8 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jklein	4c1cff1744	feat(keycloak): new chart for Keycloak (1.0.0+up26.8.0) ... Two replicas with cache=ispn, clustered through Keycloak's default jdbc-ping stack: discovery runs over the PostgreSQL that is there anyway, so no headless Service and no JGroups wiring. Deployment rather than StatefulSet - Keycloak 26 keeps everything in the database, user sessions included. The chart's defining property is that it has TWO INIT CONTAINERS and needs both. db, health-enabled and metrics-enabled are Keycloak BUILD options (verified in the 26.8.0 option table), the published image is augmented with their defaults, and supplying different ones at runtime makes Keycloak rewrite /opt/keycloak/lib/quarkus at start - which readOnlyRootFilesystem: true forbids and which upstream describes as a start that "creates an image that is mutable". Not setting db is no way out: the probes alone force it, because health-enabled is a build option too. An empty emptyDir over that path fails as well, because QuarkusEntryPoint loads quarkus/quarkus-application.dat before it dispatches any command, `build` included. So one init container seeds the directory into a volume, the next runs `kc.sh build` into it, and the serving container runs `start --optimized` - every container keeping the full hardening baseline, with no documented deviation to carry. Build options therefore exist in exactly one place, and the asymmetry is enforced rather than trusted: the serving container passes no build option at all, and a build option's variable name in keycloak.env fails the render with a message naming it. Hostname handling is the security-relevant part. KC_HOSTNAME is derived from ingress.domain as a full URL (which upstream requires alongside hostname-admin), hostname-strict stays at its default true, and proxy-headers is set rather than optional. The admin hostname is NOT presented as an access control: upstream states that hostname-admin "does not prevent accessing the Administration REST API endpoints via the frontend URL specified by the hostname option", so the chart renders no /admin deny rule and values.yaml, NOTES.txt and the wiki all say in the same words that restricting that API is reverse-proxy work. The management port 9000 is a containerPort and a ClusterIP Service for in-cluster scraping, and is in no Ingress: it serves /health/* and optionally /metrics without authentication. Liveness uses /health/live and deliberately not /health or /health/ready - those include the database, and a liveness probe on them would restart the whole cluster for as long as the database is away. Also in this change: - First PodDisruptionBudget in this repository, which makes it a convention (README section 11): minAvailable as a value, and rendered only while the computed replica count is >= 2, because minAvailable: 1 with one replica blocks every node drain forever with a message that names the PDB rather than the replica count. - First quay.io image, so quay.io joins the trusted registries in ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml - configured rather than suppressed, so AVD-KSV-0125 keeps being able to say something. - Renovate block with NO version constraint, which is the counter-case to garage and stalwart and is measured rather than assumed: docker versioning already excludes the -N rebuild tags, the floating minors and latest/nightly. Three dry-run fixtures are recorded at the block, and against the committed config 26.7.4 offers exactly 26.7.5 (patch) and 26.8.0 (minor). - No automerge exception, by decision (Gitea #83): the global automerge applies, and the minor-upgrade procedure plus `kc.sh update-compatibility` is documented in NOTES.txt instead. - Two upstream defaults deviated from, each with its reason at the value: db-pool-max-size 20 instead of 100 (two replicas at 100 ask a default PostgreSQL for twice its max_connections), and uid 1000 / gid 0 instead of this repo's 20000/1000, because the image declares keycloak:x:1000:0 and chowns its install tree to that pair. Part of #83	2026-10-04 18:00:20 +00:00
