ytdlp-web-player: new chart with an optional oauth2-proxy subchart (1.0.0+upv1.2.0)

Deploys matszwe02/ytdlp_web_player, a Flask app that fetches videos with
yt-dlp, transcodes them with ffmpeg and serves them as HLS. It ships no
authentication of any kind, so the chart carries a preconfigured oauth2-proxy
as an optional subchart, in the data path in front of the app.

This is the first chart in the repo with a dependency, so the rule "charts
have no dependencies" falls here. It is replaced in CLAUDE.md and README.md by
a bar: a dependency has to be optional and off by default, upstream's chart is
consumed as it comes (documented where it falls short of our conventions,
never patched), and the price is written down - above all that a subchart is
invisible to everything downstream watching Helm release versions, so a new
proxy release only reaches a cluster when this chart is republished.

CI learns the dependency in five places, not the three the plan expected:
helm lint, package, template and install all exit 1 while charts/ is unfilled,
so ci/helm-dependencies.sh runs before lint and package in validate-charts.yml,
before package in publish-helm-chart.yml, and inside run-install-test.sh,
run-trivy-config.sh and run-quantity-render-test.sh - the last of which renders
every chart on every PR and would have gone red first.

Notable chart decisions, each measured rather than assumed:

- The image has no USER and runs as root by default, but not by necessity: it
  runs under an arbitrary uid with readOnlyRootFilesystem and the full
  hardening baseline. Only the pinned uid is a deviation, and it is documented.
- Two emptyDirs, each justified separately. /data holds the video cache
  (DATA_PATH). /tmp is NOT mounted - measured across metadata extraction, HLS
  transcoding, sprite generation and audio extraction, the image never writes
  there. What it does write is $HOME/.cache, so /cache is mounted with HOME and
  XDG_CACHE_HOME pointed at it; without it yt-dlp re-downloads its JavaScript
  challenge-solver from github.com on every extraction.
- The proxy is wired through config.configFile, the only value the subchart
  passes through tpl - config.upstreams is emitted with toJson and would carry
  a literal {{ .Release.Name }} into the manifest.
- Rendering aborts when this chart's Ingress and the proxy's claim the same
  host: ingress-nginx rejects the second one and a Fleet bundle then sits in
  ErrApplied until forceSyncGeneration is bumped.

