feat!: NetworkPolicy in nine more charts, on by default

bulwark, calibre-web-automated, patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung,
voucher-vault, zipline, sure, homeassistant. One major each.

These are the charts with real outbound dependencies, and they all share one
limitation that is now written into every one of them: THE EGRESS PORTS ARE THE
STANDARD ONES, NOT THE CONFIGURED ONES. Databases, caches and OIDC issuers
arrive as connection URLs or as fields inside 1Password items that the charts
never parse, so a chart cannot know where its dependency listens and cannot
validate a guess. A dependency somewhere else is blocked, and
networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts is the escape hatch. That is the upgrade risk
of this rollout, stated per chart instead of discovered per release.

Four of them differ in ways that mattered:

HOMEASSISTANT gets policyTypes: [Ingress] and NO egress section at all, and
that is the decision in the file rather than an omission. Its outbound traffic
is the union of every integration an operator enables - mDNS and SSDP
discovery, MQTT, a Zigbee or Z-Wave bridge on whatever port its firmware chose,
ESPHome, printers, speakers, inverters, cloud APIs, NTP - which no chart can
know. A cap would protect little, since the devices sit on the node's own LAN,
and would break integrations one at a time, months apart, each looking like a
flaky device rather than like a policy. So valkey's rule applies in the other
direction: policyTypes names only what there is something to restrict.

URLAUBSVERWALTUNG allows BOTH 5432 and 3306, deliberately. It is handed a full
JDBC URL inside a 1Password item and never parses it, so it cannot tell
PostgreSQL from MariaDB - and this cluster runs both. Allowing one would break
half the possible deployments on upgrade, with the symptom buried in a Java
stack trace. A small widening against a large and silent failure.

RALLLY derives its SMTP rule from rallly.smtp.enabled rather than always
rendering it: with mail switched off there is nothing to permit, and a rule
that permits nothing makes the object look stricter than it is.

BULWARK is the chart where the cap can fail most quietly. Its probes test its
own port and say nothing about the JMAP server, so a jmapServerUrl on a port
the policy does not allow yields a Ready pod serving an empty webmail. 443 is
allowed, Stalwart's in-cluster 8080 is not, and both halves of that are in
values.yaml and NOTES.txt.

PATCHMON and HOMEASSISTANT select their pods by the BARE release-and-chart
label, with no -deployment or -sfs suffix. Copying a selector from a
neighbouring chart would have matched nothing and left a policy that filters
nothing - which is precisely the first assertion of the render test.

Five CI fixtures gain networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and they are the only
place in the repository where the cap's cost is actually exercised: the CI dex
runs on 5556 rather than 443 (patchmon, rallly, urlaubsverwaltung,
voucher-vault) and the CI JMAP server on plain 8080 (bulwark).

Part of #5

bulwark/Chart.yaml

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type: application
 # duplicated here. The short version: eight tag shapes, six of them things
 # nobody should pin, and plain `docker` versioning excludes all six - so that
 # block deliberately carries NO versioningTemplate.
-version: 1.1.0+up1.12.0
+version: 2.0.0+up1.12.0
 appVersion: "1.12.0"
 
 maintainers:

