4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jklein	ee9ae8a724	feat!: NetworkPolicy in six more charts, on by default ... bentopdf, apache-tika, gotenberg, rss-bridge, searxng, ytdlp-web-player. One major each, networkPolicy.enabled defaults to true. Three of them differ from the simple case in ways worth naming: GOTENBERG gets DNS-only egress as a deliberate, documented trade. It drives a headless Chromium, and 3000 is its probe port - so it is reachable from the whole cluster by default, and an egress rule for 80/443 would turn a service anyone can POST to into a way of fetching arbitrary URLs. The price is the remote-asset half of HTML conversion: inline content converts, images the page would have fetched silently do not. That degrades a PDF instead of failing a pod, so nothing alerts on it, which is why it is in the template header, in values.yaml and in NOTES.txt, with extraPorts: [80, 443] named as the knowing opt-in. RSS-BRIDGE, SEARXNG and YTDLP-WEB-PLAYER get the open internet on their web ports, because reaching other people's servers IS the application and this object cannot name a host. Said plainly in each, so none of them reads stricter than it is. What the cap still buys is real: no other outbound port, so a compromised pod reaches no database, no mail server and no SSH anywhere. APACHE-TIKA and GOTENBERG render no Ingress - their consumers are other pods, in other namespaces here - so neither gets an ingressController value and both say in NOTES.txt that narrowing probeSources means listing the consumers' namespaces in allowedNamespaces in the same change, or extraction and conversion stop. YTDLP-WEB-PLAYER names the gap this convention has: its oauth2-proxy subchart renders its own Deployment with its own labels and ships no policy, so with the proxy enabled the pod that actually faces the Ingress is unrestricted in both directions. Nothing in this chart can change that - an upstream chart is consumed as it comes - so it is written down instead. ci/outline/test-values.yaml gains egress.extraPorts: [5556]. The CI dex runs there rather than on 443, and Outline fetches the discovery document at boot - so this is the chart's documented escape hatch used for exactly the case it was written for, and the one place in the repo where the cap's upgrade risk is actually exercised. Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:20:39 +00:00
jklein	0c403b6100	gotenberg: small requests, explicit higher limits ... The computed limits (limitFactor 3 x request = 1536Mi memory, 30Mi ephemeral storage) were too small for real documents: a 12 MB HTML already gets the container OOM-killed, and the caller sees no HTTP error at all, just a dropped connection and a rising RESTARTS counter. Rather than raise the requests and reserve conversion-sized capacity on the node around the clock, requests and limits are decoupled: the requests stay as they were, and both limits are now set explicitly. The chart already supported this - an explicit limit wins over the limitFactor computation. Measured in a throwaway k3d cluster with the official image (HTML via Chromium), building on the series in the issue: 18 MB HTML, 2Gi -> OOMKilled 18 MB HTML, 2560Mi -> OOMKilled 18 MB HTML, 3Gi -> HTTP 200 in ~22s, 21 MB PDF 12 MB HTML, 1536Mi -> OOMKilled (the old computed limit) 12 MB HTML, 2Gi -> HTTP 200 in ~13s Memory beyond 3Gi buys nothing: gotenberg's own request timeout is 30s and the chart passes no flags to change it, so a document needing more memory has already run out of time (a 25 MB HTML misses the 30s even at 4Gi). The ephemeral-storage limit is raised in the same change, because raising memory alone only moves the failure. With 3Gi memory and the old 30Mi limit, /tmp peaked at 40 MB on a single conversion and at ~125 MB over a short series, and the pod was evicted: Pod ephemeral local storage usage exceeds the total limit of containers 30Mi That failure is worse than the OOM-kill: the pod does not restart, it is replaced, and the old one is left behind as Evicted. The defaults in the effectiveResources helper are updated in lockstep with values.yaml, so an erased "resources:" block (#99) falls back to the new explicit limits instead of the old computed ones. NOTES.txt is pulled along. Its numbers came from effectiveResources already, but the text described a threshold that has moved and advice that no longer holds: raising the request no longer drags the limit with it now that the limits are explicit. The warning is kept but no longer claims memory is the first limit you hit - with these limits, the 30s timeout is. Major, because the runtime behaviour changes and the pod may occupy more memory during large conversions than it was allowed to before. Fixes #106	2026-08-23 22:35:22 +02:00
jklein	8bc673d80d	gotenberg: null-safe hardening, probes and resources ... Retrofit of #99 for a chart that already carries a values.schema.json, plus the schema type change that goes with it. An override written without children is YAML null. Where the chart defines a default, Helm's coalescing deletes the default before schema validation runs, so the schema never sees the null and cannot reject it: the container rendered "securityContext: null" - unhardened, healthy, silent. Where the chart defines no default (resources.limits), the null survives into validation and a strict "object" type aborted the render. The defaultedDict helper from #96 handles the first case; widening the types of exactly these blocks to ["object", "null"] handles the second. All other keys stay strict, additionalProperties: false is untouched. The probes address the container port by name, so a rebuilt default probe needs no further context. Rendering with normal values is byte-identical to 5.0.0.	2026-08-23 20:37:12 +02:00
jklein	09d8a94bfc	Add NOTES.txt to the gotenberg chart ... Gotenberg has no Ingress, so the notes lead with the cluster-internal URL and point out that the Service listens on 80 while the container listens on 3000 — the mismatch a consumer such as paperless-ngx has to get right — plus the port-forward command for reaching it by hand. Three findings from measuring the running chart went in as warnings: - The chart passes no command-line flags, so Gotenberg's basic auth, OIDC, SSRF guards and request timeout cannot be enabled through values at all. - Memory, not disk, is the first limit to hit: at the default limit a large document gets the container OOM-killed, the caller sees the connection dropped rather than an HTTP error, and the notes give the exact kubectl command that prints OOMKilled. - Temp space is an emptyDir counted against ephemeral-storage, where running out looks different — the pod is evicted and replaced, not restarted. Both limits are read back through the chart's own resources helper, so the printed figures follow limitFactor and any override instead of being hardcoded. Refs #43.	2026-08-23 20:30:22 +02:00