jklein	813c796a7b	feat(valkey): one Valkey instance per application (1.0.0+up9.1.2.alpine) ... A new chart for a single Valkey instance per application, replacing the shared cluster-redis whose separation rests on one ACL file in one 1Password field - a construction in which every change touches six applications and which cost a month of Paperless standstill. Shape: StatefulSet with one replica, ClusterIP Service, no cluster mode, no Ingress and no value to add one. The password arrives as a finished configuration line ("requirepass <secret>") in the 1Password field auth-conf, is mounted as a file and included by the main configuration - never in argv, never in the environment. The include is rendered last, so nothing in extraConfig can override it. Because a misspelled or empty field would leave an open server that looks perfectly healthy, an init container greps the mounted file for the line and refuses to start the pod without it; it never prints the file. maxmemory is derived from the computed memory limit (maxmemoryFactor, default 0.75) and a configured value above that limit aborts the render: otherwise the kubelet's OOM kill decides what the eviction policy was configured to decide. Persistence and eviction are documented as pairs - queue (PVC + noeviction, the default) and cache (emptyDir + allkeys-lru) - and the combination "no persistence + noeviction" carries a warning in values.yaml and in NOTES.txt. Probes: valkey-cli ping as an exec probe, authenticated through VALKEYCLI_AUTH read out of the mounted file, with "-e" and an assertion on the answer PONG. Without -e valkey-cli exits 0 on an error reply (valkey 9.1.2, src/valkey-cli.c: the config.set_errcode branch in cliReadReply), which would make the probe unable to fail. Hardening: uid 999 / gid 1000 - the image's own valkey user - with fsGroup matching, runAsNonRoot, readOnlyRootFilesystem, all capabilities dropped and seccompProfile RuntimeDefault in the pod context so the init container is covered too. /data is the only writable path. NetworkPolicy on by default (first chart in this repo with one), with a switch and a list of additional namespaces; values.yaml names that it is only a boundary where the CNI enforces policies. Wiring: publish-valkey.yml, the chart-name choice list, ci/valkey fixtures for the persistent variant, a plain docker-versioning Renovate block, README chart row.	2026-09-27 11:24:55 +00:00
jklein	93fdb3eaea	sure: new chart for the we-promise Sure app (1.0.0+up0.7.4) ... One StatefulSet with two containers - the Puma web process and a Sidekiq worker - sharing one ReadWriteOnce PVC at /rails/storage. That shared volume is the reason they live in one pod: splitting them would need an RWX volume. Only the web container migrates, because the image entrypoint runs db:prepare solely for the './bin/rails server' command; the worker is started through args: so the entrypoint (and its jemalloc preload) stays in place and the two can never race. Probes are chosen for what they prove: liveness and startup use Rails' /up, which is a boot check and touches no database, while readiness uses '/', which runs User.count through authenticate_user! in self-hosted mode and therefore fails while Postgres is unreachable. The worker speaks no HTTP, so all three of its probes ask sidekiqmon whether this pod still holds a Sidekiq heartbeat in Redis. Three OnePasswordItem CRs (app, database, redis), ingress.domain kept required outside the Ingress because APP_DOMAIN and the WebAuthn relying party read it, strict values.schema.json, CI fixtures with throwaway Postgres 16 and Redis, and a Renovate manager on semver so the -alpha/-rc/-hotfix channel and the moving tags are never selected.	2026-09-26 21:08:55 +00:00
jklein	70c7106fe8	Give the Trivy scan render values for freesailarr ... ci/run-trivy-config.sh renders every changed chart before scanning it and exits non-zero when the render fails - which it does for freesailarr, because the chart is excluded from the install-test and therefore has no ci/freesailarr/test-values.yaml to fall back on. The scan job would go red without ever scanning anything. The file supplies only the values the chart declares required (secret ref, cluster issuer, the three media claims and one ingress host per app, since the chart has no global ingress.domain) and nothing that would alter the security posture the scan is meant to look at.	2026-08-24 13:51:29 +02:00
