apache-tika: seccompProfile RuntimeDefault in the pod context

Sets seccompProfile.type: RuntimeDefault in the pod security context, so
the container runtime's default syscall filter applies to every container
in the pod.

The value lives in the pod context rather than the container context
because it covers init containers and any container added later without
being repeated; a container that needs a different filter can still
override it under securityContext.container, which wins over the pod
value.

Verified in k3d against real extractions rather than a reachable port:
the -full image loads its parsers dynamically, so a blocked syscall would
surface as HTTP 200 with empty text, not as an error. The PDF parser, the
HTML parser and the detector/metadata path all return the expected
content under the filter, and the kernel reports Seccomp: 2 (filter mode)
inside the container.

Major bump: runtime behavior changes.

Refs #84

apache-tika/Chart.yaml

@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@ icon: https://www.apache.org/logos/res/tika/default.png
 
 type: application
 
-version: 9.1.0+up3.3.1.0.full
+version: 10.0.0+up3.3.1.0.full
 appVersion: "3.3.1.0-full"

apache-tika/templates/_helpers.tpl

@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ default probe needs no further context.
 {{- $defaults := dict
       "runAsNonRoot" true
       "runAsUser" 35002
-      "runAsGroup" 35002 -}}
+      "runAsGroup" 35002
+      "seccompProfile" (dict "type" "RuntimeDefault") -}}
 {{- include "apache-tika.defaultedDict" (dict "defaults" $defaults "given" $given "path" "tika.securityContext.pod") -}}
 {{- end -}}
 

apache-tika/values.yaml

@@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ tika:
       runAsNonRoot: true
       runAsUser: 35002
       runAsGroup: 35002
+      # RuntimeDefault applies the container runtime's default seccomp filter,
+      # which blocks the syscalls a normal workload never makes. It sits in the
+      # pod context on purpose: from here it covers every container in the pod
+      # including init containers, while a container-level seccompProfile would
+      # have to be repeated for each one (and silently missed on the next one
+      # added). A container that genuinely needs a different filter can still
+      # override it under securityContext.container, which wins over this value.
+      #
+      # Verified against a real extraction, not just a reachable port: the
+      # -full image loads its parsers dynamically, so a filter that blocked
+      # one would show up as HTTP 200 with empty text rather than as an error.
+      seccompProfile:
+        type: RuntimeDefault
     container:
       allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
       readOnlyRootFilesystem: true