3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jklein	e1adcef71f	feat!: NetworkPolicy in nine more charts, on by default ... bulwark, calibre-web-automated, patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault, zipline, sure, homeassistant. One major each. These are the charts with real outbound dependencies, and they all share one limitation that is now written into every one of them: THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Databases, caches and OIDC issuers arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items that the charts never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is blocked, and networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is the escape hatch. That is the upgrade risk of this rollout, stated per chart instead of discovered per release. Four of them differ in ways that mattered: HOMEASSISTANT gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and NO egress section at all, and that is the decision in the file rather than an omission. Its outbound traffic is the union of every integration an operator enables - mDNS and SSDP discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose, ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP - which no chart can know. A cap would protect little, since the devices sit on the node's own LAN, and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a flaky device rather than like a policy. So valkey's rule applies in the other direction: policyTypes names only what there is something to restrict. URLAUBSVERWALTUNG allows BOTH 5432 and 3306, deliberately. It is handed a full JDBC URL inside a 1Password item and never parses it, so it cannot tell PostgreSQL from MariaDB - and this cluster runs both. Allowing one would break half the possible deployments on upgrade, with the symptom buried in a Java stack trace. A small widening against a large and silent failure. RALLLY derives its SMTP rule from rallly.smtp.enabled rather than always rendering it: with mail switched off there is nothing to permit, and a rule that permits nothing makes the object look stricter than it is. BULWARK is the chart where the cap can fail most quietly. Its probes test its own port and say nothing about the JMAP server, so a jmapServerUrl on a port the policy does not allow yields a Ready pod serving an empty webmail. 443 is allowed, Stalwart's in-cluster 8080 is not, and both halves of that are in values.yaml and NOTES.txt. PATCHMON and HOMEASSISTANT select their pods by the BARE release-and-chart label, with no -deployment or -sfs suffix. Copying a selector from a neighbouring chart would have matched nothing and left a policy that filters nothing - which is precisely the first assertion of the render test. Five CI fixtures gain networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and they are the only place in the repository where the cap's cost is actually exercised: the CI dex runs on 5556 rather than 443 (patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung, voucher-vault) and the CI JMAP server on plain 8080 (bulwark). Part of #5	2026-10-14 14:26:25 +00:00
jklein	9625d8b182	feat(bulwark): Gateway-API as an alternative to the Ingress ... Group 3 of the #114 sweep. One route, one rule, at the root - and THREE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THIS CHART DID NOT SURVIVE CONTACT WITH IT: - #114 says bulwark has TWO Ingress objects. It has ONE. keycloak has two. - #114's measured table lists bulwark under rewrite-target. It has no rewrite-target annotation and CANNOT have one: NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH is compiled into the bundle, so the application cannot be served under a sub-path, and stripping a prefix at the proxy would yield a page that loads and then fetches everything from the wrong place. Every occurrence of the string "rewrite-target" in this chart - values.yaml, the schema, the Ingress template - is an explanation of exactly that. A grep for the string finds the refutations and counts them as occurrences. - ci/run-httproute-match-test.sh said in its header that bulwark was the second rewrite-target chart and would meet the #118 prefix/redirect assurance when group 3 landed. Group 3 landed and it does not: with no URLRewrite on a prefix other than "/", the assurance's precondition is never met here. The header is corrected rather than left standing, and it now says freesailarr is the only chart the pairing applies to. So no redirect rule is added, and none is needed. WHAT THIS MODE DROPS, MEASURED ON THE LIVE OBJECT rather than inferred. On 2026-10-12 the live Ingress on webmail.bekemeyer-klein.de carried nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: 25m supplied by the OPERATOR through ingress.annotations - values.yaml recommends exactly that value and explains why the chart cannot pick it, so the chart sets nothing and a reader of this repository alone would not find it. It is the single annotation this installation depends on, and the Gateway API has no body-size counterpart: implementation