feat(valkey): one Valkey instance per application (1.0.0+up9.1.2.alpine)
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A new chart for a single Valkey instance per application, replacing the
shared cluster-redis whose separation rests on one ACL file in one
1Password field - a construction in which every change touches six
applications and which cost a month of Paperless standstill.

Shape: StatefulSet with one replica, ClusterIP Service, no cluster mode,
no Ingress and no value to add one.

The password arrives as a finished configuration line ("requirepass
<secret>") in the 1Password field auth-conf, is mounted as a file and
included by the main configuration - never in argv, never in the
environment. The include is rendered last, so nothing in extraConfig can
override it. Because a misspelled or empty field would leave an open
server that looks perfectly healthy, an init container greps the mounted
file for the line and refuses to start the pod without it; it never
prints the file.

maxmemory is derived from the computed memory limit (maxmemoryFactor,
default 0.75) and a configured value above that limit aborts the render:
otherwise the kubelet's OOM kill decides what the eviction policy was
configured to decide. Persistence and eviction are documented as pairs -
queue (PVC + noeviction, the default) and cache (emptyDir +
allkeys-lru) - and the combination "no persistence + noeviction" carries
a warning in values.yaml and in NOTES.txt.

Probes: valkey-cli ping as an exec probe, authenticated through
VALKEYCLI_AUTH read out of the mounted file, with "-e" and an assertion
on the answer PONG. Without -e valkey-cli exits 0 on an error reply
(valkey 9.1.2, src/valkey-cli.c: the config.set_errcode branch in
cliReadReply), which would make the probe unable to fail.

Hardening: uid 999 / gid 1000 - the image's own valkey user - with
fsGroup matching, runAsNonRoot, readOnlyRootFilesystem, all capabilities
dropped and seccompProfile RuntimeDefault in the pod context so the init
container is covered too. /data is the only writable path.

NetworkPolicy on by default (first chart in this repo with one), with a
switch and a list of additional namespaces; values.yaml names that it is
only a boundary where the CNI enforces policies.

Wiring: publish-valkey.yml, the chart-name choice list, ci/valkey
fixtures for the persistent variant, a plain docker-versioning Renovate
block, README chart row.
This commit was merged in pull request #53.
This commit is contained in:
jklein committed 2026-09-27 11:24:55 +00:00
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@@ -109,6 +109,19 @@ misconfigurations:
paths: ["**/homeassistant.yaml"]
statement: "NET_RAW is the capability in question and is added on purpose for device discovery; see AVD-KSV-0022."
# --- valkey: the two keyword findings on its ConfigMap ---------------------
# Both are keyword matches on the COMMENTS and the shell script in the
# ConfigMap, not on data. Worth suppressing with a reason rather than leaving
# standing, because "ConfigMap stores secrets" on this chart of all charts
# says the opposite of what it does: the whole design exists to keep the
# password out of everything Helm renders.
- id: AVD-KSV-0109
paths: ["**/valkey.yaml"]
statement: "False positive on the rendered ConfigMap. The matched strings are the comment '# Nothing here prints the password' and the line pass=\"$(sed -n 's/^requirepass...' \"$AUTH_FILE\")\" of the probe script - i.e. the code that READS the password out of the mounted Secret file at probe time. The ConfigMap contains no credential: the password lives only in the 1Password item, is materialized into a Secret by the operator, mounted as a file and 'include'd by the configuration, which is precisely why no requirepass line is rendered here. Verify by rendering the chart - no value from the vault appears in it."
- id: AVD-KSV-01010
paths: ["**/valkey.yaml"]
statement: "Same class as AVD-KSV-0109 above: the matched keys are 'valkey.conf' and an 'echo \"valkey...' line of the validation script. Both are chart-authored configuration and diagnostics text; nothing user- or credential-derived is stored in this ConfigMap."
# --- rss-bridge: port 80 is fixed by the image ----------------------------
- id: AVD-KSV-0117
paths: ["**/rss-bridge.yaml"]