bulwark/templates/NOTES.txt

@@ -327,3 +327,56 @@ WHAT THIS CHART DOES NOT RENDER
     platform objects and live in cluster-config; this chart renders an
     HTTPRoute at most, which is the part that looks the same on every Gateway
     implementation.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+
+NETWORKPOLICY IS ACTIVE — WHAT IT CAPS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
+  {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy selects this workload's pods.
+  Inbound: TCP 3000 only. Outbound: DNS and TCP 443 — the JMAP server and the
+  OIDC provider{{ with .Values.networkPolicy.egress }}{{ with .extraPorts }}, plus TCP {{ join ", " . }}{{ end }}{{ end }}.
+
+  CHECK THE JMAP PORT. 443 is where a published JMAP endpoint lives. A
+  bulwark.jmapServerUrl pointing at Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP port (8080), or
+  at anything else, is BLOCKED by this policy — and because Bulwark's probes
+  only test its own port, the pod becomes Ready and then serves an empty,
+  broken webmail with nothing in the events to explain it. Add the real port to
+  networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
+
+  Three limits belong in the same breath, because none of them is visible in
+  the object itself:
+
+  - EGRESS IS BY PORT, NEVER BY DESTINATION. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and
+    selectors and cannot express a hostname, so every egress rule permits its
+    port to ANY address. That is a limit of the object, not a shortcut — this
+    cluster's CNI (Canal: Flannel plus Calico) has no FQDN rule either. An
+    outbound port the chart does not know about is BLOCKED: add it to
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts, and expect to find out through an
+    application-level connection error rather than through this object.
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+  - THE PROBE PATH IS RESTRICTED in this release, because
+    networkPolicy.probeSources is set to
+      {{ join ", " .Values.networkPolicy.probeSources }}
+    Probes come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod. If none of those
+    CIDRs covers the node this pod lands on, the kubelet's probes are dropped
+    and THE POD NEVER BECOMES READY — the rollout then times out and the symptom
+    looks like a broken application. Compare
+
+      kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} describe pod -l app={{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+
+    against `kubectl get node -o wide`.
+{{- else }}
+  - THE PROBED PORT IS OPEN INSIDE THE CLUSTER. networkPolicy.probeSources is
+    empty, so that rule carries no source selector at all and any pod the CNI
+    routes to can reach it. Not from the internet — but this is NOT pod-level
+    isolation. Narrowing it means listing the worker node IPs in
+    networkPolicy.probeSources, because the kubelet probes from the node's own
+    address and the chart cannot know it; a wrong guess there leaves the pod
+    permanently un-Ready.
+{{- end }}
+  - IT IS ONLY A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI ENFORCES POLICIES. Where it does not,
+    this object is accepted and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered. `kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get networkpolicy`
+    shows the object exists; only a connection attempt from an unrelated
+    namespace shows that it bites.
+
+  Switch it off with networkPolicy.enabled: false.
+{{- end }}