policy, not routing. Per decisions 1 and 2 of #114 it is NAMED, not rebuilt - in values.yaml, in the schema and in the Gateway branch of NOTES.txt, in this application's own terms: an attachment above the Gateway's default is rejected before Bulwark sees a byte, the 413 comes from the proxy, and it arrives after the user has written the mail and attached the file. CORRECTED CLAIM, the same one garage and calibre-web-automated needed: the Ingress template, the bulwark.publicUrl helper and the schema all stated that nothing outside the Ingress template FUNCTIONALLY reads ingress.domain. The HTTPRoute reads it, so the claim held only while both modes were off. All three now say so, and the route carries a required() of its own. bulwark.publicUrl follows the ACTIVE mode instead of always printing ingress.domain. The two differ exactly when httpRoute.hostnames is set, which is how a migration off the Ingress runs - and printing the old host there would hand the operator an OIDC redirect URI for the hostname being migrated away from, a failure that surfaces as a rejected login at the identity provider and says nothing about this chart. Minor: additive, defaults unchanged. Empty helm template diff against origin/main with ci/bulwark/test-values.yaml. Part of #114	2026-10-13 08:59:09 +00:00
jklein	b39f36ff5c	feat(bulwark): new chart for Bulwark Webmail (1.0.0+up1.12.0) ... A JMAP webmail client for the stalwart chart (Gitea #65): StatefulSet, one PVC at /app/data, Service plus headless Service, Ingress at a host root, two OnePasswordItems, three probes, computed limits, replicas plus scaleDown, strict values.schema.json. Everything below was measured against the source at tag 1.12.0 rather than read out of the documentation, which was wrong about three of them. THE DEFINING PROPERTY: THE VOLUME BEATS THE CHART, FOR EVERY VALUE, SILENTLY. configManager.get resolves "admin override > env var > default", the admin dashboard may write any key of CONFIG_ENV_MAP, and nothing reports that it just disconnected the chart - so a helm upgrade can succeed and change nothing. Upstream documents this for the server URL only; it is true of everything. Exactly three values escape it (SESSION_SECRET(_FILE), ADMIN_PASSWORD, BULWARK_TELEMETRY). The value that closes it, bulwark.adminConfigReadOnly, defaults to false because its price is threefold: it freezes the settings policy (and with it the only way to move Web Push off the vendor relay), it freezes an override that ALREADY exists instead of removing it, and on a fresh install it stops admin.json from being written at all - so the admin dashboard never comes up and its login answers HTTP 500 while the pod stays Ready. OIDC-only sign-in, with the real way back out of a lockout: not helm upgrade with OAUTH_ONLY=false (oauthOnly goes through the same precedence chain) but removing the override in the admin dashboard. That is why ADMIN_PASSWORD is set - the dashboard is the door. It generates no random password and logs nothing, so the #65 analogy does not apply. SESSION_SECRET_FILE and OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE are both used - the better path garage (#81) and keycloak (#83) did not have - in one projected volume mounted WITHOUT subPath, because both are re-read on every use and a subPath mount is never refreshed, and at mode 0440 because secret files are owned by root and fsGroup only supplies the group. Two backup statements, both at the value: without the session secret the synchronized settings are unreadable out of an intact volume, and if the dashboard's OAuth setup was ever used the client secret sits in config.json on that volume in cleartext. Probes: all three a plain GET on /api/health, with the limit written at the readiness value - it carries process, HTTP acceptance, a free event loop and Next.js routing, and nothing about the reported state or about Stalwart. No ConfigMap, so the checksum/config rule (#82) has nothing to attach to, and values.yaml says so explicitly; the op:// paths are covered by checksum/secret-ref. Renovate: no versioningTemplate, measured rather than assumed. 315 tags in eight shapes (releases, a second v-prefixed family of the same images, an -always flavour, floating minors and names, commit SHAs, betas, attestations) and plain docker versioning excludes all six unwanted ones. Dry runs at 1.12.0, 1.11.0 and 1.10.0 are recorded in the block. Part of #89 - deliberately not "Fixes", because one binding decision of the issue was changed out of necessity and wants ratification rather than an automatic close: the plan specifies HEAD /api/health for all three probes, and a Kubernetes probe cannot send HEAD at all (HTTPGetAction has no method field; the kubelet always issues GET). The alternative, an exec probe, would mean starting a Node process every few seconds in an image that carries no curl and no wget. GET is used instead and is marginally more capable than HEAD, so every limit the issue argues is unchanged - but the decision is the maintainer's to confirm.	2026-10-06 10:15:27 +00:00