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jklein 813c923070 test(outline): does the install-test enforce policies at all? [EXPERIMENT, reverted next]
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Validate Helm Charts / NetworkPolicy (pull_request) Failing after 10s
Validate Helm Charts / Trivy config cyberchef (pull_request) Successful in 14s
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The first experiment did not settle it. Restricting cyberchef's probe port 8080
to 192.0.2.11/32 - an address that cannot be the k3d node's - left the
install-test GREEN, which has two very different causes: either k3s' policy
controller exempts the kubelet's probe traffic (good news for this convention,
whose default leaves the probe port open anyway), or it enforces nothing at all
(no net under this rollout).

This separates them without touching a probe. Outline's egress rule for DNS is
removed, so the pod cannot resolve "postgres" or "redis" - and all three of
its probes hit /_health, which checks both stores.

Expected: RED, which proves egress is enforced. Green means nothing is enforced
in CI and the scope has to be renegotiated.

Reverted in the next commit either way.

Part of #5
2026-10-14 14:07:26 +00:00
jklein 77b978d669 feat(outline)!: NetworkPolicy, on by default
Major, as every chart in this rollout is.

Inbound 3000 only; outbound DNS plus 5432, 6379 and 443. Those three egress
ports are the STANDARD ones and not the configured ones, which is this chart's
real limitation and is written into values.yaml, the template header and
NOTES.txt rather than left to be discovered: Outline's database, Redis and OIDC
provider all arrive as connection URLs inside 1Password items that the chart
never parses, so it cannot know where they listen and cannot validate a guess.
A dependency on another port is blocked, and because all three probes hit
/_health - which checks Postgres and Redis - the symptom is a pod that never
becomes Ready rather than an error anyone reads. networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts
is the escape hatch.

That same property is what makes this chart the right place for the enforcement
experiment in the next commit.

Also reverts the cyberchef fixture from the first experiment: with the probe
port restricted to an address that is not the node's, the install-test went
GREEN, so the claim that it catches a blocked probe path does not hold as
written. The next commit establishes whether policies are enforced in CI at
all.

Part of #5
2026-10-14 14:07:06 +00:00