One StatefulSet with two containers - the Puma web process and a Sidekiq
worker - sharing one ReadWriteOnce PVC at /rails/storage. That shared
volume is the reason they live in one pod: splitting them would need an
RWX volume. Only the web container migrates, because the image entrypoint
runs db:prepare solely for the './bin/rails server' command; the worker is
started through args: so the entrypoint (and its jemalloc preload) stays
in place and the two can never race.
Probes are chosen for what they prove: liveness and startup use Rails'
/up, which is a boot check and touches no database, while readiness uses
'/', which runs User.count through authenticate_user! in self-hosted mode
and therefore fails while Postgres is unreachable. The worker speaks no
HTTP, so all three of its probes ask sidekiqmon whether this pod still
holds a Sidekiq heartbeat in Redis.
Three OnePasswordItem CRs (app, database, redis), ingress.domain kept
required outside the Ingress because APP_DOMAIN and the WebAuthn relying
party read it, strict values.schema.json, CI fixtures with throwaway
Postgres 16 and Redis, and a Renovate manager on semver so the
-alpha/-rc/-hotfix channel and the moving tags are never selected.
Follow-up to the template-chart hardening fixes in #133, which landed
while this branch was open.
The env block now quotes names, values and keyRef fields. Without it a
value like "5" renders as a YAML number and the API server rejects the
whole manifest. RSS-Bridge takes numeric settings that way
(RSSBRIDGE_http_timeout), so this was reachable with the first env entry
anyone adds.
The port-80 question is settled by measurement rather than by the
"it works in k3d" reasoning #133 warns about. Same pod spec in k3d
(k3s v1.35.5), only ip_unprivileged_port_start changed:
1024, capabilities.drop [ALL] nginx: bind() to 0.0.0.0:80 failed
(13: Permission denied)
1024, plus NET_BIND_SERVICE identical failure - for a non-root
process the capability lands in the
permitted but not the effective
set, so it buys nothing
0 binds, HTTP 200
So the chart cannot buy safety with a capability the way samba does, and
port 80 is not negotiable either: nginx is configured for it inside the
image and the entrypoint's only lever is a sed against a read-only
/etc/nginx. What it can do is stop depending on the node default - the
pod securityContext now pins the sysctl to 0, so the bind no longer
relies on cluster configuration. Verified: the chart-installed pod
reports 0 and answers 200 through the Service.
Worth recording how that failure looks without probes: the entrypoint
backgrounds nginx and then execs php-fpm, so a failed bind leaves a
container reporting Running with no web server at all. Both test pods
above were Running. The probes on /?action=health are what turn it into
a pod that never becomes Ready.
trivy config still reports 0 to act on; the KSV-0117 statement is
updated to the measured reasoning.
Two findings from the Trivy config scan that landed on main in #129.
AVD-KSV-0125 is fixed rather than excepted: writing the image as
docker.io/rssbridge/rss-bridge puts a real registry in the registry
position instead of "rssbridge", which is what ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml
asks for. Verified in k3d that the qualified reference resolves to the
same digest (sha256:0eca99b2...) and still runs.
AVD-KSV-0117 (containerPort below 1024) becomes a scoped, documented
exception. nginx listens on 80 inside the image, and the entrypoint's
only way to change that is a sed against /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default
which a read-only root filesystem rejects - so the alternative to port 80
is giving up readOnlyRootFilesystem. The premise of the check does not
hold here anyway: the container binds 80 as uid 33 with all capabilities
dropped and no NET_BIND_SERVICE.
trivy config now reports 0 to act on for this chart.
The pod runs rootless as uid/gid 1000; only init-run-ownership is root, to
chown the /run emptyDir that s6-overlay requires to be owned by the runtime
uid. Justified in paperless-ngx/values.yaml, so AVD-KSV-0105/-0022/-0106 are
excepted for that chart with the reason, instead of being reported as if the
workload itself ran as root.
Adds a trivy-config job to the PR pipeline that renders each changed chart
with Helm and runs `trivy config` over the rendered manifests. Reporting
only - TRIVY_CONFIG_MODE=report always exits 0, so the job never blocks a PR.
Rendered manifests rather than the chart directory: `trivy config <chart-dir>`
renders with default values, which fails on every chart here because of their
required() values - and Trivy does not fail with it, it logs "Skipping chart"
and prints an empty, green report.
Values come from the install-test fixtures (ci/<chart>/test-values.yaml), the
only committed per-chart values in the repo; none of them touches
securityContext, images or capabilities, so the scan sees the chart's own
hardening. Charts without fixtures get ci/trivy/values/<chart>.yaml.
Exceptions live in ci/trivy/trivyignore.yaml in Trivy's native ignore-file
schema, each with a statement - the script refuses to run without one and
reports suppressed findings with their reason instead of hiding them.
AVD-KSV-0125 is configured instead of excepted: ci/trivy/data/ksv0125.yaml
lists the trusted registries, so the check stays able to flag a genuinely
foreign source.
Refs #84.
jklein