4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jklein	e1adcef71f	feat!: NetworkPolicy in nine more charts, on by default ... bulwark, calibre-web-automated, patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault, zipline, sure, homeassistant. One major each. These are the charts with real outbound dependencies, and they all share one limitation that is now written into every one of them: THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Databases, caches and OIDC issuers arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items that the charts never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is blocked, and networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is the escape hatch. That is the upgrade risk of this rollout, stated per chart instead of discovered per release. Four of them differ in ways that mattered: HOMEASSISTANT gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and NO egress section at all, and that is the decision in the file rather than an omission. Its outbound traffic is the union of every integration an operator enables - mDNS and SSDP discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP - which no chart can know. A cap would protect little, since the devices sit on the node's own LAN, and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a flaky device rather than like a policy. So valkey's rule applies in the other direction: policyTypes names only what there is something to restrict. URLAUBSVERWALTUNG allows BOTH 5432 and 3306, deliberately. It is handed a full JDBC URL inside a 1Password item and never parses it, so it cannot tell PostgreSQL from MariaDB - and this cluster runs both. Allowing one would break half the possible deployments on upgrade, with the symptom buried in a Java stack trace. A small widening against a large and silent failure. RALLLY derives its SMTP rule from rallly.smtp.enabled rather than always rendering it: with mail switched off there is nothing to permit, and a rule that permits nothing makes the object look stricter than it is. BULWARK is the chart where the cap can fail most quietly. Its probes test its own port and say nothing about the JMAP server, so a jmapServerUrl on a port the policy does not allow yields a Ready pod serving an empty webmail. 443 is allowed, Stalwart's in-cluster 8080 is not, and both halves of that are in values.yaml and NOTES.txt. PATCHMON and HOMEASSISTANT select their pods by the BARE release-and-chart label, with no -deployment or -sfs suffix. Copying a selector from a neighbouring chart would have matched nothing and left a policy that filters nothing - which is precisely the first assertion of the render test. Five CI fixtures gain networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and they are the only place in the repository where the cap's cost is actually exercised: the CI dex runs on 5556 rather than 443 (patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault) and the CI JMAP server on plain 8080 (bulwark). Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:26:25 +00:00
jklein	33d7cedbab	feat: Gateway-API as an alternative to the Ingress in eight charts ... Group 1 of the #114 sweep: the charts that render exactly one Ingress object and set no behaviour-bearing nginx annotation - bentopdf, garage, patchmon, rallly, searxng, sure, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault. Each gets the form the pilot (cyberchef, PR #115) fixed and template-chart carries: an httpRoute block (enabled/parentRefs/hostnames, off by default), a template rendering ONLY an HTTPRoute with parentRefs - no Gateway, no gatewayClassName, no Certificate, no implementation-specific policy object - render aborts on both modes at once (naming both value paths), on an empty parentRefs and on a missing hostname, empty hostnames meaning [ingress.domain], a schema entry closed against unknown keys with an open parentRef definition, and a NOTES.txt that names the active mode and what the mode costs. Minor, additive, defaults unchanged: `helm template` with each chart's CI values is byte-identical to origin/main for seven of the eight, and for sure identical in every rendered value (the diff is two YAML comment lines). Three findings that were not in the plan, each argued in the file it changes: sure derived RAILS_ASSUME_SSL/RAILS_FORCE_SSL from ingress.enabled alone. Gateway mode sets that false by construction while TLS is still terminated at the Gateway, so both flags would have gone false: insecure cookies, no HSTS, http:// links, with a Ready pod and a working UI as the only symptom. They now read sure.publishedOverTls (ingress.enabled OR httpRoute.enabled), which is ingress.enabled while httpRoute.enabled is false - hence still Minor. garage claimed, in its Ingress template and its schema, that nothing outside that template reads ingress.domain. The HTTPRoute reads it, so the claim now holds only while both modes are off. Corrected rather than left standing. garage also depends on an upload limit it does not set: its annotations comment tells the operator to set proxy-body-size: "0" because ingress-nginx truncates S3 uploads at 1 MB. proxy-body-size has no Gateway-API counterpart, so its Gateway-mode NOTES prints that the limit is the Gateway's. README's list of affected charts named five and now names garage as a sixth. clusterIssuer needed no change in any of the eight: its only required() sits inside the Ingress template behind ingress.enabled, the same no-op the pilot found. Annotation guidance that stops applying in Gateway mode moved into the Gateway branch of NOTES.txt for bentopdf (X-Robots-Tag) and searxng (forward-auth). CI: one render overlay per chart under ci/httproute/, so the assertion is not vacuum-green - ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh goes from 4 held assertions over 2 charts to 20 over 10. The install-test fixtures stay in Ingress mode: the install runs one configuration per chart, cyberchef already pays that price against the real Gateway-API CRDs, and for garage the Ingress is the only place its Service port is referenced by NAME. Not proven, by construction: that traffic flows. No Gateway controller runs in CI. Not run locally either: k3d, Docker, Trivy. Part of #114	2026-10-12 16:06:18 +00:00
jklein	03c9fd6467	Add null-safe hardening, probes and resources to patchmon ... Third change of the same class (#99): an override written without children is YAML null and replaced the whole default sub-tree, rendering "securityContext: null" (unhardened container), a vanished probe or a container without resource accounting - silently, while the workload reports healthy. The defaultedDict helper from #96 is adopted for both workloads, so an empty block means "chart defaults apply" while an explicitly set value still wins, including false and 0. The server probes rebuild their Host header from ingress.domain via the passed-in root context, because the 2.x server rejects requests whose Host is neither loopback nor a CORS_ORIGIN host. The schema types allow null for exactly these blocks, so schema and helper agree instead of the schema rejecting what the helper absorbs. Rendering with normal values is byte-identical to the previous version, with and without the guacd sidecar.	2026-08-23 20:19:08 +02:00
jklein	a7a6d6da7c	Add strict values.schema.json and the ingress gate to patchmon ... Two changes of the same class - values that do not do what they promise: 1. values.schema.json (#68): additionalProperties: false on every chart-owned object level, so a key the chart does not read is rejected at render time instead of being silently ignored. Objects passed verbatim into the pod spec (probes, securityContext, global) stay open. 2. Ingress gate (#93): the Ingress template is wrapped in {{- if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and the key is added to values.yaml with default true, so behaviour is unchanged. Without the gate the value did not exist at all and could not switch the Ingress off. Major bump: a schema can break existing deployments that carry dead keys.	2026-08-23 19:34:41 +02:00