bulwark/templates/bulwark.networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+{{- /*
+NetworkPolicy for bulwark (Gitea #5).
+
+Bulwark is a JMAP webmail CLIENT: it holds no mail, has no database, no cache
+and no broker. Everything it shows lives on a Stalwart server reached over
+bulwark.jmapServerUrl, and that single outbound dependency is what shapes the
+egress rules.
+
+AND IT IS THE ONE CHART WHERE THE EGRESS CAP CAN FAIL QUIETLY. Bulwark's probes
+address its own HTTP port and say nothing about whether the JMAP server is
+reachable - so a release whose JMAP URL sits on a port this policy does not
+allow comes up Ready and then shows an empty, broken webmail. 443 is allowed
+because that is where a published JMAP endpoint lives; a URL pointing straight
+at Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP port (8080) is blocked and needs
+networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts. That asymmetry is in values.yaml and NOTES.txt
+because nothing else will report it.
+
+WHAT THIS OBJECT IS: a ceiling on reachability, not an authentication layer.
+Only the ports declared below are reachable at all - whatever else the process
+binds, now or after the next app update, is blocked without anyone having to
+notice it exists.
+
+WHAT IT IS NOT:
+  - EGRESS IS COARSE. A NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and NEVER
+    hostnames, so "only to the database host" cannot be expressed at all. This
+    cluster's CNI is Canal (Flannel plus Calico for policy) and has no FQDN
+    rule; Calico's GlobalNetworkSet could express one but would bind this chart
+    to Calico, the same argument that kept implementation-specific objects out
+    of the Gateway-API sweep (#114). Each egress rule therefore permits its
+    PORT to any destination.
+  - NOT A BOUNDARY WHERE THE CNI DOES NOT ENFORCE ONE. An unenforced policy is
+    accepted by the API server and filters nothing, so everything reads as
+    configured while nothing is filtered.
+  - THE REASONING IS IN TEMPLATE COMMENTS, not in "#" comments: those are part
+    of the rendered object, travel into the cluster and appear in every release
+    diff. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails on a rendered "#".
+
+THE PORT NUMBERS BELOW ARE POD PORTS, NEVER NODEPORTS. A NetworkPolicy is
+evaluated at the pod's network interface, after kube-proxy has already
+translated a NodePort to the targetPort, so a NodePort number here would match
+nothing while looking strict - and, being the only rule for that port, would
+block every inbound connection instead. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh asserts
+every port here against the containerPorts of the pod spec this policy
+selects.
+*/ -}}
+{{- if .Values.networkPolicy.enabled }}
+{{- $np := .Values.networkPolicy }}
+{{- $ns := .Release.Namespace }}
+{{- $probeSources := $np.probeSources | default list }}
+{{- $allowedNs := $np.allowedNamespaces | default list }}
+{{- $ic := $np.ingressController | default dict }}
+{{- $routed := .Values.ingress.enabled }}
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+  labels:
+    app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-networkpolicy
+spec:
+  {{- /*
+  Selects the StatefulSet's pods. ci/run-networkpolicy-test.sh fails if
+  this matches no pod spec of the same render - which is the mistake that
+  would otherwise leave a policy in the namespace filtering nothing, and
+  its usual cause is a label renamed in the workload template.
+  */}}
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-sfs
+  policyTypes:
+    - Ingress
+    {{- /*
+    Egress is listed because there IS something to restrict: this workload
+    needs DNS and the ports named below, and nothing else. A chart whose
+    workload opens no outbound connection of its own must NOT list Egress -
+    valkey is the example - because a rule that constrains nothing makes the
+    object look stricter than it is.
+    */}}
+    - Egress
+  ingress:
+    {{- /*
+    3000 - the only port this pod declares, targeted by both the regular and the
+    headless Service, and the port all three probes address. The probe path.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 3000
+      {{- if $probeSources }}
+      {{- /*
+      RESTRICTED, because the operator supplied probeSources. The kubelet's probes
+      come from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, so that address has to be
+      in the list or the pod never becomes Ready - and a pod that is never Ready
+      reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+
+      The ingress controller is added to the same rule, or the Ingress goes dark the
+      moment this list is filled.
+      */}}
+      from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- /*
+              Set by Kubernetes itself on every namespace (>= 1.21), so this needs no
+              labelling work on a namespace this chart does not own.
+              */}}
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ns }}
+        {{- if and $routed $ic.namespace }}
+        {{- /*
+        ONE from-entry with TWO selectors, which is an AND: pods carrying these labels
+        IN that namespace. Written as two list entries it would be an OR, and would
+        open the port to every pod in kube-system.
+        */}}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ $ic.namespace | quote }}
+          {{- with $ic.podLabels }}
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              {{- toYaml . | nindent 14 }}
+          {{- end }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $allowedNs }}
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+        {{- range $probeSources }}
+        - ipBlock:
+            cidr: {{ . | quote }}
+        {{- end }}
+      {{- else }}
+      {{- /*
+      NO "from" SELECTOR, WHICH MEANS OPEN - deliberately, and only inside the
+      cluster, because this port carries no NodePort. The alternative was to guess
+      the worker node CIDRs, and a wrong guess blocks every kubelet probe: the pod
+      stays un-Ready, the rollout times out, and the cause looks like the
+      application. An empty "from: []" would be worse than either - it allows
+      everything too, but while reading as a restriction. Narrow it with
+      networkPolicy.probeSources.
+      */}}
+      {{- end }}
+  egress:
+    {{- /*
+    DNS, unconditionally. There is no value to switch this off, and that is
+    deliberate: a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup in
+    the pod is a trap and not a feature.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: UDP
+          port: 53
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 53
+    {{- /*
+    Outbound HTTPS. This covers both of Bulwark's outbound dependencies: the JMAP
+    server named by bulwark.jmapServerUrl, and the OAuth/OIDC provider. Ports only
+    - the URLs are hostnames, which this object cannot match. A JMAP server reached
+    on its in-cluster HTTP port instead (Stalwart's 8080) is NOT covered and needs
+    networkPolicy.egress.extraPorts.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: 443
+    {{- with $np.egress }}
+    {{- with .extraPorts }}
+    {{- /*
+    Ports only, to any destination - see the header. This is the operator's
+    escape hatch from the egress cap, and the only alternative to switching
+    the whole policy off.
+    */}}
+    - ports:
+        {{- range . }}
+        - protocol: TCP
+          port: {{ int . }}
+        {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+    {{- end }}
+{{- end }}