jklein	7e6b3beed5	rss-bridge: pin the unprivileged-port sysctl, quote env values ... Follow-up to the template-chart hardening fixes in #133, which landed while this branch was open. The env block now quotes names, values and keyRef fields. Without it a value like "5" renders as a YAML number and the API server rejects the whole manifest. RSS-Bridge takes numeric settings that way (RSSBRIDGE_http_timeout), so this was reachable with the first env entry anyone adds. The port-80 question is settled by measurement rather than by the "it works in k3d" reasoning #133 warns about. Same pod spec in k3d (k3s v1.35.5), only ip_unprivileged_port_start changed: 1024, capabilities.drop [ALL] nginx: bind() to 0.0.0.0:80 failed (13: Permission denied) 1024, plus NET_BIND_SERVICE identical failure - for a non-root process the capability lands in the permitted but not the effective set, so it buys nothing 0 binds, HTTP 200 So the chart cannot buy safety with a capability the way samba does, and port 80 is not negotiable either: nginx is configured for it inside the image and the entrypoint's only lever is a sed against a read-only /etc/nginx. What it can do is stop depending on the node default - the pod securityContext now pins the sysctl to 0, so the bind no longer relies on cluster configuration. Verified: the chart-installed pod reports 0 and answers 200 through the Service. Worth recording how that failure looks without probes: the entrypoint backgrounds nginx and then execs php-fpm, so a failed bind leaves a container reporting Running with no web server at all. Both test pods above were Running. The probes on /?action=health are what turn it into a pod that never becomes Ready. trivy config still reports 0 to act on; the KSV-0117 statement is updated to the measured reasoning.	2026-08-23 23:39:49 +02:00
jklein	e016650f91	rss-bridge: qualify the image registry, except the port-80 finding ... Two findings from the Trivy config scan that landed on main in #129. AVD-KSV-0125 is fixed rather than excepted: writing the image as docker.io/rssbridge/rss-bridge puts a real registry in the registry position instead of "rssbridge", which is what ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml asks for. Verified in k3d that the qualified reference resolves to the same digest (sha256:0eca99b2...) and still runs. AVD-KSV-0117 (containerPort below 1024) becomes a scoped, documented exception. nginx listens on 80 inside the image, and the entrypoint's only way to change that is a sed against /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default which a read-only root filesystem rejects - so the alternative to port 80 is giving up readOnlyRootFilesystem. The premise of the check does not hold here anyway: the container binds 80 as uid 33 with all capabilities dropped and no NET_BIND_SERVICE. trivy config now reports 0 to act on for this chart.	2026-08-23 23:33:23 +02:00
jklein	705ee066a4	CI: record the paperless-ngx root init container as a documented exception ... The pod runs rootless as uid/gid 1000; only init-run-ownership is root, to chown the /run emptyDir that s6-overlay requires to be owned by the runtime uid. Justified in paperless-ngx/values.yaml, so AVD-KSV-0105/-0022/-0106 are excepted for that chart with the reason, instead of being reported as if the workload itself ran as root.	2026-08-23 23:14:12 +02:00
jklein	1ae5e1a7c3	CI: report Trivy misconfiguration findings for changed charts ... Adds a trivy-config job to the PR pipeline that renders each changed chart with Helm and runs `trivy config` over the rendered manifests. Reporting only - TRIVY_CONFIG_MODE=report always exits 0, so the job never blocks a PR. Rendered manifests rather than the chart directory: `trivy config <chart-dir>` renders with default values, which fails on every chart here because of their required() values - and Trivy does not fail with it, it logs "Skipping chart" and prints an empty, green report. Values come from the install-test fixtures (ci/<chart>/test-values.yaml), the only committed per-chart values in the repo; none of them touches securityContext, images or capabilities, so the scan sees the chart's own hardening. Charts without fixtures get ci/trivy/values/<chart>.yaml. Exceptions live in ci/trivy/trivyignore.yaml in Trivy's native ignore-file schema, each with a statement - the script refuses to run without one and reports suppressed findings with their reason instead of hiding them. AVD-KSV-0125 is configured instead of excepted: ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml lists the trusted registries, so the check stays able to flag a genuinely foreign source. Refs #84.	2026-08-23 23:14:12 +02:00