Fixes #214
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jklein committed 2026-08-30 17:34:49 +02:00
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{{- $replicas := include "ytdlp-web-player.replicas" (dict "scaleDown" .Values.scaleDown "replicas" .Values.ytdlpWebPlayer.replicas) -}}
{{- $res := fromYaml (include "ytdlp-web-player.effectiveResources" .Values.ytdlpWebPlayer.resources) -}}
{{- $eph := index ($res.limits | default dict) "ephemeral-storage" | default "the computed ephemeral-storage limit" -}}
{{- $startup := fromYaml (include "ytdlp-web-player.startupProbe" .Values.ytdlpWebPlayer.startupProbe) -}}
{{- $proxy := (index .Values "oauth2-proxy") | default dict -}}
{{- $proxyIngress := $proxy.ingress | default dict -}}
{{- $proxyHost := first ($proxyIngress.hosts | default list) -}}
{{- $env := dict -}}
{{- range $entry := .Values.ytdlpWebPlayer.env }}
{{- if not (kindIs "invalid" $entry.value) }}{{- $_ := set $env $entry.name $entry.value }}{{- end }}
{{- end }}
ytdlp_web_player {{ .Chart.AppVersion }} — release {{ .Release.Name }} in namespace {{ .Release.Namespace }}.
{{- if $proxy.enabled }} With the oauth2-proxy subchart enabled.{{ end }}
{{- if and $proxy.enabled $proxyIngress.enabled }}
ACCESS — THROUGH THE PROXY
https://{{ $proxyHost | default "<oauth2-proxy.ingress.hosts is empty>" }}
The Ingress belongs to the proxy, the proxy forwards to
{{ include "ytdlp-web-player.appServiceAddress" . }}, and that Service is the only
way into the application. Certificate and TLS secret are the subchart's too —
this chart's ingress.clusterIssuer does not reach it; set the cert-manager
annotation under oauth2-proxy.ingress.annotations.
{{- else if .Values.ingress.enabled }}
ACCESS
https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}
The certificate is requested by cert-manager through the "{{ .Values.ingress.clusterIssuer }}"
cluster issuer. Until it has been issued the browser shows a warning; follow it with
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} get certificate tls-{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-ingress
{{- else }}
ACCESS — NO INGRESS
ingress.enabled is false, so this release has no Ingress and no certificate.
Both ingress.domain and ingress.clusterIssuer are unnecessary here — unlike
in some other charts in this repo, nothing outside the Ingress template reads
the domain: this application builds no absolute URLs and has no base-URL
setting. Reach it inside the cluster:
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} port-forward svc/{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-service 8080:80
Then open http://localhost:8080.
{{- end }}
{{ if eq $replicas "0" }}
SCALED TO ZERO
{{ if .Values.scaleDown }}scaleDown: true{{ else }}ytdlpWebPlayer.replicas: 0{{ end }} — the Deployment runs with replicas: 0, so nothing answers
until you set it back and upgrade again. Service{{ if .Values.ingress.enabled }} and Ingress stay in place,
so the certificate is not re-issued.{{ else }} stays in place.{{ end }} Nothing is lost that was not
going to be lost anyway: the video cache is an emptyDir (see below).
{{- if $proxy.enabled }}
Note that scaleDown does NOT reach the subchart — the proxy keeps running and
will answer with a gateway error. Set oauth2-proxy.replicaCount: 0 as well.
{{- end }}
{{ end }}
{{- if and .Values.ingress.enabled (not $proxy.enabled) }}
THIS RELEASE IS OPEN TO EVERYONE WHO KNOWS THE URL
The application has NO authentication of any kind, and this chart adds none
while oauth2-proxy.enabled is false. What an anonymous visitor can do here is
not "read a page": they can make this pod fetch and transcode arbitrary
videos from the internet — your egress, your CPU, your IP address in the
logs of whatever site is being pulled from, and your ephemeral storage.
Assume it is found. Hosts get scanned, and certificate transparency logs
publish every name cert-manager requests, so "nobody knows the URL" has a
half-life of hours.
The intended fix is in this chart:
oauth2-proxy:
enabled: true
ingress:
enabled: true
hosts: ["{{ .Values.ingress.domain }}"]
ingress:
enabled: false # the proxy owns the host from then on
Anything else in front of it — an ingress-nginx auth annotation, a network
policy, a VPN-only ingress class — has to come from ingress.annotations or
from outside this chart.
{{- end }}
{{- if and $proxy.enabled .Values.ingress.enabled }}
WARNING — THE APP'S OWN INGRESS IS A WAY PAST THE PROXY
Both oauth2-proxy.enabled and ingress.enabled are true. The chart only
refuses this when both claim the SAME host; here they do not, so it renders —
but https://{{ .Values.ingress.domain }} reaches the application directly, with no
authentication in front of it, whatever the proxy does on its own host.
Unless that is deliberate, set ingress.enabled=false.
{{- end }}
{{- if $proxy.enabled }}
THE PROXY IS A SUBCHART, AND THAT HAS TWO CONSEQUENCES
1. Its version comes from THIS chart's Chart.yaml (oauth2-proxy {{ (first .Chart.Dependencies).Version | default "" }}) and is
baked into the packaged chart. Nothing that watches Helm release versions
can see it, so a new proxy release — a security fix included — arrives
only when a new ytdlp-web-player version is released. There is no second
place that would notice; do not wait for one.
2. Its templates are upstream's. It does not follow this repo's hardening,
probe and resource conventions, and we deliberately do not patch it. Give
it values (oauth2-proxy.resources, .securityContext, …) if you want that
shape.
SECRETS — WHAT THE 1PASSWORD ITEM MUST CARRY
{{ if .Values.secrets.oauth2ProxySecretRef }}{{ .Values.secrets.oauth2ProxySecretRef }}{{ else }}(secrets.oauth2ProxySecretRef is not set){{ end }}
→ Secret {{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-oauth2-proxy-secret
client-id the OIDC client id
client-secret its secret
cookie-secret 16, 24 or 32 bytes, URL-SAFE base64
The operator copies the item's FIELD NAMES into the Secret's keys, so those
three spellings are exact. A field named differently does not fail this
install — the Secret is written without that key and the proxy pod sits in
CreateContainerConfigError, which looks like a broken chart.
Generate the cookie secret as
openssl rand -base64 32 | tr '+/' '-_'
The tr is not cosmetic: oauth2-proxy decodes the value as URL-safe base64
first, so a standard-base64 value containing + or / fails to decode and the
pod exits with "cookie_secret must be 16, 24, or 32 bytes".