bulwark/values.schema.json

@@ -9,6 +9,57 @@
       "description": "Helm's conventional cross-chart values. Unused by this chart, kept open so an umbrella install cannot break on it.",
       "type": "object"
     },
+    "networkPolicy": {
+      "description": "The chart's NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5), on by default. A ceiling on reachability and not an authentication layer: only the declared container ports are reachable at all, egress is capped by PORT (a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors, never hostnames, so a destination host cannot be expressed), and ingress is capped by source for every port no network probe touches. Only a boundary where the cluster's CNI enforces policies - an unenforced policy is accepted by the API server and filters nothing. The template's header carries the full list of what it does not do.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "allowedNamespaces": {
+          "description": "Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's own namespace, which is always allowed. Matched on the kubernetes.io/metadata.name label Kubernetes sets on every namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist matches nothing and is silently ineffective. An entry opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace; for the ingress controller use ingressController instead.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "probeSources": {
+          "description": "Source CIDRs allowed to reach the port the network probes address. EMPTY MEANS OPEN, not blocked: with no entry that rule is rendered without a \"from\" selector. The kubelet's probes come from the IP of the worker node running the pod, an address the chart cannot know and must not guess - a guessed CIDR that excludes the real node blocks every probe and the pod never becomes Ready, which reads as a broken application rather than as a policy. Setting this restricts the rule, which is why the chart adds the own namespace, ingressController and allowedNamespaces to the same rule.",
+          "type": ["array", "null"],
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "ingressController": {
+          "description": "The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources restricts it; rendered only while ingress.enabled or httpRoute.enabled is true. The two keys become ONE \"from\" entry and are therefore an AND - pods carrying podLabels IN namespace - which is the whole point: the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port to every pod in kube-system. The default is measured on this cluster (DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system, which also serves the Gateway API here), not assumed; a policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks strict and silently blocks all web traffic.",
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "namespace": {
+              "type": ["string", "null"]
+            },
+            "podLabels": {
+              "description": "Label set the controller's pods carry, rendered verbatim as a podSelector's matchLabels. Kept open because the chart does not interpret the keys.",
+              "type": ["object", "null"]
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        "egress": {
+          "type": ["object", "null"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "properties": {
+            "extraPorts": {
+              "description": "Additional outbound TCP ports, to ANY destination - ports and not destinations, because a NetworkPolicy cannot express a hostname. DNS is always allowed and has no switch. Without an entry here an outbound port the chart does not already derive is blocked, which is the cap's whole purpose and also its upgrade risk.",
+              "type": ["array", "null"],
+              "items": {
+                "type": "integer"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
     "scaleDown": {
       "description": "true renders the StatefulSet with replicas: 0 and takes precedence over bulwark.replicas. The PVC, Secrets, Service and Ingress stay in place.",
       "type": "boolean"

