources.
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*/}}
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{{- end }}
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egress:
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{{- /*
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DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
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deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
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the pod is a trap and not a feature.
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*/}}
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- ports:
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- protocol: UDP
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port: 53
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 53
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{{- /*
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Postgres. The port, not the host - outline.secrets.dbSecretRef carries a
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connection URL the chart never parses, so this is the STANDARD port and not
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the configured one. A Postgres on any other port is blocked and must be added
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to networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
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*/}}
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- ports:
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 5432
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{{- /*
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Redis/Valkey, same reasoning as Postgres above: the standard port, because
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outline.secrets.redisSecretRef holds a URL this chart does not read.
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*/}}
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- ports:
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 6379
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{{- /*
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Outbound HTTPS. Needed for the OIDC provider: Outline fetches the issuer's
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discovery document at boot, and the discovery URL also lives inside a secret.
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443 to any destination is as narrow as this object gets for that - a hostname
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cannot appear in a NetworkPolicy. An OIDC provider on a non-standard port (a
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CI dex on 5556, for instance) needs extraPorts.
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*/}}
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- ports:
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- protocol: TCP
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port: 443
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{{- with $np.egress }}
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{{- with .extraPorts }}
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{{- /*
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Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
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escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
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the whole policy off.
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*/}}
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- ports:
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{{- range . }}
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- protocol: TCP
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port: {{ int . }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- end }}
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{{- end }}
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@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
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"description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
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"type": "object"
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},
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"networkPolicy": {
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"description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
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"type": "object",
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"additionalProperties": false,
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"properties": {
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"enabled": {
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"type": "boolean"
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},
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"allowedNamespaces": {
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"description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
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"type": ["array", "null"],
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"items": {
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"type": "string"
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}
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},
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"probeSources": {
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"description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
|
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"type": ["array", "null"],
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"items": {
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"type": "string"
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}
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},
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"ingressController": {
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"description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
|
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"type": ["object", "null"],
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"additionalProperties": false,
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"properties": {
|
||||
"namespace": {
|
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"type": ["string", "null"]
|
||||
},
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"podLabels": {
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"description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
|
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"type": ["object", "null"]
|
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}
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}
|
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},
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"egress": {
|
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"type": ["object", "null"],
|
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"additionalProperties": false,
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"extraPorts": {
|
||||
"description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
|
||||
"type": ["array", "null"],
|
||||
"items": {
|
||||
"type": "integer"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"scaleDown": {
|
||||
"type": "boolean"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -171,3 +171,90 @@ httpRoute:
|
||||
# link, every share URL and the OIDC redirect URI still name the old host
|
||||
# until ingress.domain is changed too.
|
||||
hostnames: []
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
|
||||
# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
|
||||
# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
networkPolicy:
|
||||
# WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only - the single port this pod
|
||||
# declares - and outbound DNS plus TCP 5432 (Postgres), 6379 (Redis) and 443
|
||||
# (the OIDC provider's discovery document, fetched at boot).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# WHAT IT DOES NOT DO, and this is the one to read before upgrading: THOSE
|
||||
# THREE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Outline's
|
||||
# database, Redis and OIDC provider all arrive as connection URLs inside
|
||||
# 1Password items, which this chart never parses - so it cannot know your
|
||||
# ports and cannot validate them. A dependency on a non-standard port is
|
||||
# BLOCKED, and because all three probes hit /_health (which checks Postgres
|
||||
# and Redis), that shows up as a pod which never becomes Ready. Put the real
|
||||
# port in egress.extraPorts below.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The 3000 rule is NOT restricted by source in the default - 3000 is the
|
||||
# probe port, see probeSources. And a policy is only a boundary where the CNI
|
||||
# enforces one; unenforced, it is accepted and filters nothing.
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
# Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
|
||||
# own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
|
||||
# namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
|
||||
# does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
|
||||
# matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
|
||||
# opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
|
||||
allowedNamespaces: []
|
||||
# Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
|
||||
# "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
|
||||
# inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
|
||||
# originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
|
||||
# chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
|
||||
# blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
|
||||
# the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
|
||||
# the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
|
||||
# everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
|
||||
# namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
|
||||
probeSources: []
|
||||
# The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
|
||||
# restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true, and only in
|
||||
# the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
|
||||
# the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
|
||||
# AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
|
||||
# at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
|
||||
# to every pod in kube-system.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
|
||||
# the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
|
||||
# is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
|
||||
# Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
|
||||
# path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
|
||||
# strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
|
||||
# nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
|
||||
# traffic comes from.
|
||||
ingressController:
|
||||
namespace: kube-system
|
||||
podLabels:
|
||||
app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
|
||||
egress:
|
||||
# Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
|
||||
# has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
|
||||
# in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
|
||||
# laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
|
||||
# so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
|
||||
# permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
|
||||
# compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Outline needs one entry here more often than most charts: a Postgres or
|
||||
# Redis on a non-standard port, an OIDC provider that is not on 443 (a CI
|
||||
# dex on 5556), an S3 endpoint on a custom port, or SMTP - the chart sets
|
||||
# no SMTP_* variable itself, but a deployment that adds them through
|
||||
# outline.env needs 587 or 465 here too.
|
||||
extraPorts: []
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user