Repointing secrets.oauth2ProxySecretRef at a different item does NOT restart
the proxy — the subchart's pod template is unchanged by it, and Helm never
sees a Secret's content anyway:
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} rollout restart deployment/{{ .Release.Name }}-oauth2-proxy
THE PROVIDER IS THE ONLY GATE, AND IT IS WIDER THAN IT LOOKS
The proxy is configured with email_domains = ["*"], so it admits every
identity the provider hands it. Which people that is, is decided ENTIRELY by
the group or policy binding on the provider application — and this app has no
second login behind the proxy, unlike the other instances in the cluster. A
forgotten or too-wide binding therefore does not mean "one more user", it
means every account the provider knows. Check that binding when you set this
up, not later.
Two settings in the default configFile are load-bearing; do not remove them
while trimming:
reverse_proxy = true else every redirect is built on http://
behind the TLS ingress — a loop
session_cookie_minimal = true else id_token and access_token go into the
session cookie, a longer group list pushes
it past 4kB, and the browser drops it: the
symptom is HTTP 502 AFTER a successful
login, with [AuthSuccess] in the log
Its companion belongs on the proxy's Ingress:
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-buffer-size: "16k"
And leave alphaConfig.enabled false. With it on, the subchart generates a
config WITHOUT upstreams and ignores config.configFile silently — the login
succeeds and the app answers 404.
NOT MEASURED: HLS PLAYBACK THROUGH THE PROXY
Rendering and wiring are verified; a long HLS stream through proxy and
ingress is not. Three places to look first if playback stalls where a direct
ingress works: proxy-buffering in ingress-nginx, its 60-second
proxy-read/send timeouts, and the proxy's own upstream timeout. Browser
extension and PWA are unverified too — an expired session answers with a
redirect to the provider, not a 401, and a fetch() sees only an opaque
redirect.
{{- end }}
A READY POD DOES NOT MEAN A VIDEO WILL PLAY
All three probes request "/", which renders the player page and touches
neither the network nor ffmpeg. That is on purpose — it is the only cheap
path the app has, and it keeps a slow upstream site from restarting the pod.
The price is that egress problems are invisible to Kubernetes: with DNS
broken or outbound traffic blocked, "/" still answers 200, the rollout goes
green, and every playback fails. Check it from the outside instead:
kubectl -n {{ .Release.Namespace }} logs deployment/{{ .Release.Name }}-{{ .Chart.Name }}-deployment
A failing fetch shows up there as a yt-dlp error line, never as a probe
failure. The startup budget is {{ $startup.periodSeconds }}s x {{ $startup.failureThreshold }} = {{ mul $startup.periodSeconds $startup.failureThreshold }}s, which only has to
cover the first process start.
THE VIDEO CACHE IS AN emptyDir — AND IT IS AN EVICTION RISK, NOT A DISK
DATA_PATH is /data, backed by an emptyDir. Two things follow:
Nothing survives. A restart, a node drain, an eviction or a helm upgrade
empties it, and every cached video is fetched again on demand. That is the
intended shape — the app expires files by itself after MAX_VIDEO_AGE — but do
not treat it as storage.
An emptyDir counts against the container's ephemeral-storage limit
({{ $eph }}){{ if (.Values.storage).dataSizeLimit }}, and storage.dataSizeLimit ({{ (.Values.storage).dataSizeLimit }}) caps it a second time{{ end }}. Going over it is not an
application error: the kubelet evicts the whole pod, the reason sits on the
pod rather than in any log, and everything in flight goes with it. Raising
the limit is the wrong first move — the knobs that decide how much lands
there are in ytdlpWebPlayer.env:
MAX_VIDEO_DURATION upstream default 36000 (ten hours, one enormous file)
MAX_VIDEO_AGE upstream default 3600 (seconds after last access)
MAX_PROCESSES upstream default 5 (concurrent ffmpeg/yt-dlp)
Currently set here: {{ if $env }}{{ range $k, $v := $env }}{{ $k }}={{ $v }} {{ end }}{{ else }}none — all upstream defaults apply{{ end }}
yt-dlp DOES NOT UPDATE ITSELF IN THIS CHART
On start and periodically the app runs "pip install --upgrade yt-dlp" into
its own site-packages. With readOnlyRootFilesystem: true that write cannot
happen; the app catches the failure and carries on with the version baked
into the image (verified — the container starts, serves and transcodes
normally, the update attempt just does nothing).
This is the right trade in a cluster — a pod that pulls unpinned code off the
network on every restart is not something to want — but know the
consequence: when a video site changes its extraction and playback breaks,
waiting does not fix it. The fix arrives as a new app image, i.e. a new
appVersion of this chart. There is no in-place update path.
The tools' CACHE is a separate matter and is writable on purpose: /cache is
an emptyDir, with HOME and XDG_CACHE_HOME pointed at it, holding deno's
module cache and yt-dlp's JavaScript challenge-solver library. Without it
the pod still works, but re-fetches that library from github.com on every
extraction — so if egress is restricted, github.com belongs on the allow
list either way, and doubly so if this volume is ever removed.
ytdlpWebPlayer.env IS APPENDED, NOT MERGED
The entries land after DATA_PATH and PORT, which the chart sets itself. Do
not set those two here: Kubernetes applies the LAST entry of the list, so a
duplicate silently wins and points the app away from its writable volume or
off the port that the Service and all three probes use. Everything else the
upstream understands is fair game; src/example.env in the upstream repository
is the authoritative list.
{{- if gt (atoi $replicas) 1 }}
MORE THAN ONE REPLICA SHARES NOTHING
ytdlpWebPlayer.replicas is {{ $replicas }}. Each pod has its own /data emptyDir, so a
video fetched by one is invisible to the other, and without session affinity
the segment requests of a single playback are spread across both — which
looks like a stuttering or failing stream rather than an error. Pin clients
to a pod at the ingress, or stay at one replica.
{{- end }}
WHAT THIS CHART DELIBERATELY DOES NOT DO
No cookies.txt: videos that require a login on the source site do not work,
and there is no value to make them work. No PersistentVolume. No mirror of
the upstream's twenty environment switches as chart values — they live in
ytdlpWebPlayer.env, so an upstream release cannot make this chart lie.