bulwark/values.yaml

@@ -816,3 +816,85 @@ httpRoute:
   # unregistered origin is rejected at the provider, which says nothing about
   # this chart.
   hostnames: []
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# NetworkPolicy (Gitea #5). On by default. The reference implementation with
+# the full reasoning is template-chart; the convention is in README, "Chart
+# style guidelines", and the operator's view on this chart's wiki page.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+networkPolicy:
+  # WHAT THIS POLICY ALLOWS: inbound 3000 only, and outbound DNS plus TCP 443 -
+  # which covers Bulwark's two outbound dependencies, the JMAP server
+  # (bulwark.jmapServerUrl) and the OIDC provider.
+  #
+  # WHAT IT DOES NOT DO, and this is the one to check before upgrading: 443 is
+  # where a PUBLISHED JMAP endpoint lives. If jmapServerUrl points straight at
+  # Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP port (8080) or anywhere else, that traffic is
+  # BLOCKED - and Bulwark's probes only test its own port, so the pod comes up
+  # Ready and serves a broken, empty webmail with nothing in the events to say
+  # why. Put the real port in egress.extraPorts below.
+  #
+  # Inbound 3000 is not restricted by source in the default (probe port), and a
+  # policy is only a boundary where the CNI enforces one.
+  enabled: true
+  # Namespaces whose pods may reach this workload, in addition to the release's
+  # own namespace, which is always allowed. Empty means: own namespace only.
+  #
+  # Matched on the "kubernetes.io/metadata.name" label Kubernetes sets on every
+  # namespace itself, so no labelling work is needed on a namespace this chart
+  # does not own - and no typo protection either: a name that does not exist
+  # matches nothing and is silently ineffective. Note the granularity: an entry
+  # opens the port to EVERY pod in that namespace.
+  allowedNamespaces: []
+  # Source CIDRs allowed to reach port 3000, which is the port all three probes address.
+  #
+  # EMPTY MEANS OPEN, NOT BLOCKED. With no entry that rule is rendered WITHOUT a
+  # "from" selector, so the port is reachable from anywhere the CNI routes to -
+  # inside the cluster, since it carries no NodePort.
+  #
+  # That is the deliberate choice between two bad defaults. The kubelet's probes
+  # originate from the IP of the WORKER NODE running the pod, an address this
+  # chart cannot know and must not guess: a CIDR that excludes the real node
+  # blocks every probe, the pod never becomes Ready, the rollout times out, and
+  # the symptom reads as a broken application rather than as a policy.
+  #
+  # Narrow it by listing the worker node IPs (e.g. ["10.0.1.11/32"]) - and mind
+  # the companion trap: once this list is non-empty the rule IS restricted, so
+  # everything else that needs the port has to be in it. The chart adds the own
+  # namespace, the ingressController below and allowedNamespaces to the same rule for exactly that reason.
+  probeSources: []
+  # The ingress controller allowed to reach the routed port once probeSources
+  # restricts it. Rendered only while ingress.enabled is true, and only in
+  # the restricted branch - with the default (open) rule the controller reaches
+  # the port anyway. The two keys become ONE "from" entry and are therefore an
+  # AND: pods carrying podLabels IN namespace. That is the point of having them
+  # at all - the controller's namespace in allowedNamespaces would open the port
+  # to every pod in kube-system.
+  #
+  # MEASURED ON THIS CLUSTER, NOT ASSUMED (2026-10-14): ingress-nginx is gone,
+  # the only IngressClass is "traefik" and it is the default, and the controller
+  # is the DaemonSet rke2-traefik in kube-system. The same Traefik serves the
+  # Gateway API here, so this one source covers the Ingress and the HTTPRoute
+  # path alike. A policy written against the wrong controller is accepted, looks
+  # strict, and silently blocks all web traffic - and ingress.className says
+  # nothing about it, because a class names an implementation, not the pods the
+  # traffic comes from.
+  ingressController:
+    namespace: kube-system
+    podLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: rke2-traefik
+  egress:
+    # Additional outbound TCP ports. DNS (UDP and TCP 53) is always allowed and
+    # has no switch - a knob whose only other setting breaks every name lookup
+    # in the pod is a trap, not a feature.
+    #
+    # PORTS, NOT DESTINATIONS, and that is a limit of the object rather than
+    # laziness: a NetworkPolicy matches CIDRs and selectors and never hostnames,
+    # so "only to the database host" cannot be written at all. Each entry
+    # permits its port to ANY destination. What the cap still buys is real: a
+    # compromised pod cannot open arbitrary outbound connections.
+    #
+    # 8080 is the entry this chart needs most often: a jmapServerUrl pointing at
+    # Stalwart's in-cluster HTTP Service rather than at its published HTTPS
+    # name.
+    extraPorts: []